modify his views respecting the divine Being, so as to regard him in one way when united with Jesus, and in another way when he is not. Praxeas seems to view him simply as he is in himself considered. We may indeed say, that he expressly declines making any distinctions. To maintain the union of the divine nature with Jesus and its existence in him, was undertaken by Praxeas in order to oppose the Ebionitish heresy, and every thing which approximated towards it; while the omission to make any distinction in the divine Nature, was designedly opposed to all those, who, although they entirely renounced the opinions of Ebion, yet would be inclined by their views, as he supposed, toward a species of Gentile polytheism.

The next thing which Praxeas would have had to do, had he proceeded to the further formation of his creed, would have been more exactly to distinguish how we are to conceive of the divine Being, as existing in union with a particular Being [Jesus], and as universally present and existing every where. Such a distinction the wants of Christians as to doctrinal instruction seem to have called for; and to the making of it Praxeas would no doubt have been called, if the partizans of Artemon and Theodotus had entered into and carried on a contest with him. It would have been very natural to object against them, that they knew not how to make any such distinction. But it would seem that Praxeas had no special call to develope his views, on this point; and therefore his opinions, and those of his disciples (if he had any), seem, in regard to this particular, never to have been made out, or at least not to have been exhibited.

On the other hand, the views of Tertullian were more fully disclosed. He every where brings in the Spirit as a subject of his consideration; respecting which, so far as Praxeas is concerned, we must remain in doubt. Nor can one boast that even Tertullian would have expressed himself so definitely, unless he had been called out as it were to make use of negative expressions, in order to clear himself from all suspicion of leaning toward polytheism, so long as he admitted that there are distinctions in the Godhead. To maintain the unity of the Godhead, was the more a work of urgency in his case, inasmuch as he had always been a vehement opposer of the Gnostics; who, in the sense above represented, went over to a kind of Hellenism, [i. e. polytheism]. Where however it is not Tertullian's main business to ward off suspicion, but only to

make direct and positive representations, there it of course becomes a matter of more difficulty to designate the distinctions in the Godhead; for this must be done with the most careful foresight in the weighing of expressions. Hence it comes, that on such occasions Tertullian expresses himself in a dubious and indefinite manner. * Moreover in representations of this kind, it is very natural that tropical expressions should be frequently resorted to; but in order to do this with any success, one must have a tact for rightly comprehending the force of them ;† and even then, for the most part, peculiar cautions are needed in order to avoid their being exposed to misinterpretation. Hence it is no wonder, that in different passages the defining and lim

* For example: Oixovouía... quae Unitatem in Trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens; cap. 2.-Unitas ex semet ipsa derivans 'Trinitatem; cap. 3.-Ut invisibilem Patrem intelligamus pro plenitudine majestatis, visibilem vero Filium agnoscamus pro modulo derivationis; cap. 14.—Qua Pater et Filius duo, et hoc non ex separatione substantiae sed ex dispositione; cum individuum et inseparatum Filium a Patre pronunciamus; cap. 19. ['The economy... which arranges a Unity in Trinity, marking out or designating three.-The Unity deriving a Trinity from itself.--That we may conceive of the invisible Father, according to the plenitude of his majesty; but of the visible Son, according to the limitations prescribed by his derivation.-On account of which the Father and Son are two; and this, not by separation of substance, but by arrangement of it, inasmuch as we assert that the Son is not divided or separated from the Father.']

† As an example of tropical expressions the following passage may be cited: Protulit enim Deus Sermonem, sicut radix fruticem, et fons fluvium, et sol radium. Nam et istae species probolae sunt earum substantiarum ex quibus prodeunt; cap. 8. [For God produced the Word, as the root does the fruit, and the fountain the stream, and the sun the rays of light. For the specimens now mentioned are the offspring of those substances from which they proceed.'-The reader should take notice that every where the idea of derivation as to the divine nature of the Logos, is held fast by Tertullian, as well as by most of the later fathers. TR.]

For an example [how things may be said on this subject, which may easily be misinterpreted], take the following: Omne quod prodit ex aliquo, secundum sit ejus necesse est de quo prodit; non ideo tamen est separatum. ['Every thing which is derived from another, must necessarily be second to that from which it is derived; however, it is not on account of this to be regarded as a separate thing.']

iting expressions of Tertullian, are subversive of one another.* Besides this, the relation of the Trinity to Unity cannot be maintained, if at one time [as in Tertullian] all three persons are derived from the one God, and at another the second and third persons are derived from the Father. Nor can the relation of the Father to the Son be maintained, if at one time entire similitude is insisted on, and at another dissimilitude is conceded or taken for granted.‡

This last idea, indeed, lies so deep in the whole views and representations of Tertullian, that it every where, unconsciously as it were, but still in a very marked manner, developes it

* For example: Numerum sine divisione patiuntur; cap. 2.-Pater enim tota substantia est; Filius, vero, derivatio totius et portio ; cap. 9. [They (the persons of the Trinity) are the subjects of number, but not of division.—For the Father is the whole substance; the Son, the derivation and apportionment of the whole.']

Unus Deus, ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species, in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti deputantur; cap. 2. Compare this now with the following: Ita Trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrens, et monarchiae nihil obstrepit, et oixovouias statum protegit; cap. 8. In this passage, the Father corresponds to the sun, and light and heat to the Son and Spirit. ['One God, from whom all those gradations and forms and species are reckoned, by the name of Father and Son and Spirit.--Thus the Trinity, by implicated and connected gradations proceeding from the Father, casts no reproach upon the uovaozia, and at the same time defends the constitution of the oixovouia.'—In the first passage the three persons are represented as coming from the one God; in the second, the Trinty is presented as a Patre decurrens.]

Unius substantiae, unius status, et unius potestatis ; cap. 2. Compare with this the following: Sic et Pater alius a Filio, dum Filio major; cap. 9. Also with this: Tamen alium dicam oportet, ex necessitate sensus, eum qui jubet et eum qui facit, cap. 12; and moreover with this: Unum dicit quod pertinet ad unitatem, ad similitudinem, ad conjunctionem, ad dilectionem Patris, et ad obsequium Filii ... et ita per opera intelligimus unum esse Patrem et Filium, cap. 22. ['Of one substance, one state, and one power.-So the Father is another or different from the Son, since he is greater than the Son.-Yet from the necessity of the sense, he who gives orders must be different from him who executes them.-Oneness means that which pertains to unity, to similitude, to conjunction, to the love of the Father and obedience of the Son... and thus by their works we understand that the Father and Son are one."]

self. For if the Father was originally sole and by himself, and had the Logos only in him;* and the Logos himself first attained to full and complete existence when he came forth out of the Father; how could he then be altogether like to him from whom he came forth? Or how could the Son say: 'ALL which the Father hath is mine,' when eternity was not his? How I say could one be consistent in believing these latter assertions, and still persevering to maintain, that while the Logos was in God, he had not yet his appropriate existence? Or how can one maintain the immutability of the Logos, if he holds to his passing out of that state in which he was ivdiaveTos in God, and his coming into a state of separate and hypostatic existence? Or if we are to make distinctions so nice respecting the Godhead of the Son, that in and by himself considered we may give the name God to him, but when we compare the Son with the Father we must then call the former nothing more than Lord;‡ how then is a perfect similitude between the two to be made out?

[* Ante omnia enim Deus erat solus. . . . Caeterum ne quidem solus; habebat enim secum, quam habebat in semetipso, rationem suam scilicet... Hanc Graeci óyov dicunt. 'Before creation, God was alone... Yet not alone, indeed, for he had with him that which he had in him, viz., his reason ... which the Greeks name Logos.' Dr. S. has omitted to cite this. TR.]

Tunc ... Sermo speciem et ornatum suum sumit... cum dicit Deus: Fiat lux. Haec est nativitas perfecta Sermonis, dum ex Deo procedit. In the sequel he appeals to the following passage of Scripture in order to prove such a derivation of the Logos from the Father, viz., Eructavit cor meum Sermonem optimum, (Ps. 45: 1). ['Then the Word assumes his form and beauty... when God says: Let there be light. This is the perfect nativity of the Word, when he proceeds from God. My heart eructates the Word who is most excellent.' These almost grossly offensive views harmonize very exactly with those of Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, Athenagoras, and Hippolytus. TR.]

[ The whole strain of Tertullian's reasoning, in cap. 13, is to establish the propriety of making such a distinction as to appellations. He says that we are justified in so doing by the fact, that we may call the light of the sun by the name of sun, when the light is considered in and by itself; but when the sun itself is also mentioned, it would not be proper to give to his light the same name. TR.]

We may readily say then, in respect to Tertullian, that in developing his positive views of the doctrine of the Trinity, notwithstanding all his zeal against Gnosticism, his probolae [emanations] Gnosticize; and in his representations of the Logos, as existing indeed before all things, but (in order to create all things) as first coming forth substantially out of God, he Arianizes. Moreover his ante omnia enim Deus erat solus (cap. 5), agrees very exactly with the v notε öte ovx žv of Arius, respecting the Logos.

Finally, that these are not matters of mere oversight in debate, nor such departures from consistency merely the result of other errors of Tertullian, but that they are almost necessarily connected with the undertaking of Tertullian to make out some definite distinctions in the divine Being, in opposition to the simple phraseology of Praxeas-all this will be made apparent in the sequel, when we come to consider the relative opposition between the views of Noetus and Hippolytus.

ARTICLE II.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN MASSACHU

SETTS.

By the Editor.

In a late number of a most respectable foreign publication, we find the following paragraphs: "It is often asked in England, both within and without the established church, What is the relation of Christianity to civil government in the United States of America, and how does the system practically work? These inquiries are of considerable moment, as connected with the important question of national church establishments. It is urged by the opposers of established churches, that in the United States of America the experiment of doing without them has been tried, and has succeeded. It is replied by the friends of national religious establishments, that the experiment has not yet been fully tried; for that the United States still retain much of the beneficial influence of the arrangements, which existed VOL. V. No. 18.

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