N° 69.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 31.

Ητοι κυκεών και απεμπλοκή, και σκεδασμός" η ένωσις και ταξις και προνοια. Ει μεν εν τα πρότερα, τι και επι θυμω είναι συγκριματ και Φυρμών τοιχίων ενδιατρίβειν ; τι δε μοι και μελει αλλά τινος, η τα όπως πολε αια γινεσθαι ; τι δε και ταρασσομαι ; ήξει γαρ επ' ἔμε ὁ σκεδασμός, ὁ τι αν ποιω· εἰ δε θατέρω εςι, σεβω και ευςαθώς nai Gajjw vw dinınevli.

ΜΑΡΚ. ΑΝΤΩΝ. Βιβλ. ς.

The univerfe is either a mere medley, jumble, or confufed mixture, fuch as chance might be fuppofed to have produced: or it is a connected fyftem of things, fuch as might have been expected at the hands of a wife Providence. If the former be true, why should we be anxious to prolong our stay in fuch a squalid and diforderly fcene? Why should we give ourselves trouble about any thing further than the easiest mode of mixing with our mother earth? Why should we fuffer our minds to be so difquieted, fince, do what we will, we must at last all fink into the general confufion? But if the other fide of the propofition be true, then do I reverence the great Ruler of all Things, put my trust in him, and am full of courage.

AFTER all which has been urged in the fore

going Papers on the proof afforded us from analogy, in defence of God's moral government of the world, it must be confeffed, that it contains fome facts which ftartle human reafon, and to

which analogy furnishes no specific answer; yet, if the analogy of nature support the probability that the moral conftitution of things is a scheme or fyftem of government, as diftinguished from a number of fingle unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness, and that it is a scheme imperfectly comprehended, it affords a general an fwer to fuch doubts as arife as to the equity of this moral conftitution. We shall see enough to convince us that this is the cafe, if we look into the course and order of things in the natural world. Here we shall find that analogy (a moral government being fupposed) justifies a conclusion, in the first place, that this government is a fcheme or fyftem; in the next, a fcheme imperfectly comprehended.

In the great natural order of the world we are all related together in a common bond of neceffity and dependence. Under various circumftances and conditions are we all related together, nor know we where these relations end. No action, no event stands so fingle and unconnected, as not to be related to other actions, other events: nor are we fafe in saying that there are not other rela

tions beyond the limit of this prefent world. Every thing has future unknown consequences. Were we to trace any event as far as we could proceed, we fhould find that if such event were not connected with fomething ftill beyond it in nature, unknown to us, fuch event could not have been at all nor can we give the whole account of any thing whatever, of all its caufes, ends, and neceffary adjuncts. The natural world, then, and the natural government of the world being a fcheme, and fuch an incomprehensible scheme, we are led in confequence to believe that the moral government is alfo a fcheme, and a fcheme that alfo baffles human enquiry and comprehension.

On a deeper confideration it becomes probable that thefe fchemes are but one in truth, and that the first is fubfervient to the feeond, as the vegetable world to the animal, as bodies to minds. We are taught, therefore, by analogy, that every act of divine juftice and goodness may be fuppofed to look much beyond itself and its immediate object, to have reference to fome other parts of God's moral adminiftration and to a general moral plan. Thus our very fcanty views of the frame and order

of

of the natural world, furnish (a moral govern ment being supposed) an easy and obvious answer of a negative force to all fuch objections as are directed against the equity, unity, confiftency, and excellence of this moral government of the world.

Our gradual progrefs in the developement of this great fcheme of adminiftration, has been well illustrated by the manner in which modern astronomers made the difcovery of the circular form of that phænomenon which we call the Ring of Saturn. Sometimes contemplating it as a narFow, fometimes as a broader oval; fometimes in the form of a ftraight line, in its different relative fituations during its twenty-nine years revolu tion through all the parts of the ecliptic; they came at length, by a fort of optical funthefis, to afcertain the circularity of its real shape. Thus, though the great providential fcheme of the world viewed through the medium of our grofs understandings, puts on diftorted and broken appearances; obfervation and research reconcile a part, and, as in the progreffion of time, the moral order of the world moves on, new relations and con fentanieties

fentanities unfold themfelves, and we gain more and more accurate views of the roundness and perfection of this mighty system, till it may please the great Difpenfer of all Things, to purify and enlarge our mental optics to the contemplation of his whole defign.

In another view we are forced to acknowledge that no apparent irregularities form any grounds of objection to the adequacy and perfection of the moral plan; for, in the natural world, experience proves that very defirable ends are brought about by means in no fort defirable, and frequently by means which we fhould have conceived without experience would have produced very oppofite effects. Befides which, the natural government of the world is conducted by general laws; and for this there exift may wife and admirable reafons. Yet it is impoffible for general laws to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they arife, as we find in civil government: and were all irregularities prevented or remedied by immediate interpofitions (as things are constituted), the bad confequences are plain. They would unquestionably fofter indolence and apathy, render doubtful

very