the decision was not determined by a con- 14. ADMIRALTY excise. Downs v. United States, 187 U. S. 496, 23 Sup. Ct. 222, 47 L. Ed. 275, is a like example, and direct and indirect bounties are illustrated. As an instance of the former the amount paid upon the production of sugar under the act of Congress of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. 617, c. 1244) is adduced, and also the "draw back" (the word of the statute is used) upon Under Const. art. 3, § 2, extending judicial power of United States to all cases of admiralty jurisdiction, and legislation enacted to carry it into execution (Act Sept. 24, 1789, с. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77; Rev. St. § 563 (8); Judicial Code § 24 (3) [Comp. St. § 991]), entire contract, contemplating performance of service and furnishing of necessary materials for repairs of steamship to make her fit for Alaskan voyage, held within maritime jurisdiction, so that libel in personam against owner would lie, though repairs in which libelant was to furnish work and materials, and use of marine railway and oth er equipment, would have been under superintendence of owner. certain articles exported; as instances of the latter, that is, of indirect bounties, the remission of taxes upon the exportation of articles which are subject to a tax when sold Appeal from the District Court of the Unitor consumed in the country of their produc-ed States for the Northern District of Cali tion is given, and, as another example, the fornia. laws permitting distillers of spirits to ex- We consider further discussion unnecessary (249 U. S. 119) NORTH PAC. S. S. CO. v. HALL BROS. (Argued and Submitted Nov. 18 and 19, 1918. Decided March 3, 1919.) No. 53. 1. ADMIRALTY1018-JURISDICTION TORT AND CONTRACT. While civil jurisdiction of admiralty in matters of tort depends upon locality, whether the act was committed upon navigable waters; in matters of contract it depends upon the subject-matter, the nature and character of the contract. 2. ADMIRALTY 27-JURISDICTION-IMPLIED HYPOTHECATION. Neither in jurisdiction nor in method of procedure are the admiralty courts of the United States dependent alone upon the theory of implied hypothecation; it being established that in a civil cause of maritime origin, involving personal responsibility, libelant may proceed in personam, if respondent is within reach of process. 3. ADMIRALTY11-"MARITIME CONTRACT" Libel by the Hall Bros. Marine Railway & Shipbuilding Company against the North Pacific Steamship Company, which filed answer and cross-libel, resulting in decree for the Shipbuilding Company and dismissal of the cross-libel; the Steamship Company filing motion to arrest and vacate the decree and to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction, which motion was denied, and the Steamship Company appeals. Decree affirmed. Messrs. Jackson H. Ralston and William E. Richardson, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant. Messrs. Warren Gregory, Allen L. Chickering, and George H. Whipple, all of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee. *Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a direct appeal under section 238, Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, 1157, c. 231 [Comp. St. § 1215]), involving only the question whether the cause was within the admiralty jurisdiction of a Dis trict Court of the United States. Both parties are corporations of the state of California. Appellee, which for convenience may be referred to as the "Shipbuilding Company," filed its libel in personam against appellant, which we may call the "Steamship Company," to recover a balance claimed to be due for certain work and labor done, services rendered, and materials furnished in and about the repairing of the steamship Yucatan. The Steamship Com -CONTRACT TO BUILD SHIP OR FURNISH pany filed an answer denying material aver MATERIAL. Contract for building ship or supplying materials for her construction is not a "maritime contract." [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Maritime Contract.] ments of the libel, and a cross-libel setting up a claim for damages for delay in the making of the repairs. The cause having been heard upon the pleadings and proofs, there was a decree for a recovery in favor of the Shipbuilding Company and a dismissal of the cross-libel. After this the Steamship Com For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 122 *124 *123 pany filed a motion to arrest and vacate the each working day thereafter, another rate; decree and to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction. The motion was submitted to the court upon the pleadings, the proofs taken upon the hearings of the merits, and some slight additional proof. It was denied, and the present appeal followed. The facts were these: In the month of May, 1911, the Steamship Company was the owner of the American steamer Yucatan, which then lay moored or tied up at *dock upon the waters of Puget Sound at Seattle, in the state of Washington. The vessel, which was of steel construction, was in need of extensive repairs. She had been wrecked, and had remained submerged for a long time; ice floes had torn away the upper decks, and some of her bottom plates also needed to be replaced. She was under charter for an Alaskan voyage, to be commenced as soon as the repairs could be completed. The Shipbuilding Company was the owner of a shipyard, marine railway, machine shops, and other equipment for building and repairing ships, situate upon and adjacent to the navigable waters of Puget Sound at Winslow, in the same state, and had in its employ numerous mechanics and laborers. Under these circumstances it was agreed between the parties that the Shipbuilding Company should tow the vessel from where she lay to the shipyard, haul her out as required upon the marine railway to a position on dry land adjacent to the machine shop-the place being known as the "dry dock," and the hauling out being described as "docking"-and should furnish mechanics, laborers, and foremen as needed, who were to work with other men already in the employ of the Steamship Company, and under its superintendence; and the Shipbuilding Company was also to furnish plates and other materials needed in the repairs, and the use of air compressors, steam hammers, riveters, boring machines, lathes, blacksmith forge, and the usual and necessary tools for the use of such machines. At the time the contract was made, another vessel (the Archer) was upon the dry dock, and it was uncertain how soon she could be returned to the water. It was understood that the Yucatan should be hauled out as soon as the Archer came off, should remain upon the dry dock only during such part of the work as required her to be in that position, and at other times should lie in the water alongside the plant. For the services to be performed and the materials and equipment *to be furnished, the Shipbuilding Company was to receive stated prices, thus: For labor of all classes, the actual rate of wages paid to the men plus 15 per cent.; for use of tug and scow, a stated sum per hour; for hauling out the vessel and the use of the marine railway, a stated sum for the first 24 hours, and a specified rate per day for 6 "lay days" immediately following the hauling out; for for vessel lying alongside the dock for repairs, no charge; for the running of air compressors, a certain charge per hour; for the use and operation of other machines, certain rates specified; and for materials supplied, invoice prices and cost of freight to plant, with 10 per cent. additional. The vessel was docked and repaired in the manner contemplated by the agreement; she was brought to the shipyard on the 27th of May, and lay in the water alongside of the dock there until the 17th of June, during which time upper decks and beams weré put in and other work of a character that could be done as well while she was afloat as in the dry dock. On June 17th she was hauled out and remained in dry dock for about two weeks while her bottom plates were renewed. During the same period the propeller was removed to permit of an examination of the tail shaft, and as the shaft showed deterioration a new one was ordered to be supplied by a concern in San Francisco. Upon completion of the work upon the bottom plates, and on the 5th of July, the vessel was returned to the water and lay there for about two weeks awaiting arrival of the new tail shaft. When this arrived the vessel was again hauled out, the tail shaft and propeller were fitted, and the remaining repairs completed. Libelant's claim was for work and labor performed, services rendered, and materials furnished under the circumstances mentioned, and was based upon the agreed scale of compensation. The question in dispute is whether a claim 5 thus grounded is the subject of admiralty jurisdiction; appellant's contention being that the contract, or at least an essential part of it, was for the use by appellant of libelant's marine railway, shipyard, equipment, and laborers in such manner as appellant might choose to employ them, and that it called for the performance of no maritime service by libelant. The Constitution (article 3, § 2) extends the judicial power of the United States to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"; and the legislation enacted by Congress for carrying the power into execution has been equally extensive. Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77; Rev. Stat. § 563 (8); Judicial Code, § 24 (3); 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, c. 231 (Comp. St. § 991). In defining the bounds of the civil jurisdiction, this court from an early day has rejected those trammels that arose from the restrictive statutes and judicial prohibitions of England. Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 457, 459, 12 L. Ed. 226; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 24, 20 L. Ed. 90; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 576, 22 L. Ed. 654. [1] It must be taken to be the settled law of this court that while the civil jurisdiction of the admiralty in matters of tort de *126 pends upon locality, whether the act was long controversy that began with The Gener committed upon navigable waters, in matter of contract it depends upon the subjectmatter, the nature and character of the contract, and that the English rule, which conceded jurisdiction, with a few exceptions, only to contracts made and to be executed upon the navigable waters, is inadmissible; the true criterion being the nature of the contract, as to whether it have reference to maritime al Smith, 4 Wheat. 438, 4 L. Ed. 609, and ended with The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 579, 581, 22 L. Ed. 654. See The Glide, 167 U. S. 606, 17 Sup. Ct. 930, 42 L. Ed. 296. [3] It is settled that a contract for building& a ship or supplying materials for her construction is not a maritime contract. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393, 15 L. Ed. 961; Roach V. Chapman, 22 How. 129, 16 L. service or maritime transactions. People's Ed. 294; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393, 401, 15 L. Ed. 961; Phila. W. & B. R. Co. v. Phila., etc., Steam Towboat Co., 23 How. 209, 215, 16 L. Ed. 433; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 26, 20 L. Ed. 90; The Eclipse, 135 U. S. 599, 608, 10 Sup. Ct. 873, 34 L. Ed. 269. In some of the earlier cases the influence of the English *rule may be discerned, in that the question whether a contract was to be performed upon the navigable waters was referred to as pertinent to the question whether the contract was of a maritime nature (The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428, 429, 6 L. Ed. 358; The Planter [Peyroux v. Howard] 7 Pet. 324, 341, 8 L. Ed. 700; Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175, 183, 9 L. Ed. 677; New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 392, 12 L. Ed. 465); but a careful examination of the opinions shows that the place of performance was dealt with as an evidential circumstance bearing with more or less weight upon the fundamental question of the nature of the contract. If they go beyond this, they must be deemed to be overruled by Insurance Co. v. Dunham, supra. [2] Neither in jurisdiction nor in the method of procedure are our admiralty courts dependent alone upon the theory of implied hypothecation; it being established that in a civil cause of maritime origin involving a personal responsibility the libelant may proceed in personam if the respondent is within reach of process. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438, 443, 4 L. Ed. 609; Manro v. 553, 557, 22 L. Ed. 487; The Winnebago, 205 U. S. 354, 363, 27 Sup. Ct. 509, 51 L. Ed. 836. In the case in 20 How. 402, 15 L. Ed 961, the court said: "So far from the contract being purely maritime, and touching rights and duties appertaining to navigation (on the ocean or elsewhere), it was a contract made on land, to be performed on land." But the true basis for the distinction be tween the construction and the repair of a ship, for purposes of the admiralty jurisdiction, is to be found in the fact that the structure does not become a ship, in the legal sense, until it is completed and launched. * * * "A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is preserved. Prior to her launching she is a mere congeries of wood and iron-an ordinary piece of personal property-as distinctly a land structure as a house, and subject to mechanics' liens. created by state law enforceable in the state courts. In the baptism of launching she receives her name, and from the moment her keel touches the water she is transformed, and becomes a subject of admiralty jurisdiction.” Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 438, 22 Sup. Ct. 195, 46 L. Ed. 264. In The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 33, 34, 24 Sup. Ct. 8, 13 (48 L. Ed. 73), it was held that the admiralty jurisdiction extended to an action for repairs put upon a vessel while in dry dock; but the question whether this would apply to a vessel hauled up on land for repairs was reserved, the Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473, 486, 6 L. Ed. 369; language of the court, by Mr. Justice Brown, New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Mer- being: chants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 390, 12 L. Ed. 465; Morewood v. Enequist, 23 How. 491, 16 L. Ed. 516; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 644, 19 L. Ed. 266; The Kalorama, 10 Wall. 204, 210, 19 L. Ed. 941; The Sabine, 101 U. S. 384, 386, 25 L. Ed. 982; In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U. S. 488, 490, 10 Sup. Ct. 587, 33 L. Ed. 991; Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552, 573, 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 45 L. Ed. 314; Ex parte Indiana Transportation Co., 244 U. S. 456, 37 Sup. Ct. 717, 61 L. Ed. 1253. That a materialman furnishing supplies or repairs may proceed in admiralty either against the ship in rem or against the master or owner in personam is recognized by the twelfth rule in admiralty (29 Sup. Ct. xi) adopted in its present form in the year 1872 (13 Wall. xiv, 20 L. Ed. 922) after a "Had the vessel been hauled up by ways upon the land and there repaired a different question might have been presented, as to which we express no opinion; but as all serious repairs upon the hulls of vessels are made in dry dock, the proposition that such repairs are made on land would practically deprive the admiralty courts of their largest and most important ju risdiction in connection with repairs." * In The Steamship Jefferson, 215 U. S. 130, 30 Sup. Ct. 54, 54 L. Ed. 125, 17 Ann. Cas. 907, it was held that the admiralty jurisdiction extends to a claim for salvage service rendered to a vessel while undergoing repairs in a dry dock. [4] What we have said sufficiently indicates the decision that should be reached in the case at bar. The contract as made con *128 templated the performance of services and ratus, together with his employés, superinthe furnishing of the necessary materials for tended and conducted the operation of raisthe repairs of the steamship Yucatan. It was an entire contract, intended to take the ship as she was and to discharge her only when completely repaired and fit for the Alaskan voyage. It did not contemplate, as is contended by appellant, either a lease, or a contract for use in the nature of a lease, of the libelant's marine railway and machine shop. The use of these was but incidental; diction must be sustained. the vessel being hauled out, when consistent with the progress of other work of the Shipbuilding Company, for the purpose of exposing the ship's bottom to permit of the removal and replacement of the broken plates and the examination of the propeller and tail shaft. In The Planter (Peyroux v. Howard), 7 Pet. 324, 327, 341, 8 L. Ed. 700, the vessel, requiring repairs below the water line as well as above, was to be and in fact was hauled up out of the water; and it was held that the contract for materials furnished and work performed in repairing her under these circumstances was a maritime contract. We think the same rule must be applied to the case before us; that the doubt intimated in The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 33, 34, 24 Sup. Ct. 8, 48 L. Ed. 73, must be laid aside; and that there is no difference in character as to repairs made upon the hull of a vessel dependent upon whether they are made while she is afloat, while in dry dock, or while hauled up by ways upon land. The nature of the service is identical in the several cases, and the admiralty jurisdiction extends to all. This is recognized by the Act of Congress of June 23, 1910 (chapter 373, 36 Stat. 604 [Comp. St. § 7783]), which declares that "any per*son furnishing repairs, supplies, or other necessaries, including the use of dry dock or marine railway, to a vessel, whether foreign or domestic," upon the order of a proper person, shall have a maritime lien upon the vessel. ing and lowering the vessel and also of fixing her upon the ways preparatory to the re pairs, a service requiring skill and experience and essential to the process of repair. Mr. Justice Nelson held there was no substantial distinction between such a case and the case where the shipmaster was employed to make the repairs; and that the admiralty juris Nor is the present case to be distinguished upon the ground that the repairs in which libelant was to furnish work and materials and the use of a marine railway and other equipment were to be done under the superintendence of the Steamship Company. This affected the quantum of the services and the extent of the responsibility, but not the es sential character of the services of the nature of the contract, which, in our opinion, were maritime. Decree affirmed. (249 U. S. 72) COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS v. ALHAMBRA CIGAR & CIGARETTE MFG. CO. (Submitted Jan. 22, 1919. Decided March 3, 1919.) No. 180. COURTS387(2) - PHILIPPINE ISLANDS - Treaty of Paris 1898, arts. 8, 13, providing that cession of Philippine Islands to United States shall not impair property rights of individuals or associations, and continuing in force rights of property secured by patent and copyright, is not involved, within Judicial Code, § 248, by decision of Supreme Court of Philippine Islands, in action for infringement and unfair competition by Philippine association having Spanish trade-mark in La Flor de la Isabela, that action was for wrongful use of name "Isabela," which was a geographical name incapable of registration as trade-mark, and that no unfair competition was shown. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. The principle was recognized long ago by Mr. Justice Nelson in a case decided at the circuit, Wortman v. Griffith (1856) 3 Blatchf. 528, 30 Fed. Cas. 648, No. 18057, which was a libel in personam to recover compensation for services rendered in repairing a steamboat. Libelant was the owner of a shipyard with apparatus consisting of a railway cradle and other fixtures and implements used for the purpose of hauling vessels out of the water and sustaining them while being repaired. Certain rates of compensation were charged for hauling the vessel upon the ways, and a per diem charge for the time occupied while she was under repair, in cases where the owner of the yard and apparatus was not employed to do the work but the repairs were made by other shipmasters, as was done in that case. The owner of the yard and appa- C., for appellee. Suit for infringement of trade-name by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas against the Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company. From a decree of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, reversing a decree of the court of the first instance, plaintiff appeals. Appeai dismissed. * Mr. F. C. Fisher, of Manila, P. I., for appel- For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 73 Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of that court found in favor of the defendthe Court. ant upon both issues, and directed a rep Suit was brought by the appellant, a cor-versal of the judgment below. 33 Phil. poration organized under the laws of Spain, Rep. 485. Appeal to this court was sought in the Court of First Instance of Manila. and allowed upon the ground that the judgThe complainant set up: That for more ment of the Supreme Court was in an action than 27 years it had been engaged in the which involved the Paris Treaty of 1898 be business of manufacturing cigars and cigar- tween the United States and Spain, because ettes in the Philippine Islands. That its it is therein provided that the property rights factory is known as "La Flor de la Isabela," of private establishments or associations havwhich name is used upon the packages and ing legal capacity to acquire and possess propcontainers of the products manufactured by erty, and especially the rights of property secomplainant and on the advertising matter cured by copyrights and patents acquired in its cigar and cigarette business. That by Spaniards in the Philippine Islands at on April 5, 1887, the kingdom of Spain as the the time of the ratification of the treaty, sovereign authority in the Philippine Islands shall not be impaired, but shall continue to issued to it, under laws then in force, a certifi- be respected. cate of registration and ownership of certain This appeal was perfected before the Act trade-marks and trade-names and label de- of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726, c. 448, and is controlled by section 248 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1158), which provided that this court should have jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm the final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in all actions, cases, causes, and proceedings in which the Constitution, or any statute, treaty, title, right, or privilege of the United States is involved. signs therein described and enumerated, including the trade-name "La Flor de la Isabela," conferring the right upon the complainant to all the benefits appurtenant thereto, including the right to prosecute for infringement. That the trade-name has been in continuous use solely by the complainant from the issuance of the Spanish certificate of registration and ownership to the time of bringing suit, except for the acts of the appellee. That by reason of the long-continued use of the phrase "La Flor de la Isabela" to designate its factory and its products the Supreme Court thereby authorizing this the said phrase and sundry abbreviations thereof, when applied to the manufactures of tobacco as a distinguishing brand or name, had come to have a secondary meaning designating and denoting that they are the products of its factory. In common parlance the name "La Flor de la Isabela" is abbreviated to "Isabelas" when applied to cigars or cigarettes. That on or about the 1st of June, 1914, the defendant, now appellee, a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigars and cigarettes in Manila and elsewhere in the Philippine Islands, unlawfully misappropriated to its own use and benefit the word "Isabelas" in its secondary meaning as a distinguishing brand or name of its tobacco products. That the unlawful use of the name "Isabelas" as the distinguishing brand or name of the products of the defendant is calculated to deceive the public into the belief that the goods of the defendant so designated and branded are the goods manufactured by the complainant, and that the use thereof by the defendant will cause it irreparable injury. An injunction was prayed against the defendant, and an accounting sought. The Court of First Instance found in favor of the complainant because of its exclusive ownership of the Spanish trade-mark, and in favor of the defendant on the question of unfair competition. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, 39 SUP.CT.-15 The contention is that the provisions of this treaty were involved in the decision of appeal. By the treaty of Paris of 1898 (30 Stat. 1758) Spain ceded to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands. In article 8 of the treaty it is provided that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, "*** cannot in any respect impair the property rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be." Article 13 provides that "the rights of property secured by copyrights and patents ac*quired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba, and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected." Treaties in Force, 1904, pp. 722, 725, 726. It is the evident purpose of these provisions in view of the cession of territory made by Spain to the United States, to preserve private rights of property, and to provide that the change of sovereignty should work no impairment of such rights. The Philippine Act of 1902, carried into the section of the Judicial Code which we have quoted, intended to give this court jurisdiction in cases involving rights secured 76 |