483 the plaintiff has no knowledge or information | which render it unfit for human food, an that sausage contains cereal and added water, earlier provision of the act applies, which it that such information is not conveyed to persons who purchase plaintiff's sausage at retail by any method of marking or branding now or heretofore in use by plaintiff, and that it is impracticable and impossible in the ordinary course of manufacture and distribution of sausage to mark or brand the same so that the purchaser at retail or the consumer will be informed as to the amount of cereal and water added thereto." An elaborate trial on the merits resulted in the dismissal of the bill by the District Court (231 Fed. 779), but this judgment was reversed by a divided Circuit Court of Appeals (242 Fed. 337, 155 C. C. A. 113) and the case was remanded with directions to award the appellee injunctions substantially as prayed for. The case is here for review on appeal. The claim made by the government in the lower courts that the compound of meats, cereal and water, which the appellee claimed the right to sell as "sausage" was unwholesome is abandoned in this court and the only question argued and submitted is wheth. er it was within the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to prohibit the use of the word "sausage" as false and deceptive, within the meaning of the act, when applied to the appellee's product. *The foregoing statement shows that the question for decision in this court is: Whether, in promulgating the regulation assailed, the Secretary of Agriculture acted arbitrarily and in excess of the authority given him by the act of Congress, to make, from time to time, such rules and regulations as are necessary for the efficient enforcement of the act, or whether he acted in good faith and upon substantial grounds in deciding that the sale of appellee's product as "sausage" resulted in deception of purchasers and consumers, so that his determination of such question of fact was within the power conferred upon him as the head of an executive department of the government and is not subject to review by the courts. The contention of the government is that the product of the appellee being a meat food product, put up in containers-casings or canvas coverings-it falls within the prohibition of the act that such product shall not be sold or offered for sale by any corporation in interstate commerce "under any false or deceptive name," and that the reg, ulation being for the purpose of preventing its sale under the false or deceptive name of "sausage," it is plainly within the authority given to the Secretary of Agriculture to make rules and regulations for the efficient execution of the act. On the other hand, the contention of the appellee is that the product being wholesome and containing no dyes or chemicals, is asserted deprives the Secretary of all discretion in such a case and requires that he shall cause the product to be marked "Inspected and passed," and also, it is claimed, that the word "sausage," when qualified as was required by prior regulations by including in the label such expressions as "Cereal added," or "Sausage and cereal," was not a false or deceptive name. [1] The contention of the appellee that if its product is wholesome, and if it does not contain dyes and chemicals, the act imperatively requires the Secretary to mark its product as "Inspected and passed" is clearly unsound if the word "sausage" as applied to it is false and deceptive, for plainly the provision of the act requiring the marking of the product must be harmonized with the subsequent provision that no such meat or meat food product shall be sold or offered for sale under any false or deceptive name. [2] Whether or not the term "sausage," when applied to the product of the appellee, in which more than the permitted amount of cereal and water is used, is false and deceptive is a question of fact, the determination of which is committed to the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture by the authority given him to make rules and regulations for giving effect to the act, and the law is that the conclusion of the head of an executive department on such a question will not be reviewed by the courts, where it is fairly arrived at with substantial evidence to support it. This rule has been most frequently applied in Land Department cases, but often also to decisions by heads of other departments. Thus, to the action of the Secretary of the Navy in Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 599 Appx., 10 L. Ed. 559, 609, to the action of the Secretary of the Interior, on full consideration of the subject, in Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347, 19 L. Ed. 62, and in Burfenning v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 321, 16 Sup. Ct. 1018, 41 L. Ed. 175, and to decisions of the Postmaster General in Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L. Ed. 894, and Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53, 33 Sup. Ct. 6, 57 L. Ed. 119. The doctrine has been extended by act of Congress to decisions by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 32 Sup. Ct. 359, 56 L. Ed. 606; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272, 33 Sup. Ct. 31, 57 L. Ed. 218; Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291, 34 Sup. Ct. 488, 58 L. Ed. 967. The scope of the rule is illustrated by this court, saying in Johnson v. Drew, 171 U. S. 93, 99, 18 Sup. Ct. 800, 802 (43 L. Ed. 88): "If there is any one thing respecting the administration of the public lands which must be considered as settled by repeated adjudications of this court, it is that the decision of the land *485 *486 department upon mere questions of fact is, in the absence of fraud or deceit, conclusive, and such questions cannot thereafter be relitigated in the courts." And in New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 261, 264, 13 Sup. Ct. 303, 305 (37 L. Ed. 162): "In Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, decided at the present term [147 U. S. 165, 13 Sup. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123], we had occasion to examine the question as to when a court was authorized to interfere by injunction with the action of the head of a department, and came to the conclusion that it was only where, in any view of the facts that could be taken, such action was beyond the scope of his authority. If he were engaged in the performance of a duty which involved the exercise of discretion or judgment, he was entitled to protection from any interference by the judicial power." in general water was added in double the percentage of cereal used; and that the cereal, usually corn meal or corn flour, was resorted to to cheapen the product and cost about 2 cents a pound, while the meat used cost from 6 to 15 cents a pound. Before the regulation assailed was promulgated cereal and water were generally used by large manufacturers of sausage, but all of the representatives of manufacturers, other than those of the appellee, who were called as witnesses, testified that they were obeying the regulation, and the agreement of such witnesses was general that retail purchasers and consumers did not know of the presence of cereal in what they were buying as sausage. There is conflict in the evidence as to whether the use of cereal in excess of the ferment in a shorter time than when cereal is not used at all, or when used in smaller quantities. [3] That the case before us is one for the prescribed amounts renders the product less application of this rule is shown by the rec-digestible and wholesome, whether it reduces ord, which contains an interesting history its food value, and whether the sausage will of what large manufacturers have come, in a more or less gradual progress, to regard as the proper ingredients of the product which they have sold as sausage, and which also shows, without conflict, that the ultimate purchaser and consumer of the product is not informed and in general does not know of the presence of cereal and added water in it. The evidence shows that the poorer classes of beef and pork are used in making sausage, such as trimmings, hearts, ears, cheeks, liver, snouts and tripe, "and all that kind of things," but the preferred material is bull meat; that such meat, other than bull meat, is dry and has not the cohesive properties which will unite it when ground or minced into the mass popularly known as "sausage" and that, for this reason, corn meal, potato flour and other like substances have come to be used by the trade as "binders" to give it the desired cohesiveness and appearance. *The president of the appellee testified that when he first began making sausage 25 years ago he used anywhere from 5 per cent. to 12 per cent. of cereal and that when the regulation was promulgated he was using 2 or 3 per cent. to 10 per cent., when he used any at all, but that in a part of his product he did not use any, notably in that which was sent into Pennsylvania, where the use of cereal was prohibited by statute; that when he used 10 per cent. of cereal he added from 15 to 20 per cent. of water, and that The result, thus stated, of the examination of the record before us shows beyond controversy, that the Secretary of Agriculture in promulgating the regulation complained of acted on substantial evidence and with sufficient reason in concluding that persons purchasing or using as "sausage" the appellee's compound of various meats, cereal and water would be deceived as to its composition and *as to its value as a food product, and we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion to prohibit the use of the word "sausage" as applied to it, rather than to prescribe qualifying terms explanatory of it. Few purchasers read long labels, many cannot read them at all, and the act of Congress having committed to the head of the department, constantly dealing with such matters, the discretion to determine as to whether the use of the word "sausage" in a label would be false and deceptive or not, under such circumstances as we have here this court will not review, and the Circuit Court of Appeals should not have reviewed and reversed the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. *487 *491 ment of the court of another state is not pre-sufficiently stated in Hartford Life Insursented to the state court, so as to give juris- ance Co. v. Ibs, 237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. diction to the United States Supreme Court, 692, 59 L. Ed. 1165, L. R. A. 1916A, 765, and under Judicial Code, § 237, as amended by Act Sept. 6, 1916, § 2 (Comp. St. § 1214), where the judgment in the other state was not rendered until after the judgment in the Missouri trial court, so that the question could be raised only by brief on appeal. 2. COURTS394(14) - FEDERAL QUESTION FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-CORPORATE CHARTER. -FOREIGN DOCUMENT Even if the charter of a corporation is a public act or record of a state, and entitled under Const. art. 4, § 1, to full faith and credit in another state, a decision of the courts of the latter state, treating the charter as valid and giving it a construction not contrary to any statute or decision of its home state, does not deny full faith and credit, so as to give jurisdiction to the federal Supreme Court. in Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Barber, 245 U. S. 146, 38 Sup. Ct. 54, 62 L. Ed. 208. The respondent, on this motion to dismiss, does not seek to have the decisions in the cases cited modified, but asserts that the claim of right now made was not so "set up or claimed" in the state courts that full faith and credit could be or was denied to the Dresser decree. The judgment in this case in the trial court was rendered against the petitioner in September, 1909, and the decree in the Dresser Case was not rendered until six months later, in March, 1910. The latter decree was not set up in any pleading and was not introduced in evidence in this case. The only way in which it came to the notice of the On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Missouri courts was in argument and as an Court of the State of Missouri. Action by Nannie M. Johnson against the Hartford Life Insurance Company. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the Kansas City, Mo., Court of Appeals (166 Mo. App. 261, 148 S. W. 631), and by the Supreme Court of Missouri (271 Mo. 562, 197 S. W. 132), and defendant brings certiorari. Writ dismissed. Messrs. James C. Jones, George F. Haid, and James C. Jones, Jr., all of St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner. Messrs. Matthew A. Fyke and Charles W. German, both of Kansas City, Mo., for respondent. *Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a suit, on a life insurance policy or certificate, in which judgment was rendered against the company, petitioner, successively, by three courts of the state of Missouri. The case is in this court on writ of certiorari granted on the asserted ground that the state Supreme Court failed and refused to give full faith and credit to the judgment and decree of a superior court of the state of Connecticut, and also to the petitioner's charter, "a public record and act of the state of Connecticut," in violation of the rights secured to it by article 4, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States. exhibit to a brief filed in the appellate courts and the Supreme Court of Missouri dealt with it in this single paragraph: "The case at bar was tried below on May 12, 1909, which was prior in time to the entering of the decree in the Dresser Case, and the record in the Dresser Case was therefore not offered or presented in the trial of this case. Since the record of the Dresser Case is in no manner properly raised or lodged in this case, we do not deem it to be within the scope of our review, and likewise the federal question based thereon. Under such circumstances the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs, supra [237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 692, 59 L. Ed. 1165, L. R. A. 1916A, 765], should not be applied to this case." [1] The jurisdiction of this court to review the final judgment or decree of the highest court of a state, in such a case as we have here, is defined in section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), as amended September 6, 1916 (39 Stat. 726, с. 448, § 2 [Comp. St. § 1214]), which provides that it shall be competent for this court, by certiorari to require any such cause to be certified to it for review when there is claimed in it any title, right, privilege or immunity under the Constitution of the United States and "the decision is either in favor of or against the title right, privilege or immunity especially set up or claimed, by either party, under such For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *493 492 *494 Constitution." It is the settled law thattary, or possibly the vice president and as and upon the question whether or not such a claim has been so asserted the decision of the state court is binding upon this court, when it is clear, as it is in this case, that such decision is not rendered in a spirit of evasion for the purpose of defeating the claim of federal right." Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Mims, 242 U. S. 532, 535, 37 Sup. Ct. 188, 189 (61 Ed. 476); Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U. S. 367, 371, 37 Sup. Ct. 165, 61 L. Ed. 367, and cases cited. No suggestion is or could be made that the Missouri state Supreme Court's holding in this case was framed to evade the consideration of the federal right now asserted, for it had long been the established law of that state that under its system of practice the construction of either the federal or state Constitution would not be treated as involved in a case, in a jurisdictional sense, unless it appeared that such question was raised and ruled on in the trial court, and also that constitutional questions could not be injected into a' case for the first time in an appellate court by argument or brief of counsel for the purpose of giving jurisdiction. Miller v. Connor, 250 Mo. 677, 684, 157 S. W. 81. It has further been uniformly held by that court since 1836 that it will not take judicial notice of the laws of other states, but that they must be proved, as other facts, by evidence introduced at the trial. Southern Illinois & Missouri Bridge Co. v. Stone et al., 174 Mo. 1, 33, 73 S. W. 453, 63 L. R. A. 301. On the authorities thus cited we are obliged to conclude that the question as to the faith and credit which should be given to the Dresser decree was not so presented to or ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Missouri as to present a federal question for review by this court. [2] But, as if anticipating the result we have just reached, the petitioner contends that full faith and credit were denied to its charter, "a public record and act of the state of Connecticut," which was introduced in evidence, for the reason that the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting that charter, erroneously approved the charge to the jury by the trial court "that it devolved upon the defendant to prove that the assessment," the nonpayment of which was relied upon as forfeiting the policy sued upon, was made by the directors of the defendant. The petitioner introduced evidence tending to prove that the assessment under discussion was made, not by formal action of the board of directors, but by executive officers of the company, "the president and secretary or the vice president and secre * * * sistant secretary," and it contended that this was sufficient in law because it had long been the practice of the company and was recognized by the directors as action taken in their behalf under authority delegated by them. Even if this charter, which was granted by a resolution of the Assembly of Connecticut, be regarded as a public act or record of that state within the scope of the constitutional provision (article 4, section 1), which is not decided, nevertheless since no statute of Connecticut or decision of any court of that state was pleaded or introduced in evidence in this case, giving a construction to the provision of the charter which the Missouri courts, treating as valid, interpreted, the exercise by those courts of an independent judgment in placing a construction upon it cannot present a federal question under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 50, 30 Sup. Ct. 676, 54 L. Ed. 921, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 84, and Western Life Indemnity Co of Illinois v. Rupp, 235 U. S. 261, 273, 275, 35 Sup. Ct. 37, 59 L. Ed. 220. It is asserted that the record presents other constitutional questions which give this court jurisdiction to review the case but an examination shows the claims to be too un substantial to merit discussion and the writ 1. HABEAS CORPUS 45(1)-ORIGINAL PETITION TO SUPREME COURT-EFFECT OF PERMISSION TO FILE. Duty of Supreme Court to consider petition to it for habeas corpus to a District Court arises from permission granted to file it, prima facie implying that the case is of such a character as to be an exception to the general rule of procedure that other available sources of judicial power may not be passed by for purpose of obtaining relief by resort to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and though whether definitively the case is of such exceptional character must depend on an analysis of the merits on the hearing. The contumacious refusal of a witness to testify may so obstruct a court in the performance of its duty as to justify punishment for contempt. 3. CONTEMPT 13-PERJURY. That perjury is a crime, for which one committing it may be tried and punished, does not prevent it, when committed in the presence For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 39 SUP.CT.-22 *379 of a court, being the subject-matter of punish- punishing as a contempt an act which it had ment for contempt; exceptional conditions no power to so punish, and that even if the justifying. act punished was susceptible of being treated 4. CONTEMPT31 POWER TO PUNISH- as a contempt the action of the court was arCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. While power to punish for contempt committed in the presence of the court, existing within the limits of and sanctioned by the Constitution, is not controlled by the limitations of the Constitution as to modes of accusation and methods of trial generally safeguarding the rights of the citizen, judicial authority is not exempt from constitutional limitations; the great and only purpose of the power being to secure judicial authority from obstruction in the performance of its duties to the end that means appropriate for the preservation and enforcement of the Constitution may be secured. 5. CONTEMPT 13-PERJURY-OBSTRUCTIVE EFFECT. An obstruction to the performance of judicial duty from an act done in the presence of the court is essential to power to punish for contempt, though the act be perjury. bitrary, beyond the limits of any discretion possessed, and violative of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. Prior to submission and after return and the hearing which ensued an order admitting to bail was made. [1] The duty to consider the case arises from the permission to file, and therefore prima facie implies that it is of such a character as to be an exception to the rule of procedure that other available sources of judicial power may not be passed by for the purpose of obtaining relief by resort to the original jurisdiction of this court. Ex parte *Royall, 117 U. S. 254, 6 Sup. Ct. 742, 29 L. Ed. 872; Riggins v. United States, 199 U. S. 547, 26 Sup. Ct. 147, 50 L. Ed. 303; Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420, 428, 32 Sup. Ct. 753, 56 L. Ed. 1147; Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245, 6. CONTEMPT64-COMMITMENT-GROUNDS. 33 Sup. Ct. 240, 57 L. Ed. 497; Jones v. Perkins, 245 U. S. 390, 38 Sup. Ct. 166, 62 L. Ed. 358; Re Mirzan, 119 U. S. 584, 7 Sup. Ct. 341, 30 L. Ed. 513; Re Huntington, 137 U. S. 63, 11 Sup. Ct. 4, 34 L. Ed. 567. Whether, however, definitively the case is of such exceptional character must depend upon an analysis of the merits, which we now proceed to make upon the petition, the return, argument for the petitioner, suggestions by the United States, a statement by the judge, and a transcript of the stenographer's notes showing what transpired in the court below, made a part of the argument of the petitioner and in substance conceded by all parties to be the record. In a trial which was proceeding in the court below, presided over by the judge of the district of Vermont assigned to the Eastern district of New York, the petitioner was recalled as a witness by the government for the purpose of proving by his testimony the handwriting of MacMillan and Van Amburgh. On being shown the writings referred to, in answer to questions by the government, he said that he believed, from having often seen the writing of the persons named, that the writings shown him were theirs, but that he could not so state from having seen MacMillan and Van Amburgh write because he could not recollect ever having seen them do The court thereupon pointedly questioned the witness on the subject of his recollection and, in view of his persistency in de so. Mr. Chief Justice WHITE delivered the claring that he could not swear from knowlopinion of the Court. After hearing and leave granted on a rule to show cause, this petition for habeas corpus seeking the discharge of the petitioner from custody under a commitment for contempt was filed. The grounds for discharge were that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction by edge derived from a recollection of having seen MacMillan and Van Amburgh write or sign that the writings were theirs, stated to government counsel that because of the evident unwillingness of the witness the widest latitude would be allowed the government in its examination. This was availed of, and For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |