the phenomena of thought, in the same manner that the logic of physics is directed to the phenomena of external motion.

SECT. II.

Metaphysical Principles.

THE science of metaphysics presents itself to us with advantage as succeeding to that of physics or natural philosophy, because it has run nearly the same course in the history of the world; so that the progress and history of the one, may serve to illustrate and exemplify the fortunes and history of the other.

With Aristotle and the ancient philosophers, they both laboured under the same fundamental defect, through the want of sound and solid principles for their legitimate investigation. Cultivated in the same school of factitious and assumptive logic, they began both at the wrong end. With them, general truths, i. e. propositions of their own supposition or invention, which they styled axioms, formed the basis of all science, instead

of beginning with particular facts, and ascending by a just induction to general principles. And thus the metaphysical axioms of the ancients were nothing better than gratuitous assumptions, instead of being the result of observations, accurately deduced from the actual motions and operations of the mind, through the medium of consciousness and self-reflection. Nor it is to be wondered that if their physical researches terminated in theories, which had little relation to the real laws of the external world, their researches into the regions of mind should have been still more distinguished by baseless fancies and chimeras.

From the false principles on which this science has so long been cultivated, it has become the theme of ridicule with many sensible men, and from the nature of the abstract subjects on which it treats, many philosophers have deemed it too abstruse and barren to reward their labours. Some good men, from the vast range of its subjects, and the depth and sublimity of its researches, have denounced its study altogether, as dangerous, vain, and presumptuous.

But, when brought down from the flights of imagination to the calm and sober study of our own faculties, what is more worthy of man than the mind of man? When built on the sound principles of observation and experience, no study can be more productive of utility and honour to the philosophical inquirer. But it should be pursued strictly on the rules of the Baconian logic-" Homo naturæ minister et interpres tantum facit et intelligit, quantum de ordine naturæ opere, vel mente observaverit; nec amplius scit, aut potest."

What then are its genuine principles, and what is the legitimate course of its study? The mind, though invisible, is known to us by its operations, as distinctly as external objects are known to our outward senses. Our consciousness is ever present, and by turning itself on its own axis can become the spectator and reviewer of all our mental operations, just as things hard or soft, rough or smooth, are known to the touch, or the beauteous tints of the rainbow are recognised by the eye.

Hence by an obvious analogy, as external

sense is the primary principle of all physical knowledge, so consciousness, or the internal sense, is the primary principle of all metaphysical science. This internal sense is keen, penetrating, and acute, and becomes wonderfully strengthened by thus concentrating its attention on the surrounding faculties. As the external senses discover the various qualities and affections of body, this interior sense discovers the various acts and operations of mind, and when in a sound and healthy state, it reports mental facts and phenomena with sufficient truth and accuracy, for all the purposes of human knowledge1.

On the general subject of metaphysical science, consult the works of Locke, Reid, Stewart, and Browne-Hobbes, Berkeley, Baxter (Andrew), and Hume with some caution and reserve. For the establishment of sound first principles, the Editor would recommend the works of Dr. Reid as superior to those of every metaphysical writer, ancient or modern, with which he is acquainted.

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SECT. III.

Metaphysical Reasoning.

CCORDING to our foregoing observa

tions, reason begins her operations in this science, as in physics, with particulars; but here, internal sense, or consciousness, is the primary principle. By frequent observations on the acts and motions of the human mind, closely and accurately pursued, reason, on comparing them with each other, can distinguish their difference or agreement, and thus arrange them into their several orders or classes. And by frequent repetition of the same analytical process, reason can form the lower classes into more general classes. By this analysis, she can also discriminate one operation of mind from another, and attribute them to separate and distinct faculties, the intellect, the will, and the imagination. She can observe the laws of association, the connexions of one faculty with another, and the general union and harmony of all.