holders, after being sworn according to the sout his having an opportunity to take an ap *60 provisions of section three of this act, 2 *shall accordingly ascertain such compensation and re port the same to the board of supervisors. Said board may allow the full amount so agreed upon, or reported by said freeholders, or so much thereof as upon investigation they may deem reasonable, subject to such owner or tenant's right of appeal to the circuit court as in other cases." peal. We think the contention is not tenable. It takes into account some of the statutory provisions and rejects others equally important. It is true there is no express provision for notice at the inception or during the early stages of the proceedings; and for present purposes it may be assumed that such a requirement is not even implied, although a different view might be admissible. See The same statute, in clause 5, deals with Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 13 Sup. the compensation to be paid for lands taken Ct. 750, 37 L. Ed. 637. But the provisions for roadways, and in that connection provides relating to the later stage the decision by that the proprietor or tenant, if dissatisfied the supervisors are not silent in respect of with the amount allowed by the supervisors, notice, but speak in terms easily understood. "may of right appeal to the circuit court of Clauses 5 and 22 taken together provide that said county, and the said court shall hear the the owner, if dissatisfied with the decision, matter de novo" and determine and certify shall have the right to appeal as in other the amount to be paid. And a general statute cases. This presupposes that he will have (section 838), which regulates the time and some knowledge of the decision, and yet mode of taking appeals from decisions of the neither clause states how the knowledge is supervisors disallowing claims in whole or in to be obtained, or when or how the right of part, provides that the claimant, if present appeal is to be exercised. All this is explainwhen the decision is made, may appeal to the ed, however, when section 838 is examined. circuit court within thirty days thereafter, It deals with these questions in a comprehen and, if not present, shall be notified in writing by the clerk and may appeal within thirty days after service of the notice. sive way and evidently is intended to be of general application. Of course, newly created rights of appeal of the same class fall Apart from what is implied by the deci- within its operation unless the Legislature sion under review, no construction of these provides otherwise. Here the Legislature statutory provisions by the state court of last has not provided otherwise, and so has inresort has been brought to our attention; so dicated that it is content to have the general for the purposes of this case we must con *62 strue them. The task is not difficult. The statute applied. As before stated, that *stat words employed are direct and free from ambiguity, and the several provisions are in entire harmony. They show that, in the absence of an agreement, the compensation is to be assessed primarily by viewers, that their award is to be examined by the super visors and approved or changed as to the latter may appear reasonable, and that from the decision of the supervisors an appeal lies as of right to the circuit court where the matter may be heard de novo. Thus, by exercising the right to appeal the owner may obtain a full hearing in a court of justiceone concededly possessing and exercising a general jurisdiction. An opportunity to have ute provides that the claimant, if not present when the supervisors' decision is made, shall be notified thereof in writing and shall have thirty days after such notice within which to appeal. If he be present when the deci sion is made, he is regarded as receiving no tice at that time, and the thirty days for taking an appeal begins to run at once. It is apparent therefore that special care is taken to afford him ample opportunity to appeal and thereby to obtain a full hearing in the circuit court. [5] The claim is made that this opportunity comes after the taking, and therefore is too late. But it is settled by the decisions of this court that where adequate provision is made for the certain payment of the compensation without unreasonable delay the taking does not contravene due process of law in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because it precedes the ascertainment of what compensation is just. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 402, 407, 16 Sup. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 568, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853; Williams v. Parker, 188 U. S. 491, 23 Sup. Ct. 440, 47 L. Ed. 559; Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290, 306, 32 Sup. Ct. 488, 56 L. Ed. 771. And see Branson v. Gee, 25 Or. 462, 36 Pac. 527, 24 L. R. A. 355. As before indicated, it is not questioned that such adequate provision for payment is ma.de in this instance. (40 Sup.Ct.) 122 We conclude that the objections urged against the validity of the statute are not employed by Henry *and Eugene Peters as a well taken. Judgment affirmed. (251 U. S. 121) longshoreman on board the Seria, then lying at New Orleans. The steamer was being unloaded. While upon her and engaged in that work, Veasey accidentally fell through a hatchway. Veasey v. Peters, 142 La. 1012, 77 South. 948. A compensation policy in favor of Peters, issued by the Ætna Life Insurance Company, PETERS et al. v. VEASEY. (Argued Nov. 14, 1919. Decided Dec. 8, 1919.) was in force when the accident occurred. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Suit under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Louisiana by Thomas Veasey against Henry Peters, Eugene Peters, and the Etna Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which affirmed (142 La. 1012, 77 South. 948), and, plaintiff having died, and the administratrix of his succession having been substituted, defendants bring error. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings. Messrs. George Janvier and William C. Dufour, both of New Orleans, La., for plain tiffs in error. Mr. Walter S. Penfield, of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error. Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Louisiana (No. 20, Acts La. 1914), the Supreme Court of that state affirmed a judgment against plaintiffs in error and in favor of Veasey, who claimed to have suffered injuries, August 6, 1915, while [1] The work in which defendant in error was engaged is maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters clearly within the admiraty jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the Workmen's Compensation Law of the state had no application when the accident occurred. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 59, 60, 61, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1157; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 217, 218, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900. [2] Clause third, section 24, of the judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, с. 231, 36 Stat. 1091) confers upon the District Courts of the United States jurisdiction "of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a commonlaw remedy where the common law is competent to give it." Clause third, section 256, provides that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States shall be exclusive in "all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." By an act approved October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 395, c. 97 [Comp. St. 1918, §§ 991, 1233]), Congress directed that both of these clauses be amended by inserting after "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it," the words "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state." The court below erroneously concluded that this act should be given retroactive effect and applied in the Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (251 U. S. 48) LIVERPOOL, BRAZIL & RIVER PLATE ERN DISTRICT TERMINAL. The car float was the vessel that came into contact with the Vauban, but as it was a passive instrument in the hands of the Intrepid that fact does not affect the question (Argued Nov. 14, 1919. Decided Dec. 8, 1919.) of responsibility. The James Gray v. The COLLISION No. 81. 25-LIMIT OF RESPONSIBILITY OF OWNER OF TUG. Under Rev. St. §§ 4283-4285 (Comp. St. §§ 8023-8025), providing that liability of owner of any vessel for any injury by collision shall in no case exceed the value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, responsibility of owner of tug, the moving cause of collision with a vessel, is not increased by the fact that a loaded car float and a disabled boat, both belonging to the tug's owner, were lashed to its sides, and that one of them was the object that came in contact with the injured vessel. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Cirouit. Libel by the Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Navigation Company against the Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal. Decree limiting respondent's liability was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (250 Fed. 1021, 162 C. C. A. 664), and the Navigation Company brings certiorari. Affirmed. Messrs. Van Vechten Veeder and Roscoe H. Hupper, both of New York City, for petitioner. Messrs. Samuel Park and Henry E. Mattison, both of New York City, for respondent. 51 *Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a libel in admiralty brought by the petitioner against the respondent for a collision with the petitioner's steamship Vauban while it was moored at a pier in Brooklyn. The respondent does not deny liability but claims the right to limit it under Rev. Stats. §§ 4283, 4284 and 4285 (Comp. St. §§ 8023-8025), to the value of the vessel that caused the damage. The moving cause was the respondent's steam tug Intrepid which was proceeding up the East River, with a car flat loaded with railroad cars lashed to its port side and on its starboard side a dis *52 abled tug, both belonging to the *respondent. By a stipulation dated August 3, 1917, it was agreed that the damage sustained was $28,036.98 with $5,539.84 interest. The value of the tug Intrepid was found to be $5,750, and the liability of the respondent was limited by the District Court to that sum with interest. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree without an opinion. 250 Fed. 1021, 162 C. C. A. 664. The case is brought here on the question whether the value of the whole flotilla should not have been in cluded in the decree. John Fraser, 21 How. 184, 16 L. Ed. 106; The J. P. Donaldson, 167, U. S. 599, 603, 604, 17 Sup. Ct. 951, 42 L. Ed. 292; The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 474, 475, 29 Sup. Ct. 339, 53 L. Ed. 600; Union Steamship Co. v. Owners of the Aracan, L. R. 6 P. C. 127. The rule is not changed by the ownership of the vessels. The John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113, 123, 18 Sup. Ct. 544, 42 L. Ed. 969; The W. G. Mason, 142 Fed. 913, 917, 74 C. C. A. 83; The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 475, 29 Sup. Ct. 339, 53 L. Ed. 600; L. R. 6 P. С. 127, 133. These cases show that for the purposes of liability the passive instrument of the harm does not become one with the actively responsible vessel by being attached to it. If this were a proceeding in rem it may be assumed that the car float and disabled tug would escape, and none the less that they were lashed to the Intrepid and so were more helplessly under its control than in the ordinary case of a tow. It is said, however, that when you come to limiting liability the foregoing authorities are not controlling that the object of the statute is "to limit the liability of vessel owners to their interest in the adventure," The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 131, 14 Sup. Ct. 486, 488 (38 L. Ed. 381), and that the same reason that requires the surrender of boats and apparel requires the surrender of the other instrumentalities by means of which the tug was rendering the services for 53 which it was paid. It can make no difference, it is argued. whether the cargo is carried in the hold of the tug or is towed in another vessel. But that is the question, and it is not answered by putting it. The respondent answers the argument with the suggestion that if sound it applies a different rule in actions in personam from that which as we have said, governs suits in rem. Without dwelling upon that, we are of opinion that the statute does not warrant the distinction for which the appellant contends. The statute follows the lead of European countries, as stated in The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 126, 127, 14 Sup. Ct. 486, 38 L. Ed. 381. Whatever may be the doubts as to the original grounds for limiting liability to the ship or with regard to the historic starting point for holding the ship responsible as a moving cause, The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, 366, 367, 25 Sup. Ct. 46, 49 L. Ed. 236, it seems a permissible conjecture that both principles, if not rooted in the same conscious thought, at least were influenced by the same semi-conscious attitude of mind. When the continental law came to be followed by Congress, no doubt, alongside of the de For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (40 Sup.Ct.) to the beginning of the term, instead of an- FOR COMPENSATION OF RAILROAD VOLUNTARI- Prior to Act July 28, 1916, with the exception of certain roads aided by land grants, railroads were not required by law to carry the mails, and a road which voluntarily accept sire to give our shipowners a chance to com- *54 words of the *statute are: "The liability of the owner of any vessel for any injury by collision shall in no case exceed the value of the interest of such owner in such vessel." The literal meaning of the sentence is reinforced by the words "in no case." For clearly the liability would be made to exceed the interest of the owner "in such vessel" if you said frankly, In some cases we propose to count other vessels in although they are not "such vessel"; and it comes to the same thing when you profess a formal compliance with the words but reach the result by artifically construing "such vessel" to include other vessels if only they are tied to it. Earlier cases in the Second Circuit had disposed of the question there, and those in other circuits for the most part if not wholly are reconcilable with them. We are of opinion that the decision was right. The Transfer No. 21, 248 Fed. 459, 160 C. C. A. 469; The W. G. Mason, 142 Fed. 913, 74 C. C. A. 83; The Erie Lighter 108 (D. C.) 250 Fed. 490, 497, 498; Van Eyken v. Erie R. Co. (D. C.) 117 Fed. 712, 717. Decree affirmed. (251 U. S. 123) ed and performed the service with knowledge of what the United States intended to pay under Rev. St. § 4002 (Comp. St. § 7483), as amended, cannot later claim an implied contract for a greater sum; the possibility that by failing to carry the road would incur the hostility of those along its lines not amounting to compulsion by the United States, forming the basis of a justiciable claim against them for taking Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Suit by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Company against the United States. From a judgment dismissing the petition on demurrer (53 Ct. Cl. 222), petitioner appeals. Affirmed. Messrs. Edward G. Buckland, of New Haven, Conn., and S. S. Ashbaugh, of Washington, D. C., for appellant. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Brown, for the United States. *126 *Mr. Justice MCKEYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant sued the United States to recover the difference between amounts received through the Post Office Department and what it claims should have been paid for its services in carrying the mails during a series of years, ending June 30, 1914. The demand is based upon implied contracts alleged to arise from the following circumstances: First. Acceptance and transportation of the mails in reliance upon section 4002, Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 7483), as amended. This directs payment of specified sums per mile per annum according to weights; and the claim is that because the Post Office Department improperly construed and applied it, appellant received much less than it should have. Second. Acceptance and trans NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO. v. UNITED portation of the mails under orders and co STATES. ercion of the Post Office Department, followed by failure to allow reasonable compensa (Argued May 2, 1919. Decided Dec. 8, 1919.) tion therefor. Appellant claims its property No. 74. 1. POST OFFICE 21(4)-TIME FOR WEIGHING MAIL TO DETERMINE COMPENSATION DUE RAILROAD, was taken for public use and adequate compensation must be paid. [1] Concerning the challenged interpretation and application of section 4002, Revised Statutes, resulting in payments during each Payments by the United States to a mail- four-year term upon the basis of weights carrying railroad pursuant to Rev. St. § 4002 (Comp. St. § 7483), during each four-year term, taken *immediately prior to the beginning of on the basis of weight taken immediately prior the same, instead of annually, it suffices to *127 For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes TIONALITY OF PROVISION MAKING NEGLI- say that the action taken accords with prior 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW305-CONSTITUpractice followed for many years, the letter of the statute permits it, the carrier submitted with full knowledge, and, impliedly at least, it was sanctioned by this court in Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 385, 39 Sup. Ct. 348, 63 L. Ed. 659. [2] We think it must be treated as settled doctrine that prior to Act July 28, 1916, c. 261, 39 Stat. 412, 429-with the exception of certain roads aided by land grants-railroads were not required by law to carry the mails. Eastern R. R. Co. v. United States, 129 U. S. 391, 394, 9 Sup. Ct. 320, 32 L. Ed. 730; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 640, 650, 32 Sup. Ct. 702, 56 L. Ed. 1236. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co. v. United States, supra. And as appellant voluntarily accepted and performed the service with knowledge of what the United States intended to pay, it cannot now claim an implied contract for a greater sum. It may be that any railroad by failing to carry the mails would incur the hostility of those living along its lines and as a consequence suffer serious financial losses; but the fear of such results certainly does not amount to compulsion by the United States and cannot constitute the basis of a justiciable claim against them for taking property. The Court of Claims (53 Ct. Cl. 222) dismissed the petition upon demurrer, and its judgment is Affirmed. Mr. Justice BRANDEIS dissents. (251 U. S. 54) CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO. 7. COLE. (Submitted on Motion to Dismiss or Affirm No. 290. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW105-NO VESTED RIGHT TO DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PERSON ON TRACK, A railroad company, which ran over and killed plaintiff's intestate standing on its track, had no vested right to the defense of contributory negligence. 2. JURY11 (5) - FEDERAL CONSTITUTION NO LIMITATION ON STATE AS TO RIGHTS TO JURY TRIAL. A state is not compelled by the federal Constitution or its amendments to maintain the familiar line between the functions of the jury and those of the court, but may do away with the jury altogether, modify its Constitution or the requirements of a verdict, or the procedure before the jury, and may confer larger powers on the jury than those generally prevailing. Const. Okl. art. 23, § 6, providing that the defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk shall in all cases be a question of fact, and at all times left to the jury, held not violative of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, in its application to a railroad whose train killed plaintiff's decedent when he stepped on its track as a train was approaching in full view; the railroad not being entitled to complain that its chance to prevail on a certain ground was diminished, when the ground might have been altogether removed. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. Action by Eva Roberts Cole, as administratrix of the estate of A. W. Roberts, deceased, for herself and others, against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. To review a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brought error to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, which affirmed, and defendant brings error. Judgment affirmed. Messrs. R. J. Roberts, of El Reno, Okl., and Thomas P. Littlepage and Sidney F. Taliaferro, both of Washington, D. C., for plain tiff in error. *Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action brought by the defendant in error for knocking down and killing her intestate, Roberts. He stepped upon the railroad track when a train was approaching in full view and was killed. It may be assumed, as the State court assumed, that, if the question were open for a ruling of law, it would be ruled that the plaintiff could not recover. But the Oklahoma Constitution provides that "the defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left to the jury." Article 23, § 6. The case was left to the jury and they found a verdict for the plaintiff. Judgment was entered for her and was affirmed on error by the Supreme Court of the State, which held that the provision applied to the case and that when so applied it did not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. [1-3] The State Constitution was in force when the death occurred and therefore the defendant had only such right to the defense of contributory negligence as that Constitution allowed. The argument that the Railroad Company had a vested right to that defense is disposed of by the decisions that it may be taken away altogether. Arizona Em For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |