Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science
Although both philosophers and scientists are interested in how to obtain reliable knowledge in the face of error, there is a gap between their perspectives that has been an obstacle to progress. By means of a series of exchanges between the editors and leaders from philosophy of science, statistics, and economics, this volume offers a cumulative introduction connecting problems of traditional philosophy of science to problems of inference in statistical and empirical modeling practice. Philosophers of science and scientific practitioners are challenged to reevaluate the assumptions of their own theories - philosophical or methodological. Practitioners may better appreciate the foundational issues around which their questions revolve and thereby become better "applied philosophers." Conversely, new avenues emerge for finally solving recalcitrant philosophical problems of induction, explanation, and theory testing.
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Introduction and Background
The ErrorStatistical Philosophy
Learning from Error Severe Testing and the Growth
Can Scientiﬁc Theories Be Warranted with Severity?
Revisiting Critical Rationalism
Exchanges with Alan Musgrave
Theory Conﬁrmation and Novel Evidence
New Perspectives on Some Old Problems
Objectivity and Conditionality in Frequentist Inference
An Error in the Argument from Conditionality
On a New Philosophy of Frequentist Inference
Causal Modeling Explanation and Severe Testing
Explanation and Testing Exchanges with Clark Glymour
Graphical Causal Modeling and Error Statistics
Error and LegalEpistemology
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Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability ...
Deborah G. Mayo,Aris Spanos
Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2009
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