such as have the seed absolutely in themselves, that is, such as are derived from no others of any kind whatever by any act or process of reason; such as, in the words of a late writer, “are intuitively certain, or intuitively probable, and are known by a power of the mind .which perceives truth not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous and instinctive impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently upon our will, whenever the object is presented, according to an established law, and therefore not improperly called sense, and acting in the same manner upon all mankind, and therefore properly called common sense, the ultimate judge of truth"?" Or, are they the result of the laborious investigations, reasonings, and deductions of a few philosophers? If the latter part of this alternative be true (and the Categories from which Aristotle formed his axioms, whether philosophically or not is here no question, as well as the Principia of Newton, have immortalized the

'Beattie on Truth, p. 36 and 42.

fame of their inventors as splendid monuments of human reason;) there must be other grounds or evidences productive of intuitive certainty or intuitive probability, obvious, instantaneous, and incapable of being deduced by reason, which constitute the first principles from which these secondary ones are, by a process of reason, formed.

These primary principles (and they have surely the first title to the name of principles) are mentioned by the same author to be-the evidence of external sense; the evidence of internal sense or consciousness; the evidence of memory, memory, and some others3.

This general division of principles into primary and secondary, original and derived, evidences and axioms, let the distinction be made in what terms you will, however novel it may sound, is, I hope, philosophically made': and, if so, it will be found of great

Beattie on Truth, p. 43.

'These original evidences are acknowledged by Aristotle in book ii. cap. 19 of the Post. Analyt. as the genuine foundation from which all axioms are derived: and though he chooses to reserve an equal honour to the latter, he

importance in the search of truth in general, as it will divide our reasoning, which should always be governed by the principles, into two direct kinds or methods.

A'

SECT. IV.

Of Reasoning in general.

LL truth, to whatever province or department of mind it bears a reference, is deduced from principles by an act or reason, the organ which is common to them all, and the distinguishing prerogative of human nature.

It is observed by the excellent Lord Bacon in his Advancement of Learning, that soundness of direction in the application of the means takes away error and confusion, and forms the principal of those general expedients

allows the former to be necessary to their existence. 'Aváyên ἄρα ἔχειν μέν τινα δύναμιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δ' ἔχειν, ἤ ἐτι τέτων τιμιωτέρα κατ' ἀκρίβειαν-δυνάμιν σύμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἣν καλᾶσιν αίσθησιν, etc.

by which every work must be successfully conducted'.

To execute a work in the line of his profession with competent ability, the artist not only should understand the power and compass of his instrument, but the particular manner in which, according to the nature of his materials and the progress of the work it should be employed. And it is of equal moment for the philosopher to know the general power and compass of reason, the instrument of truth; and also the particular method in which it is to be applied on different subjects, and in different stages of the investigation because the want of a just attention to these fundamentals of sound logic has often misled the reasoner, increased his labour, and disgraced his learning.

A false estimate of reason heightened, as

1 Merito primas tenet, Consilii prudentia et sanitas; hoc est, monstratio et delineatio viæ rectæ et proclivis ad rem quæ proponitur, peragendam. "Claudus enim (quod dici solet) in via antevertit cursorem extra viam :" et Solomon perapposite ad hanc rem: "Ferrum si retusum fuerit, viribus utendum majoribus: quod vero super omnia prævalet, est sapientia." Quibus verbis innuit, medii prudentem electionem efficacius conducere ad rem, quam virium aut intentionem aut accumulationem.-De Augm. Scient. lib. ii.

it has often been, into a wild conceit of its all-sufficiency, that it is itself the cause and the standard of all truth, is a fatal rock on which many adventurers in philosophy have either suffered shipwreck before they were well embarked, or else have been thrown out of the direct road, and left to the mercy of the waves to be tossed upon a tempestuous sea, by every blast of doctrine, into all the harbours round the world, except the right one. Supposing that from its own underived resources, by acting and reacting upon itself, reason can discover all truth of consequence to man, they totally mistake both its nature and office; as it is neither the original cause nor the standard of truth.

So far from being the cause of truth, it cannot penetrate into or even apprehend the essence or substances of things corporeal or mental'. It can only pass over their surface to take account of their qualities, powers, properties, operations, and affections, which are the causes; and that not directly

'Internas substantias nullo sensu, nulla actione reflexa cognoscimus.-Newtoni Sch. Gen. sub fine Princip.