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UTILITY OF DIRECT LAWS FROM GOD.

[ESSAY 1. The welfare of mankind depends upon circumstances which, if it were possible, it is not easy to foresee. Indeed in many of those conjunctures in which important decisions must instantly be made, the computation of tendencies to general happiness is wholly impracticable.

Besides these objections which apply to the systems separately, there is one which applies to them all-That they do not refer us directly to the will of God. They interpose a medium; and it is the inevitable tendency of all such mediums to render the truth uncertain They depend not indeed upon hearsay evidence, but upon something of which the tendency is the same. They seek the will of God not from positive evidence, but by implication; and we repeat the truth, that every medium that is interposed between the Divine will and our estimates of it, diminishes the probability that we shall estimate it rightly.

These are considerations which, antecedently to all others, would prompt us to seek the will of God directly and immediately; and it is evident that this direct and immediate knowledge of the Divine will, can in no other manner be possessed than by his own communication of it.

THE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD.

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That a direct communication of the will of the Deity respecting the conduct which mankind shall pursue, must be very useful to them, can need little proof. It is sufficiently obvious that they who have had no access to the written revelations, have commonly entertained very imperfect views of right and wrong. What Dr. Johnson says of the ancient epic poets, will apply generally to pagan philosophers: They "were very unskilful teachers of virtue," because "they wanted the light of revelation." Yet these men were inquisitive and acute, and it may be supposed they would have discovered moral truth if sagacity and inquisitiveness had been sufficient for the task. But it is unquestionable, that there are many ploughmen in this country who possess more accurate knowledge of morality than all the sages of antiquity. We do not indeed sufficiently consider for how much knowledge respecting the Divine will we are indebted to his own communication of it. Many arguments, many truths, both moral and religious, which appear to us the products of our understandings and the fruits of ratiocination, are in reality nothing more than emanations from Scripture; rays of the gospel imperceptibly transmitted, and as it were conveyed to our minds in a side light."* Of Lord Herbert's book, De Veritate, which was designed to disprove the validity of Revelation, it is observed by the editor of his "Life," that it is "a book so strongly imbued with the light of revelation relative to the moral virtues and a future life, that no man ignorant of the Scriptures, or of the knowledge derived from them, could have written it." (A modern system of moral philosophy is founded upon the duty of doing good to man, because it appears, from the benevolence of God himself, that such is his will. Did those philosophers then who had no access to the written expression of his will discover, with any distinctness, this seemingly obvious benevolence of God? No. "The heathens failed

Balguy; Tracts moral and theological :-Second Letter to a Deist. + 4th Ed. p. 336.

CHAP. 2.]

THE EXPRESSED WILL OF GOD.

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of drawing that deduction relating to morality to which, as we should now judge, the most obvious parts of natural knowledge, and such as certainly obtained among them, were sufficient to lead them, namely, the goodness of God."*-We are, I say, much more indebted to revelation for moral light than we commonly acknowledge or indeed commonly perceive.

But if in fact we obtain from the communication of the will of God, knowledge of wider extent and of a higher order than was otherwise attainable, is it not an argument that that communicated will should be our supreme law, and that if any of the inferior means of acquiring moral knowledge lead to conclusions in opposition to that will, they ought to give way to its higher authority?

Indeed, the single circumstance that an Omniscient Being, and who also is the Judge of mankind, has expressed his will respecting their conduct, appears a sufficient evidence that they should regard that expression as their paramount rule. They cannot elsewhere refer to so high an authority. If the expression of his will is not the ultimate standard of right and wrong, it can only be on the supposition that his will itself is not the ultimate standard; for no other means of ascertaining that will can be equally perfect and authoritative.

Another consideration is this, that if we examine those sacred volumes in which the written expression of the Divine will is contained, we find that they habitually proceed upon the supposition that the will of God, being expressed, is for that reason our final law. They do not set about formal proofs that we ought to sacrifice inferior rules to it, but conclude, as of course, that if the will of God is made known, human duty is ascertained. "It is not to be imagined that the Scriptures would refer to any other foundation of virtue than the true one, and certain it is that the foundation to which they constantly do refer is the will of God." Nor is this all they refer to the expression of the will of God. We hear nothing of any other ultimate authority-nothing of "sympathy"-nothing of the "eternal fitness of things"-nothing of the "production of the greatest sum of enjoyment;"-but we hear, repeatedly, constantly, of the will of God; of the voice of God; of the commands of God. To" be obedient unto his voice," is the condition of favour. To hear the "sayings of Christ and do them," § is the means of obtaining his approbation. To "fear God and keep his commandments, is the whole duty of man." Even superior intelligences are described as "doing his commandments, hearkening unto the voice of his word." In short, the whole system of moral legislation, as it is exhibited in Scripture, is a system founded upon authority. The propriety, the utility of the requi. sitions are not made of importance. That which is made of importance is the authority of the Being who legislates. "Thus saith the Lord," is regarded as constituting a sufficient and a final law. So also it is with the moral instructions of Christ. "He put the truth of what he taught upon authority." In the sermon on the mount, I say unto you is proposed as the sole, and sufficient, and ultimate ground of obligation. He does not say, My precepts will promote human happiness, therefore you are to obey them: but he says, They are my precepts, therefore you are to obey them. So habitually is this principle borne in mind, if we may

* Pearson: Remarks on the Theory of Morals.

Deut. iv. 30.

TPs. ciii. 20

+Pearson: Theory of Mor. c. 1. Matt. vii. 24. Eccl. xii. 13. **Paley: Evid. of Chris. p. 2, c. 2:

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STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

[ESSAY I. so speak, by those who were commissioned to communicate the Divine will, that the reason of a precept is not often assigned. The assumption evidently was, that the Divine will was all that it was necessary for us to know. This is not the mode of enforcing duties which one man usually adopts in addressing another. He discusses the reasonableness of his advices and the advantages of following them, as well as, perhaps, the authority from which he derives them. The difference that exists between such a mode and that which is actually adopted in Scripture, is analogous to that which exists between the mode in which a parent communicates his instructions to a young child, and that which is employed by a tutor to an intelligent youth. The tutor recommends his instructions by their reasonableness and propriety: the father founds his upon his own authority. Not that the father's instructions are not also founded in propriety, but that this, in respect of young children, is not the ground upon which he expects their obedience. It is not the ground upon which God expects the obedience of man. We can, undoubtedly, in general perceive the wisdom of his laws, and it is doubtless right to seek out that wisdom; but whether we discover it or not, does not lessen their authority nor alter our duties.

In deference to these reasonings, then, we conclude, that the communicated will of God is the final standard of right and wrong-that wheresoever this will is made known, human duty is determined—and that neither the conclusions of philosophers, nor advantages, nor dangers, nor pleasures, nor sufferings, ought to have any opposing influence in regu lating our conduct. Let it be remembered, that in morals there can be no equilibrium of authority. If the expressed will of the Deity is not our supreme rule, some other is superior. This fatal consequence is inseparable from the adoption of any other ultimate rule of conduct. The Divine law becomes the decision of a certain tribunal-the adopted rule, the decision of a superior tribunal-for that must needs be the superior which can reverse the decisions of the other. It is a consideration, too, which may reasonably alarm the inquirer, that if once we assume this power of dispensing with the Divine law, there is no limit to its exercise. If we may supersede one precept of the Deity upon one occasion, we may supersede every precept upon all occasions. Man becomes the greater authority, and God the less.

If a proposition is proved to be true, no contrary reasonings can show it to be false; and yet it is necessary to refer to such reasonings, not indeed for the sake of the truth, but for the sake of those whose conduct it should regulate. Their confidence in truth may be increased if they discover that the reasonings which assail it are fallacious. To a considerate man it will be no subject of wonder, that the supremacy of the expressed will of God is often not recognised in the writings of moralists or in the practice of life. The speculative inquirer finds, that of some of the questions which come before him, Scripture furnishes no solution, and he seeks for some principle by which all may be solved. This indeed is the ordinary course of those who erect systems, whether in morals or in physics. The moralist acknowledges, perhaps, the authority of revelation; but in his investigations he passes away from the precepts of revelation, to some of those subordinate means by which human duties may be discovered-means which, however authorized by the Deity as subservient to his purpose of human instruction, are wholly unauthorized as ultimate standards of right and wrong. Having fixed

CHAP. 2.]

CAUSES OF ITS REJECTION.

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his attention upon these subsidiary means, he practically loses sight of the Divine law which he acknowledges; and thus without any formal, perhaps without any conscious, rejection of the expressed will of God, he really makes it subordinate to inferior rules. Another influential motive to pass by the Divine precepts, operates both upon writers and upon the public:-the rein which they hold upon the desires and passions of mankind is more tight than they are willing to bear. Respecting some of these precepts we feel as the rich man of old felt; we hear the injunction and go away, if not with sorrow, yet without obedience. Here again is an obvious motive to the writer to endeavour to substitute some less rigid rule of conduct, and an obvious motive to the reader to acquiesce in it as true without a very rigid scrutiny into its foundation. To adhere with fidelity to the expressed will of Heaven, requires greater confidence in God than most men are willing to repose, or than most moralists are willing to recommend.

But whatever have been the causes, the fact is indisputable, that few or none of the systems of morality which have been offered to the world, have uniformly and consistently applied the communicated will of God in determination of those questions to which it is applicable. Some insist upon its supreme authority in general terms; others apply it in determining some questions of rectitude: but where is the work that applies it always? Where is the moralist who holds every thing, ease, interest, reputation, expediency, "honour,"--personal and national,--in subordination to this moral law?

One source of ambiguity and of error in moral philosophy has consisted in the indeterminate use of the term, "the will of God." It is used without reference to the mode by which that will is to be discovered— and it is in this mode that the essence of the controversy lies. We are agreed that the will of God is to be our rule: the question at issue is, What mode of discovering it should be primarily adopted? Now the term, the "will of God," has been applied, interchangeably, to the precepts of Scripture, and to the deductions which have been made from other principles. The consequence has been that the imposing sanction, "the will of God," has been applied to propositions of very different authority.

To inquire into the validity of all those principles which have been proposed as the standard of rectitude, would be foreign to the purpose of this essay. That principle which appears to be most recommended by its own excellence and beauty, and which obtains the greatest share of approbation in the world, is the principle of directing "every action so as to produce the greatest happiness and the least misery in our power." The particular forms of defining the doctrine are various, but they may be conveniently included in the one general term-expediency.

We say that the apparent beauty and excellence of this rule of action are so captivating, its actual acceptance in the world is so great, and the reasonings by which it is supported are so acute, that if it can be shown that this rule is not the ultimate standard of right and wrong, we may safely conclude that none other which philosophy has proposed can make pretensions to such authority. The truth indeed is, that the objections to the doctrine of expediency will generally be found to apply to every doctrine which lays claim to moral supremacy-which application the reader is requested to make for himself as he passes along.

Respecting the principle of expediency-the doctrine that we should,

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PRINCIPLES OF EXPEDIENCY,

[ESSAY I. in every action, endeavour to produce the greatest sum of human happiness-let it always be remembered that the only question is, whether it ought to be the paramount rule of human conduct. No one doubts whether it ought to influence us, or whether it is of great importance in estimating the duties of morality. The sole question is this :-When an expression of the will of God, and our calculations respecting human happiness, lead to different conclusions respecting the rectitude of an action-whether of the two shall we prefer and obey?

We are concerned only with Christian writers. Now, when we come to analyze the principles of the Christian advocates of expediency, we find precisely the result which we should expect a perpetual vacillation between two irreconcilable doctrines. As Christians, they necessarily acknowledge the authority, and, in words at least, the supreme authority of the Divine law: as advocates of the universal application of the law of expediency, they necessarily sometimes set aside the Divine law, because they sometimes cannot deduce, from both laws, the same rule of action. Thus there is induced a continual fluctuation and uncertainty, both in principles and in practical rules: a continual endeavour to "serve two masters."

Of these fluctuations an example is given in the article "Moral Philosophy," in Rees's Encyclopædia,-an article in which the principles of Hartley are in a considerable degree adopted. "The Scripture precepts," says the writer, "are in themselves the rule of life."-"The supposed tendency of actions can never be put against the law of God as delivered to us by revelation, and should not therefore be made our chief guide." This is very explicit. Yet the same article says, that the first great rule is, that "we should aim to direct every action so as to produce the greatest happiness and the least misery in our power." This rule however is somewhat difficult of application, and therefore "instead of this most general rule we must substitute others, less general and subordinate to it:" of which subordinate rules, to " obey the Scripture precepts" is one!—I do not venture to presume that these writers do really mean what their words appear to mean,-that the law of God is supreme and yet that it is subordinate,-but one thing is perfectly clear, that either they make the vain attempt to "serve two masters," or that they employ language very laxly and very dangerously.

The high language of Dr. Paley respecting expediency as a paramount law, is well known :-" Whatever is expedient is right."* "The obligation of every law depends upon its ultimate utility."-"It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it."‡ Perjury, robbery, and murder "are not useful, and for that reason, and that reason only, are not right." It is obvious that this language affirms that utility is a higher authority than the expressed will of God. If the utility of a moral rule alone constitutes the obligation of it, then is its obligation not constituted by the Divine command. If murder is wrong only because it is not useful, it is not wrong because God has said "Thou shalt not kill."

But Paley was a Christian, and therefore could neither formally displace the Scripture precepts from their station of supremacy, nor avoid formally acknowledging that they were supreme. Accordingly he says, "There are two methods of coming at the will of God on any point: First-By • Mor. and Pol. Phil. B. 2, c. 6. + B. 6. c. 12. + B. 2. c. 6.

§ Ibid.