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some protection and negligence per se is imposed on the master. Anything short of willful misconduct in an employe exposing himself to injury ought not to count against him, or at least very plain contributory negligence as distinguished from assumption of risk. The statute ought to be construed as if it expressly stated there was no assumption of risk.
etc. * *
ITEMS OF PROFESSIONAL
MEETING OF THE LOUISIANA STATE BAR
over his circular saws, or to box or cover his gearings, is meant primarily for the protection of his employes, whose duties expose them to contact with these dangerous instrumentalities. In cases of the first class, we have held that an employe may assume the risk of the known and habitual disregard of his employer of a statute,
* But the reasons which have been thought controlling in these cases have much less persuasive force when considered in connection with a case of the other class." There is then pursued the same character of argument as that set forth in the instant case in its excerpt from the Streeter case.
In Low v. Clear Creek Coal Co., 140 Ky. 754, 131 S. W. 1007, 33 L. R. A. 656, the ruling was somewhat qualified as thus the court said: "We think the safe rule is to hold, that unless the danger from the lack of props is not only imminent, but so obvious that an ordinarily careful man would not have worked under the conditions, the owner has the responsibility. He having failed in his statutory duty, the liability for all consequences is upon him, unless the miner could see or know by ordinary care, that the situation was dangerous and imminently so. In other words, there is no assumption of risk by the laborer where the master neglects •a statutory duty; but such laborer is still liable for his contributory negligence.” This seems a sensible distinction.
In Fitzwater v. Warren, 206 N. Y. 355, 99 N. E. 1042, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1229, it was stated by the writer of the opinion that his personal view was at variance with former New York decision that there was assumption of risk, but in a case where, though a defect be apparent. there is no assumption of risk if the defect may require judgment not possessed by the ordinary observer or servant to realize the danger therefrom. Therefore an inexperienced servant was not held to have assumed the risk. It was said: "The statute which the defendants violated was enacted for the express purpose of safeguarding the persons of employes. Where an employer deliberately fails to comply with the statute, the courts should be loath, except in a very clear case, to hold that the employe assumes the risk of his master's violation of law. Otherwise the beneficent results sought to be attained by the statute will fail to be realized."
In Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Pribyl, 38 Okla. 511, 134 Pac. I, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 471, in holding there is no assumption of risk where a master violates a statutory duty, cites Johnson v. Fargo, 184 N. Y. 379, 77 N. E. 288, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 5.37, 6 Ann. Cas. I, 20 Am. Neg. Rep. 156, as holding that it was against public policy for an emplover and an emplove to contract for the latter to be relieved from his negligence and also reasoning by New York court in the Fitzwater case, supra, that: “If an express agreement could not relieve the master in the case cited, it does not seem clear how, by a merely implied contract, he can be relieved from the results of a direct violation of the statute."
The cases on this subject are so very numerous that it is tedious even to cite them, much more to discuss their reasoning. Of all of them, however, it seems to us that the Low case is possibly the most practical in the applying of such a statute. An employe is meant to have
Lawyers of Louisiana are looking forward with anticipation to the next meeting of the State Bar Association which convenes at the city of Opelousas, May 5th, 1916, for a two days' session.
The orator of the day will be Judge Henry D. Clayton, of Alabama. Other speakers will be Hon. R. L. Tullis, Dean of the Louisiana State University Law School, who will speak on "Substitutions and Fidei Commissa; Impossible and Illegal Conditions Under the Civil Code of Louisiana;” Mr. Walker B. Spencer, who will lead a discussion on “The Complete Reorganization of the Judiciary;" Hon. Rufus E. Foster, who will speak on "The Federal Compensation Act;" and Mr. Philip S. Gidiere, who will speak on "Subrogation Under Policies of Fire Insurance Covering Cotton in Transit."
The ladies accompanying the party will be well taken care of. The entertainment features will include an informal reception at the Elks' Club and an automobile ride to St. Charles College, Grand Coteau.
Mr. W. W. Young, of New Orleans, La., the efficient secretary of the association, writes us that Judge Gilbert L. Dupre, of Opelousas, is in charge of the local arrangements and has provided ample accommodation in the expectation of entertaining a large representation of Louisiana lawyers.
THE BRANDEIS MUDDLE.
Editor of the Central Law Journal:
May I bring to your attention an error in the leading article of the Central Law Journal for March 24, 1916, entitled “The Brandeis Muddle," which says:
"It appears that the Harvard faculty is hope. lessly divided on the issue, the majority, with HUMOR OF THE LAW.
President Lowell as a mouth-piece, alleging his unfitness, while others, speaking through Arthur D. Hill and others, equally enthusiastic in favor of his qualifications, intellectually and otherwise."
The faculty of Harvard University, if that is what is meant by “Harvard faculty," has never expressed any opinion whatever on the matter. President Lowell, in signing a petition against the coniirmation of Mr. Brandeis, spoke only for himself.
On the other hand, the faculty of Harvard Law School, including Dean Pound, expressed itself almost unanimously in favor of Mr. Brandeis, only one man opposing and one man pleading ignorance, having just returned from several years abroad.
THERLOW M. GoRDON,
Harvard Law School, 1911. Washington, D. C.
[We are delighted, indeed, to be able to correct any wrong impression we may have created by our editorial with respect to the opinion of the faculty of Harvard University on the question of Mr. Brandeis' confirmation,
Wholly apart from the merits of the question of confirmation it is refreshing to be again confirmed in our assurance of the intellectual independence of the members of the faculty of Harvard University, a fact that, among other things, has made it one of the few really great institutions of learning in the world.
Mr. Brandeis is a product of the Law Department of Harvard University and the faculty of the law school have not found any reason to be ashamed of its work. Intellectually compared even with the great lawyers of Boston or New York, Mr. Brandeis would not suffer most by the comparison, He is easily recognized as one of the master legal minds of our generation and it is unfortunate, indeed, that any question should have been raised as to his fitness as Supreme Judge on ethical grounds.-EDITOR.]
When Lord Charles Beresford was a candidate for the representation of York in Parliament-a position which he ultimately occupied-his opponent was Sir Charles Furness. In his "Memoirs" Lord Charles recalls the following reminiscence:
“My brothers, Lord William and Lord Marcus, were helping me. Lord Marcus accompanied me to a meeting, and I told him that he must make a speech.
“'I can't' he said. “I don't know what to say.'
"I told him to begin, because he would surely be interrupted, and then, being an Irishman, he would certainly find something to say. Lord Marcus thereupon rose to his feet and a voice immediately shouted:
“ 'Who are ye?'
“'Who are we?' cried Lord Marcus. 'I'll tell you who we are. We are three brothers, and our names are Shadrach, Meshach and Abedne. go. And we have come here to put out the burning, fiery Furness!'"-St. Louis Star.
The idea that everybody is virtually defenseless against the gas company and the ice man apears to be taken as a universal joke. It crops out in unexpected places.
In a Western town the attorney for a gas company was making a popular address.
“Think of the good the gas company has done!” he cried. "If I were permitted a pun, I would say, in the words of the immortal poet, 'Honor the light brigade!'”
Whereupon a shrill voice came from the rear:
“Oh, what charge they made!"-St. Louis Star.
A Treatise on the Limitations of Actions at Law and in Equity. By H. G. Wood, author of “The Law of Nuisances," "Master and Servant," "Fire Insurance," "Landlord and Tenant," "Law of Railroads,” etc. Third edition, by John M. Gould, Ph. D., author of "Waters," joint author of "Gould and Tucker's Notes on the U. S. Statutes,” editor of Kent's Commentaries (14th ed.), etc. Fourth edition, revised and enlarged by Dewitt C. Moore, of the New York Bar; author of "Carriers,” and “Fraudulent Conveyances.” In two volumes. Price, $15.00. Albany, N. Y. Matthew Bender & Company. 1916. Review will follow.
In "Anecdotes of Bench and Bar" Mr. Arthur Engelbach tells the story of a carpenter who was subpoenaed as a witness on a trial for assault. One of the counsel, who was much given to browbeating the witnesses, asked him what distance he was from the parties when he saw the prisoner strike the prosecutor.
The carpenter answered, "just four feet five inches and a half."
“Pray tell me," said the counsel, “how is it possible you can be so very exact as to the distance?" "Why, to tell the truth,” replied the carpenter, “I thought perhaps that some fool or other might ask me, and so I measured it.”
Weekly Digest of ALL the Important Opinions
of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort and of ALL the Federal Courts.
Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn.
.6, 20, 29, 40, 65, 67, 82, 87 Arkansas.
32, 36, 76 California
88, 107 Delaware.
70, 81 Florida
.15, 28, 49, 83, 93, 97 Ilinois
.-73, 109 Indiana
.26, 38, 69, 72 Iowa
1, 46, 50, 89, 103 Kentueky
3, 56, 58 Maine
44, 100 Massachusetts. 17, 23, 33, 34, 37, 39, 42, 52,
59, 91, 110 Minnesota.
31, 35, 47, 48, 51, 90, 94, 98 Missouri.
....4, 24, 53, 55, 95 New Jersey
45, 54, 62, 75, 86, 108 New York.
61, 71, 78, 80, 104 North Dakota.
41, 43, 68 Ohio Oklahoma
5, 10, 15, 21, 25, 27, 77, 101 U. S. C. C. App.....9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 30, 60, 66, 84, 96 United States D. C.
7, 8, 11, 57, 99 United States s. C......
85 West Virginia.
2, 64 Wisconsin
Bankruptcy Act to order an attachment lien on a bankruptcy's homestead, valid under the state law, preserved for the benefit of the estate.-In re Malone's Estate, U. S. D. C., 228 Fed. 566.
8. -Composition.-Under Bankruptcy Act, $ 12b, offer of composition within one year after adjudication held to include all scheduled creditors, though claims were not proved within one year and deposit must provide for their claims notwithstanding section 57n.-In re Atlantic Const. Co., U. S. D. C., 228 Fed. 651.
9.-Exemption From.- Whether insolvent person is exempt from involuntary bankruptcy proceedings under Bankruptcy Act, $ 4b, held dependent on occupation when acts of bankruptcy were committed. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Shelhorse, C. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 493.
10.---Jurisdiction.-Where a partner was а trustee in bankruptcy, and his copartners secured an injunction against his delivery to his successor of alleged partnership funds received by the trustee, the funds, having been received by the successor without notice, are no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the state court.Broussard V. Le Blanc, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 78.
11. Partnership.-One partner may petition to have the partnership declared a voluntary bankrupt.-In re Hansley & Adams, U. S. D. C., 228 Fed. 564.
12.- -Preference. Whether recipient of alleged preferential transfer knew or had reasonable cause to believe that transferer was insolvent held a question of fact, and finding not opposed by proponderance of proof would not be disturbed.-Owens v. Farmers' Bank of Abbeville, U. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 508.
13. Rent Reserved.--The validity of a lien for rent reserved in an unrecorded lease, as against a trustee in bankruptcy, was governed by the local law.-Dellinger v. Waite-Thresher Co., U. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 506.
14.- -Subrogation.-A customer of bankrupt brokers, whose stocks had been loaned by them and sold by the borrowers on their insolvency, held not entitled by subrogation to a lien on the proceeds of the sale of their seat in the stock exchange.-In re Van Schaick & Co., L. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 465. 15.
Banks and Banking-Forgery.-A bank cannot recover, from bona fide holder for value, money paid by it on a check of a depositor to which the drawer's signature was forged, unless the holder negligently contributed to the success of the fraud, or his conduct tended to mislead the drawee, who was free from fault.-Swan-Edwards Co. v. Union Sav. Bank, Ga. App., 87 S. E. 825.
16. --Trust Funds.-Å bank having on deposit trust funds, with knowledge of their character, which aids the depositor in wrongfully appropriating the same to his own use, is liable in equity therefor to the beneficiaries.-United Ştates Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v, Union Bank & Trust Co., U. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 448.
17. Bills and Notes-Holding in Due Course. -The payees of a check, not having received it from the drawer, but, without notice of any infirmity, from a third person, to whom, presumably, it was delivered as a completed instrument, are holders in due course.-National Investment & Security Co. v. Corey, Mass., 111 N. E. 357.
18.---Pleadings and Defenses.—That defendants signed note without consideration at plaintiff payee's request upon his statement that he was hard pressed for money and their signature would enable him to sell the note, which was given by principal maker in payment of account due, held not to state defense.- Magill v. McCamley, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 22.
19. Boundaries-Prescription.-A line agreed upon by the parties in interest and occupied up to for more than 20 years is conclusive, though it does not appear that the occupation has been such as would amount to a continuous
1. Accord and Satisfaction-Bona Fide Dispute.-As relating to accord and satisfaction, a claim is not liquidated if there is a bona fide dispute and the dispute may be on matter of law as well as of fact.-Ferguson v. Grand Lodge of lowa Legion of Honor, Iowa, 156 N. W. 176.
2. Account Stated-Defined.- Where persons having previous transactions agree that an account representing same and, the balance are correct and the debtor promises to pay such balance, the account ordinarily becomes an account stated.-Hoover-Dimeling Lumber Co. v. Neill, W. Va., 87 S. E. 855.
3. Adverse Possession-Easement.--That one having easement of way occasionally locked the gate and would not permit others to use it, and often allowed his stock to pasture on the way, was not sufficient to apprise the owner of the land that owner of easement was asserting a hostile title to the land itself.-O'Banion v. Cunningham, Ky., 182 S. W. 185.
4. Assault and Battery-Self-Defense.-The defendant, in a prosecution for assault, is entitled to an instruction on self-defense, though his own testimony is the only evidence to support it.-State v. Robinson, Mo. App., 182 S. W. 113.
5. Attorney and Client-Contingent Fee.-Where the attorney of an injured servant suing for damages was assigned one-half the amount which might be recovered, the transfer being made before the filing of the petition, the attorney's interest was contingent upon collection, and was mere assignment of funds to be collected.-Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Cosio, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 83.
6.---Disbursement. The reinstatement of disbarred attorney is not a modification or vacation of the judgment within the rule that judgments pass beyond the court's power and control after the lapse of the term at which they were rendered.—Ex parte Peters, Ala., 70 So. 648.
7. Bankruptcy-Attachment Lien.-A referee held to have power under section 671 of the
disseisin for that time.—May v. Labbe, Me., 96 Atl. 502.
20. Brokers-Course of Sale.-Whether a broker has earned a commission by procuring a purchaser is a question of fact, and it is enough that the efforts of the broker acting upon the purchaser are the efficient cause of his offer; it being not necessary that such efforts be the whole cause. --Bailey V. Padgett, Ala., 70 So. 637.
21. Carriers of Goods--Carmack Amendment. -As the Carmack Amendment did not deprive shippers of remedies under the existing laws, a shipper of live stock may, where the written contract was not binding, recover under an oral contract.-Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Jones, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 1.
22.-Measure of Damases.—Where poultry was shipped subject to a bill of lading providing that damages should be computed on the basis of the value of the property at the place and time of shipment, etc., the measure of damages for loss of part, and damage to the balance, of the shipment was the market value at place of shipment, plus freight, drayage, and commissions, not market value at destination. -Wegener v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., Wis., 156 N. W. 201.
23.-—-Notice to Shipper.-- Where a local custom provided that the railroad company should notify the shipper if goods were not delivered within 48 hours, failure to give such notice was a breach of contract, although railroad did not have express notice of a refusal by purchaser to unload car.-South Deerfield Onion Storage Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R, Co., Mass., 111 X. E. 367.
24.- Perishable Goods,- Where perishable goods could have been brought to destination in time for their marketing by transferring the shipment at an intermediate point to another train, failure to make such transfer is negligence rendering the carrier liable for the spoil. ing of the goods owing to the delay in shipment.--Whittom v. Adams Express Co., Mo. App., 182 S. W. 137.
25. Carriers of Live Stock-Bill of Lading.-Where the contract for an interstate shipment of cattle was oral, but just before the train started the shipper was required to sign a written bill of lading which he did not have time to read and could not have understood, the oral contract was not supplanted, the contract contained in the bill of lading not being mutual.- Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Jones, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 1.
26. Carriers of Passengers-Relation of Passenger.-An interurban railroad continued under duty to use a reasonable degree of care for the safety of a passenger who, by the negligence of a conductor, had been carried past his intended destination, until such passenger, walking back, reached that point: he still being a passenger.-Terre Haute, I. R E. Traction Co. v. Hunter, Ind. App., 111 N. E. 344.
27. -Seats for Passenger.-The failure of a .street car company to furnish a passenger with a seat in the car is not actionable negligence. where the fact that all the seats are orcupied is apparent to the passenger when he takes his position on the running board, from which he thereafter falls.--Tennegkeit v. Galveston Electric Co., Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 72.
28. Chattel Mortgages Foreclosure. The landlord may place his lien, which was not foreclosed until the day of sale of the crop under mortgage foreclosure, in the levying officer's hands. and thereafter by rule require that so much of the proceeds as are necessary be applied to satisfy the lien.-Hill-Atkinson Co. V. Hasty, Ga. App., 87 S. E. 839.
Commerce - Employes.-Emplove assist ing in repairing engine used in drawing work train engaged in repairing interstate track held not within the federal Employers' Liability Act and entitled to sue under the state statute. -Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Carter, Ala., 70 So. 655.
30. -Employes.--Hostler in railway yards, who left engine, and went where bucket was being hoisted. and was killed, held not then engaged in interstate commerce, within the Employers' Liability Act.—Erie Railroad Co. V. Van Buskirk, U. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 489.
Confusion of Goods-Waiver.--Where plaintiff in replevin insisted on recovery of all the lumber in defendant's yards or its value, on the ground that lumber sawed from plaintiff's logs had been inextricably mingled in the other lumber, and consented to an instruction that the verdict must be for the value of all the lumber or be for defendant, it waived the right to recover for lumber sawed from its logs.-International Lumber Co. v. Bradley Timber & Ry. Supply Co., Minn., 156 N. W. 274.
32. Constitutional Law--Jitney Busses.-A municipal ordinance regulating jitney busses and requiring a license and bond from their operators is not invalid as discriminatory class legislation: the classification being a reasonable one resting on substantial differences.--Willis v. City of Ft. Smith, Ark., 182 S. W. 275.
33. ----Police Power.- When the Legislature properly empowers the mayor of a city to remove officers for cause, and allows but a review of his proceedings instead of the more extensive remedy of an appeal, the wisdom of such allowance is for legislative and not judicial determination.-Swan v. Justices of Superior Court, Mass., 111 N. E. 386.
34. Contracts—Excuse for Breach.—A contractor for the construction of a grand stand cannot excuse his failure to construct the grand stand because it was impossible to build it according to the plans agreed on.-N. J. Magnam Co. v. Fuller, Mass., 111 N. E. 399.
35. Corporations-Duties of Officers.-Where the duties of the directors are not defined by charter or statute, the stockholders may confer the entire corporate power on an officer, and the existence of such power may arise from implication.-Gross Iron Ore Co. v. Paulle, Minn., 156 N. W. 268.
Subscription.- Where persons signed a subscription contract for the formation of a corporation, but no steps toward incorporation were thereafter taken, although some of the subscribers purchased machinery and established a canning factory, there was no de facto cornoration.-Rainwater v. Childress, Ark., 182 S. W. 280.
37.--Subscription.- Where defendant agreed to tako stock in proposed corporation in exchange for patent rights and accepted certificate after organization, he was bound by his agreement. though there was not formal stock subscription.--Bridgeport Window Hardware Co. v. Osborne, Mass., 111 N. E. 364.
38, Damages-Excessive.--Damages are not deemed excessive unless at first blush they appear to be so, or it is apparent that some improper element was taken into account by the jury in determining the amount.--Huntington Light & Fuel Co. v. Spell, Ind., 111 N. E. 311.
39. Dedication-Description.-_Where a deed described land with reference to a plan of the premises, and recited that the contemplated street running northerly from the lot was to be laid out within a year, and a plan existed, the grantee received a right of way to use the street throughout its length on the grantor's land and a right to have the street constructed.-Burn. ham v. Mahoney, Mass., 111 N. E. 396.
40. Deeds-Statute of Frauds.- Where a conveyance was not witnessed or acknowledged as required by statute so as to pass legal title. but was such that legal title would have passed had it been witnessed and acknowledged, was not obnoxious to the statute of frauds, but the equitable title to the propertv passed.-Bethea v. McCullough, Ala., 70 So. 680.
41. Divorce--Collusion.-Where plaintiff cured a divorce by collusion that she might be a witness for her husband in a criminal case, she could not secure vacation of the decree
to hy merely showing that defendant failed keep his agreement to remarry her, especially
52. Landlord and Tenant-Repairs.-A lessor is not bound to maintain demised premises in repair so that they would be fit for occupancy as a dwelling house, nor is there an implied covenant that they were in good repair at the time of the letting.-Mills v. Swanton, Mass., 111 N. E. 384.
53. Malicious Prosecution-Advice of Counsel.-Where defendant took a prosecuting attorney's advice in instituting prosecution, but acted in bad faith, withholding facts, he was not, by acting on such advice, legally exonerated from imputation of malice in subsequent action for malicious prosecution.-Bowers v. Walker, Mo. App., 182 S. W. 116.
54. Mandamus-Pleading.-In case of an adverse decision by the state superintendent and state board of education on a controversy arising out of refusal of a board of education to call a special meeting of voters, the Supreme Court will not, on mandamus, require the local board to call the meeting until the adverse decision has been set aside on certiorari.--Ridg
after he had married another woman.-Henderson v. Henderson, N. D., 156 N. W. 245.
42. Electrieity-Anticipating Injury.--Where no danger was obviously likely to result to decedent from leaning against a telephone poie, or from touching or grasping a guy wire, which ran from a town's pole supporting power and fire alarm wires to the telephone pole, decedent was not negligent in so doing.-O'Donnell v. Inhabitants of North Attleborough, Mass., 111 N. E. 374.
43. Exchange of Property-Misrepresntation. -Where, in an action for misrepresentations in connection with an exchange of a newspaper plant for plaintiff's farm and personalty thereon, it appeared that plaintiff had sold a half interest in the plant and was never in a position to rescind, he could not rely on an alleged representation that defendant would trade back it plaintiff were dissatisfied.-Fisher v. Smith, N D., 156 N. W. 242.
44. Executors and Administrators--Inadequacy of Price.—Mere inadequacy of price in a sale by the executors of property of the estate is insufficient ground upon which to vacate the sale, unless it is so grossas to indicate mistake or unfairness for which the purchaser is responsible, or misconduct or fraud on the part or the one making the sale.—Boyd v. Smith, Md., 96 Atl. 526.
45. -Laches.- Bill to compel executors to account for difference between selling price of property of estate and its alleged value at day of sale, brought seven years thereafter, when administrator and purchaser were dead, denied on ground of complainant's gross laches.-Bennett v. Piatt, N. J. Ch., 96 Atl. 482.
46. Explosives-Vibration.-The owner of realty damaged by concussion through earth or air from blasts in the bed of a river during construction of a dam by a private company to provide electric power, authorized by Congress, could recover irrespective of any negligence on the part of the company or its contractor.-Watson v. Mississippi River Power Co., Iowa, 156 N. W. 188.
47. Husband and Wife-Necessaries. The authority of the wife to purchase actual necessaries for minor children suitable to their station in life need not be based on any theory of agency, since the wife and minor children are entitled by law to support from the husband, and, if he fails therein, a tradesman may supply them at his charge without his consent. -Gately Outfitting Co. v. Vinson, Mo. App., 182 S. W. 133.
48. Insurance-Intoxicants.—The words "excessive or intemperate use of intoxicants," as used in a benefit certificate precluding recovery if the member became addicted to such use, referred to a case where the member's condition in such respect was of such nature as to impair his health, mental faculties, or otherwise render the risk more hazardous.—Wising V. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, Minn., 156 N. W. 247.
49.-Total Disability.-The loss of one eye by accident held not total disability, within an accident policy providing that total disability shall be such as renders insured unable to work or earn money, where the evidence showed that insured was not wholly unable to earn money. --Whitton v. American Nat. Ins. Co., Ga. App., 87 S. E. 827.
50. Waiver.-A member of a benefit insurance society consented to, acquiesced in, and ratified changes in the constitution and by-laws by paying subsequent assessments without protest or objection.-Ferguson v. Grand Lodge of Iowa Legion of Honor, Iowa, 156 N. W. 176.
51. Intoxicating Liquors- Local Option.Where a county, pursuant to the county option law, votes to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors therein, the power to issue licenses for sale of such liquors is withdrawn from every municipality within the county, including cities operating under home rule charters.---State V. City of International Falls, Minn., 156 N. W. 249.
Tp., N. J. Supp., 96 Atl. 390.
55. Master and Servant-Assumption of Risk. -Master may conduct business in own way, though there is one less dangerous, and a seryant, knowing the hazards, impliedly waives recovery for injuries resulting from causes incident to method adopted.—Cobb v. Richmond Cotton Oil Co., Mo. App., 181 S. W. 1196.
56.—Employers' Liability Act.—In an action under the federal Employers' Liability Act, the petition must allege that the defendant is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce or state facts from which it might be reasonably inferred that the plaintiff was engaged.—Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry Co. v. Tucker, Ký., 181 S. W. 940.
57.-Hours of Service Act.—Under Hours of Service Act, $$ 2, 3, carrier held liable, though telegraph operator's excessive service was contrary to its rules and without the knowledge of any officer or agent other than himself.United States v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., U. S. D. C., 228 Fed. 561.
58. -Negligence.-If telephone cable suspended above railroad track and sagging so as to injure brakeman had been down sufficiently long for railroad company in exercise of ordinary care to discover it, such company held liable for brakeman's injuries.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mink, Ky., 182 S. W. 188.
59. -Proximate Cause. - Where the already impaired heart of a servant was injured yet further by her work of pulling a carpet, which did not require such a muscular exertion
as would have affected a healthy person, the injury resulted from her work as a contributing proximate cause.-In re Madden, Mass., 111 N. E. 379.
60.-Respondeat Superior.—The authority of the son of an automobile owner to represent his father in driving the automobile need not be expressed in words, but may be implied from the precedent course of conduci.-Demson v. MeNorton, U. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 401.
61.--Terms of Employment.-An employment at a special rate per year is not an employment for a year.-Cuppy v. Stollwerck Bros., N. Y., 111 N. E. 249.
62. Workmen's Compensation Act.—The liability enforceable in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not one arising out of negligence, but a contractual obligation created by section 7 of the act with the consent of both the employer and the employe. -Winfield v. Erie R. Co., N, J. 96 Atl. 394.
63.-—-Workmen's Compensation Act.-The word "commute," as employed in Workmen's Compensation Act, $ 40, providing that the Board of Awards, under special circumstances, may commute periodical payments to one or more lump payments, means that the board may pay the defendant something less than he otherwise would receive.-State V. Industrial Commission of Ohio, Ohio, 111 N. E. 299.