make the decision? I am curious as to how, under this authority, about how we would select out groups which were deserving of dirty tricks? Mr. LAMBIE. I think you would select out groups based on the same parameters, whatever those parameters might be, that caused you to open the investigation and continue the investigation in the first place. You find the group as a revolutionary group, for instance, as a group that seeks to deprive individuals of their civil rights, as a group that has potential for terrorism or violence. So whatever causes you to maintain the investigation in the first instance, is probably the same definition you would use in terms of getting into the dirty tricks area. Maybe the dirty tricks just consist of cutting holes in the Klan's sheets, but what the heck? Why not do it?

Mr. STAREK. Then you do not think that the domestic security guidelines which provide timetables for closing investigations would be helpful in determining which groups need dirty tricks?

Mr. LAMBIE. They might very well be helpful, but probably not in terms of any counterintelligence activity, but certainly in terms of the organizations that prove out to be legitimate and proper organizations. The difficulty is that the guidelines are probably redundant there because the Bureau itself does not want to maintain a whole lot of open and active investigations of organizations that don't lead them anywhere.

I don't know an agent in the Bureau who does not already have too many cases assigned to him. I think it is a misconception to charge that the Bureau wants to maintain open cases in situations in which the need or the feeling is that you should not have an open case. I think the Bureau is anxious to close cases. I think the Bureau has closed cases. And the imposition of the time deadline, once a decision has been made to go forward with an investigation, probably is artificial in terms of how long the investigation ought to continue.

Mr. STAREK. With respect to terrorist activities, and I am referring to bombings in particular, it seems that the evidence that we have shows that the Bureau has really not been able to do an effective job in preventing these activities. And I wonder how the guidelines

Mr. LAMBIE. I don't know where that evidence comes from. As I said earlier, terrorist activities have occurred for sure, and are occurring, and are occurring on an escalating basis; but I don't think we can very accurately suggest that there has been no deterrence or prevention. The Bureau has been able to prevent some things from occurring. I don't know how many things you have to prevent or deter to constitute a deterrence. My feeling would be if you deter a single bombing that might kill people, then you have performed an effective job of deterrence.

Mr. STAREK. All right, I agree with that, but what I am getting at is whether or not there has been an effective job in the past-as

to

Mr. LAMBIE. How do we measure that? How can you compile statistics on crimes that don't happen? That is the question.

Mr. STAREK. Well, I think one of the ways is to count how many bombs the FBI finds that did not go off, but I don't want to debate that. What I am curious about is how do you see the domestic security guidelines limiting the Bureau's capability of continuing to provide a deterrent activity against terrorist activities?

Mr. LAMBIE. They may not. If we can assume that you can mantain an investigation over a long enough period of time to get the kind of coverage you need, the guidelines may not. I am not that unhappy with the guidelines. I would prefer to see, as I say, the guidelines torn up and revert to the Manual of Rules and Regulations; but I think that the FBI has indicated it can live with the guidelines. And so in that sense I am not all that unhappy with them.

Mr. STAREK. I have one final question. I was somewhat confused during your testimony as to where you would envision the most effective congressional oversight for the Bureau. I think you indicated in your statement that either the Appropriations Committee or the Judiciary Committee should probably have that oversight function. Then at another point you said

Mr. LAMBIE. I have a strong faith in the power of the purse. I don't mean to take it out of the Judiciary but, as I say, I have a strong faith in the power of the purse.

Mr. STAREK. But at another point, as I recall, you were advocating one oversight committee holding the jurisdiction. I wondered if you meant, Mr. Lambie, one committee within each House of the Congress or if you think just one committee

Mr. LAMBIE. My personal preference would be a joint Senate/House committee. I think that has been pretty well ruled out. And in the absence of that kind of a function, I would prefer to see just a single committee or subcommittee in the House and in the Senate. My reasons for that are purely practical; and that is to really allow the Bureau to have the Director and senior Bureau officials, Mr. Starek, to be able to respond meaningfully and in depth to a single body rather than to be up here on the Hill every other week in testimony that is largely redundant, and before a great many committees or subcommittees. I think that there has been too much of that already.

Mr. STAREK. Thank you, Mr. Lambie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Lambie, I have just a couple of more questions. Do you think the Ku Klux Klan should be under surveillance? Mr. LAMBIE. Absolutely.

Mr. EDWARDS. At the present time?

Mr. LAMBIE. Absolutely. I think it is a pretty miniscule organization and they probably cannot mount much of a threat in many areas, but I absolutely believe that they should be under surveillance.

Mr. EDWARDS. Do you think there should-by the FBI COINTEL program-there should be disruptions going on within the Ku Klux Klan?

Mr. LAMBIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EDWARDS. How about the Black Panthers?

Mr. LAMBIE. There are a lot of organizational problems with the various Klan groups there, as you know, and I would exacerbate those with every chance I got.

Mr. EDWARDS. How about within the Black Panther party?

Mr. LAMBIE. I think the Panthers have gone largely political now. If we take something like the Black Revolutionary Army, or whatever that is these days, the violence-prone groups, I would accept exactly the same definition. yes.

Mr. EDWARDS. How about the American Communist Party?

Mr. LAMBIE. Yes.

Mr. EDWARDS. Do you think, they should be-I mean, they are a legal political party and they run candidates, but do you still think the FBI should infiltrate and disrupt it?

Mr. LAMBIE. Absolutely.

Mr. EDWARDS. How about the Socialist Party?

Mr. LAMBIE. The Socialist Party-Socialist Democratic Federation? No; the Socialist Party has certainly never advocated violence or revolution.

Mr. EDWARDS. How about Jesse Jackson's PUSH in Chicago?
Mr. LAMBIE. No.

Mr. EDWARDS. But who makes that judgment?

Mr. LAMBIE. Let me say this. Regarding about finding out what PUSH is about and what they do, I don't think there is anything wrong with having a file on PUSH. I think PUSH is a legitimate political social action organization. I don't think the organization or Reverend Jackson or anyone else is damaged by the Bureau having that much in its files, which will reflect precisely that.

Now counterintelligence activity? No; of course not.

Mr. EDWARDS. But if a supervisor in the Bureau and maybe Mr. Kelley came to the conclusion that PUSH was a dangerous organization and might someday result in some violence, then you would approve of infiltration and disruption?

Mr. LAMBIE. Well, now we are speculating on somebody in the Bureau making a really bad decision on bad facts. That can happen, sure. But as I said before, you can't make any legislation that is reasonable in my view, that can prevent bad judgment. You can write legislation that simply forbids a whole range of activity, but I think that the Nation is the loser rather than anything else, if you do indeed do that. I think that goes much too far.

Mr. EDWARDS. Any further questions?

Mr. PARKER. No.

Mr. STAREK. No.

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Lambie, we thank you very much for coming to Washington and testifying. We have had a very interesting time. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11 a.m. the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

FBI OVERSIGHT

Freedom of Information Act Compliance by the FBI and
Plan To Eliminate Backlog

THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice at 9:35 a.m. in room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Don Edwards [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Edwards, Drinan, Dodd, and Butler. Also present: Alan A. Parker, counsel; Thomas P. Breen, assistant counsel; and Rocoe B. Starek III, associate counsel.

Mr. EDWARDS. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we will hear from representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding their compliance with the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act.

A continuing concern of this subcommittee, which has legislative and oversight jurisdiction over the FBI, is to understand how the Bureau is allocating its total resources to the numerous responsibilities imposed on the Bureau by statute.

Along with that basic concern is added our growing concern that requests under these two acts are not being processed in a complete and timely fashion.

Today we will have the benefit of testimony from FBI personnel who deal with the requests on a daily basis. We trust that we will be better informed as to how each request is processed, and the levels of decisionmaking required by those requests, as well as some information on the costs and problems encountered by the FBI.

Our witnesses today are James M. Powers, Section Chief of the Freedom of Information-Privacy Act Section of the FBI. Mr. Powers is accompanied by Richard C. Dennis, Jr., Unit Chief of the Privacy Act Unit of the Freedom of Information-Privacy Act Section, and by James W. Awe, Unit Chief of the Records, Systems, and Training Unit. Gentlemen, we welcome you. Mr. Powers, you may proceed.

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