vial, it ought to be retained, for its tendency to expand or invigorate the intellect. To this, it would seem sufficient to reply, that the syllogistic logic produced no such beneficial result on the minds of those, who formerly cultivated it to the greatest extent; and that the experience of the middle ages will for ever demonstrate its futility, as an element of rational and intellectual education. But it may be questioned, whether, in the present state of science and literature, it is capable of improving the mental faculties, even to the limited extent, which it may be supposed to have attained, in another and very different stage of moral, literary, and philosophic intercourse. It has been acutely remarked by Dr. Reid, that the ancients, in their logical researches, attended only to categorical propositions, which have one subject, and one predicate, and of these, to such only, as have a general term for their subject; whereas the moderns have attended chiefly to relative propositions, which express a relation between two subjects, and these subjects always general ideas.

6 See Chart and Scale, vol. i. p. 113, 114.

Now, it deserves consideration, whether, by this transfer of categoric to relative propositions, the entire value and propriety of the syllogistic logic has not been set aside on all topics of probable and contingent reasoning. The "dictum de omni et de nullo," on which this whole logic is based, does not apply to the agreement or disagreement of ideas. It can serve only to elucidate propositions which are strictly categorical, which have one subject, one predicate, and which have for their subject, a general term. It cannot be brought to apply to propositions when compared with others, whose subjects are general and correlative ideas. Of such propositions, as Wallis has remarked, the test should consist in another axiom 66 "Quæ conveniunt in eodem tertio, conveniunt inter se."

And this difference may serve to explain the extreme puerility of all the questions which can now be examined by the scholastic logic. It can be applied only to the most simple and categorical reasoning -to reasoning which carries with it its own evidence, and which approaches the simplicity of Euclid. As soon as any ques

tion becomes complex or obscure, demanding the scrutiny and comparison of our thoughts, its utility, as a test, is destroyed; it can only add to our difficulties, by contracting our attention to the terms, instead of expanding it over the whole compass of the reasoning. It is, in fact, incapable of measuring such modern inquiries; and hence it was, that Locke, though he imperfectly understood the rationale of the ancient logic, perceived enough of its deficiency, to enable him to reject its claims, as an instrument for enlarging, regulating, or improving the human understanding.—But why should we invoke the spirit of the dead, or insult the corpse of that mighty monster, who once bestrode the world, "like a Colossus?" The scholastic logic has long since lost its sway. It now serves only "to point a moral or adorn a tale.” It has sweetened the pleasantries of Goldsmith, and heightened the satire of Swift.

In offering these observations, it is not my object to make any formal or preconcerted attack on that system of logic, which is still taught at Oxford; but merely to justify the

principles of the work, which I have been requested to revise. It has long been my firm conviction, that the principles of this work are built on a basis, which can never be shaken; and that, when ancient prejudices have passed away, its merits will be felt and acknowledged, even by the Alma Mater of its author.

Be this as it may, the work now comes before the public, in an enlarged and improved form, as a practical comment on the inductive logic. In this respect, its merits were widely acknowledged on its first appearance. It is well remembered, that Mr. Burke called on Dr. Tatham, soon after its publication, and expressed himself in the highest terms of approbation. The letters of Dr. Reid and Dr. Doig' will speak for themselves. The Editors of the Encyclopædia Britannica, in the article "Logic,"thus announce their obligation, and their opinion of its merits :-" This chapter is almost wholly taken from Dr. Tatham's 'Chart and Scale of Truth,' a work, which,

7 See Appendix.

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notwithstanding the ruggedness of its style, has so much real merit, as a system of logic, that it cannot be too diligently studied by the inquirer, who would travel by the straight road to the temple of science." These observations, which are principally applicable to the first volume, (in which the various kinds of truth relating to human science are explained) may also be partially transferred to the second, which relates exclusively to theology.-Theologic truth, according to Dr. Tatham, rests originally on our belief in the Divine veracity. Faith is the basis of its logic, but its external and internal evidences form the proper subjects of human reasoning and inquiry. He views it with Bacon

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tanquam portus et sabbatum humanarum contemplationum omnium." Whilst he allows it is more distinct and separate in the nature of its truth, than any of the human arts or sciences are from each other, and confesses the informality of its logical arrangements; he appropriately represents Theology, as their queen and potentate, to whom they all respectively subserve and