the law was held not to apply to the shipment of seamen on American vessels in foreign ports. After some amendments in 1898, not important to consider in this connection, the matter came before this court in the case

of Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002, and it was held to apply to a British vessel shipping seamen at an American port, and, furthermore, that the act, as thus applied to a foreign vessel in United States waters, was constitutional.

[1] *While the Seaman's Act of 1915 contains many provisions for the amelioration of conditions as to employment and care of seamen, in the aspect now involved we have called attention to the state of legislation and judicial decision when that act was passed. Did Congress intend to make invalid the contracts of foreign seamen so far as

continue to permit such contracts and advance payments no matter what our declared law or policy in regard to them might be as to vessels coming to our ports.

[3] In the same section, which thus applies the law to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States, it is provided that the master, owner, consignee, or agent of any such vessel, who violates the provision of the act, shall be liable to the same penalty as would be persons of like character in respect to a vessel of the United States. This provision seems to us of great importance as evidencing the legislative intent to deal civilly and criminally with matters in our own jurisdiction. Congress certainly did not intend to punish criminally acts done within a foreign jurisdiction, a purpose so wholly futile is not to be attributed to Congress. United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117, 120, 36 Sup. Ct. 32, 60 L. Ed. 172. The crim

when the contract and payment was made in a foreign country where the law sanctioned such contract and payment? Conceding for the present purpose that Congress might have legislated to annul such contracts as a condition upon which foreign vessels might enter the ports of the United States, it is to be noted, that such sweeping and important requirement is not found specifically made in the statute. Had Congress intended to make void such contracts and payments a few words would have stated that intention, not leaving such an important regulation to be gathered from implication. There is nothing to indicate an intention, so far as the language of the statute is concerned, to control such matters otherwise than in the ports of the United States. The statute makes the payment of advance wages unlawful and affixes penalties for its violation, and provides that such advancements shall in no cases except as in the act provided, absolve the master from full payment after the wages

are earned, and shall be no defense to a libel or suit for wages. How far was this intended to apply to foreign vessels? We find the answer if we look to the language of the act

itself. It reads that this section shall apply to foreign vessels "while in the waters of the United States."

[2] Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the lawmaking power has jurisdiction. American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 357, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047. In Patterson v. Bark Eudora, supra, this court declared such legislation as to foreign vessels in United States ports to be constitutional. We think that *there is nothing in this section to show that Congress intended to take over the control of such contracts and payments as to foreign vessels except while they were in our ports. Congress could not prevent the making of such contracts in other jurisdictions. If

that Congress intended to deal only with acts committed within the jurisdiction of the United States.

[4] It is true the act provides for the abrogation of inconsistent treaty provisions, but this provision has ample application treating the statute to mean what we have here held to be its proper construction. It abolishes the right of arrest for desertion. It gives to the civil courts of the United States jurisdiction over wage controversies arising within our jurisdiction. These considerations amply account for the treaty provision. See Treaties in Force, Ed. 1904, index p. 969.

It is said that the advances in foreign ports are against the policy of the United States and, therefore, not to be *sanctioned here. As we have construed this section of the statute, no such policy as to foreign contracts legal where made, is declared.

We have examined the references in the

briefs of counsel to the reports and proceedings in Congress during the progress of this legislation so far as the same may have weight in determining the construction of this section of the act. We find nothing in them, so far as entitled to consideration, which requires a different meaning to be given the statute. We may add that the construction now given has the sanction of the Executive Department as shown in Instructions to Consular Officers, promulgated through the medium of the State Depart

ment.

We are of opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals reached the right conclusion as to the meaning and interpretation of this section of the act, and its judgment is Affirmed.

Mr. Justice MCKENNA, with whom concur Mr. Justice HOLMES, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice CLARKE, dissenting. This is a libel in admiralty under the Sea

pecially involving section 11 (Comp. St. 1916, $8392a),

The libel was filed by petitioners here and others. It was dismissed as to the latter and they have acquiesced in the judgment. The facts are set out in the opinion of the court.

With this case were submitted others that present the act of Congress in different aspects. Among these was No. 361. Dillon v. Strathearn S. S. Co., 248 U. S. 182, 39 Sup. Ct. 83, 63 L. Ed. 199. It was a libel by a seaman who had shipped on a British vessel and was based on a demand for wages not due at the time of the demand under the terms of the shipping articles signed by him. Section 4 (section 8322) of the act, infra, was especially involved in consideration and its constitutionality was attacked by the ship. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to which the case had gone, presented the question to this court in two aspects, first generally, and, second, more particularly that provision which makes the section "apply to seamen on foreign vessels while

in the harbors of the United States."

In the present case the ship is also British and the libelants and petitioners citizens or subjects of nations other than the United States, and the controversy is as to the right

of the master to deduct from the wages, of

which the law authorizes the demand, advances made to the seamen in Liverpool, Eng

land. To make such advances was a practice usual and customary and not forbidden by English law. It would seem, therefore, that the constitutional question is as much involved in one case as in the other. But under the court's construction of the act that question can be pretermitted. Under our construction it would seem to be not only of ultimate but of first insistence. The court, however, is of opinion that the question of the constitutionality of the act was not certified in such manner as to be subject to its consideration. From that conclusion we are not disposed to dissent and shall assume, as the court does, that the legislation is valid and pass to its consideration.

ritorial jurisdiction of the United States." And, indeed, it is insisted that Congress "ex industria in terms confined the application to the waters of the United States." The conclusions are deduced from the cases which are reviewed and the language of the act is quoted. We give the quotation as it amplifies the contentions:

"That this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States [counsels' emphasis), as to vessels of the United States, and any master, owner, consignee, or agent of any foreign vessel who has violated its provisions shall be liable to the same penalty that the master, owner, or agent of a vessel of the United States would be for similar violation.

"The master, owner, consignee, or agent of any vessel of the United States, or of any foreign vessel seeking clearance from a port of the United States, shall present his shipping

articles at the office of clearance, and no clearance shall be granted any such vessel unless the provisions of this section have been complied with."

The quotation is but a part of section 11.1 It is preceded by *the explicit declaration that it is "unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same or to pay such advance wages." There is no limitation of

place or circumstances and the universality of the declaration is given emphasis and any implication of exception is precluded with tautological care by the provision that "the payment of such advance wages or allotment

shall in no case except as herein provided absolve the vessel or the master or the owner thereof from the full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or ac

1 Section 11 was an amendment of section 24 of the Act of December 21, 1898, and section 24 was an amendment of section 10 of the laws of 1884 as amended in 1886, and, as it now stands as far as pertinent, is as follows:

"Sec. 10. (a) That it shall be, and is hereby, made unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages, or to make any order, or note, or other evidence of indebtedness therefor to any other person, or to pay any person, for the shipment of seamen when payment is deducted or to be deducted from a seaman's wages. Any person violating any of the foregoing provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $100, and may also be imprisoned for a period of not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages or allotment shall in no case except as herein provided absolve the vessel or the master or the owner there

of from the full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or action for the recovery of such wages. If any person shall demand or receive, either directly or indirectly, from any seaor from any person on his behalf, any remuneration whatever for providing him with em

man

**

These considerations, we think, answer as well other contentions; that is, that the act "should be construed as applicable only to seamen shipping in an American port on vessels which remain for a time in or afterwards return to an American port to load or deliver cargo" or "to seamen of American nationality upon foreign or domestic vessels, irrespective of the port of shipment."

It is enough to say of the contentions, in addition to what has been said, that they impose on the statute qualifications and limitations precluded by its words and the purpose they express. There is a great deal said, and ably said, upon these contentions and the more pretentious one that the act would violate the Constitution of the United States unless so "construed as not to apply to foreign seamen shipped on a foreign vessel in a foreign port, under a contract, valid where made.

"

We cannot concede the qualification nor doubt the power of Congress to impose conditions upon foreign vessels entering or remaining in the harbors of the United States. And we think that the case of The Eudora declares the grounds of decision. Its principle is broader than its instance and makes the vessel and its locality in the waters of the United States the test of the application of the act and not the nationality of the seamen nor their place of shipment, nor contravening conventions, and precludes deductions of advances,

Nor is there obstacle in the penal provisions of the act. They may be distributively applied and such application has many examples in legislation. It is justified by the rule of reddendo singula singulis. By it words and provisions are referred to their appropriate objects, resolving confusion and accomplishing the intent of the law against, it may be, a strict grammatical construction. United States v. Simms, 1 Cranch, 252, 2 L. Ed. 98; Comm. v. Barber, 143 Mass. 560, 10 N. E. 330; Quinn v. Lowell Electric Light Co., 140 Mass. 106, 3 N. E. 200. The Seamen's Act especially invokes the application of the rule. The act applies to foreign vessels as explicitly and as circumstantially as

it does to domestic vessels. Let the foreign vessel be in the waters of the United States and every provision of the act applies to it as far as it can apply. In other words, it gives the right to a seaman on a foreign vessel to demand from the master one-half part of the wages which he shall have earned at every port and makes void all stipulations to the contrary. And the remedy of the seaman in such case is made explicit. If his demand be refused ("failure on the part of the master to comply" are the words of the act) the seaman is released from his contract and he is entitled to the full payment of wages earned. 3 And he is given a remedy in the courts of the United States. The defense of an advance payment is precluded and clearance of the foreign vessel is forbidden. And thus the act has completeness of right and remedy and, we think, precludes judicial limitation of either. Its provisions are simple and direct, there is no confusion in their command, no difficulty in their obedience. Of course, a "master, owner, consignee or agent of" any foreign vessel, to quote the words of the act again, cannot violate any provision of it if he be not in the United States. If there be provisions that cannot reach him, that with which this case is concerned can reach him.

We are, therefore, of opinion that the District Court was right in refusing to allow the Liverpool advances and the Circuit Court of Appeals was wrong in reversing the ruling.

(248 U. S. 205) NEILSON et al. v. RHINE SHIPPING CO. HARDY et al. v. SHEPARD & MORSE

LUMBER CO.

THE RHINE.

THE WINDRUSH.

(Argued Nov. 5, 1918. Decided Dec. 23, 1918.)

Nos. 393 and 394. SEAMEN23-WAGES-ADVANCE PAYMENTAMERICAN VESSEL IN FOREIGN PORT.

Act June 26, 1884, § 10a, as amended by Act March 4, 1915, § 11 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8323), prohibiting paying seamen wages in advance, providing such payment shall not absolve from full payment of wages when earned, and denying clearance papers to vessels violating its terms, does not apply to advances by an American ship in a foreign port in accordance with local custom to seamen there employed.

Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting.

*211

In the first case Paul Neilson and nine other seamen sue for the recovery of wages claimed to be due them from the bark Rhine. It

That American vessels might be controlled by con*gressional legislation as to contracts made in foreign ports may, for present purposes at least, be conceded. It appears that only by compliance with the local custom of obtaining seamen through agents can American vessels obtain seamen in South American ports. This is greatly to be deplored, and the custom is one which works much hardship to a worthy class. But we are unable to discover that in passing this statute Congress intended to place American shipping at the

bark Rhine at Buenos Ayres, October 7, 1916, for a voyage to New York, at the rate of $25 per month. It is stipulated that the shipping of seamen on sailing vessels at Buenos Ayres is controlled by certain shipping masters, to one of whom the libelants, in accordance with the usual custom and as a means of securing employment, signed a receipt or advance note for one month's wages. These advance notes were presented to the American Vice-Consul at Buenos Ayres before the libelants signed the articles, were by him noted on the articles and, in the presence of the libelants, directed to be paid on account of the wages of the respective libelants. It was further stipulated that in directing the master of the Rhine to honor such advance notes, the Consul was acting in accordance with section 237 of the Consular Regulations of the United States. When the bark arrived at New York the libelants were paid the wages earned, less the $25 advanced. They now seek to recover the sum thus deducted, by virtue of the terms of section 10 (a), c. 121, Act June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 55, as amended by Act March 4, 1915, c. 153, § 11, 38 Stat. 1168 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8323), entitled an "Act to promote the welfare of American seamen in the merchant marine of the United States," upon the theory that such advances are unlawful and of no effect.

The facts in relation to the case of the barkentine Windrush differ from the above only in respect of the fact that the advance notes are not in evidence, but are noted on the articles.

The District Court decided in favor of the libelants. 244 Fed. 833. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decrees. 250 Fed.

tain seamen when compared with the vessels of other nations which are manned by complying with local usage.

The statute itself denies clearance papers to vessels violating its terms. This provision could only apply to domestic ports and is another evidence of the intent of Congress to legislate as to advances made in our own ports.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice MCKENNA, with whom concur Mr. Justice HOLMES, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice CLARKE, dissenting.

These cases were submitted with Nos. 361 and 392 (248 U. S. 182, 185, 39 Sup. Ct. 83, 84, 63 L. Ed. 199, 200), and, like them, are proceedings in admiralty under the Seamen's Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 1165-1168.

The facts are set out in the opinion of the court. In these cases, as in others, we are constrained to dissent. The principle of decision should be, we think, that declared in our dissent in The Talus, 248 U. S. 185, 39 Sup. Ct. 84, 63 L. Ed. 200. The facts of these cases put more tension upon it, that is, an adhesion to the words of the statute as determinative of its purpose rather than some of its consequences. We have here the 'somewhat appealing force of a picture *of an American ship only able to escape practical internment in a foreign port by a violation of the law, if it be as we have declared it. And this under the sanction of the United States Consul acting under the following regulation of the Department of State:

"237. Advances to Seamen Shipped in Foreign Ports. The shipment of seamen in foreign ports cannot be considered as within the intention, and hence not within the proper construction

4