haven't been able to reconstruct the thing minute by minute as to what took place.

But that's not the only thing I can't recall or reconstruct back in those days. I couldn't go back and tell you exactly what happened when.

Mr. DODD. What else can't you recall?

Mr. Howe. Pardon?

Mr. DODD. What else can't you recall?

Mr. Howe. I mean so far as the investigation was concerned; when this happened, when that happened in specific chronological order. I said it was a kaleidoscope really, those first few days or first week or two after the assassination. You can imagine we were going in 14 different directions at once, and the whole office was that way. It was a confusing time.

Mr. DODD. Did you ever see the note again?

Mr. Howe. No, sir.

Mr. DODD. So you must have left it in Shanklin's office; at least that is one of the possibilities.

Mr. Howe. That's what I said, it's one of the three possibilities. I never saw the note subsequently nor have I any knowledge of what happened to it.

When I turned the note over to-I didn't turn it over to Shanklinbut after that particiular episode there, having left the office and telling Hosty to see the SAC

Mr. DODD. Well, excuse me.

You've mentioned one of the three possibilities that you put it back in Hosty's workbox.

Mr. Howe. Yes, that's what I say. But whatever I did

Mr. DODD. But you told me you didn't see it after you left Shanklin's

office.

Mr. Howe. Well, after that series of events there, I did one of the three things with the note, and let me say there, that's what I mean, after that I never again saw the note.

Mr. DODD. Did Mr. Shanklin look at the note or did you just hold it out for him to read?

Mr. Howe. I had it in my hand. I didn't hand it to him. He didn't read it. I know that.

it.

Mr. DODD. He didn't read it?

Mr. HOWE, But I described to him what I had and where I'd found

Mr. DODD. Is your testimony he didn't read it?

Mr. Howe. He didn't read it at that time, no.

Mr. DODD. He didn't put his hands on it? You just kind of held it out there for him to look at?

Mr. Howe. That's right. I had it in my hand and wanted to put it on his desk, and then I thought we would discuss this thing, what do we do now, here is this thing that we thought didn't any longer exist. Mr. DODD. And you don't remember putting it back in your pocket? Mr. Howe. No, I don't.

Mr. DODD. What would you most likely have done with other information that you brought to Mr. Shanklin in the past? I'm sure you saw him many, many times regarding many pieces of information-normally, when you brought something into Mr. Shanklin to see, did

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you normally take it back out with you, or did you leave it for him to look over?

Mr. Howe. Well, that would depend. If it was something that I wanted to discuss with him and we sat down and discussed it at that time and we came to a conclusion, I would carry it back out with me. If it was something that I felt he should review with a little care, I didn't want to wait until he did it, I would leave it there and then walk out.

Mr. DODD. He would normally make a request-leave this here, I would like to look at it further.

Mr. Howe. Sometimes. If he were busy with something else he would say well, OK leave it there, I'll take a look at it when I get a chance. Mr. DODD. And if he didn't say that, normally you'd take it back out with you when you left?

Mr. Howe. Well, if we had come to some conclusion in connection with whatever problem might be involved and what I had gone in about, I would take it back out with me and go on from there on my

own.

Mr. DODD. Thank you.

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Seiberling?

Mr. SEIBERLING. One more question.

Suppose the note had not been destroyed and in due course had been included in the file on the investigation of the assassination? Do you have any feeling as to what would have been the reaction of the Washington office of the Bureau as to the existence of the note and the failure to take action on it prior to the assassination?

Mr. Howe. I think there would have been action taken of a very severe nature possibly in connection-had that taken place, although I don't know.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Against the head of the Dallas office?

Mr. Howe. Well, there again, this thing would be handled in accordance with Bureau policy. There would be an explanation demanded. That explanation would be prepared. It would with the SAC's recommendation. That's a hypothetical matter.

Mr. SEIBERLING. So that it wasn't necessarily an irrational act by Mr. Shanklin, if indeed he did order the destruction of the note? It could have been a self-protective act.

Mr. Howe. It-I don't know. You could look at it that way I suppose. The note could have had just one consequence. Actually at that stage of the game it represented nothing more than something on which Jim Hosty, you might say, could have been very, very severely criticized when the thing was evaluated in the hysteria following the assas sination on the basis of facts which existed prior to the assassination, and which at that time would not have been a great big deal.

Mr. SEIBERLING. So either Hosty or you or Shanklin or all three could have been injured by it?

Mr. Howe. I don't see where I would have been in any way culpable. Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, simply because you were his superior, like the captain who's in command of the ship that sinks. Whether he was on deck or not at the time, or on the bridge, he is responsible,

Mr. Howe. No, not for something that was never brought to your attention. I don't feel that I would have been held in any way responsible in connection with that, if some action had been taken in connec

tion with that letter. I did what I was responsible for doing in connection with it, as soon as I had an opportunity to do it.

Mr. SEIBERLING. But you do feel that nevertheless there could have been some very sharp reactions on the part of Washington as to the fact that the note had not been disclosed prior to the assassination?

Mr. Howe. As I see it, the note would have only served one purpose, and that would have been for action, disciplinary action, as I said, directed primarily at Jim Hosty because it would have been said he should have done something with it prior to the assassination. Of course, that's what I say. It would be severe because it would be evaluated in the light of what had occurred, rather than in the light of the circumstances which existed prior to the assassination; in which event I don't doubt.

But what if he hadn't had an inspection then, and that note had come to light in the course of that inspection that there would have been anything more than a mild letter of censure because it would be called a delayed investigation.

But after the assassination, it would not have been, in my opinion, rationally evaluated. And that's the only thing that the letter was good for at that time. It was an administrative matter, a personnel matter, and after I turned it over to the SAC I was through with it as far as I was concerned. Administrative action, disciplinary action, recommendations concerning for or against are the responsibility of the SAC.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Well, on that, since apparently Mr. Hosty would be the one that would most likely be penalized, I suppose you might assume that he would have the greatest incentive to destroy the note. But if he did that all on his own, why then certainly no one else would have been criticized for it.

Mr. Howe. Well, that's probably true.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Is that true?

Mr. Howe. That's probably true, if he did that on his own.

Mr. SEIBERLING. But Mr. Shanklin does not testify that he didn't order the destruction of the note. He testified that he never even heard of the note.

Mr. Howe. I understand that.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Which is a rather strong combination of circum

stances.

Mr. Howe. All I can tell you is-to the best of my ability-my recollection of the events which are pertinent to the activity concerning the

note.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Thank you.

Mr. EDWARDS. Are there any other questions?

If there are no other questions, the committee will recess until Monday morning at 9:30 in this room.

Mr. Howe, thank you very much for your testimony.

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

INTRODUCTION TO APPENDIX

Requests made of James B. Adams, Deputy Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the hearing of October 21, 1975 were further amplified in a letter from Chairman Edwards of October 29, 1975 to the Attorney General. That letter follows this introduction, which is followed by the responses. On December 15, 1975 Chairman Edwards requested the Attorney General to respond to further questions regarding issues raised in the testimony of James P. Hosty, Jr. before the Subcommittee on December 12, 1975. Chairman Edwards' letter of December 15, 1975 appears in this appendix with the response following the request. Certain of the responses by the FBI were treated by the Subcommittee as executive session material because of personal privacy considerations and not included in this appendix. Those materials are: questions 8(a) as to names of individuals interviewed regarding the destruction of the Oswald note and 8(c) as to names of all individuals regarding the alleged telex to the New Orleans FBI office. Subcommittee staff reviewed materials relating to the questions at FBI Headquarters for additional information which would aid the Subcommittee in determining the circumstances surrounding the destruction of the Oswald note. No information was developed which would settle the conflicts which arose in testimony before the Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee believes that the Committee on Assassinations, created by the House of Representatives during the 94th Congress, will deal further with these subjects during their inquiry.

Hon. EDWARD H. LEVI,

Attorney General of the United States,
Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C.

OCTOBER 29, 1975.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: At a hearing on October 21, 1975, held by the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the witness, James B. Adams, Deputy Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was asked to augment the record in certain instances. Mr. Adams was advised that this Subcommittee would submit a series of questions regarding FBI procedures and some legal issues involved which are attached and marked Exhibit A. The witness was directed to respond to the submitted questions under a continuation of his oath, or to submit the answers as a sworn statement. The other matters to be furnished are as follows:

1. Copy of the Report (Summary) first furnished to the Warren Commission which did not refer to Agent Hosty along with the report later furnished to the Commission which included the reference data on Agent Hosty.

2. Agreement (Guidelines) by which FBI furnishes information to the Secret Service regarding individual or group threats to the Executive.

3. The Oswald file of some 69 documents which existed at the time of the deliberations of the Warren Commission with designation of which documents were reviewed by the Commission and which were not so reviewed. Mr. Adams indicated that he would submit a statement for the record at this time.

4. Copy of any and all internal rules of the FBI (whether in the formal rules and regulations or not) regarding the procedures for reporting misconduct, whether active or passive. Identify any changes made in such rules between 1963 and 1975.

5. Report or reports regarding the discipline of any FBI or Department of Justice personnel related to the conduct of the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. Please provide the names, nature of the violation, discipline imposed, 1963 and 1975 rank or job description and present address (employment and home if known).