If

noted the limitations of the provisions referred to. And it is clear that this proviso merely relates to the interpretation of the requirements of the act, and does not enlarge its purview or establish a rule as to matters which lie outside its prohibitions. Is, then, a denial to the state of the exercise of its power for the purposes in question necessarily implied in the federal statute? For when the question is whether a federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must, of course, be considered, and that which needs must be implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power. [Citing cases.] But the intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its police power as to matters not covered by the federal legislation *is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the state. This principle has had abundant illustration."

And, after citing many previous decisions of this court, and analyzing several of them, the opinion proceeds (225 U. S. 539, 32 Sup. Ct. 728, 56 L. Ed. 1182):

"Applying these established principles to the present case, no ground appears for denying validity to the statute of Indiana. That state has determined that it is necessary in order to secure proper protection from deception that purchasers of the described feeding stuffs should be suitably informed of what they are buying and has made reasonable provision for disclosure of ingredients by certificate and label, and for inspection and analysis. The requirements, the enforcement of which the bill seeks to enjoin, are not in any way in conflict with the provisions of the federal act. They may be sustained without impairing in the slightest degree its operation and effect. There is no question here of conflicting standards, or of opposition of state to federal authority. It follows that the complainant's bill in this aspect of the case was without equity."

An attempt is made to distinguish Savage v. Jones, upon the ground that the Indiana statute there under consideration covered a field of regulation which had not been included in the federal statute, whereas, it is said, the Kansas Food and Drugs Law is almost literally a reproduction of the federal law upon the same subject. It is true that the Kansas statute mutatis mutandis follows quite closely the lines of the act of Congress, and that its eighth section, which defines the term "misbranded," is almost a copy of the corresponding section of the federal act; but in the following proviso at the close of the section the words italicized have

"And provided further, that nothing in this act shall be construed as requiring or compelling proprietors or manufacturers of proprietary foods, which contain no unwholesome ingredients, to disclose their trade formulas, except in so far as the provisions of this act, or the rules and regulations of the state board of health, may require to secure freedom from adulteration or misbranding."

These italicized words make a very substantial difference. Section 3 of the Kansas act provides that "the state board of health is authorized and directed to make and publish uniform rules and regulations, not in conflict with the laws of this state, for carrying out the provisions of this act"; and under this authority regulation 6 was adopted and published, which requires manufacturers of certain proprietary foods, including syrups that are compounds, mixtures, or blends, to state definitely upon the principal label the percentage of each ingredient. It is insisted that the regulation goes beyond the authority conferred upon the state board because it is inconsistent with the definition of "misbranding" conta'ned in the act, and therefore cannot be deemed to be a regulation required to secure freedom from misbranding. Upon this particular point the opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court is silent; but the decision of the district court upon the demurrer sustained the validity of the regulation as being within the authority of the board; the Supreme Court did not overrule this; the question is one of state law; and we must assume that the regulation, having been adopted by the board and in effect sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court, is within the authorization of the statute. This being so, it must be treated as an enactment

proceeding from the legislative power of the state; and hence it stands upon precisely the same basis as the requirement of the Indiana statute (quoted in 225 U. S. 504, 32 Sup. Ct. 715, 56 L. Ed. 1182, and referred to above) that commercial feeding stuffs should bear a label showing among other things a guaranteed analysis stating the minimum percentage of crude fat and crude protein and the ingredients from which the article was compounded. It was because of the absence from the federal act of a provision requiring the ingredients to be disclosed that this court held that Congress had limited the scope of its prohibitions and had not included that at which the Indiana statute aimed.

The Food and Drugs Act of Congress has not been changed in any material respect from the form it bore when Savage v. Jones arose. By Acts of August 23, 1912 (chapter 352, 37 Stat. 416), and March 3, 1913 (chapter 117, 37 Stat. 732 [Comp. St. § 8724]), section 8 has been amended, but not in any manner that affects the present question.

Messrs. J. B. Collins and Worth W. Pepple, both of Michigan City, Ind., for plaintiff in

error.

Messrs. S. J. Crumpacker and Samuel Parker, both of South Bend, Ind., for defendant in error.

*Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 7855, Burns' Anno. Indiana Statutes 1914, provides:

"A married woman shall not enter into any contract of suretyship, whether as indorser, guarantor, or in any other manner; and such contract, as to her, shall be void."

[1, 2] Relying upon this, defendant in error sued to recover a certificate of national bank stock issued in her name and held by plaintiff in error bank as security for her husband's indebtedness. The bank defended upon the theory that, exercising rights given by section 12 of the National Bank Act (Act June 3, 1864, с. 106, 13 Stat. 102; R. S. § 5139 [Comp. St. § 9676]), she transferred the stock to her husband, and in turn he had hypothecated it to secure his personal note. Being of opinion that the National Bank Act did not inhibit an inquiry concerning all the circumstances, the trial court permitted introduction of proof to that end; the jury found the bank had knowledge of facts sufficient to charge it with notice that the transaction amounted to a contract of suretyship by the wife; and judgment in her favor was affirmed by the state Supreme Court. A petition to rehear was overruled May 18, 1917, and at that time the judgment below became final for purposes of review here. Andrews v. Virginian Railway Co., 248 U. S. 272, 39 Sup. Ct. 101, 63 L. Ed. 236; Chicago Great Western R. R. v. Basham, 249 U. S. 164, 39 Sup. Ct. 213, 63 L. Ed. 534, decided March 3, 1919. This writ of error was applied for July 13, 1917-within three months.

Act Sept. 6, 1916, с. 448, 39 Stat. 726, 727, 728, limited our power to review judginents or decrees in state courts which became final subsequent to date when it went into effect (October 6, 1916), upon writs of error, to those cases "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or

statute of, or an authority exercised under any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity." Section 2 (Comp. St. § 1214). It also authorized this court to bring up for review and determination by certiorari "any cause wherein a final judgment or decree has been rendered or passed by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is against their validity." And it further distinctly directed that, except as to writs of certiorari addressed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, "no writ of error, appeal, or writ of certiorari intended to bring up any cause for review by the Supreme Court shall be allowed or entertained unless duly applied for within three months after entry of the judgment or decree complained of." Section 6 (section 1228a). Where a petition for rehearing is entertained, the judgment does not be come final for purposes of our review until such petition has been denied or otherwise disposed of, and the three months' limitation begins to run from date of such denial or other disposition,

Plaintiff in error presented its petition here for a writ of certiorari to bring up the present cause April 15, 1918; this was denied April 22, 1918. 246 U. S. 673, 38 Sup. Ct. 424, 62 L. Ed. 932. Manifestly the application was not within the prescribed time.

[3] An examination of the record shows that in the courts below there was not really drawn in question (Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586, 595, 18 Sup. Ct. 435, 42 L. Ed. 865) "the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States," or "the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any state on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States." Consequently we are without jurisdiction to entertain the writ of error and it must be Dismissed.

so that the adoption by him of a regulation prohibiting such sale was not an abuse of discretion, but was authorized under Meat Inspection Act June 30, 1906, prohibiting the sale of meat under deceptive name and authorizing regulations to enforce its provisions.

Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

product from interstate commerce, to its great and irreparable damage. The prayer was that the defendants, the Secretary of Agriculture and the officers subordinate to him, be enjoined from refusing to mark as "Inspected and passed" all "sausage" manufactured by the petitioner found to be sound, healthful, and wholesome, and whích contained no dyes, chemicals, preservatives or ingredients which would render such "sausage" unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food; that they be required by mandatory injunction to mark such "sausage" as "Inspected and passed," and that the regulation be declared to be unauthorized by

The District Court denied the application, on the bill, for an injunction (St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. Houston, 204 Fed. 120), but on appeal that holding was re

Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinlon of the Court.

The Secretary of Agriculture, assuming to exercise authority under the Meat Inspection Act, approved June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 669, 676, 678, с. 3913), promulgated a regulation, effective April 1, 1913, in part as follows, viz.:

"Washington, D. C., Feb. 28, 1913.

"For the purpose of preventing the use in interstate or foreign commerce of meat or meat food products under any false or deceptive name, under the authority conferred on the Secretary of Agriculture by the provisions of the act of Congress, approved June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 674), regulation 18 is hereby amended by the addition of sections 15 and 16, to read

as hereinafter set out.

"James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture. "(Section 16, paragraph 1.) Sausage shall not contain cereal in excess of two per cent.; when cereal is added its presence shall be stated on the label or on the product.

"(Paragraph 2.) Water or ice shall not be added to sausage, except for the purpose of facilitating grinding, chopping and mixing, in which case the added water or ice shall not exceed three per cent., except as provided in the following paragraph."

Immediately after the effective date of this regulation the appellee, an extensive manufacturer of sausage correctly interpret ing it as prohibiting the marking, stamping or labeling as "sausage" any compound of chopped or minced meats containing cereal in excess of 2 per cent. and water or ice in excess of 3 per cent. (except as otherwise provided), filed the bill in this case in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Eastern District of Missouri, averring that "sausage" made by it with cereal and water in excess of the

Circuit Court of Appeals (St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. Houston, 215 Fed. 553, 132 C. С. А. 65).

The Secretary of Agriculture then answered admitting that it was the purpose of the Department to refuse, and that it had refused, to mark as "Inspected and passed" as "sausage" the product of the appellee unless manufactured in compliance with the regulations complained of, and, as warrant therefor, he quoted in his answer from the act of Congress the following:

"No such meat or meat food products shall be sold or offered for sale by any person, firm, or corporation in interstate or foreign commerce under any false or deceptive name; but established trade-name or names which are usual to such products and which are not false and de ceptive and which shall be approved by the Seoretary of Agriculture are permitted, and that said Secretary of Agriculture shall, from time

to time make such rules and regulations as are necessary for the efficient execution of the provisions of this act, and all inspections and examinations made under this act shall be such and made in such manner as described in the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture not inconsistent with the provisions of this act."

*Answering the allegation of the bill that the appellee's trade in "sausage" would be ruined by the enforcement of the regulation, the Secretary of Agriculture averred that the appellee manufactured and sold large quantities of sausage which did not contain any cereal or added water, and

added:

"That the manufacture and sale of a product as sausage which product contains added cereal and water in quantities as described in plaintiff's bill, or in any quantities in excess of the amount designated in said regulation, effective April 1, 1913, is false and deceptive; that the ordinary consumer of sausage manufactured by