To each of these faculties, in their operation upon their respective objects external or

Philosophia practica cujus finis est praxis, id est actio interna, libera, ex electione profecta, et ad bonum directa. Philosophia poetica cujus finis est poesis, id est effectio, seu actio externa.—Du Val. Synops. Doctr. Peripat.

Plato divided the mind into four faculties or affections, νόησις, διάνοια, πιστις, εἰκασία : intelligentia, cogitatio, fides, simulatio-correspondent to the different degrees of truth. Νόησις ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, διάνοια ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ πιτες, καὶ Tý Teλevtáty eikaoía.-De Repub. sub fine. This distribution is not however so well calculated to distinguish the several kinds, as Tíoris has a common relation to all the kinds.

Lord Bacon makes his general partition of learning as it relates to the memory, the imagination, and reason. Partitio doctrinæ humanæ ea est verissima quæ sumitur ex triplici facultate animi rationalis quæ doctrinæ sedes est. Historia ad memoriam refertur, poesis ad phantasiam, philosophia ad rationem.-Neque aliâ censemus ad theologica partitione opus esse."-De Augm. Scient. lib. ii. c. 1.

And in the seventh book he refers morality to the will under the conduct of reason.

This distribution of our great philosopher and reformer of learning seems also to be imperfect; for reason is the general instrument of the mind common to all its faculties (and his words are ex triplici facultate animi rationalis”), and common alike to all the kinds of truth or learning.

I have therefore preferred the distribution of the Peripatetic to those both of the Academic and English philosopher, as being more proper and distinct, and equally comprehensive; for under his division διάνοια θεωρητική, he classes all those parts of learning which do not belong to the other two. Τρεῖς φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματική, φυσική, Θεολογική. Aristot. Metaph. lib. vi. cap. 1.

And for the same reasons I deem it much more just and philosophical than Locke's Division of the Sciences in the conclusion of his Essay.

internal, truth in general divides into special relations, or correspondencies; and the distribution of its several parts, forming the whole circle of learning divine and human, will be most naturally and philosophically made, according as they range under one or other of these general provinces of human intellect.

The universal science or philosophy of mind is the true foundation of the universal art or philosophy of logic, the organ or instrument, by which truth is to be found and cultivated in all different relations and correspondencies to the different parts or faculties. of the mind, of which it is an attribute. And the general office of this logic or universal art is, first, to find and establish right principles; secondly, to institute a right method of reasoning correspondent to the principles; and, thirdly, to estimate the kind and value of the truth when found, whether it belong to the intellect, the will, or imagination.

SECT. III.

Of Principles in general.

HAT all truth of which the mind is

TH

capable, to whatever faculty it may relate, is derived from certain principles' or first and fundamental truths, which are the causes why other things are true, is a maxim older than the days of Aristotle, and in which all sound philosophers have necessarily concurred; since, by the contrary supposition, there could be no such thing as truth at all2:

1 Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ, ἐκ προϋπαρχέσης γίνεται γνώσεως. Φανερὸν δὲ τῦτο θεωρᾶσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν. αἵ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπισημῶν διὰ τέτε το τρόποι παραγίνονται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάτη τέχνων.-Aristot. Analyt. Post. lib. i. cap. 1.

Οὐκ ἴσμεν δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας. ἕκατον δὲ μάλισα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καθ ̓ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον, οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμότατον. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ αἴτιον τᾶτο τῆς Θερμότητος. ὥτε καὶ ἀληθέςατον τὸ τοῖς ὑπέροις αἴτιον τῶ ἀληθέσιν εἶναι. διὸ τὰς τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἀρχὰς, ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀληθεςάτας. οὐ γάρ ποτε ἀληθεῖς, ἐδ ̓ ἐκείναις αἴτιόν τι ἐπὶ τῶ εἶναι, ἀλλ ̓ ἐκεῖναι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ὥσθ' ἕκατον ὡς ἔχει τῶ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.—Aristot. Metaph. lib. ii. cap. 1. • Aristot. Metaph. lib. iv. cap. 4.

for, as all the productions of the material creation owe their existence to seeds of one kind or other; so every true production in the intellectual system owes its existence to some sort of principles analogous to seeds.

But though all philosophers, who are in any respect entitled to that name, are unanimously agreed in the existence of such principles, as the only foundation of sound learning; it is amazing to reflect how widely they differ from each other in determining what they are. Almost every one who has embarked in the search of knowledge has exhibited a train of his own as the grounds of his future reasoning; and others refusing to admit them have, upon equal authority, substituted different ones in their room3. Aristotle himself, after refuting those of all his predecessors was the prolific father of various principles; and, collected from one or

'Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 3-6, in which the Peripatetic delivers the different opinions of the ancient philosophers, Hesiod, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Melissus, and Plato.

Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 7.

other, their number, their variety, and their inconsistency are almost infinite.

Principles like seeds are of many and various kinds, and to canvass and examine them, to reduce them to simplicity and order, to arrange them into classes, and determine them with precision, is the first and most essential office of sound logic.

As they are indispensable to all truth', What are principles is a previous question essential to the final and more comprehensive inquiry," What is truth?"

Are they such axioms or universal propositions as those upon which Aristotle and the sages of antiquity erected sciences and systems, and such as our Newton established for his Principia? If this question be affirmed (and it cannot be denied), it will bring after it another of equal moment. Are these axioms such principles as are properly first;

5 Μάλισα δὲ ἐπιζητὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια. διὰ γὰρ ταῦτά, καὶ ἐκ τέτων τἄλλα γνωρίζεται, ἀλλ ̓ ἐ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμévwv.-Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2.

Aristot. Metaph. lib. ii. cap. 2.

• Καθόλο γὰρ μάλισα, καὶ πάντων ἄρχαι τὰ αξιωματα εςίν. Aristot. Metaph. lib. iii. cap. 2.