are conclusive enough if we are sure of our premises. But it is just this instability of our premises that keeps the spectre of skepticism before the human mind. The conclusion will never be more certain than the premises and the moment they collapse the conclusion collapses.

When matter was supposed to be a created substance it was easy to maintain some sort of theistic interpretation of the cosmos, as the very conception of creation implied something else than matter at the basis of all things and if that be regarded as intelligence, whether finite or infinite, and whether after the image of man or man after the image of it, there would be at least the possibility that man's intelligence would share in the law of persistence as long as that primary intelligence willed it. This was the direction of human speculation after the earlier stage of Christianity when the endeavor was to define God so as to make it inconsistent with his character that he should destroy human hopes. But as men could not appeal to the fact of survival in proof of that character they had to seek it in other evidence, good or bad, and then infer the probabilities a priori.

From what I have already said there are two general ways in which we can try to show survival possible, the philosophical and the scientific. But both of these methods are subject to what we mean by survival and that has not been explained. Were it not for the fact of death we should not use the term survival at all. But death puts an end to the phenomena of life as we know them. There is and can be no dispute or discussion about that. What man seeks, therefore, is whether something in addition to the body may not exist and therefore persist after death. To guarantee this possibility men have asserted, with or without good reasons, that man is or has a soul and thus brought its destiny under the persistence or continuity of sub

stance. A substance, as we have seen, remains in the same condition or mode of action unless it is modified by another agent. This is so universal a fact of experience or knowledge that we can safely predict upon it, and it is true regardless of the question whether the substance be simple or complex. The consequence of this is that any fact which proves the brain cannot account for consciousness and that there is a soul has in its favor the whole force of the indestructibility of substance, but nothing more. If we should at any time give up this indestructibility the case would be lost, and it is apparent in the more modern theory of matter; namely, that it is created out of the ether and not the simple reality which the atomic doctrine assumed, that we cannot guarantee immortality, even if we do grant a period of survival after death. On the other hand materialism can secure it only by contriving a method that will prevent death as we know it. But this is so improbable on the basis of experience that it would seem hopeless to encourage a prospect.

But what do we mean again by survival? We have not yet explained it. If death did not occur as a fact, I have said we should not use the term "survival" at all. There would be no question raised except that which would be suggested by the general laws of nature. That is, the bodily organism would be subject to the fate of the world or cosmos generally. But then if death did not occur, there would be no reason to suppose that the cosmos would otherwise remain the same. Death is but a phenomenon under the general law of change and decomposition, and to eliminate death would be to eliminate other and connected changes, as the law is the same for all compounds. Survival, then, obtains its meaning from the assumption that death is a fact and death means that the organism perishes. Does anything else remain is the question which interests mankind.

The answer is that what we want is personal consciousness and memory. These are supposed either to be the soul or to imply it. Strictly speaking they imply it and do not constitute it, but when the interest in the subject is brought to its real meaning it is for the persistence of consciousness whether we have any metaphysics about a soul or not. If consciousness be a functional activity, it must have a subject or ground and that we would call the soul. If that survived without the consciousness we should not be especially interested in it, as it is personal life and memory which determines or constitutes the object of real interest to any one when raising the question of survival, just as it is consciousness in the present existence that makes our interest in its retention and persistence. We want that to survive if an after life is to have any meaning for us. But when we say that it is the continuance of consciousness that we desire we may not be clear as to what is implied by it. With most people the term consciousness defines or denotes a stream of action more or less divested of its material associations and we may think of it as without the concrete points of interest and conception that the bodily life represents in connection with consciousness, and so not be interested in so abstract and lifeless a thing.

This feeling gives rise to the demand to have it related as we experience it in life where we suppose that the bodily organism is its condition. To normal life the area of consciousness seems larger than its definition by the philosopher as a stream with a memory. It is constituted by present perceptions and panoramic visions of reality. It is richer in content than the abstract conception of it as a group of inner states with a memory. This suggests an embodiment of some kind and the effort, conscious or unconscious, to conceive the conditions under which such a consciousness might exist apart from the body. Hence the demand for the

nature of the life and conditions under which consciousness supposedly survives. The various systems of belief about the nature of the after life are the answers to that query and it is not necessary to review them here. That they should be different from each other would be a natural corollary of the differences in human intelligence and experience. For us here it is the way in which the tendency gives rise to different philosophies that interest us. It determines the way in which we should defend or deny the possibility of survival. Whether the continuance of consciousness is possible or not will depend on what we expect to go with it or upon what relation we think it sustains to the physical body. If it be a function of the physical organism and this organism perishes it is as impossible for consciousness to survive as it would be for digestion or circulation to continue after death. Hence some other view of the nature of consciousness would be necessary as a precondition of entertaining the conceivability of continuance after the dissolution of the body.

1. The first answer to the human query would be that of Metchnikoff. He starts with the hypothesis of materialism which makes consciousness a function of the organism and endeavors to prevent death. Physiologists tell us that, so far as physiology is concerned, there is no reason why we should die at all. The laws of chemistry are such that it is only a question of keeping up the equilibrium between assimilation and dissipation of energy, between waste and repair. Metchnikoff proposes the protection of the digestive tract as a measure of preventing the survival of those destructive agents that cause death, and hence his conception of immortality is to get rid of death, to preserve consciousness with the body, not apart from it. This is certainly a new point of view, whether feasible or not. But it attacks the problem very dif

ferently from those who accepted death as a final and unpreventable fact. Mankind, assuming that death is as much a law of nature as waste and repair, has insisted on preserving consciousness in spite of the apparent disappearance of it and so have constructed their philosophic theories to suit the demand. But Metchnikoff takes the bull by the horns and endeavors or proposes to preserve the existing condition of things, accepting the materialistic theory of the world.

But many minds would not be satisfied with any such order. Men would divide on the desirability of such a regime. Some would prefer annihilation to any such system. Others no doubt would prefer the continuance of the material existence to any spiritual life that might be conceived. Besides, Metchnikoff would have to show some probability that death could be set aside and that it was not a law of nature before much attention could be paid to his proposal. We must accept this law and make our peace with it, with or without a future life, and if we can find reasons to believe that life continues in spite of death we must form some conception of consciousness and its conditions different from the materialistic one. The materialist will get his answer only by denying the possibility of survival or by preserving life along with the body. He can affirm continuance only by preserving the present order and eradicating the fact of death.

2. The second answer to the question was made by the believers in the doctrine of a physical resurrection. Their solution differed little from that of Metchnikoff. They, however, while admitting that consciousness was a function of the body also admitted that death was unescapable, and sought to overcome it by a system of causes, the act of God, for restoring that consciousness to its bodily possession and so fixed a time when the body should be raised from the dead.

I suspect, however, men would differ regarding the