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legislation.-Meehan v, Parsons, Ill., 111 N. E. 529.

49.

45. --Public Policy -A stipulation of a commercial contract that no action should be maintained against a Pennsylvania corporation, a party to the contract, except in certain courts of that state, held invalid.-Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., Mass., 111 N. E. 678.

46.—Public Policy.-Contract of express messenger, whereby he released claims for in· jury and agreed to contract of express com,pany with defendant carrier to save it harmless 'for personal injury to company's employes, held not invalid as against public policy.--McKay V. Louisville & N. R. Co., Tenn., 182 S. W. 874.

47. Corporations - Contracts.—The question whether a private corporation can make a contract to secure the location of a post office site or a military encampment depends upon the nature of the corporation and whether the contract is connected with the legitimate exercise of its corporate powers.-Eastern Illinois State Normal School v. City of Charleston, ill., 111 N. E. 573.

48. ---Deceit.-For a stockholder, though an officer, in buying from others their stock as a personal venture, not to disclose that he had a contract to sell it above its value to another corporation desiring control, held not actionable deceit.--Haverland. v. Lane, Wash., 154 Pac. 1118.

False Representations.-Defendant cannot avoid his contract of purchase of stock because of plaintiff's representations, not shown to be anything more than mere opinions about value, or to have been relied on in making the contract.-Templeton v. Warner, Wash., 154 Pac. 1081.

50.-—Presumption.—Execution of corporation's note by president will be presumed to be authorized, making prima facie case of such authority in action on such note.-Moyse Real Estate Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, Miss., 70 So. 821.

51. -Subscription to Stock.-In an action on a note given to a corporation for part of the price of stock subscribed for, held, that nondelivery of the stock certificate was no defense, where the certificate had been prepared and attached to the note awaiting payment thereof, and there no request for, or refusal of, delivery.-Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Lasseter, Ga. App., 87 S. E. 922.

52. Courts—Comity.--A federal court, assuming jurisdiction of a suit in equity to cancel a contract for sale of realty, which suit involved only an incident of the main controversy previously begun in a state court for damages for failure to perform the contract, which was an action at law, should await determination of issues in the action at law, instead of determining entire controversy.-Ingersoll Engineering & Constructing Co. v. Crocker, U. S. C. C. A., 228 Fed. 844.

53.—Jurisdiction.-Federal decisions, holding valid, under the Interstate Commerce Act and Carmack Amendment, a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting liability of interstate carriers of live stock to an agreed value of $100 per head for horses and mules, are binding on the state courts.-Washington Horse Exchange v. Louisville & N. R. Co., N. C., 87 S. E, 941.

54. Covenants–Building Line.-Violations of a building line covenant by an inch or two are too trivial for aid in equity.-Forsee v. Jackson, Mo. App., 182 S. W. 783.

55.-Tax Liens.-Purchaser of land subject to paramount tax lien, which the vendor warranted against legal claims of all persons, and which was sold under the tax lien and not redeemed, held entitled to recover the consideration of the vendor.-Congregation of Sisters of Perpetual Adoration v. Jane, Miss., 70 So. 818.

56. Damages-Interest.-Where contract did not provide a penalty nor stipulate for liquidated damages for a breach, interest was not allowable by way of damages for a breach until after the damages were ascertained by verdict or judgment.-Stevens & Elkins V. Lewis-Wilson-Hicks Co., Ky., 182 S. W. 840.

57. Death Dependency. Where father, mother, and minor children residing together are mutually dependent on the labor of the family, a minor child, the proceeds of whose labor comes into the common stock for the entire family, contributes to the mother's support so as to give her a right of action for his wrongful death.-City of Thomasville v. Jones, Ga. App., 87 S. E. 923.

58.--Eyewitness.-In an action for death of employe, where there were no eyewitnesses as to what'deceased was doing, or where he was at the time of his death, evidence that he was a careful man is admissible.-Greene v. L. Fish Furniture Co., Ill., 111 N. E. 725.

59. Dedication Public Use.-Under Civ. Code 1910, $ 4171, one who by his acts dedicates land for public use cannot appropriate such land for private use after the public has entered into possession and used the land pursuant to the dedication, so that interruption of such use would materially affect public or private rights. -Gartrell v. McCravey, Ga., 87 S. E. 917.

60.- Public Use.—The conveyance of land for an avenue adjacent to a park and to be a part thereof, to be maintained as a "carriage avenue" subject to the rules of the park commissioners, indicated a purpose to dedicate for a public use.-Kennard v. Eyermann, Mo., 182 S. W. 737.

61. Dismissal and Nonsult-Voluntary Dismissal.—The mere prospect of annoyance from second litigation in case of voluntary nonsuit is not legally prejudicial to defendant.—Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. S. Breen & Co., N. c., 87 S. E. 938.

62. Divorce-Estoppel-Where a husband, after mistreating his wife, willfully deserts her, her failure to solicit a reconciliation and renewal of actual cohabitation will not preclude her from obtaining a divorce.-McKinney v. MeKinney, W. Va., 87 S. E. 928.

63. Easements-Appurtenance-An easement appurtenant to lands cannot be severed by an act of the owner of the dominant estate; therefore a

conveyance whereby the owner of the dominant estate attempted to transfer the easement to another is invalid.-Kixmiller v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co., Ind. App., 111 N. E. 401.

64. —Prescription.—Thirty years' continuance of a ditch draining a populous community, which was afterwards incorporated as a town, will ripen into an easement, and one purchasing with notice land on which part of the ditch was located, with notice thereof, cannot obstruct it.-Town of Roper v. Leary, N. C., 87 S. E. 945.

65. Election of Remedies-Elements Constituting.–Where, pending entry of decree of affirmance, one surety on a supersedeas bond died, and the judgment creditor presented a contingent claim to the representatives of his estate, and on its rejection brought action thereon in the superior court, such action was not an election of remedy, and did not bar his right to summary judgment in the Supreme Court. -Olson v. Seldovia Salmon Co., Wash., 154 Pac. 1107.

66. Electricity-Public Use.-The sale of electrical power for traction purposes, light, manufacturing, etc., is not a public use, and the sale by a public service traction company of the difference between its ordinary requirements and its peak load is only an incident to the public employment, of which the law will take no notice.-State v. Spokane & I. E. R. Co., Wash., 154 Pac. 1110.

67.—-Res Ipsa Loquitur.- Where a person was killed by an electric shock when he took hold of a tin reflector attached to an incandescent light attached to a wire intended only for a current of low voltage, defendant's negligence could be inferred from the mere happening of the accident.-City of Thomasville v. Jones, Ga. App., 87 S. E. 923.

Eminent Pomain-Defenses.—Where the city of Chicago was authorized to condemn an outlet through a strip of land on the bank of the Chicago River owner by the Chicago Sanitary District, the district cannot complain that the funds for the sewer outlet were furnished by the Union Station Company whose subsurface

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rights necessitated a change in sewers.-City of Chicago v. Sanitary Dist, of Chicago, Ill., 111 N. E. 491.

69.—Evidence.-In a proceeding to condemn right of way for a graae crossing of another road, exclusion of testimony that the added stop would depreciate the road economically was not error, since damages cannot be assessed on

account of a requirement of the statute, and the statute requires the stop at crossings. -Alton & S. R. R. v. Vandalia R. Co., lll., 111 N. E. 531.

70. Equity — Retention of Jurisdiction. Where plaintiff commences his action apparently entitled to equitable relief, but the impracticability or inequity of such award becomes manifest on hearing, the cause will be retained and a personal judgment for money awarded; but where plaintiff was not justified in believing in his alleged equities the case will be sent to the jury term for disposition.-Clarke v. Borough Asphalt Co., N. Y. Sup. Ct., 157 N. Y. S. 581.

71. False Imprisonment Defenses.—Where the servants of a railroad company wrongfully excluded plaintiff from a train and had him arrested, the fact that he was arrested on a warrant is no defense to an action for false imprisonment; the charge being unfounded.Davis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., Mo. App., 182 S. W. 826.

72. Fraud-Proximate Cause.-A fraudulent representation to be treated as the proximate cause of a loss must have been acted on by the party to whom addressed, and he must have exercised the care to be expected from an ordinarily prudent person.-Kelley v, Peeples, Mo. App., 182 S. W. 809.

73. Reliance on Representation.- Where the buyer of an engine, in purchasing, did not rely upon the seller's fraudulent representations made to induce the purchase, the buyer had no cause of action based upon such fraudulent representations.-Wilson v. Avery Co., of Texas, Tex. Civ. App., 182 . W. 884.

Frauds, Statute of_Contract.-The oral contract, on which complainant was taken into decedent's family, that they would leave to her all their land and other property, cannot be enforced, absent a showing that she was worse off for so being brought up.-Snyder v. French, Ill., 111 N. E. 489.

75. Fraudulent Conveyances - Creditors. Where a purchaser of land pending suit involving title thereto incumbered same without warranty, and the decree in the suit vitiated his title, held that the transaction did not, in the decree to one from whom he secured a good title, held that the transaction did not, in the absence of other evidence, show a fraud upon his creditors.-Linn v. Collins, W. Va., 87 S. E. 934.

76. Gifts-Delivery.- Where defendant intended to give a piano to his stepdaughter, and, though there was never any formal delivery of it to her, it was exclusively used by her in their home under claim of ownership, there was a sufficient actual delivery to constitute a valid gift.-Wiley B. Allen Co. v Edwards, Cal. App., 154 Pac. 1066.

77. Husband and Wife-Joinder in Deed.-A married woman's deed, signed and acknowleged by herself and husband, though he is not named as grantor, shows his joinder in the deed and passes her title to her separate realty.—Linn V. Collins, W. Va., 87 S. E. 934,

78. Infants--Guardian ad Litem.-Failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant defendant duly served with process renders a decree against the infant voidable, but not void. -Linn v. Collins, W. Va., 87 S. E. 934. 79.

Insurance - Employers. -- Employers' insurance policies are of two sorts, the “liability" contract, which obligates the insurer to pay the loss without first requiring that the assured do so, and the "indemnity” contract, which obligates the insurer to reimburse only after the employer has paid the debt to his injured employe.-Davies Maryland Casualty Co., Wash., 154 Pac. 1116.

80.-—-Explosions. That insured was part owner of a steam engine used in operating a saw mill, and met his death by an explosion

of the boiler, is not engaging in or using explosives within the meaning of a life policy. Anchor Life Ins. Co. v. Meyer, Ind. App., 111 N. E. 436.

81. -Severable Contract.-Principal contract of accident insurance against injury to son in favor of mother, and separate supplemental contract against injury to mother in favor of son, covered by same premium, held not to constitute one contract.to be construed as a whole.

-State ex rel. Schmohl v. Ellison, Mo., 182 S. W. 740.

82. Internal Revenue--Income Tax.-Labor and agriculture organizations, mutual savings banks, etc., can be excepted from operation of income tax provisions without rendering the tax repugnant to the federal Constitution.Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., 36 S. Ct. 278.

83. Landlord and Tenant — Negligence. Where plaintiffs impliedly agreed to remain as defendant's tenants if he would thaw out frozen sewer pipes, he is liable in damages for injury to or destruction of plaintiffs' property, from negligence in doing the work.-Franco v. Maker, Mass., 111 N. E. 721.

84. Literary Property-Damages.- Where author and publisher made contract for publication under a certain name, agreement between the publisher and another publisher for publication of the work in connection with other volumes under a different name was a breach of the author's contract, entitlng him to damages.-De Bekker v. Frederick A. Stokes Co., N. Y, Sup. Ct., 157 N. Y. S. 576.

85. Mandamus--Civil Service Commission.Mandamus lies on the petition of a janitor in the state capitol against the secretary of state and the civil service commission to compel them to certify and approve a pay roll for such janitor's back salary for a period of more than a year from the time of his attempted discharge by the secretary to his legal discharge by the commission, during which he tendered his services.-People v. Stevenson, Ill., 111 N. E. 595.

86. Master and Servant-Course of Employment.-Where, despite its rules, a newspaper company allowed compositors to go on the roof for fresh air, an employe who fell from the roof and was killed, while seeking fresh air, was in the course of his employment.—In re Von Eeete, Mass., 111 N. E. 696.

87.-Guarding Machinery.-To place an immature boy or girl at work upon a laundry mangle, unprotected by a guard, is negligence and shows failure of the employer to supply the employe with a reasonably safe appliance as demanded by the law:-Guyer v. Sterling Laundry Co., Cal., 154 Pac. 1057.

88.-Inspection of Appliances.—If a servant is instructed to inspect an appliance, and he fails therein to another's injury, the master cannot avail himself of the instructions given. --Pette's Adm'r v. Old English Slate Co., Vt., 96 Atl. 596.

89.- -Nonsuit.-Entry of nonsuit held proper, where it appeared that the injured employe, under his instructions, could easily have performed his duty of filling an oil cup dangerously close to machinery at a time when the machinery was not in motion.-Carll v. Brown, Pa. 96 Atl. 647.

90.-Railroads.- Railroad trains have the right of way over section men, and such men, where the rules require them to look out for trains, are bound to do so.-Anest v. Columbia & P. S. R. Co., Wash., 154 Pac. 1100.

91.- Respondeat Superior.—That a conductor in charge of a lumber company's train had been approved by the railroad company over whose track the train was operated did not constitute him an employe of the railroad company, where he was paid by and under authority of the lumber company.–Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Bessinger, Ga. App., 87 S. E. 920.

92. -Respondeat Superior.—The proprietor of a saloon and connected hotel, even though not an innkeeper, as to one in the saloon for drinks, held liable for injury to him from a servant throwing a glass.-McKeon v. Manze, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 157 N. Y. S. 623.

93. Mechanic's Liens—Materialman.-In an action

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furnished a building contractor, evidence that the owner had paid for the building was admissible to show that he regarded the building as finished and accepted.-J. F. Meyer Mfg. Co. V. Sellers, Mo. App., 182 S. W. 789.

94. Municipal Corporation-City Council Permission given by a city council to maintain minor obstructions in a street may be terminated at any time by the same or any succeeding council. City of New Orleans v. Kaufman, La., 70 So. 874.

95.- -Correcting Minutes.-Where the city clerk inadvertently omits a portion of a resolution authorizing a sidewalk assessment, the council may, eight months thereafter by resolution, no intervening rights of third parties having arisen, require that the minutes be corrected.-Owens v. City of Dalton, Ga., 87 S. E. 913.

96.-Legislature.--The Legislature may create any conceivable kind of public corporation for the more efficient administration of public affairs, and endow it and its officers with the powers and functions necessary and proper for the administration of the corporate powers and affairs.-Perkins v. Board of Com'rs of Cook County, Ill., 111 N. E. 580.

97.-Police Power.-In the creation of a system of waterworks and its operation to protect against fire, for flushing sewers, or for other uses pertaining to the public health and safety, the city exercises the police power, and therefore a governmental function.—Eastern Illinois State Normal School V. City of Charleston, Ill., 111 N. E. 573.

98. New Trial-Impeachment of Verdict.-A juror cannot in support of a motion for new trial give testimony to impeach his verdict.Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry, Co. v. Brown, Okla., 154 Pac. 1161.

99. Officers-Powers.-An office created by the Legislature is wholly within that body's power, and it may prescribe the powers and duties of the incumbent, and from time to time change or impose additional duties upon officers elected or appointed.-Perkins v. Board of Com'rs of Cook County, Ill., 111 N. E. 580.

100. Partition-Life Estate.--A life estate is no obstacle to the partition of a vested mainder when the extent of the shares is determinable.-Richardson v, Van Gundy, Ill., 111 N. E. 494.

101. Patents-Estoppel-Self-imposed limitations in the claims of a patent preclude the patentee from showing that the invention is broader than his claims, and he is deemed to have surrendered any surplus to the public.Thacher v. Transit Const. Co., U. S. D. C., 228 Fed. 905.

102. Pledges-Pleading and Practice.-In an action on a note reciting that certain collateral was given to secure its payment, wherein the collateral was neither tendered nor accounted for, held error on demurrer to strike a plea alleging that the collateral was given and that plaintiff was unable to produce same.-Turner v. Commercial Savings Bank, Ga, App., 87 S. E. 918.

103. Principal and Agent-Liability.-- Where an agent acting under general order to do work such as cutting timber, by mistake or otherwise, goes beyond the boundary, the principal is liable.—Lewis y, Guthrie, Ind. App., 111 N. E. 455.

104. Railroads-Bondholders.-Under agreement between holders of bonds issued by defendant railroad securing its purchase of stock in another railroad held, that assent of such bondholders was necessary to a consolidation whereby their bonds were exchanged for new bonds secured by a consolidated mortgage.Continental Securities Co. v. New York Cent, & H. R. R. Co., N. Y., 111 N. E. 484.

105.---Crossing Accident.— Though the Kansas statute required locomotives to be equipped with headlights, removal of a headlight from a locomotive propelling a snowplow will not, where the snow would have demolished it, render the railroad company liable for a crossing accident in that state.—McNeil v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., Mo. App., 182 S. W. 762

106,--Liability - Where a lumber company's employe was injured in the operation of

train over the track of a railroad company under no obligation to him except to furnish a safe track, the railroad company was not liable for his death unless he was killed through a defect in the track.–Central of Georgia Ry. Co. V. Bessinger, Ga. App., 87 S. E. 920.

107.-----Passenger.-One railroad track, where train was expected, who, though awaiting the train, was not a passenger, and was reading, and made no effort to avoid danger, is not in the exercise of due care. - Youngerman v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., Mass., 111 N. E. 607.

108. Sales-Acceptance.—That the seller, after shipping the goods, wrote the buyer that he would draw for the money at a time earlier than that specified in the contract as the date of payment, and the buyer on account thereof refused to accept the goods, held not to justify the purchaser's refusal to accept.--Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Brown, Ga. App., 87 S. E. 921.

109.----Cross-Petition.-In an action on a note given for machinery, recovery may be had on a cross-petition for damages from breach of warranty of fitness of the machinery to do the work.-Murray Co. v. Palmer, Okla., 154 Pac. 1137.

110. Specifie Performance-Damages.-Plaintiff may not have specific performance of defendant's contract to buy stock and deliver a note in payment, but it is a case for damages only.-Templeton v. Warner, Wash., 154 Pac. 1081.

111. Statutes Construction. — The rule of ejusdem generis limiting the meaning of general words used in connection with specific enumerations to things of the class named does not apply where the context of the statute shows an intent to give such words a more extensive meaning and effect.-Gauley Coal Land Co. v. Koontz, W. Va., 87 S. E. 930.

112. Taxation-Mortgages.-Acts relating to taxation of mortgages do not apply to a mort. gage executed by a railroad company to a trustee to secure its bonds, and it does not thereby avail itself of any rights, privileges, or advantages within Const. Amend. of 1891.–State V. Baltimore & O. R. Co., Md., 96 Atl. 636.

113.Tax Sale.—Since notice of a tax sale of delinquent lands need not be recorded, neither a tax sale nor a tax deed can be set aside for any irregularity in it uness it appears on the face of the proceedings.--Gauley Coal Land Co. v. Koontz, W. Va., 87 S. E. 930.

114.- Trustee.- Personal property belonging to an estate held in trust is assessable to the trustee in his representative capacity at his residence

or domicile.-Board of Sup'rs of Adams County v. Dale, Miss., 70 So. 828.

115. Wills — Construction. - A bequest of "3,000, share and share alike, to each one of my sisters,” held a gift of that amount to each Jenne V. Jenne, Ill., 111 N. E. 540.

116. Construction.-Bequest to wife of household goods and "other chattel property absolutely held not to include money in bank. -Strickland v. Strickland, Ill., 111 N. E. 592.

117.-_Contingent Gift.-A gift over, contained only in a direction to pay and devise at the end of an intermediate estate, will not be deemed contingent, where by the utmost effort a contrary intention can be detected in the will.--In re Lotz, N. Y. Sur. Ct., 157 N. Y. S. 685.

118.--Nieces and Nephews.-In a will contest the law will not recognize that nieces and nephews are natural objects of the testator's bounty.--Barnes v. Phillips, Ind., 111 N. E. 419.

119. -Power of Appointment.-Where testator's will gave his property to his wife with power of control and disposition, whatever should be left on her death to go to their relatives, such relatives could not pursue the proceeds of the property sold by the wife.-Feegles V. Slaughter, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 10.

120.----Remainder.--Under a gift of the remainder, on death of the life tenant, J., to the “issue" of J., to be distributed to such issue "per stirpes," a son of J. dying before him and after testatrix, the son's children take his share.In re Wienholz's Estate, N. Y. Sur. Ct., 157 N. Y. S. 677.

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of liability of directors' under the Federal Act, he thought ‘a case had not been made.'

'For that reason alone' he concurred in the ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 12, 1916.

conclusion." MAJORITY OF COURT SHOULD AGREE ON The justice then says: “It is manifest DECISIVE RULINGS.

that this was simply the expression of an

opinion with respect to the legal sutticiency In 82 Cent. L. J. 277 we discussed “Un

of the plaintiff's case. That is, the decisive necessary Judicial Opinions," as “Breeders

ruling-upon which the reversal restedof Confusion” and we find in Jones Nat.

was that matter of law, applying the FedBank v. Yates, 36 Sup. Ct. 129, decided

eral statute, the plaintiffs were not entitled April 3, 1916, remarks by Justice Hughes

to their recovery. And the judgment as which seem to give some point to the views

entered upon appeal simply set forth that we expressed.

the court finding 'error apparent in the There the Supreme Court of Nebraska

record of the proceedings and judgment' re

versed and dismissed." was reversed and judgment of trial court reinstated on the merits. In so deciding, the

As we gather this statement, expressions learned justice, among other things, said:

of opinion by judges not supported by a "It is apparent that there were no findings majority of a court are merely personal, of fact by the Supreme Court of the state. and not judicial, opinions and properly have The actions being at law and trial by jury

no place in a judicial opinion at all. being waved, the findings of fact made by

As to the harm done in this case it the trial court-as we understand the local

would seem that this judge concurring in practice—had 'the same force and effect' as

the result, if he was unable to agree in the the verdict of a jury. *** But apart from

findings of fact by three judges, should these considerations, findings of fact by the have gone with the other three and have Supreme Court would necessarily require affirmed the judgment. To apply a fathe action of a majority of that court, and

miliar expression, a judge “should either it is plain that the opinion of the three fish or cut bait.” By his not going with judges, unaided by the concurrence of the

the three for affirmance of the district court fourth, could not be regarded as embodying he put upon the plaintiffs the onus of prossuch findings. Justice Letton, whose con- ecuting a writ of error, and, as the result currence in the result made the reversal shows, he would have done them serious possible, stated specifically the sole ground injury had they not have prosecuted the of his action, and his statement did not pur

writ. port to be the resolving of questions of fact. We do not care to weary our readers by After saying that he was inclined to the harping on a single string, but we do feel view that the evidence would support a very strongly, that a great part of the vol‘judgment upon a cause of action at com- ume of judicial opinions could be reduced, mon law for deceit,' and that the findings not only to the benefit of all concerned, but of the district court were to that effect,' that clarity in ruling and the clear bounhe added that he was not satisfied that daries of precedent would the better apthese findings were 'unsustained by the evi- pear. dence.' He considered the presumption to There are not many questions that arise, be that they were ‘so sustained, but he which call for wholly novel principles. The had ‘not examined the evidence so critically conclusions judges reach are results from

ferent line of thought, is it not better not to state academic reasons? If the reasons are not viewed by another as sound, the decisions lack the force a precedent should have. If the reasons vary, a lawyer may follow one or the other judge or he is even not restrained from getting at the matter independently of the reasons given. How, indeed, will he be able to apply the principle to a different state of facts, if by one judge's view this is admissible and by another's it is not?

Furthermore, it seems to us that reasons are greatly like obiter dicta, when there is an announcement which may not work out satisfactorily. The reasons cannot cover every contingency, and they are therefore misleading, if any test shows an exception apparently comprehended. There is often the same difficulty in stating a matter comprehensively as courts find in trying to define, for example, a state's police power.

as to the dog being or not out of bounds, or whether he was where he could have been seen before he "jumped," or whether he might have been expected to jump, or whether plaintiff should have slowed up if he saw him. Should the automobilist have taken into account animal propensities, or should the dog be regarded as having the intelligence of a human being so as to make his owner liable for his pranks or harmful indiscretions? Does the case mean that, so far as dogs are concerned, the "joyrider" must not be interfered with, whatever may be thought as to other animals or persons on the highway?

If so, let his "joy be unconfined.” Perhaps also a chicken may not "cross the road” in safety.

BANKS AND BANKING-GENERAL MANAGER OF CORPORATION ISSUING CHECKS TO FICTITIOUS PARTIES.—Upon the principle that a bank is not liable where it is misled by the negligence or other fault of the drawer in paying a check to one other than the payee, the Supreme Court of Tennessee holds, that where a corporation's general manager issues checks to payees and, vouching for their identity, collects the checks himself and appropriates their amounts the bank is not liable to the drawer. Litchfield Shuttle Co. v. Cumberland Valley Nat. Bank, 183 S. W. 1006.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

HIGHWAYS-DOG CAUSING INJURY TO AUTOMOBILE.—The superior right of automobile or dog on street appears to have been involved in Tasker v. Avey, 96 Atl. 737, decided by Maine Supreme Court, and judgment against the owner of the dog for damage to the automobile seems to establish a principle in highway law.

The facts show that plaintiff was driving his automobile along the highway in the exercise of reasonable care, when defendant's dog, as plaintiff testifies, “jumped directly in front of my machine and so quick I didn't have time to apply the brakes before it struck him. The lefthand wheel struck him and jacked the machine around across the ditch, blown out of the solid ledge, and tipped it over."

The Maine statute provides that, “when a dog does damage to a person or one's property, his owner or keeper * * * forfeits to the person injured the amount of the damage done,” provided it was not occasioned by the fault of the person injured. The court thought there was evidence to justify verdict in plaintiff's favor.

There is here an utter absence of discussion

The court admits the rule that a bank must judge for itself as to the identity of the payee of a check, but, under circumstances amounting to a direction by the drawer to pay to one as the named payee, it is excused. This exception appears quite evident, but does it cover the case of a corporate officer collecting such a check himself? It seems a well known principle that, if such an officer draws a check to his own order, one receiving it is bound to inquire whether it was lawfully issued or not. How is it different, if the officer draws the check in favor of another and then vouches for the latter's identity ?

Or suppose he may do the latter, so far as a named payee collecting the check is concerned, can the officer vouch for that payee's identity so as to collect the check himself? Is not the bank put on inquiry just as much as were the check drawn by the officer to his own order?

The court concluding its opinion says: “Considering the character of complainant's business and the extent of Hooper's authority, the defendant bank may very well have concluded

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