Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of ScienceDeborah G. Mayo, Aris Spanos Cambridge University Press, 2011 - 419 sidor Introduction and background / Deborah G. Mayo and Aris Spanos -- 1. Learning from error, severe testing, and the growth of theoretical knowledge / Deborah G. Mayo -- 2. The life of theory in the new experimentalism : can scientific theories be warranted? / Alan Chalmers -- Can scientific theories be warranted with severity? : exchanges with Alan Chalmers / Deborah G. Mayo -- 3. Revisiting critical rationalism -- Critical rationalism, explanation, and severe tests / Alan Musgrave -- Toward progressive critical rationalism : exchanges with Alan Musgrave / Deborah G. Mayo -- 4. Theory confirmation and novel evidence -- Error, tests, and theory confirmation / John Worrall -- Ad hoc save of a theory of adhocness? : exchanges with John Worrall / Deborah G. Mayo -- 5. Induction and severe testing -- Mill's sins or Mayo's errors? / Peter Achinstein -- Sins of the epistemic probabilist : exchanges with Peter Achinstein / Deborah G. Mayo -- 6. Theory testing in economics and the error-statistical perspective / Aris Spanos -- 7. New perspectives on (some old) problems of frequentist statistics -- Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference / Deborah G. Mayo and David Cox -- Objectivity and conditionality in frequentist inference / David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo -- An error in the argument from conditionality and sufficiency to the likelihood principle / Deborah G. Mayo -- On a new philosophy of frequentist inference : exchanges with David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo / Aris Spanos -- 8. Causal modeling, explanation and severe testing -- Explanation and truth / Clark Glymour -- Explanation and testing exchanges with Clark Glymour / Deborah G. Mayo -- Graphical causal modeling and error statistics : exchanges with Clark Glymour / Aris Spanos -- 9. Error and legal epistemology -- Anomaly of affirmative defenses / Larry Laudan -- Error and the law : exchanges with Larry Laudan / Deborah G. Mayo. |
Innehåll
Introduction and Background | 1 |
The ErrorStatistical Philosophy | 15 |
Learning from Error Severe Testing and the Growth | 28 |
TheLifeofTheoryintheNewExperimentalism | 58 |
Can Scientific Theories Be Warranted with Severity? | 73 |
Revisiting Critical Rationalism | 88 |
Exchanges with Alan Musgrave | 113 |
Theory Confirmation and Novel Evidence | 125 |
New Perspectives on Some Old Problems | 247 |
Objectivity and Conditionality in Frequentist Inference | 276 |
An Error in the Argument from Conditionality | 305 |
On a New Philosophy of Frequentist Inference | 315 |
Causal Modeling Explanation and Severe Testing | 331 |
Explanation and Testing Exchanges with Clark Glymour | 351 |
Graphical Causal Modeling and Error Statistics | 364 |
Error and LegalEpistemology | 376 |
An Ad Hoc Save of a Theory of Adhocness? | 155 |
Induction and Severe Testing | 170 |
Sins of the Epistemic Probabilist | 189 |
Theory Testing in Economics and the ErrorStatistical | 202 |
Exchanges with Larry Laudan | 397 |
411 | |
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Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability ... Deborah G. Mayo,Aris Spanos Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2009 |
Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability ... Deborah G. Mayo,Aris Spanos Ingen förhandsgranskning - 2009 |
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