error, Dr. Gray, is illegal and non-enforceable, because against public policy. The eighth item of said contract obligated the plaintiff in error to give to the defendant in error legal advice regarding all commercial matters, which was a portion of the service for which the $10.00 were to be paid. The fact that plaintiff in error employs a licensed attorney to perform such services for it cannot make the contract legal, for the reason, that if it cannot practice directly, it cannot do so indirectly by employing a licensed attorney to carry on the business of practicing law for it. It results that we find no error in the judgment of the court below, and it is affirmed with costs. NOTE-What Constitutes the Practice of Law? -So many legislatures and bar associations have become interested in driving out of the practice of the law, those not licensed therefor, that it becomes more than an interesting academic question to define the terms "law business" and the "practice of the law," in order to determine who are and who are not "legal practitioners." There seems to be hardly any doubt that the advocatus of the old Roman system of jurisprudence referred only to those who appeared for their clientes before some juridical tribunal. And this is still the distinguishing characteristic of the work of the advocat in the practice of law in continental Europe and of the barrister in the British Empire. The jurisconsult under the old Roman law, on the other hand, was engaged in what we would now call office practice. He gave advice with respect to business and personal rights under the law to all who sought his chambers. The English solicitor has added to the usual prerogatives of the jurisconsult the duties of a conveyancer. The American attorney and counselor at law draws to himself all of the distinguishing characteristics, prerogatives and privileges of every order of legal practitioner. He is an advocate, jurisconsult and conveyancer, all in one, and his license authorizes him in the exclusive performance of all duties which properly came within the purview of these great and heretofore separate professions. I might be pardoned a moment of digression in which to remark that it is not altogether a matter of settled conviction in this country either among the people or the profession, that it would not be in the interest of greater efficiency in the administration of legal affairs to separate the practice of law again into some of the component parts into which it was originally divided. At least, it has seemed to some that the state might very properly license men as conveyancers who were not also entitled to appear in court as advocates. But until such a distinction is made by the legislature, it is certain that in this country a lawyer is not only licensed to practice law, but is the only person in the community who has any authority to perform legal business of any kind, including that of conveyancing. Some states like Missouri distinguish the terms "practice of law" and "legal business" and while absolutely prohibiting any but licensed attorneys from practicing law, exclude unlicensed persons from doing legal business only where such business is performed for compensation. (Mo. Sess. Acts, 1915, p. 99. See 81 Cent. L. J. 4, where these interesting statutes are set out and discussed in full.) The distinction is important since it is one of the treasured inheritances of the practice of the law that, whatever it may be to-day, it was originally a purely honorable profession—its highest reward being the honor which attended the service which the patronus causorum was enabled to render in the cause of justice. The Cincian Law of ancient Rome prohibited advocates from receiving compensation for their services. Later this law was modified to the extent of permitting the client to reward his benefactor with an honorarium and this is still the practice of the English barrister, even though often concealed under thinly veiled subterfuges. No such restrictions, however, were ever imposed on the solicitor, conveyancer or legal advisor, so the distinction made by the recent Missouri statutes comports with the best traditions of the profession. So far as the "practice of law" is concerned, which includes the appearance before a judicial tribunal on behalf of another, there can be no doubt that it would defeat the very purpose of the laws passed to elevate the moral character and intellectual capacity of those entitled to practice law to permit unlicensed practitioners to appear in court and plead in behalf of another. In some states, however, this restriction is limited to courts of record, and litigants in police and justice courts are permitted to be fleeced and defrauded by incompetent, unlicensed practitioners. It would seem advisable that if unlicensed practitioners may appear for clients before inferior tribunals, they should be prohibited from receiving compensation for such services which would be effective at least to the extent of limiting such service to the gratuitous undertakings of friends of the litigant or of social service workers who are interested solely in assisting in securing justice for those unable to procure counsel. From what we have already said, it will be noted that the prerogatives and privilege exclusively reserved to licensed practitioners are quite unrestricted though possibly indefinite. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized this very broad scope of an attorney's duties in this country when it defined them as follows: "Persons acting professionally in legal formalities, negotiations or proceedings by the warrant or authority of their clients may be regarded as attorneys at law within the meaning of that designation as used in this country." tional Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621. Na It must be borne in mind that the right to represent another unlike the right to appear and represent his own cause in a court of justice or to draw his own legal papers, is not a natural right protected by the Constitution. It is a privilege conferred by the state upon those show ing proper moral and intellectual qualifications. In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140; State Bar Commission v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745; In re Application for License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213; Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 307. And the supervision which courts by summary proceedings have over the exercise of this privilege is an important safeguard against oppression of clients and incompetency in the handling of judicial disputes which it is the policy of the law to pre serve. Therefore, even where an attorney at law properly admitted is afterward disbarred, he is not entitled to recover the compensation provided for in the contract to prosecute a claim before the Treasury Dept., of the U. S., nor could he continue to perform any services under the contract. Moyers v. Graham, 15 Lea. (Tenn.) 57. This case shows how jealous the courts are with respect to the exercise of privileges which depend on the prior and continued judicial recognition of qualifications which entitle one to the enjoyment of such privileges. It is well settled, therefore, that all contracts by unlicensed persons for the performance of services which are regarded as legal business are against public policy and will not be enforced. Ames v. Gilman, 10 Met. (Mass.) 239; Bachman v. O'Reilly, 14 Colo. 433; Sellers v. Phillips, 37 Ill. App. 74. In Colorado, Missouri, New York and possibly other states, it is a misdemeanor for one unlicensed to practice law, to contract to render legal services and it is held that any money paid for such services may be recovered three-fold. Such statutes have been construed and upheld in two cases. Hittson v. Browne, 3 Colo. 304; Buxton v. Lietz, 136 N. Y. S. 829. Under many of these recent statutes the question of such established businesses as trust companies and collection agencies have come into question and it is interesting to note that the court in Buxton v. Lietz, supra, construing the New York statute held that a contract for services or commissions made with an individual engaged in the business of a mercantile agency for collection of accounts on behalf of clients and instituting suits for that purpose when necessary, is illegal and unenforceable. So strict has been the enforcement of the Colorado statute respecting the unlawful practice of the law that one who had been licensed to practice law in another state who had removed to Colorado was convicted for practicing law without first having been admitted in Colorado. People v. Ellis, 44 Colo. 176. What is the practice of law or the doing of law business, which is thus prohibited by these statutes has been broadly stated by a recent authority as follows: "It is too obvious for discussion that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in courts. According to the generally understood definition of the practice of law in this country, it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings and the management of such actions and proceedings in behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds and in general all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law." Thornton on Attorneys at Law, Vol. I, p. 105. This comprehensive statement of duties prohibited in their performance in a representative capacity to those unlicensed to practice law and whose performance in such capacity constitutes a misdemeanor under recent statutes, seem to be fully sustained by the authorities. In re Cooperative Law Company, 198 N. Y. 479; In re Duncan, 83 S. C. 186. In Ely v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, it was said: "As the term is generally understood, the practice of law is the doing or performing services in a court of justice, in any matter depending therein, throughout its various stages, and in conformity to the adopted rules of procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal documents and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may not be depending in any court." Nor is it necessary that one perform legal services in order to violate a statute prohibiting the practice of law by unlicensed persons. The mere printing of cards and letterheads and the inclusion of one's card in a newspaper or directory in which he holds himself out as an attorney at law is sufficient. People v. Erbaugh, 42 Colo. 480, 94 Pac. 349. It seems that in North Carolina the element of compensation is necessary to make out a case of "practicing law" and in that state it was held that a person by appearing on behalf of a defendant, examining and cross-examining witnesses, and arguing the case, would not violate a penal statute forbidding him "to practice law as an attorney in any of the courts" if he did not claim or receive any compensation for his services, professed to act as "agent" and did not hold himself out to the public as an attorney at law. State v. Bryan, 98 N. C. 644. In other words, the court in effect, holds that practicing law, implies more than a single act; it implies conduct extending over some period of time by which a person holds himself out as an attorney and charges a compensation for his services. See also to same effect: McCargo v. State, I So. Rep. 161. The following cases indicate what does not constitute the practice of law: performing the usual duties of a notary public (Allen v. Jarvis, 32 U. C. Q. B. 56, 64): assisting in procuring a pardon (Bird v. Breedlove, 24 Ga. 623); doing the work of a "process server" (In re Louis [1891] 1 Q. B. 649; a chartered accountant sending a dunning letter with threat of suit (Montreal Bar v. Duff, 24 Quebec Super. Ct. 478). In the last case cited it was said: "What the legislature had in mind was to protect the legal profession against the acts of those who would attempt to pass themselves off as lawyers and through this deception exact fees which they had no right to demand. The practice of lawyers to write warning or conciliatory letters to the adverse party has been so common and so universal that it may be considered as part of the exercise of their profession, but I know of no law by which such practice might be restricted to members of the legal profession or which would constitute it a privileged right in their favor." A. H. ROBBINS. ITEMS OF PROFESSIONAL INTEREST. ELIHU ROOT, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION Very few public men who have been as long in politics as Elihu Root are as favorably regarded or so universally admired. As a judicial thinker and as a law practitioner, Mr. Root is unhesitatingly estimated by his contemporaries in the legal profession as the present-day leader of the American bar. His recent selection at Salt Lake City last August as president of the American Bar Association confers upon him, therefore, the honor of being the titular as well as the actual head of his profession. Mr. Root was born February 15, 1845, at Clinton, New York. He was graduated from Hamilton College in 1864, received his degree of LL.B. from New York University in 1867 and was admitted the same year to practice at the bar in New York City. In 1883 he was appointed by President Arthur as United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, serving for two years, when he once more embarked upon the active practice of the law, which was not again interrupted by the demands of political leaders until 1889, when he was appointed Secretary of War by President McKinley. President Roosevelt later appointed him Secretary of State, which position he held until 1909, when he was elected United States Senator from New York. Mr. Root has given more time and attention than is usually contributed by busy lawyers to the solution of questions of public interest. He was a delegate to two Constitutional Conventions, and was chairman of one of them. He represented the United States as chief counsel in the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration at The Hague in 1910, and was a member of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal in 1903. He was elected in 1910 a member of the permanent Board of Arbitration at The Hague, and later was president of the Carnegie Foundation. For his activity in behalf of the peaceful solution of international questions he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1912. But after all is said about this eventful life, it is as a great lawyer, a keen, far-seeing, philosophical, yet practical, student of jurisprudence that Mr. Root's profession and posterity will ever regard him. A. H. R. JETSAM AND FLOTSAM. ANECDOTES ABOUT HON. JERE S. BLACK. Mrs. Mary Black Clayton, in her "Reminiscenses of Jeremiah Sullivan Black," relates some new anecdotes of the great jurist. Mrs. Clayton said: "He was as different from the ordinary boy as noon is from midnight. The busy bee which 'gathers honey from every opening flower' was no more diligent than he was in acquiring knowledge. From the time he could talk well enough to ask questions to the day of his death, no human being who knew anything parted with him without having given him of his knowledge. "When he was on the Supreme Bench of Pennsylvania a friend took him to see the Philadelphia markets. Next day the friend's butcher said: "Excuse me, sir; but was not that gentle man with you yesterday a butcher?' "No; he is Chief Justice of Pennsylvania.' "I was sure he was a butcher; he knew so much about the business.'" In 1851 Judge Black was nominated for Judge of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and was elected by a larger majority than any other man running on the ticket. Four other judges were elected at the same time. They drew lots for length of terms, with the understanding that the justice drawing the fewest years was to be chief of the bench during the term. Judge Black wrote home thus: "My Own Mary: We drew yesterday, and the result is as follows: Black, 3 years; Lewis, 6 years; Gibson, 9 years; Lowrie, 12 years; Couter, 15 years. So you see your husband is to be chief justice. I don't like it. The whole business has been like our old woman's soap; somehow I have no luck with it.'" He was the most modest of great men, and so remained until his death. THE ATTORNEY'S SOLILOQUY. (With Apologies to the Bard of Avon.) To quote, or not to quote; 'tis often questioned Whether 'tis better to embellish pleadings With borrowed words of true euphonic merit, Or speak plain truths in prosy words of wisdom, And, speaking thus, prove tiresome. To dull; to drug-with words, Our clients may believe our word is law. E But why thus stupefy? Let us speak words And thoughts of high intent; and let them be The words first used by sages long since dead. The fact that they've endured the test of time But proves their worth; there's great support In calling to our aid these marvelous thoughts. Who could resist such pleas as Portia made, The words of Cicero, or Henry Clay? A judge, or jury, ev'n, could but agree With arguments of law so reinforced. Mere jurisprudence and the Civil Code Are cold as glittering steel or lifeless clay; A soulless thing; man needs the human touch; That spark divine which renders all men kin; The love which doth make brothers of us all. This may result from rhetoric, not from law, And ne'er is found in Blackstone's musty tomes. "We imagine that there can be no doubt as to the soundness of the decision of the California Court of Appeal, Third District, in Adams v. Cameron, 150 Pac., 1005, confirmed by the Supreme Court in 151 Pac., 286, that a complaint made by a passenger to a railway company as to the intoxication of a conductor and consequent discourtesy to another passenger, is not a privileged communication, and that damages are recoverable, if the complaint results in the discharge of the conductor. Yet there seems to be some disposition to uphold the contention of the defendant. In the Central Law Journal it is said:"-National Corporation Register. Here follows excerpt from 81 Cent. L. J., 361. Had our contemporary looked more closely into the decision it cited, it would have discovered that the courts referred to held that the communication was privileged and the Supreme Court held that the error of the lower courts as to the way this privilege was treated was harmless. EDITOR C. L. J. HUMOR OF THE LAW. The attorneys for the prosecution and defense had been allowed fifteen minutes each to argue the case. The attorney for the defense had commenced his argument with an allusion to the old swimming-hole of his boyhood days. He told in flowery oratory of the balmy air, the singing birds, the joy of youth, the delights of the cool water And in the midst of it he was interrupted by the drawling voice of the judge: "Come out, Chauncey," he said, "and put on your clothes. Your fifteen minutes are up." -Everybodys. A man was brought before a police court charged with abusing his team and using loud and profane language on the street. One of the witnesses was a pious old darky, who was submitted to a short cross-examination. "Did the defendant use improper language while he was beating his horses?" asked the lawyer. "Well, he talk mighty loud suh." "Did he indulge in profanity?" The witness seemed puzzled. The lawyer put the question in another form: "What I mean, Uncle Aus, is-did he use words that would be proper for your minister to use in a sermon?" "Oh, yes suh, yes suh," the old man replied, with a grin that revealed the full width of his immense mouth; "but dey'd have to be 'ranged diff'runt."-Everybodys. The old negro had been arrested for “having more than one wife," the last woman being the complainant. He happened to be well known locally and an orderly character. "How many wives have you had?" demanded the judge. "Six, yo' Honor," was the reply. "Why couldn't you get along with them?" the judge insisted. "Well, suh-de fust two spiled de white folks' clothes when dey washed 'um; de thu'd worn't no cook; de fo'th was des nacherally lazy-en' de fif'-I'll tell yo', Jedge de fif she-." "Incompatibility?" the court suggested. "No, yo' Honor," said the old negro slowly, "it worn't nothin' lik dat. Yo' jes' couldn't get along wid her onless yo wuz somewhars else." -National Corporation Reporter. Substitu 2. Attachment Abandonment. tion in place of plaintiff of partnership of which he was a member held not an abandonment of attachment or release of the sureties so as to justify vacation of the attachment.— Noziska v. Aten, S. D., 154 N. W. 445. 3. Attorney and Client-Fees.-An agreement by one charged with murder to pay counsel $1,000 each does not show that the fee is excessive.-Hansel V. Norblad,, Ore., 151 Pac. 962. 4. Bailment-Bad Faith.-A bailee for the accomodation of the bailor is answerable only for his gross negligence or bad faith, the degree of care being measured, however, with reference to the nature of the article bailed. --Ridenour V. Woodward, Tenn., 179 S. W. 6. Equity.-Bankruptcy proceedings are equitable in nature, and bankruptcy courts administer the law according to the spirit of equity. Ogden v. Gilt Edge Consol. Mines Co., U. S. C. C. A., 225 Fed. 723. 7.-Liens.-Where property of a bankrupt was sold in bulk, the lien of a creditor upon a specific part of the real estate did not follow the proceeds of the sale, where the amount derived from the particular real estate did not appear. In re B. A. Lockwood Grain Co., U. S. D. C., 225 Fed. 873. 8. Parties.-Where registered holder of bonds was adjudged a bankrupt, but trustee did not claim the bonds, right to enforce payment was in registered holder.-Shaffner v. Federal Cement Co., U. S. D. C., 225 Fed. 893. 9.- -Special Fund. Where a bankrupt stockbroker did not have in his possession free and clear stock for all customers, none of them could reclaim any part of the stock on hand or any equity in such loans as had among their collateral the remaining stock.-In re J. F. Pierson, Jr., & Co., U. S. D. C,, 225 Fed. 889. 10. Voluntary Assignment. Bankruptcy Act recognizes right of bankrupt to make voluntary assignment of his property to avoid attachments thereon and secure an equal distribution among all creditors.-Bell v. Blessing, U. S. C. C. A., 225 Fed. 750. 11. Banks and Banking-De Facto Corporation. A national bank, once chartered and continuing to do business, is a de facto corporation, and, though its charter has expired, its right to sue cannot be questioned.-First Nat. Bank of Kansas City, Mo., v. Pennig, Cal. App., 151 Pac. 1153. 12. Deposit of Draft.-Where a draft is deposited by the payee in a bank other than that on which it is drawn "for deposit *** to the credit of" the payees, prima facie the title to the draft and the proceeds thereof is in the payees. Baldwin State Bank v. National Bank of Athens, Ga., 86 S. E. 538. A 13. Beneficial Associations-Injunction. colored order, known as the Free and Accepted Masons, held not entitled to enjoin a rival order from the use of the name of the Ancient Free & Accepted Masons, Colored.-Free and Accepted Masons of the State of Texas v. Ancient Free and Accepted Masons, Colored, Tex. Civ. App., 179 S. W. 265. 14. Bills and Notes-Burden of Proof.-Where fraud or illegality in the execution or procurement of a note is set up as a defense to the suit of an indorsee, the burden is on the indorsee to show his protection from such defense as a bona fide purchaser for value before maturity. Bright Nat. Bank of Flora v. Hartman, Ind. App., 109 N. E. 846. 15. Burden of Proof.-Where the maker of a note shows that the note has been negotiated in violation of agreement, the burden is on the holder to prove acquisition of title as a holder in due course, without notice of any infirmity.Gourley v. Pioneer Loan Co., Okla., 151 Pac. 1072. 16. Negotiability.-A provision for payment of an attorney fee, in a note given since enactment of the negotiable instrument law, does not render the note nonnegotiable.-City Nat. Bank v. Kelly, Okla., Pac. 1172. 17. -Novation-Where either of two renewal notes constituted a novation, the note for which the renewals were given was no longer a binding obligation.-First State Bank of . |