BRITISH CONSTITUTION. 275 given up their offices when the senate has rejected their measures. This is an unequivocal indication of the wrong station in which cabinets are placed in the legislature,-because it indicates, that if a cabinet cannot carry its point it is supposed to be unfit for its office. All this is natural enough upon the present system, but it is very unnatural when cabinets are regarded, either in their ministerial capacity, as executive officers, or in their legislative capacity, as ordinary members of the senate Executive officers are to do what the constitution and the legislature direct; members of a senate are to assist that legislature in directing aright in all which, no necessity is involved for ministers to resign their offices because the measures which they think best are not thought best by the majority. That a ministry should sometimes judge amiss is to be expected, because it is to be expected of all men: but surely in a sound state of political institutions, their fallibility would not be a necessary argument of unfitness for their offices, nor would the rejection of some of their opinions be a necessary evidence of a loss of the confidence of the public. CHAPTER VIII. BRITISH CONSTITUTION. THAT the British Constitution is relatively good is satisfactorily indi cated by its effects. Without indulging in the ordinary gratulations of our "own country being the first country in the world," it is unquestionably, in almost every respect, among the first,-among the first in liberty, in intellectual and moral excellence, and in whatever dignifies and adorns mankind. A country which thus surpasses other nations, and which has, with little interruption, possessed a nearly uniform constitution for ages, may well rest assured that its constitution is good. To say that it is good is however very different from saying that it is theoretically perfect, or practically as good as its theory will allow. Under a king, lords, and commons, we have prospered; but it does not therefore follow that under a king, lords, and commons, we might not have prospered more. Whatever may be the future allotment of our country as to the form of its government, whether at any period, or at what, the progressive advancement of the human species will occasion an alteration, we are not at present concerned to inquire. Of one thing, indeed, we may be assured, that if it should be the good pleasure of Providence that this advancement in excellence shall take place, the practical principles of the government and its constitutional form, will be gradually moulded and modified into a state of adaptation to the then condition of mankind. I. Of the regal part of the British Constitution I would say little. The sovereign is, in a great degree, identified with an administration and into the principles which should regulate ministerial conduct th preceding chapters have attempted some inquiry. Yet it may be observed, that supposing ministerial influence to be "necessary" to the constitution, there appears considerable reason to think that its amount may be safely and rightly diminished. As this influence becomes needless in proportion to the actual rectitude of polit (cal measures; as there is some reason to hope that this rectitude is 276 INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN. [ESSAY III. increasing; and as the public capacity to judge soundly of political measures is manifestly increasing also; it is probable that some portion of the influence of the crown might be given up, without any danger to the constitution or the public weal. And, waiving all reference to the essential moral character of influence, it is to be remembered, that no degree of it is defensible, even by the politician, but that which apparently subserves the reasonable purposes of government. It is recorded that in 1741, in Scotland, "sixteen peers were chosen literally according to the list transmitted from court."* Such a fact would convince a man, without further inquiry, that there must have been something very unsound in the ministerial politics of the day; or, at any rate (which is nearly the same thing), something very discordant with the general mind. In 1793, and while, of course, the Irish parliament existed, a bill was brought into that parliament to repeal some of the Catholic disabilities. This bill, the "parliament loudly, indignantly, and resolutely rejected." A few months afterward, a similar bill was introduced under the auspices of the government. Pitt had taken counsel of Burke, and wished to grant the Catholics relief: and when the viceroy's secretary accordingly brought in a bill, two members only opposed it; and at the second reading it was opposed but by one vote. Now, whatever may be said of the "necessity" of ministerial influence for the purposes of state, nothing can be said in favour of such influence as this. Every argument which would show its expediency would show even more powerfully the impurity of the system which could require it. It is common to hear complaints of ministerial influence in parliament. "That kind of influence which the noble lord alludes to," said Fox, in one of his speeches, "I shall ever deem unconstitutional; for by the influence of the crown, he means the influence of the crown in parliament." But if it is concluded that influence is "necessary," it seems idle to complain of its exercise in the senate. Where should it be exerted with effect? Whether it be constitutional it is difficult to say, because it is difficult to define where constitutional acts end and unconstitutional acts begin. But it may safely be concluded that, in such matters, questions of constitutional rectitude are little relevant. Influence, you say--and in a certain sense you say it truly-is necessary. To what purpose then can it be to complain of the exercise of that influence in those places in which only or principally it is effectual? It would be impossible for persons, with our views of political rectitude, to execute the office of minister upon any system that approached, in its character, to the present; but were it otherwise, I would advise a minister openly to avow the exercise of influence, and to defend it. This were the frank and, I think, the rational course. Why should a man affect secrecy or concealment about an act "politically necessary." I would not talk about disinterestedness and independence; but tell the world that influence was needful, and that I exerted it. Not that such an avowal would stop, or ought to stop, the complaints of virtuous men. The morality of politics is not so obscure but that thousands will always perceive that the exertion of influence, and the submission to it, is morally vicious. This conflict will continue Artifice and deception are "necessary" to a swindler, but all honest men know and feel that the artifice and deception are wrong. * Smollett: Hist. England, v. iii., p. 71. † Fell's Public Life of C. J. Fox. CHAP. 8.] CANDIDATES FOR A PEERAGE. 277 II. It appears to have been discovered, or assumed, in most free states, that it is expedient that there should be two deliberative assemblies, of which one shall, from its constitution, possess less of a democratical tendency than the other. Not that, in a purer state of society, two such assemblies would be necessary, but because, while separate individuals or separate classes of men pursue their peculiar interests and are swayed by their peculiar prejudices, it is found needful to obstruct one class of interests and tendencies by another. Such a purpose is answered by the British House of Lords. The privileges of the members of this house are such as to offer considerable temptation to their political virtue. A body of men whose eminence consists in artificial distinctions between them and the rest of the community are likely to desire to make these distinctions needlessly great; and for that purpose to postpone the public welfare to the interests of an order. We all know that there is a collective as well as an individual ambition. It is a truth which a peer should habitually inculcate upon himself, that however rank and title may be conferred for the gratification of the possessor, the legislative privileges of a peer are to be held exclusively subservient to the general good. I use the word exclusively in its strictest sense: so that, if even the question should come, whether any part or the whole of the privileges of the peerage should be withdrawn or the general good should be sacrificed, I should say that no reasonable question could exist respecting the proper alternative. Were I a peer, I should not think myself at liberty to urge the privileges of my order in opposition to the public weal; for this were evidently to postpone the greater interests to the less. If rulers of all kinds, if civil government itself, are simply the officers of the nation, surely no one class of rulers is at liberty to put its pretensions in opposition to the national advantage. The love of title and of rank constitutes one of the great temptations of the political man. He can obtain them only from the crown; and it is not usual to bestow them except upon those who support the administration of the day. The intensity of the desire which some men feel for these distinctions has a correspondently intense effect. Lord Chatham said "that he had known men of great ambition for power and dominion, many whose characters were tarnished by glaring defects, some with many vices,—who nevertheless could be prevailed upon to join in the best public measures; but the moment he found any man who had set himself down as a candidate for a peerage, he despaired of his ever being a friend to his country." This displays a curious political phenomenon. Can the reader give a better solution than the supposition that, in the love itself of title, there is something little and low, and that the minds which can be so anxious for it are commonly too little and too low to sacrifice their hopes to friendship for their country?-Many who are not candidates for peerages nevertheless look upon them with a wishing eye; and some who have attained to the lower honours of the order are equally solicitous for advancement to the higher. So that even upon those on whom the temptation is not so powerful as that of which Chatham speaks -some temptation is laid; a temptation of which it were idle to dispute that the aggregate effect is great. If, without reference to the existing state of Britain, a man should ask * Quoted by Fox.-Fell's Memoirs. 278 HOUSE OF LORDS-BISHOPS. [ESSAY III whether the legislators of a nation ought to be subjected to such temptation, whether it were a judicious political institution, I should answer, No: because I should judge that a legislative assembly ought to have no inducements or motives foreign to the general good. This appears to be so obviously true that the necessity, if there be a necessity, for an assembly so constituted, only evinces how imperfect the political character of a people is. There would be no need for having recourse to an objectionable species of assembly, if it were not wanted to counteract or to effect purposes which a purely constituted assembly could not attain. In estimating the relative worthiness of objects of human pursuit, a peerage does not appear to rank high. I know not indeed how it happens that men contemplate it with so much complacency; and that so few are found who appear to doubt whether it is one of the most reasonable and worthy objects of desire. A title! Only think what a title is, and what it is not. It is a thing which philosophy may reasonably hold cheap; a thing which partakes of the character of the tinsel watch, for which the new-breeched urchin looks with anxious eyes, and by which, when he has got it, he thinks he is made a greater man than before. If such be the character of title when brought into comparison with the dignity of man, what is it when it is compared with the dignity of the Christian? Nothing. It may be affirmed, without any apprehension of error, that the greater the degree in which any man is a Christian, the less will be his wish to be called a lord; and that when he attains to the "fulness of the stature" of a Christian man, no wish will remain.—If additional motives can be urged to reduce our ambition of title, some perhaps may be found in considering the grounds upon which it has too frequently been conferred. Queen Anne, when once the ministry could not carry a measure in the Upper House, made twelve new peers at once. These, of course, voted for the measure. What honourable and elevated mind would have purchased one of these titles at the expense of the caustic question which a member put when they were going to give their first vote,-"Are you going to vote by your foreman ?" Whether the heads of a Christian church should possess seats in the legislature is a question that has often been discussed. If a Christian bishop can attend to legislative affairs without infringing upon the time and attention which is due to his peculiar office, there appears nothing in that office which disqualifies him for legislative functions. The better a man is, the more, as a general rule, he is fit for a legislator; so that, assuming that bishops are peculiarly Christian men, it is not unfit that they should assist in the councils of the nation. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that there is no peculiar congruity between the office of the Christian overseer and that of an agent in political affairs. They are not incompatible indeed, but the connexion is not natural. Politics do not form the proper business of a Christian shepherd. They are wholly foreign to his proper business; and that retirement from the things of the world which Christianity requires of her ministers, and which she must be supposed peculiarly to require of her more elevated ministers, indicates the propriety of meddling but little in affairs of state. But, when it comes to be proposed that all the heads of a Christian church shall be selected for legislators, because they are heads of the church,— the impropriety becomes manifest and great. To make a high religious office the qualification for a political office is manifestly wrong. It may CHAP. 8.] HOUSE OF LORDS-BISHOPS. 279 be found now and then that a good bishop is fit for a useful legislator,— but because you have elevated a man to a more onerous and responsible office in the church. forthwith to superadd an onerous and responsible office in the state, is surely not to consult the dictates of Christianity or of reason. Nor is it rational or Christian forthwith to add a temporal peerage. If there be any one thing, not absolutely vicious, which is incongruous with the proper temper and character of an exalted shepherd of the flock, it is temporal splendour. Such splendour accords very well with the political character of the Romish church, but with Protestantism, with Christianity, it has no accordance. The splendours of title are utterly dissimilar in their character to the character of the heads of the church, as that character is indicated in the New Testament. How preposterous is the association in idea of "My lord" with a Paul or a Barnabas!-The truth indeed is, that this species of fornication did not originate in religion, nor in religious motives. It sprang up with the corruptions of the papacy; and in this, as in some other instances, we, who have purified the vicious doctrine, have clung to the vicious practice To these considerations is to be added another: that the extent of Jurisdiction which is assigned to the bishops of this country is such as to occupy, if the office be rightly executed, a large portion of a bishop's time,--a portion so large, that if he be exemplary as a bishop, he can hardly be exemplary as a legislator. If, as will perhaps be admitted, the diligent and conscientious pastor of an ordinary parish has a sufficient employment for his time, it cannot be supposed that a bishop has less. He who presides over hundreds of parishes and hundreds of pastors, and rightly presides over them, can surely find little time for attendance in the senate; especially when that attendance takes him, as it necessarily does, far away from the inferior shepherds and from the flocks. But when it comes to be considered that our bishops are the heads of an established church, we are presented with a very different field of inquiry. That which is not congruous with Christianity may be congruous with a religious establishment. Nor, in a religious establishment like that which obtains in England, would there perhaps be any propriety in dismissing bishops from the House of Lords. They have to watch over other interests than those of religion,-political interests; and where shall they efficiently watch over them if they have no voice in political affairs? Bishops in this country have not merely to "feed the flock of God which is among them," but to take care that that flock and their shepherds retain their privileges and their supremacy: so that if I were asked whether bishops ought to have a seat in the legislature, I should answer,—if mean by a bishop a head of a Christian church, he has other and better business-if by a bishop you mean the head of an established church, the question must be determined by the question of the rectitude of an established church itself. you Without stopping to decide this question, it may be observed, that some serious mischiefs result from the institution as it exists. A bishop should be not only of unimpeachable, but, as far as may be, of untempted virtue. His office as a peer subjects him to great temptations. Bishops are more dependent upon the crown than any other class of peers, because vacancies for elevation in the church are continually occurring; and for these vacancies a bishop hopes. Since he cannot generally expect to obtain them by an opposition, however conscientious, to the minister of the day, he is placed in a situation which no good man ought to desire |