the attributes and will of God, erected in his goodness, established in his justice, and sanctioned by his power.

From this foundation all religion springs. It is the obedience of man, the moral agent, to the will and law of God, the moral governor. Hence we see the light of nature taking its origin, as a part of the law uncreated and eternal, as a glimpse of the divine and immaculate light, shining though dimly in the breast of man. Hence we see that every man has the "law of God written in his heart," and is made amenable to a tribunal which is spiritual and invisible. And hence the apostle argues, that they, who, deprived of the advantage of a fuller and clearer light, by the dictates of con

As it is the nature of the independent first Cause of all things, to be obliged by his own wisdom; so it seems to be the nature of all dependent intelligent beings, to be obliged only by the will of the first Cause.

"All things therefore (says Hooker, the great master of reason, Eccl. Pol. book i. sect. 2) do work after a sort according to a law, whereof some superior, to whom they are subject, is author; only the works and operations of God have him both for the worker, and for the law, whereby they are wrought. The Being of God is a kind of law to his workings; for that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to what he doeth."-Warb. Div. Leg. book i. sect. 4.

science and the guide of reason, conform their actions to the will of God, "are a law unto themselves 5."

All truth is therefore born of God. That which is natural springs every where from his works, and that which is moral results every where from his will, reflected on us by the medium of conscience or internal sense. This is God within,-that clear and invincible evidence of his Being, shining in the human mind, as a ray of the divine, and discovering to men in part his will, and by the performance of that will, through the merits of another, their way to happiness. Thus, even on the authority of this natural evidence, we may exclaim, with the royal psalmist "Verily there is a reward for the righteous, doubtless there is a God that judgeth the earth"."

As the external senses are the ultimate criteria of all material objects, this internal sense is the ultimate criterion of all moral actions; and though in its acts and opera

Rom. ii. 14, 15.

6 Psalm lviii. 10.

tions as a guide to truth, it may be subsequent to them, it is prior both in use and dignity. In the analogy which subsists between these two great inlets of all human knowledge in their exercise and effects, we cannot but observe with admiration, that uniformity of design, which marks all the works of Him, who is unchangeable and the same, and that consistency of operation which pervades the universe. We know from too frequent experience, that as the former are liable, through ill habit or distemper, to be vitiated and even lost; so the other from corresponding causes is subject to corresponding effects. The eye, the most perfect of the senses, is liable to great injuries and disqualifications, and is often rendered incapable of its proper functions. The taste, from corresponding causes, is liable to corresponding defects and perversions. By long habit and abuse, the taste of some is known to relish that which is abhorrent to others. We are thus informed by an experience, which none can controvert, that the external senses, which are the inlets of our natural knowledge, and common to all men, are in some cases pro

ductive of different and even contradictory sensations. And because we find the same to be the case with conscience, why should Locke, or other philosophers, discard it as the native principle of moral truth? Though this sublime principle of morals, which is the theme of our present consideration, may sometimes have been so far weakened in its evidence, or perverted in its use, as even to persuade that great philosopher of its nonexistence; it is an authority so supreme and permanent in the jurisdiction of the human mind, and so properly innate, that its power can never be entirely banished or discharged, till the mind itself is totally changed or annihilated.

See Mr. Locke's first book on Innate Practical Principles, chap. iii. sect. 8. "If conscience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate," &c.

The principles however, both speculative and practical, which Mr. Locke is in this book proving not to be innate, are maxims and general propositions; not evidences, but axioms; not primary but secondary principles: which indeed so far from being innate are generally the conclusions of much reasoning and investigation. Yet, that many of these maxims are implanted in the mind by nature, as the foundations and principles of all its knowledge, never to be questioned, but always to be assumed and granted, was a fundamental and most inveterate error, which this great man combated with success.

SECT. II.

Of Ethical Reasoning.

UPON these congenial and collateral

truths, the distinction between good and evil, the existence of the will, reward and punishment,-implicitly resulting from the same first principle, and acting, as they always do, in perfect conjunction and unison, all moral reasoning is ultimately founded.

Convinced by experience of their uniform operation on ourselves in particular instances perpetually occurring, and beholding that uniform operation still more confirmed by the experience and observation of all others, in every stage and sphere of life, and by the records of all ages,—we are obliged, by a kind of tacit induction, to admit the truth of two moral propositions corresponding to each other, which are universal in their operation and extent: