by a mysterious union with the body, it is mediate and progressive, advancing from the information of the senses through the operations of the intellect, like the gradual dawn of light. In the Divine mind, which is simple and uncompounded, it is of equal force; in the human, which is composed of different faculties adapted to different subjects, it is of different degrees and kinds, according to the difference of its faculties and the subjects presented to them; as the light is varied into many degrees of shade and colour, according to the different media through which it passes. In the Divine mind, which is pure, it is unerring and infallible; in the human, which is corrupt, it is subject to error, as the pure light of the sun is darkened and obscured by the grosser exhalations of the earth. But as the Divine mind is incapable of change, so also hath he formed the human the same in all men and nations, in reference to general truths and faculties; so that whatever be the imperfections or shades of any truth as relative to men, it is essentially immutable, that is, absolute and opposite to falsehood, as “darkness to light, and light to darkness."

Thus of truth, which, in its omniscient fountain, is universal, immediate, equal, and infallible, from the infirmity and inferiority of their nature, men are only blessed with a partial, progressive, various, though immutable ray, which is obstructed by passions, prejudices, habits and vices, the causes of error, as clouds and vapours obscure the sun. Yet partial and imperfect as it is, truth is the greatest gift which God could bestow, or man receive-but it is not bestowed on us, even thus partially and imperfectly, on unconditional terms. It is hidden in darkness, and involved in difficulties, intended like all the other gifts of heaven, to be sought and cultivated by all the different powers and exertions of human reason.

The love of truth is accordingly one of the strongest passions of the mind, a stimulus 18 which prompts it incessantly to its sublimest exercise; and the investigation of its various

18 Ορεξις διανοητικὴ, ἧς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς, τὸ αληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος. -Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. lib. v. cap. 2. ἐθὲν ἀνθρώπῳ λαβεῖν μεῖζον, ἢ χαρίζεσθαι Θεῷ σεμνότερον ἀληθείας. — Plutarch.

19

kinds, whether they rest in contemplation are applied to action20, or operate in effect", is the most honourable employment of human life. This honour, to which all who have leisure and opportunity should ambitiously aspire, is enhanced three ways; by the utility of the truth in question, by the assiduity and ability employed to overcome the difficulty of the search, and by the willingness with which, when found, it is received and adopted; forming together an exalted union of intellectual and moral virtue. One, who was the most highly honoured of earthly potentates, could withdraw from the splendour of his riches and the glories of his crown, as a candidate for the higher honour of cultivating this wisdom, and of ministering in all her provinces. "The glory of God," says Solomon," is to conceal a thing; and the honour of the king to search it out"."

Conscious however of the fallibility which attends the best exertions of human reason,

"Пoinois.-Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 3, 4.

22 Proverbs, xxv. 2.

sensible of the darkness under which the Author of all truth hath left some of its most interesting and important parts, and convinced withal, that as the search of it is the duty, so the invention will be the happiness of man, the honest and ingenuous inquirer will enter upon the task with humility, with diligence, with desire, and all the best affections of heart and understanding, with hope, not unmixed with fear. There is but one path to truth, whereas error is open to a thousand ways, and is prepared, as an enemy in ambush, on all occasions, to turn him aside from the direct and successful road.

SECT. II.

Of Mind in general.

HE mind of which truth is an attribute,

TH

is not easily made the object of its own view and contemplation. By our consciousness, which is the first ground of judgment, incapable of being resisted or evinced by reason, aided by reflection, we are partially informed of the motions, capacities, and operations of that invisible agent; which, though removed from external sense and abstracted from common apprehension, has been analyzed and arranged in its faculties both by ancient and modern philosophers.

Taken in its largest comprehension, as the knowledge of abstract and separate substances, Aristotle raises the philosophy of mind above all other parts of learning. He assigns to it the investigation of the principles and causes' of things in general, and ranks

· Δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρη TIKY.-Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2.