end might be accomplished. The commission | United States intervened. On first report of was directed to act, if it had reason to be- receiver. Order entered instructing receiver. lieve that an "unfair method of competition in commerce has been or is being used." The purpose of Congress was to prevent any unfair method which may have been used by any concern in competition from becoming its general practice. It was only by stopping its *442 use before it became a general practice, that the apprehended effect of an unfair method in suppressing competition by destroying rivals could be averted. As the Circuit Court of Appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to support the facts set forth above, and since on those facts the commission could reasonably hold that the method of competition in question was unfair under the circumstances, it had power under the act to issue the order complained of. In my opinion the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed. STATE OF OKLAHOMA v. STATE OF TEX- (Decided June 7, 1920.) In Equity. Original suit by the State of Oklahoma against the State of Texas, in which the United States intervened. On motions by the Judsonia Developing Association and others for leave to file petitions in intervention. Motions granted. See, also, 40 Sup. Ct. 353, 64 L. Ed. -; 40 Sup. Ct. 394, 64 L. Ed.-; 253 U. S. 465, 40 Sup. Ct. 580, 64 L. Ed. -; 40 Sup. Ct. 582, 64 L. Ed. -. See, also, 40 Sup. Ct. 353, 64 L. Ed. -; 40 Sup. Ct. 394, 64 L. Ed. -; 40 Sup. Ct. 580, 64 L. Ed. -; 40 Sup. Ct. 582, 64 L. Ed. -. Order Instructing Receiver. PER CURIAM. Upon consideration of the first report of Frederic A. Delano, receiver, in the above-entitled cause, and of the supple mental report of June 3, 1920, and the various suggestions of the United States, intervener, and of the state of Texas, and of the several motions, applications, exceptions, and suggestions heretofore filed by parties claiming an interest in the subject-matter of this suit, it is this 7th day of June, A. D. 1920, adjudged and ordered that the action of said receiver in taking possession of and operating under his own management and control the property described in the order of this court of April 1, 1920, until the further order of this court, including the oil and gas wells and plants, toll bridges, water plants, tank wagons, pipe lines, storage tanks, and other property located thereon and therein; the arrangements made by said receiver for guarding and policing said property; the office and *466 field organization created by him for the operation and development of the property and the resources thereof, and for collecting, conserving, and investing the proceeds of the sale of all oil, gas, gasoline, and other products taken therefrom since April 1, 1920, be, and they are hereby, ratified and approved. 2. So much of the land described in the or der of this court of April 1, 1920, in range 14 west, as lies between the south edge of the present sand bed of the Red river (marked generally by the border line of vegetation along the edge of the flood plain) and the foot of the Texas bluff, as was on the 1st day of April, 1920, in the possession of persons claiming under patents from the state of Texas, and is not included in the river-bed lands, as hereinafter defined, shall be returned by the receiver to the several operators or claimants in possession on April 1, 1920, or their assigns, together with all wells, tanks, pipe lines, structures, equipment, and material, upon condition that such operator, claimant, or assigns account for, pay over to, and impound with the receiver, if not already done, three-sixteenths of the gross proceeds of all oil taken from the respective lands on and since April 1, 1920, and the royalty on commercial gas customary in the Burk-Burnett and Northwest Extension oil fields, and royalty on casing-head gas in accordance with the regulations and schedule of prices promulgated for Indian lands by the Secretary of the Interior August 10, 1917, the proceeds thereof to be either paid in cash, or the pay (40 Sup.Ct.) ment thereof within 90 days to be secured by good and sufficient surety to be approved by the receiver, and upon the further condition that said operator or claimant shall enter into an agreement in writing with the receiver, by the terms of which the operator shall develop and operate said properties in a workmanlike and businesslike manner, subject to the supervision of the receiver and to the orders of this court, and shall impound with the receiver three-sixteenths of the gross amount of the proceeds from the sale of *467 vision, but excluding any allowance for general or office supervision; (2) to refund to those operators or drillers who have drilled and brought into production new wells in said area since April 1, 1920, a fair percentage of the entire actual cost of such work, including a reasonable allowance for field supervision, but excluding any allowance for general or office supervision; (3) to pay the just claims of mechanics and materialmen for work done and materials furnished on wells in said area brought in since April 1, 1920, and the claims of persons, associations, and corporations for advancements made in good faith for drilling operations upon such wells, provided satisfactory evidence of the existence of all of such claims oil *thereafter produced, and the royalty on of water to the oil sands or oil-bearing strata 5. Said receiver is further authorized and to the destruction or injury of the oil depos- directed to release and surrender to the lawits or the damage of wells in the possession ful owners thereof (1) all oil and gas stored of the receiver; and, provided further, that the receiver, in his discretion, may agree with any operator or claimant to operate for his benefit and at his expense the lands in said "Big Bend" area. Until the several operators or claimants comply with the foregoing conditions, the receiver shall retain possession of the respective properties and shall operate the same in accordance with the order of this court of April 1, 1920, as modified by this order. In the event of failure or refusal of any operator to operate the property as directed by the receiver, or if any operator shall violate his agreement with the receiver, the receiver is authorized to take possession of and operate such property, impound three-sixteenths of the proceeds as provided by this order, and pay out of said proceeds the expenses of operation, keeping a separate account of the expense of production of each well as nearly as practicable. 3. The river-bed lands, for the purposes of this order, shall comprise all lands not here within the receivership area which is shown by evidence satisfactory to him to have been produced by operations outside of said area ; (2) all machinery, tools and other equipment stored within the receivership area when the receiver took possession and not actually used in the production, storage, transportation, etc., of the oil and gas products thereof, and such other machinery, tools, drilling rigs and similar apparatus found within the receivership area as may not be required for the receivership operations; (3) all oil, gas and the products thereof which are shown by evidence satisfactory to the receiver to have been produced by operations outside of the receivership area, but which were mingled and stored with similar products produced within said area on and subsequent to April 1, 1920. 6. Said receiver is further authorized and directed (1) to arrange for the sale and dis *469 position of all oil, gas, *gasoline, water, and other products of said property; (2) to take possession and license the operation of ali inbefore excepted, being more specifically toll bridges within the receivership area, and that part covered by the receivership of all the broad and approximately flat sandy stretch which extends from the foot of the bluff or to regulate and limit the tolls chargeable thereon; (3) to sell at the best price obtainable, properly credit and account for, such the edge of the flood plain, as the case may derricks, tanks, pipe lines, tools, appliances be, on the south side of the river, to the midchannel of the river as defined in said order of April 1, 1920, and as it then existed including everything within the bounds just described. 4. It is further ordered that said receiver be and he is hereby authorized and directed, out of the gross proceeds derived from the *468 and materials not claimed by the owners thereof and not required for the receiver's operations; (4) to purchase at the best price obtainable such tanks, machinery, appliances, tools, motor cars, and equipment, as may be necessary for the operation, protection, and development of the property in his charge; (5) to retain and employ whatever technical or other assistants he may require or may deem necessary to satisfactorily operate, develop and protect the property in his charge, production of any well in the river-bed area paid to him since April 1, 1920: (1) To pay to the operator or operators of any such well the actual cost of operating the same since fix the terms of employment and the rate of April 1, 1920, inclusive, including in such compensation; (6) to make such banking arcost a reasonable allowance for field super- rangements as he may deem necessary to petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. No. 863. Samuel L. SNEIERSON, petition- Gen., and Mr. Franklin G. Wixson, for the Uniter, v. The UNITED STATES of America. ed States. Petition for a writ of certiorari June 1, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 268. Messrs. Wm. Shaw McCallum, David for the Fifth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 490) Stoneman, and Wm. H. Garland, all of Boston, (253 U. S. 491) No. 880. F. H. ORCUTT & SON COMPANY et al., petitioners, v. NATIONAL TRUST & CREDIT COMPANY. June 1, 1920. For opinion below, see 265 Fed. 267. Messrs. Harrison Musgrave and William S. Oppenheim, both of Chicago, Ill., for petitioners. Messrs. James W. Hyde, John W. Creekmur, and Donald J. De Wolfe, all of Chicago, Ill., for respondents. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 491) = No. 885. The CHESAPEAKE STEAM SHIP COMPANY OF BALTIMORE CITY, owner, etc., et al., petitioners, v. Frank HAND, master, etc. June 1, 1920. For opinion below, see 266 Fed. 641. Messrs. Hughes, Vandeventer & Eggleston, of Norfolk, Va. (Mr. Floyd Hughes, of Norfolk, Va., of counsel), for petitioners. Messrs. Hughes, Little & Sewaell, of Norfolk, Va. (Mr. R. M. Hughes, of Norfolk, Va., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. No. 907. Arnold Jacob UHL, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 1, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 79. Mr. William Augustus Denson, of Birmingham, Ala., for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. W. C. Herron, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 492) No. 914. CURACAO TRADING COMPANY (Curacaosche Handel Mattschappij), petitioner, v. Carl BJORGE, master and claimant, etc., et al. June 1, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 693. Messrs. J. Blanc Monroe and Monte M. Lemann, both of New Orleans, La., for petitioner. Messrs. Terriberry, Rice & Young, of New Orleans, La. (Mr. W. W. Young, of New Orleans, La., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. No. 938. SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, appellant, v. Franklin K. LANE, Secretary of the Interior, et al. June 1, 1920. See, also, 263 Fed. 637. Mr. A. A. Hoehling, Jr., of Washington, D. C., for the motion. Substitution of John Barton Payne, present Secretary of the Interior, in the place of Franklin K. Lane, former Secretary of the Interior, as a party appellee, ordered on motion of Mr. A. A. Hoehling in that behalf. No.-, Original. Ex parte in the matter of CHICAGO ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, petitioner. June 7. (40 Sup.Ct.) 1920. Motion for leave to file petition for a a rule to show cause awarded returnable Monday, October 4 next. No. 7, Original. The STATE OF ARKANSAS, complainant, v. The STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. June 7, 1920. See, also, 252 U. S. 344, 40 Sup. Ct. 333, 64 L. Ed. 605. Messrs. Walter P. Armstrong and J. M. Moore, of Little Rock, Ark., and Herbert Pope, of Chicago, Ill., for complainant. Messrs. Garner W. Green, of Jackson, Miss., Gerald Fitz Gerald, of Clarksdale, Miss., and Ross A. Collins, of Jackson, Miss., for respondent. Motion to stay further proceedings in this cause denied. (253 U. S. 477) No. 22, Original. The STATE OF GEORGIA, complainant, v. The STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA. June 7, 1920. See, also, 39 Sup. Ct. 258, 64 L. Ed. -. Mr. Clifford Walker, of Monroe, Ga., for complainant. Messrs. A. M. Lumpkin, of Columbia, S. C., and Sam M. Wolfe, Atty. Gen., for respondent. Motion for the appointment of a special master to take such testimony as may be necessary and to receive in evidence such exhibits as may be offered by the parties hereto, granted, and, on the suggestion of counsel for both parties, Mr. Charles S. Douglas, of Washington, D. C., appointed as such special master and directed to report the testimony and exhibits to the court without conclusions of law or findings of fact. (253 U. S. 478) = No. 3. The UNITED STATES of America, appellant, v. READING COMPANY et al.; and No. 4. READING COMPANY et al., appellants, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For former opinion, see 253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425, 64 L. Ed. -. The Attorney General, for the United States. Messrs. Henry S. Drinker, Jr., Charles Heebner, Abraham M. Beitler and William Jay Turner, all of Philadelphia, Pa., and Jackson E. Reynolds, of New York City, and William Clarke Mason, of Philadelphia, Pa., for respondents. Motions to modify the decree in these cases denied. No. 27, Original. The STATE OF OKLAHOMA, complainant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS. June 7, 1920. See, also, 40 Sup. Ct. 585, 64 L. Ed. - Messrs. W. A. Ledbetter and H. L. Stuart, both of Oklahoma City, Okl., for complainant. Ordered that this cause be set down for hearing on the 15th day of November, 1920, upon certain questions, and that the parties be permitted to take and present testimony, and Ernest Knaebel, Esq., of the District of Columbia, appointed commissioner to take said evidence and report the same to the court without findings or conclusions. No. 27, Original. The STATE OF OKLAHOMA, complainant, v. The STATE OF TEXAS. June 7, 1920. See, also, 40 Sup. Ct. 585, 64 L. Ed. -. Messrs. W. A. Ledbetter and H. L. Stuart, both of Oklahoma City, Okl., for complainant. Leave granted to file intervening petitions on behalf of Judsonia Developing Association, the Burke Divide Oil Company Nos. 2 and 3, and Mellish Consolidated Placer Oil Mining Association; and similar leave is granted to any and all other parties claiming any title to or interest in the lands in the possession of the receiver herein by virtue of the orders of April 1, 1920, and June 7, 1920. No. 298. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY et al., plaintiffs in error, v. W. H. JENKINS et al. June 7, 1920. See, also, 252 U. S. 589, 40 Sup. Ct. 393, 64 L. Ed. -. Messrs. Charles H. Sloan, of Geneva, Neb., and William E. Flynn, of No. Platte, Neb., for plaintiffs in error. Motion to vacate the judgment of dismissal and restore this cause to the docket denied. No. 411. Morris ZUCKER, plaintiff in error, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. Mr. Louis B. Boudin, of New York City, for plaintiff in error. The Attorney General, for the United States. Motion to vacate the stay order in this cause granted. No. 489. SILVER KING COALITION MINES COMPANY, petitioner, v. CONKLING MINING COMPANY. June 7, 1920. See, also, 250 U. S. 655, 40 Sup. Ct. 13, 63 L. Ed. 1192. Messrs. Curtis H. Lindley, of San Francisco. Cal., W. H. Dickson, A. C. Ellis, Jr., and Thomas Marioneaux, all of Salt Lake City, Utah, for petitioner. Motion to vacate the order allowing a writ of certiorari in this case denied. (253 U. S. 492) No. 730. BOSTON WEST AFRICA TRADING COMPANY, petitioner, v. QUAKER CITY MOROCCO COMPANY. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 665. Messrs. Lee M. Friedman and Friedman & Atherton, all of Boston, Mass., for petitioner. Messrs. William L. Putnam, Joseph B. Jacobs, Putnam, Putnam & Bell, and Jacobs & Jacobs, all of Boston, Mass., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. No. 734. The UNITED STATES, appellant, v. L. P. & J. A. SMITH. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 54 Ct. Cl. 119. Motion to remand this cause to the Court of Claims for additional findings granted. (253 U. S. 477) No. 810. LINCOLN GAS & ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, appellant, v. The CITY OF LINCOLN et al. June 7, 1920, Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska. Messrs. Charles A. Frueauff, of New York City, Max V. Beghtol, of Lincoln, Neb., and Frueauff, Robinson & Sloan of New York City (Mr. Robert Burns, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant. Mr. C. Petrus Peterson, of Lincoln, Neb., for appellees. 1 quire the eye of a seer to see contention at | Fourteenth Amendment which would have the bar of this Court against liberal, paramount, congressional definition of intoxicating liquors as strenuous and determined as that which we have witnessed over the strict definition of the Volstead Act. With respect to the eleventh conclusion of the Court, it is enough to say that it approves as valid a definition of liquor as intoxicating which is expressly admitted not to be intoxicating in each of the cases in which it is considered. This is deemed warranted, I suppose, as legislation appropriate to the enforcement of the first section and precedent is found for it in prohibition legislation by states. But I cannot agree that the prohibition of the manufacture, sale, etc., of intoxicating liquors in the first section of the Eighteenth Amendment gives that plenary power over the subject which the Legislatures of the states derive from the people or which may be derived from the war *411 powers of the Constitution. Believing, as I do, that the scope of the first section cannot constitutionally be enlarged by the language contained in the second section, I dissent from this conclusion of the Court. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall 36, 21 L. Ed. 394, and other cases, this Court was urged to give a construction to the radically changed the whole constitutional theory of the relations of our state and federal governments by transferring to the general government that police power, through the exercise of which the people of the various states theretofore regulated their local affairs in conformity with the widely differing standards of life, of conduct and of duty which must necessarily prevail in a country of so great extent as ours, with its varieties of climate, of industry and of habits of the people. But this Court, resisting the pressure of the passing hour, maintained the integrity of state control over local affairs to the extent that it had not been deliberately and clearly surrendered to the general government, in a number of decisions which came to command the confidence even of the generation active when they were rendered and which have been regarded by our succeeding generation as sound and wise and highly fortunate for our country. The cases now before us seem to me to again present questions of like character to, and of not less importance than, those which were presented in those great cases, and I regret profoundly that I cannot share in the disposition which the majority of my Associates think should be made of them. END OF CASES IN VOL. 40. |