was the real soul that survived and the physical consciousness passed away, except that we should not identify the rational and the subliminal. We might well conceive the inner consciousness of man to survive and the sensory to perish with the organism, but Aristotle had no such conceptions of the problems as are implied by psychic research and his terms only happen to coincide partly with distinctions we make. He came to his doctrine through his general philosophy. He was no doubt influenced in early life by the doctrine of Plato which ended in transmigration. Aristotle, while he did not express himself in that language, was not far removed from the ideas of Plato. He recognized three kinds of soul: the vegetable, the animal, and the rational. These were in reality distinctions between the vegetable, the animal and the human kingdoms. Vegetable souls were what we should to-day call vital force. Animal souls were the forces which organized the bodies of the animal kingdom and combined the vegetable and other forces. Probably he would have limited the animal soul to the sensory functions. At any rate the rational soul was found only in man and represented his intellect or reasoning powers, which the animals were supposed not to have. Now this intellect was the divine part of man and came to him from without. It was immortal.

But there is no evidence that Aristotle thought it personal survival. He was so influenced by the monism of the time that he probably had the same conception of its survival that Plato had, except that he was careful to clear it of mythical elements and eschewed the ideas of metempsychosis. He did not make clear just what he meant and probably regarded the intellect or the rational functions of the mind as the "essence" of all minds obtained from the Absolute or the divine, and so did not give it personality in survival any more than Plato did. Probably like all the philosophers he

kept aloof from the plebeian ideas associated with ancestor worship and the spiritualism of the oracles. We know from the persecution of Socrates that the philosophers had to make concessions to the beliefs of the rabble or suffer as Socrates did, and as Aristotle is said to have once left Athens to save philosophy a second disgrace like that of Socrates, we may well imagine that he took a prudential course in his attitude on this question. The language conceded immortality though a critical examination of it reveals that it had no such meaning as the mythical conception in the popular views stated and rejected by Plato. Aristotle's view amounts only to the fact that a man's mind was related to the Absolute in the same way that his body was. He regarded them as different things, but they were both subject to the same destiny. It was their substance that was permant and not their form, and this view did not carry with it any survival of personal identity.

The Stoics were largely confined to Ethics in their theories. They had a theory of nature, but religious and ethical ideas were the dominant ones in their system. Religion, however, as applied to their views had no such meaning as understood by the common people and may be said to have been exhausted in their ethics. They lived and taught in the decline of Greco-Roman civilization and labored under two limitations, a view of nature which was one of inflexible law and which, though it was regarded as rational, placed such restraints on human freedom that life had to be pursued with indifference to pain. The Stoics took no such joyous view of things as did the earlier Greeks who lived in a happier civilization. They had all the desires of the nature loving Greeks, but felt it a duty to submit to an order which did not allow their satisfaction and their lives had the appearance of gloominess to those who gave way to their passions. Hence their

ethics were somber and uninviting. In such an atmosphere and with resignation as their chief maxim they were not likely to take as much interest in the problem of a future life as other schools. Some of them, however, held views closely allied to the Christian. The general materialism of their age and the infection of their own philosophy with this materialism made them less assured of immortality, and they held it not only with some reservations but some of them made the future life only for an indefinite period. It was Seneca that approximated the Christian view more especially. Some of the earlier members of the school probably did not believe in immortality at all, though it is clear from the doctrine of a temporary existence after the death of the body that they had come into contact with facts or speculations that suggested it. In any case the doctrine had little interest for them.

The Epicureans denied immortality. But they had a curious belief for philosophers who denied a future life. They admitted that man had a soul, which they regarded as a fine material or ethereal organism, but they held that this organism perished at death. That is the soul as well as the body perished. They gave no evidence of this and it was perhaps their object to remove the fear of death that prejudiced them against the continuance of life after death. The representations of that life were such as might well frighten brave men, and the Epicureans had a philosophy to defend and did not see that the only safe way to protect their denial of immortality would have been to deny that a soul existed and to affirm that mental phenomena were simply functions of the body. This was the position taken by later materialists. But to admit that there was a soul at all was to suggest a view which might protect survival. The Epicureans made the atoms imperishable and had to assume that the soul was a complex organism to make it perishable. But they did

not see that you required evidence that a complex organism which was independent of the body perished at the same time as the body did. However they held that view and it remained for another system to dispute it and to perfect a philosophy to which Epicurean maxims did not apply. It was the Christian doctrine of the resurrection that laid the foundations for a different view.

3. The Roman Period

There is little in this period that excites interest. The Romans were a practical and not a philosophic people. Conquest and politics were their chief occupation and interest. They were not, as were the Greeks, a nature loving people. Life with them was more somber and serious, at least for those whose ideas and character have been brought down to us by history. It might have been different with the common citizens of whom history so often says little. But it is probable that the ruling classes did not constitute an exception in temperament to the majority of the population. Hence we are probably safe in supposing that, as they are represented in history, the Romans were lacking in the love of nature which might prompt an interest in the continuity of life with any such enthusiasm as marked their other interests.

Roman beliefs also had their two periods, the earlier and the philosophic. The earlier belief seems to have begun in Fetishism and Animism. The relics of them are found in the Lares and Penates or household gods of common life. They indicate a period when men believed in the gods and the human soul with the power to communicate with the dead. When the philosophic period arrived these household gods retired into mere customs and had no special significance for the educated classes. They were mere evidence of ideas that had

passed away with a higher civilization. Skepticism, which arose with philosophic reflection, displaced them except as artistic expression, and though the interest in a future life may have remained intact, as indicated by some of the writings of Cicero and others, the evidence that would appeal to the intellectuals was not such as to obtain their assent any more than it does with the same class to-day.

Cicero believed in immortality, but some of his arguments for it are childish, as were most arguments in antiquity. Some of his arguments are the regulation philosophic ones and are based upon the worth of intelligence, which is a purely aristocratic conception and does not meet the question. His Tusculan Disputations, in which he discusses the subject, deal mostly in literary quotations and shallow arguments, though appealing to natural human sentiments. There is no clear conception of what he thinks the after life is or may be, and he would probably have confessed entire ignorance of that, though believing that we survive. But there is no well defined view of the subject. The school of thought to which he belonged was not accustomed to assurance on such things.

Seneca was more explicit. He held to a happy existence after death and conceived this life as one of probation and death as marking the day of judgment. He evidently refined and rationalized the mythical view of Plato and made it similar to that which Christianity adopted. There seems to be no trace of primitive Animism in his doctrine, and little argument to prove it. His Stoical ethics made it unimportant to insist upon immortality as an ethical stimulus.

It was the same with Marcus Aurelius. His calm and Stoical life and reflections have no apparent interest in a future existence. The rational life in the present sufficed and indeed this marked the whole Stoical school, so that the interest in immortality