CHAP. 6.] POPULAR GOVERNMENT. 265 of a congenial temper in the people, and because, as the public wish is the natural measure of sound political institutions, even beneficial changes ought not to be forced upon them against their own consent. The pubi:e mind, however, should be enlightened by a government. The legislato: who perceives that another form of government is better for his country. does not do all his duty if he declares himself willing to concur in the alteration when the country desires it: he should create that desire by showing its reasonableness.-Unhappily there is a vis inertie in governments of which the tendency is opposite to this. The interests which prompt men to maintain things as they are, and dread of innovation, and sluggishness, and indifference, occasion governments to be among the last portion of the community to diffuse knowledge respecting political truth. But when the public mind has by any means become enlightened, so that the public voice demands an alteration of an existing form, it is one of the plainest as well as one of the greatest duties of a government to make the alteration: not reluctantly but joyfully, not urging the prescription of ages, and what is called "the wisdom of our ancestors," but philosophically, yet soberly, accommodating present institutions to the present state of mankind. If, then, it is asked by what general rule forms of government should be regulated, I would say,-Accommodate the form to the opinion of the community, whatever that community may prefer: and, adopt institutions such as will facilitate the peaceable admission of alterations as greater light and knowledge become diffused. I would not say to the sultan, Adopt the constitution of England to-morrow; because the sudden transition would probably effect, for a long time, more evil than good. I would not say to the King of France, Descend from the throne and establish a democracy; because I do not think, and experience does not teach us to think, that democracy, even if it were theoretically best, is best for France at the present day. Turning, indeed, to the probable future condition of the world, there is reason to think that the popular branches of all governments will progressively increase in influence, and perhaps eventually predominate. This appears to be the natural consequence of the increasing power of public opinion. The public judgment is not only the proper, but almost the necessary, eventual measure of political institutions; and it appears evident that as that judgment becomes enlightened, it will be exercised, and that, as it is exercised, it will prevail. The expression of public opinion upon political affairs, and consequently the influence of that opinion, partakes obviously of the principles of popular government. If public opinion governs, it must govern by some agency by which public opinion is expressed; and this expression can in no way so naturally be effected as by some modification of popular authority. These considerations, which appear obvious to reasoning, are enforced by experience. There is a manifest tendency in the world to the increase of the power of the public voice; and the effect is seen in the new constitutions which have been established in the New World and in the Old. Few permanent revolutions are effected in which the community do not acquire additional influence in governing themselves. It will not perhaps be disputed, that if the world were wise and good, the best form of government would be that of democracy in a very simple state. Nothing would be wanting but to ascertain the general wish and to collect the general wisdom. If, therefore, the present propriety of 266 CHARACTER OF LEGISLATORS. [ESSAY III. other forms of government results from the present condition of mankind, there is reason to suppose that they may gradually lapse away, as that condition, moral and intellectual, is improved. Whether mankind are thus improving readers may differently decide; and their various decisions will lead to various conclusions respecting the future predominance of the public voice: the writer of these pages is one who thinks that the world is improving, that virtue as well as knowledge is extending its power; and therefore that, as ages roll along, every form of government but that which consists in some organ of the general mind will gradually pass away. It may be hoped, too, that this gradual lapse will be occasioned, without solicitude on the part of those who then possess privileges or power, to retain either to themselves. That same state of virtue and excellence which enabled the people almost immediately to govern themselves would prevent others from wishing to retain the reins. Purer motives than the love of greatness, of power, or of wealth would influence them in the choice of their political conduct. They might have no motive so powerful as the promotion of the general weal As no limit can be assigned to that degree of excellence which it may please the Universal Parent eventually to diffuse through the world,-s none can be assigned to the simplicity and purity of the form in which government shall be carried on. In truth, the mind, as it passes onward and still onward in its anticipations of purity, stops not until it arrives at that period when all government shall cease; when there shall be no wickedness to require the repressing arm of power; when terror to the evil-doers and praise to them that do well, shall no longer be needed, because none will do evil though there be no ruler to punish, and all will do well from higher and better motives than the praise of man. In speaking of political constitutions, it is not sufficiently remembered in how great a degree good government depends upon the character and the virtue of those who shall conduct it. There is much of truth in the political maxim that "whatever is best administered is best." But how shall good administration be secured except by the good dispositions of the administrators? The great present concern of mankind, in the selection of their legislators, respects their political opinions rather than their moral and Christian character. This exclusive reference to political biases is surely unwise-because it leaves the passions and interests to operate without that control which individual virtue only can impart. Thus we are obliged to contrive reins and curbs for the public servants, as the charioteer contrives them for an unruly horse; too much forgetting that the best means of securing the safety of the vehicle of state are found in the good dispositions of those who move it onward. Political tendencies are important, but they are not the most important point: mora! tendencies are the first and the greatest. The question in England should be, less, "ministerialist or oppositionist?" in America, less, "federalist or republican?" than in both, "a good or a bad man?" Rectitude of intention is the primary requisite; and whatever preference I might give to superiority of talents and to political principles, above all, and before all, I should prefer the enlightened Christian: knowing that his character is the best pledge of political uprightness, and that political uprightness is the best security of good government. CHAP. 7.] POLITICAL INFLUENCE. 267 CHAPTER VII. POLITICAL INFLUENCE-PARTY-MINISTERIAL UNION. THE system of governing by influence appears to be a substitute for the government of force,-an intermediate step between awing by the sword and directing by reason and virtue. When the general character of political measures is such that reason and virtue do not sufficiently support them to recommend them, on their own merits, to the public approbation, these measures must be rejected, or they must be supported by foreign means: and when, by the political institutions of a people, force is necessarily excluded, nothing remains but to have recourse to some species of influence. There is another ground upon which influence becomes, in a certain sense, necessary,-which is, that there is.so much imperfection of virtue in the majority of legislators, they are so much guided by interested, or ambitious, or party motives, that, for a measure to be recommended by its own excellence is sometimes not sufficient to procure their concurrence; and thus it happens that influence is resorted to, not merely because public measures are deficient in purity, but because there is a deficiency of uprightness in public men. While political affairs continue to be conducted on their present, or nearly on their present, principles, I believe influence is necessary to the stability of almost all governments. How else shall they be supported? They are not sufficiently virtuous to bespeak the general and unbiased support of the nations; and without support of some kind, they must fall. That which Hume says of England is perhaps true of all civilized states: "The influence which the crown acquires from the disposal of places, honours, and preferments may become too forcible, but it cannot altogether be abolished without the total destruction of monarchy, and even of all regular authority."* A mournful truth it is! because it necessarily implies one of two things-either that the acts of "authority" do not recommend themselves by their own excellences, or that subjects are too little principled to be influenced by such excellences alone. While the generality of subjects continue to be what they are, influence is inseparable from the privilege of appointing to offices. With whomsoever that privilege is intrusted, he will possess influence, and consequently power. Multitudes are hoping for the gifts which he has to bestow; and they accommodate their conduct to his wishes, in order to propitiate his favour and to obtain the reward. When they have obtained it, they call themselves bound in gratitude to continue their deference; and thus the influence and the power is continually possessed. Now there is no way of destroying this influence but by making men good: for until they are good, they will continue to sacrifice their judgments to their interests, and support men or measures, not because they are right, but because the support is attended with reward. It matters little in morals by whom the power of bestowing offices is possessed, * History of England. 268 POLITICAL INFLUENCE. [ESSAY III. unless you can ensure the virtue of the bestower. Politicians may talk of taking the power from crowns and vesting it in senates; but it will be of little avail to change the hands who distribute, if you cannot change the hearts. If a man should ask whether the influence of the crown in this country might not usefully be transferred to the House of Commons, I should answer, No. Not merely because it would overthrow (for it certainly would overthrow) the monarchy, but because I know not that any security would be gained for a better employment of this influence than is possessed already. In all but arbitrary governments it appears indispensable that much of the privilege of appointing to offices should rest with the executive power. It is the peculiar source of its authority. In our own government, the peers possess power independently of their political character, and the commons possess it as representatives of the public mind; but where, without influence, would be the power of the king? So it is in America. They have two representative bodies, and a third estate in the office of their president. But that president could not execute the functions of a third estate, nor the office of an executive governor, without having the means of influencing the people. I do not know whether it was with the determinate object of giving to the president a competent share of power that the Americans invested him with the privilege of appointing to offices, but it is not to be questioned tnat if they had not done it the fabric of their government would speedily have fallen. The degree of this influence, which may be required to give stability to an executive body (and therefore to a constitution) will vary with the character of its own policy. The more widely that policy deviates from rectitude, the greater will be the demand for influence to induce concurrence in its measures. The degree of influence that is actually exerted by a government is therefore no despicable criterion of the excellence of its practice. In the United States, the degree is less than in England; and it may therefore be feared that we are inferior to them in the purity of the general administration of the affairs of state. But let it be constantly borne in mind, that when we thus speak of the "necessity" for influence to support governments, we speak only of governments as they are, and of nations as they are. There is no necessity for influence to support good government over a good people. All influence but that which addresses itself to the judgment is wrong,wrong in morals, and therefore indefensible upon whatever plea. Influence is in part necessary to a government in the same sense as oppression is necessary to a slave-trader,—not because the captain is a man, but because he has taken up the trade in slaves:-not because the ment is a government, but because it conducts so many political affairs upon unchristian principles, or in an unchristian manner. The captain says, I cannot secure my slaves without oppression:-Let them go free. The government says, I cannot conduct my system without influence :Make the system good. govern And here arises the observation, that if a government should faithfully act upon moral principles, that demand for influence which is occasioned by the ill principles of senators or the public would be diminished or done away. The opposition which governments are wont to experience, indefensible as that opposition frequently is,-is the result, principally, of the general character of political systems. Men, seeing that integrity and purity are sacrificed by a government to other considera CHAP. 7.] INCONGRUITY OF PUBLIC NOTIONS. 269 tions, adopt kindred means of opposing it. If I reason with a man upon the impropriety of his conduct, he will probably listen: if I use violence, he will probably use violence in return. There is no reason to doubt, that if political measures were more uniformly conformable with the sober judgments of a community, respect and affection would soon become so general and powerful, that that clamorous opposition which it is now attempted to oppose by influence would be silenced by the public voice. Besides, the very fact that influence is exercised animates opposition to measures of state. The possession of power-that is, in a great degree, of influence is a tempting bait; and it cannot be doubted that some range themselves against an executive body, not so much from objections to its measures as from desire of its power. Take away the influence, therefore, and you take away one operative cause of opposition,-one great obstacle to the free progress of the vessel of state. "All influence but that which addresses itself to the judgment is wrong." Of the moral offence which this influence implies, many are guilty who oppose governments as well as those who support them, or as governments themselves. It is evidently not a whit more virtuous to exert influence in opposing governments than in supporting them: nor, indeed, is it so virtuous. To what is a man influenced? Obviously, to do that which, without the influence, he would not do ;-that is to say, he is induced to violate his judgment at the request or at the will of other men. It can need no argument to show that this is vicious. In truth, it is vicious in a very high degree; for to conform our conduct to our own sober judgment is one of the first dictates of the moral law: and the viciousness is so much the greater, because the express purpose for which a man is appointed to legislate is that the community may have the benefit of his uninfluenced judgment. Breach of trust is added to the sacrifice of individual integrity. A nation can gain nothing by the knowledge or experience of a million of "influenced" legislators. It is curious, that the submission to influence which men often practise as legislators they would abhor as judges. What should we say of a judge or a juryman who accepted a place or a promise as a bribe for an unjust sentence? We should prosecute the juryman, and address the parliament for a removal of the judge. Is it then of so much less consequence in what manner affairs of state are conducted than the affairs of individuals, that that which would be disgraceful in one case is reputable in another? No account can be given of this strange incongruity of public notions, than that custom has in one case blinded our eyes, and in the other has taught us to see. Let the legislator who would abhor to accept a purse to bribe him to write Ignoramus upon a true bill, apply the principle upon which his abhorrence is founded to his political conduct. When our moral principles are consistent, these incongruities will cease. When uniform truth takes the place of vulgar practice and opinion, these incongruities will become wonderful for their absurdity; and men will scarcely believe that their fathers, who could see so clearly, saw so ill. The same sort of stigma which now attaches to Lord Bacon will attach to multitudes who pass for honourable persons in the present day. A man may lawfully, no doubt, take a more active part in political measures in compliance with the wishes of another than he might otherwise incline to do; but to support the measures of an opposition or an administration because they are their measures can never be lawful. Nor can it ever be lawful to magnify the advantages or to expatiate upon |