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The taking away of the contract from the note part thereof made a negotiable note out of a non-negotiable instrument. How then could the Act apply to the non-negotiable instrument? It cannot. The courts are in error when they refer to such detachment as a material alteration of the note. There never has been any alteration of the note. It was the contract that was altered, and not the note.

By the Act, a note which is materially altered is void in the hands of any person except a holder in due course thereof, and he may enforce payment according to its original tenor. But the Act applies to negotiable instruments. The instrument, to fall within the Act, must be negotiable at the time of the material alteration. In these cases, however, the instrument was not negotiable at the time of the alteration. Therefore the law on non-negotiable instruments would apply instead of the provisions of the Act.

By the negligence of the maker of the order or contract, he has made it possible for his non-negotiable instruments to be so altered that a perfectly regular and negotiable instrument can be put in circulation. A holder thereof, if a holder in due course, can enforce payment according to the terms of the note, and not according to the terms of the instrument as originally made. Of course if he took it with knowledge that it had been detached, he would have to defend upon the original paper.

For these reasons I cannot see just why the courts persist in saying such detachment is a material alteration of a note. It is the other way around, it is a material alteration of a non-negotiable instrument or contract.

Yours very truly,


When ex-Attorney General Knox was a young lawyer, he was in physique not much larger than Tom Thumb. In one of his first cases where he appeared before the court of an adjoining state it was his fortune to be opposed by an attorney, a veritable giant in size, and possessor of a most intimidating manner. Going up to young Knox, the giant guffawed down upon him, “Are you the attorney opposing me? Why, I could put you in my vest pocket."

"Maybe you could," said the unabashed Knox; “but if you did so you would have more law in your pocket than you ever had in your head."-St. Louis Globe-Democrat.

A Connecticut man tells of the case of one Silas Ketchum, the champion liar of a village in that state.

It appears that one day Si was arrested and brought before the local justice for chicken stealing.

"Jedge, Your Honor," he said, “I plead guilty on the advice of my lawyer."

But the Justice gazed at the noted prevaricator and rubbed his chin dubiously.

"I dunno," he said, "I dunno. I guesswell, Si-I guess I'll have to have more evi. dence before I sentence ye.”—Kansas City Bar Monthly.

Louisville, Ky.

The evidence was absolutely conclusive against the old negro who was charged with stealing a chicken from his neighbors, says the National Monthly. The negro was a familiar figure to the judge, who addressed him reproachfully:

"Now, Rastus, why did you steal that chick

NOTE-Our correspondent extends the point made by us, by saying that to detach a part of a written instrument so as to make the detached part in form a negotiable instrument is, at most, "alteration of a non-negotiable (and not a negotiable) instrument." This is a strong point, and seems to take detachment out of the rule of recovery on a negotiable instrument according to its original tenor. The original tenor in such a case is on a non-negotiable instrument, and suit on such an instrument admits all defenses that might be made against original payee. We think there is here something more than a play upon terms, even if detachment may not amount to forgery, as some courts hold. It may be that the question of possibility of converting a contract into a negotiable instrument by the simple process of detachment and thus leave no sign behind, would rather be taken as presumptive proof of authority, than

negotiable instrument materially changed.



“Bekase ma pooh family wuz starving, yo' honnor," whimpered the old man.

“Family starving!” cried the judge. “But they tell me you keep four dogs. How is that, uncle?"

"Why, yo' Honnor," said the old fellow, reproachfully, "you wouldn't 'spect ma family to eat dem dogs!"-St. Louis Post-Dispatch.




Weekly Digest of ALL the Important Opinions

of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort and of ALL the Federal Courts,

Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn.

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.3, 23, 27, 45, 62, 66, 99 California

110 Colorado

101 Illinois

118 Indiana

.72, 117 Iowa........18, 36, 42, 46, 48, 50, 87, 96, 106, 108, 114 Maine.

.22, 64, 85 Maryland

59 Massachusetts

28, 31 Michigan.

6, 24, 47, 61, 115 Mississippi

.70 Missouri.. .1, 37, 39, 52, 56, 65, 73, 74, 88,

91, 97. Montana

.83 Nebraska

35 New Jersey

.67 New York.

..2, 15, 58, 77, 82, 89 North Carolina

60, 103 North Dakota

.63, 119 Ohio.

..34, 79, 111 Oklahoma.

.5, 16, 17, 29, 40, 75, 107 Oregon

43 Pennsylvania

44, 68 South Carolina

.81, 102 South Dakota..

.4, 49, 71, 76, 78 Tennessee..

.51, 55, 113 Texas........19, 26, 30, 38, 53, 57, 84, 92, 93, 100;

104, 105, 109. U. S. C. C. App......

...7, 12, 13, 21, 94, 95 United States D. C........ 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 69, 112, 116, United States S. C.......

..32, 33, 80, 90, 98 120. Washington....

20, 25, 41, 54, 86


6. Bailment—Conversion.-Where defendant S, as agent, dictated the memorandum of sale of the contents of a building in which plaintiff's machinery was stored, investigated the plaintiff's claim that a portion of the property belonged to him, and received the purchase price, there was an act of conversion-Knowles v. Smith, Mich., 157 N. W. 276.

7. Bankruptcy-Act of.- Execution of deed to trustee for creditors pursuant to agreement with creditors held not act of bankruptcy, where it was delivered in escrow for delivery in case all creditors should consent.-N. L. Carpenter & Co. v. Lybrand, U. S. C. C. A., 230 Fed. 84.

8.- -Assignment.-Adjudication in bankruptcy held not to avoid assignment under state law, recognized by state courts as valid, more than 20 months before the adjudication, and not to vest title to the property in the trustee.-In re Bridge, U. S. D. Č., 230 Fed. 184.

9.-Burden of Proof.—Trustee, suing to recover payments alleged to have been voidable preferences, held bound to show that defendant had reasonable cause to believe that bankrupt's property at fair valuation was less than indebtedness.—Clifford v. Morrill, U, S. D. C., 230 Fed. 190.

10.- -Concealment. Bankrupt's schedules and financial statements showing shrinkage of assets held to make prima facie case, and, unless explained, to raise conclusive presumption, of concealment of assets within Civ. Code Ga. 1910, § 3380, as to loss_of exemptions.-in re Powell, U. S. D. C., 230 Fed. 316.

-Estoppel.—Though state court's judgment, in favor of customer of bankrupt stockbrokers, whose stock was pledged by bankrupt, estopped the trustee and the estate, held, that the customer could only claim in competition with other customers having equal rights.-In re Stringer, U. S. D. C., 230 Fed. 177.

12. — Insolvency:-Land claimed to have been purchased with wife's money, but of which husband was apparent owner for years, held his property for the purpose of paying debts, and he could not convey it to her when insolvent.Owens v. Daniel, U. S. C, C. A., 230 Fed. 101.

13.-Jurisdiction. Though bankruptcy court may not enforce process or orders outside its territorial jurisdiction, held, that its jurisdiction is coextensive with the United States.-Orinoco Iron Co. v. Metzel, U. S. C. C. A., 230 Fed. 40.

14.- Preference.-Under Bankr. Act, $$ 57g, 60b, 67e, preferred creditors held entitled to prove claim, though the only surrender of the preference was the payment of a judgment against him in favor of the trustee.-In re Louis J. Bergdoll Motor Co., U. S. D. C., 230 Fed. 248.

15.—Provable Claim.-Rents accruing after commencement of bankruptcy proceedings are not provable against either tenant or surety.Kamioner V. Balkind, N. Y. City Ct., 158 N. Y. Supp. 310.

16. Banks and Banking-Estoppel.--Where bank pays draft for benefit of customer at his request, customer cannot be heard to say, in action by bank for money paid, that there was no liability because draft was not accepted in writing by customer.–Central Exch. Bank v. Williams, Okla., 156 Pac. 347.

17.-Laches.- Pledgee of bank stock is not guilty of laches in failing to inquire if bank had loaned money to its active manager where it is violation of law to do so.—Bryan County State Bank v. American Nat. Bank of Ft. Worth, Tex., Okla., 156 Pac. 352.

18. Bills and Notes—Certificate of Deposit.Where certificates of deposit provide for paym at maturity, "upon the surrender of this certificate properly assigned and indorsed," a delivery of the certificate to the court, in a suit by a holder against an indorser, is a sufficient surrender.-Park v. Best, Iowa, 157 N. W. 233.

19.-Evidence.- Where plaintiff sought to recover on note as payee and alleged and proved that apparent payee was his agent and named as such by mistake, contention that judgment was erroneous for failure to prove transfer_for value held untenable.-Ford v. Johnston, Tex. Civ. App., 184 S. W, 303.

1. Abatement and Revival-Dismissal.-Although pendency of an action in the federal court on the same cause will defeat a second action in the state court, it is sufficient to prevent abatement if the suit in federal courts is terminated by nonsuit or dismissal before trial of the plea in abatement.—Martin v, Richmond Oil Co., Mo. App., 184 S. W. 127.

3. Animals-Negligence.—Where defendant's Where a party claiming under a tax lease contracted to sell the lots, and the buyer went into possession, his vendor giving him an assignment of the tax lease, and later a quitclaim deed purporting to convey the lots in fee, the possession under the quitclaim deed of the buyer, and his widow as his devisee, was adverse to the true owner.-Cardwell v. Clark, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 158 N. Y. Supp. 300.

3. Animals-Negligence.—Where defandant's mules, while stabled in plaintiff's barn, carried disease to plaintiff's horses, defendants were not liable unless they knew, or were charged with knowledge, of the condition of the mules. -M. C. Brown & Co. v. Bennett, Ark., 184 S. W. 35.

4. Attorney and Client-Disbarment.-Conduct of attorney in making extortionate charges, procuring conveyance of property by concealment of value, and entry of false items in account with client required his disbarment.-In re Egan, s. D., 157 N. W. 310.

5. Bail—Vacating Judgment.--That defendant was confined in a federal jail at the time of forfeiture of his recognizance given for appearance in state courts did not require vacation of the judgment of forfeiture in the absence of showing that he was incarcerated in the federal jail through no fault of his own.Metcalf v. State, Okla., 156 Pac. 305.

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20. Indorser.-Indorser of note giving holder the option to declare the whole sum due on default in payment of interest was not liable to a holder, who made no presentment and demand for payment upon the maker and gave the indorser no notice of dishonor, though the maker had defaulted in the interest when the note was negotiated.-Bardshar v. Chaffee, Wash., 156 Pac. 388.

21. Breach of Marriage Promise—Damages. -Plaintiff suing for breach of marriage promise held entitled to recover for loss of reasonable expectations of advantageous settlement in life, pecuniary loss, injured feelings, anxiety of mind, wounded pride, and mortification.Thrush v. Fullhart, U. S. C. C. A., 230 Fed. 24.

22.- Damages.—Plaintiff, suing for breach of promise of marriage, can recover just compensation for defendant's breaking their engagement, the money value to her of the marriage, and damages for mortification and injury to her affections.—Densmore v. Thurston, Me., 96 Atl. 1068.

23. Bridges-Letting of Contract.-Warrants for building a bridge cannot be canceled because the contract for the construction of the bridge was not let at public auction as required by statute, where it was constructed for

an amount within the appropriation, and was accepted and used by the county.-Izard County v. Vincennes Bridge Co., Ark., 184 S. W. 67.

24. Brokers-Dual Agency.-An agent to lease real property cannot act for both parties, without consent of principals, but with their consent, he may act for both, and his agreement


compensation is binding:-KirbySorge-Felske Co. v. Doty, Mich., 157 N. W. 273.

25.-Estoppel.-Brokers, suing for commissions, could not set up that agreement between them and defendant as to commissions was void as in fraud of a corporation with whom defendant exchanged properties.-Lloyd v. Williamson, Wash., 156 Pac. 390.

26.-Estoppel.--Where a landowner availed himself of contracts procured by plaintiff broker and did not cancel the broker's contract for nonperformance, he cannot defeat recovery of commissions on the ground that the broker did not comply with all terms of the contract.Denton v. Holbert, Tex. Civ. App., 184 S. W. 251.

27.--Estoppel.--A furniture manufacturer cannot object that a broker who negotiated sales between the manufacturer and merchants on commission employed subagents to solicit business for him.-Tomlinson Chair Mfg. Co. v. Jop-pa Mattress Co., Ark., 184 S. W. 32.

28.-Principal and Agent.-A broker owes his customer the same duties in the purchase and sale of stocks on margins as of those paid for.---Hall v. Paine, Mass., 112 N. E. 153.

29. Carriers of Goods-Publication of Rates. -Where carrier has published and filed two rates for shipment of live stock, one based on special contract and higher rate on unrestricted liability, shipper is charged with knowledge of two rates and may exercise option between them.-St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Taliaferro, Okla., 156 Pac. 359.

30. Carriers of Live Stock-Stipulations.Stipulation in contract for carriage of live stock that suit for damages must be brought within 90 days is not binding if there was no consideration therefor, and where a binding oral contract had been previously made, the subsequent written contract would be without consideration.---Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. Co, v. Hansard, Tex. Civ. App., 184 S. W. 329.

31. Carriers of Passengers-Limitation of Liability.-A passenger, though unable to read English, and told by the carrier that it would be

unnecessary to insure his baggage, was bound by the limitation in the ticket on liability for loss

of baggage.-Secoulsky Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., Mass., 112 N. E. 151.

32. Commerce-Pure Food Law.-Laws N. D. 1911, p. 355, prohibiting the sale of lard not in bulk unless put up in packages of specified weights, is not repugnant to the Pure Food and Drugs Act, which has reference merely to adulteration and misbranding.--Armour & Co. V. State of North Dakota, U. S. Sup. Ct., 36 Sup. Ct. 440.

33. Constitutional Law-State Court.--The federal supreme court will not disturba de

cision of the state court that a municipal ordinance requiring a street railway company to pave its tracks with asphalt did not impair the obligations of its charter, where the state court found that the use of crushed stone by the railway company would interfere with the pavement of other parts of the street.-Southern Wisconsin Ry. Co. v. City of Madison, U. S. Sup. Ct., 36 Sup. Ct. 400.

34. Contracts—Construction.—Under contract between theatrical company and theater owner providing for settlement at the end of each performance or at such other times as shall be mutually agreed, either party may demand settlement at end of each performance. -Comstock Amusement Co. v. Opera Ball Co., Ohio, 112 N. E. 150.

35.- Construction.-Where owner refused to allow contractor to replace broken glass in side lights furnished because he wanted another style of light he is chargeable with cost of side lights, less cost of replacing glass.-S. A. Foster Lumber Co. v. Glatfelter, Neb., 157 N. W. 329.

36.-Parol Evidence.—Where a contract provided for a "eomplete piped well" and the parties disputed the meaning of the term, parol evidence being introduced, its meaning was for the jury.-Becker V. Incorporated Town of Churdan, Iowa, 157 N. W. 221.

37. Corporations-Estoppel.--One who aids in a transaction by which another party secures stock for services in excess of the value of such services, cannot be heard to deny that such stock was fully paid, though he might lend money to the corporation, but he is estopped by his acquiescence to make such claim.Schroeder v. Edwards, Mo., 184 S. W. 108.

38.- Stock Subscription.--A call for a subscription to stock in a corporation is not necessary when the contract of subscription contains the promise to pay the amount subscribed at a specified date.-Commonwealth Bonding & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hill, Tex., 184 S. W. 247.

39. Covenants-Breach of.-A grantee in a warranty deed need not submit to eviction before purchasing an outstanding title to protect himself against a loss morally certain to happen, but must act in good faith towards his grantor.-Githens v. Barnhill, Mo. App., 184 S. W. 145.

-Merger.--Where a contract between M and E for the exchange of properties was fully executed and merged into final deeds of conveyance, on deed being from B, held that E, in bringing a suit against M for the value of land, on the ground that B had no title thereto, mistook his remedy and should have sued on the covenants in the deed from B, a merger having resulted.-McClelland v. Ehrig, Okla., 156 Pac. 307. 41.

Customs and Usages-Evidence.—Where the terms of an express contract are not ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, evidence of a local custom or usage is inadmissible for the purpose of supporting the claim of either party as to the terms of the contract.-Wilkins v. Kessinger, Wash., 156 Pac. 389.

42.—-Evidence.-Where plaintiff made arrangements for defendants to take corn bought from a farmer, and, his elevator being full, it was agreed that defendants should pay the contract price, the contract cannot be varied by a custom among grain dealers that the price should be paid directly to the farmer.-McDowell v. Bowles. Billings & Kissler Grain Co., Iowa, 157 N. W. 173.

Damages-Counterclaim.-Under counterclaim for damages done to hay through failure to stack, in plaintiff's action on contract for cutting and stacking hay, defendant's measure of damages was different between market price of hay in good condition properly put up and market price of hay as damaged.-Lemler v. Bord, Ore., 156 Pac. 427.

44. -Measure of.-Damages are not measured by actual difference in earnings before and after injury, but by difference in earning capacity.-Leonhardt v. Green, Pa., 96 Atl. 1096.

45. Deeds—Cloud on Title.-Where grantors exchanging land delivered their deed to a third person, but subject to their further direction, and the third person delivered the deed without







the grantors' consent, such grantors could have the deed canceled as a cloud on their title.Moore v. Moye, Ark., 184 S. W. 63.

46,- Evidence.—That the grantor made no investigation of the mortgaged land and did not have the assignments of mortgage recorded tens to negative his claim that misrepresentations were made as to the value of the mortgage security and that he relied on them.Tidgwell v. Bouma, Iowa, 157 N. W. 200.

47.-Voidable.—A deed, though secured by fraud and voidable at the instance of the grantor, conveys his entire interest in the land, and he cannot reconvey to another until the ded has been set aside as fraudulent.-Cochran Timber Co. v. Fisher, Mich., 157 N. W. 282.

48. Divorce-Cruel Treatment.-Cruel and inhuman treatment does not necessarily involve

finding of physical violence.-Pooley v. Pooley, Iowa, 157 N. W. 129.

49. -Custody of Children.—In a divorce case, the children of the parties are wards of the court, which is concerned with their welfare and not with the wishes of either of the parents, and which has the power and the duty to

to their welfare when the matter is properly brought to its attention.-Houghton v. Houghton, S. D., 157 N. W, 316.

50.- -Habitual Drunkenness.-Where a husband, who had used liquor moderately before marriage, thereafter became a habitual drunkard, the wife is entitled to a divorce.—Bill v. Bill, Iowa, 157 N. W. 158.

Domicile-Change of.--The rule that a domicile once fixed remains until another is acquired does not apply to a change from a domicile of choice to that of origin, in which case the domicile of origin is acquired the moment the other is given up.-Denny v. Sumner County, Tenn., 184 S. W. 14.

52. Drains-Taxation. Drainage districts cannot exercise the right of taxation to aid purely private enterprises.-Elsberry Drainage Dist. v. Harris, Mo., 184 S. W. 89.

53. Easements-Parol Evidence. Where parol evidence showing a verbal gift of a rightof-way is not admissible to establish an easement, it is admissible to show that one using such easement did SO adversely.—Heard v. Bowen, Tex. Civ. App., 184 S. W. 234.

54. -Prescription.-The owner of property, served with water through pipe running across an adjoining lot, who used such pipe for more than 10 years, it being invisible and the use unknown, could not claim an easement by prescription to maintain the pipe.-Davison v. Columbia Lodge No. 8, K. P., Wash., 156 Pac. 383.

55. Election of Remedles-Estoppel in Pais. -An "election" differs from an "estoppel in pais" in that it need not be acted upon by the other party to his detriment.-Phillips v. Řooker, Tenn., 184 S. W. 12.

56. Embezzlement-Accounting. - Where landowner for whom accused applied and obtained a loan directed that the funds be transmitted to accused, the latter was charged with the duty of accounting to the landowner, and his appropriation of the funds was embezzlement.—State v. McWilliams, Mo., 184 S. W. 96.

67.-Agent.-An insurance agent receives premiums under his employment, and may not appropriate them to his own use, so that failure of the applicant to sign a new application as required would not affect his guilt in appropriating the premiums.--Meredith v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 184 S. W. 204.

58. Eminent Domain-Compensation. Ordinance of the city of Niagara Falls, forbidding erection or operation of factory within prescribed residence district without consent of owners of two-thirds of residences, in view of its exceptional scenic beauty, its historical associations, etc., held not taking of private property without just compensation in violation of Const. N. Y., art. 1, § 4.-In re Russell, N. Y. Sup., 158 N. Y. Supp. 162.

59.—Navigable Stream.-Where a stream was only two feet deep at high tide and all possibility of navigation had been destroyed by piers, held, that it was not a navigable stream, and damages for condemnation could not be defeated on ground it was navigable.—City of Baltimore v. Carroll, Md., 96 Atl. 1076.

60.-Right-of-Way.-In proceedings to condemn a right-of-way for a street railroad, the depreciation in value of the property in consequence of the poles and trolley wires projecting into the street, being unsightly and a source of danger to persons, was an element to be considered in fixing damages.- Wadsworth Land Co. v. Charlotte Electric Co., N. C., 88 S. E. 439.

61. Equity-Clean Hands.—The maxim that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands" cannot be applied to complainant in a suit to quiet title on the ground that he secured a deed thereto by fraud, where the suit is between him and a subsequent grantee, who took with knowledge of the fraud.—Cochran Timber Co. v. Fisher, Mich., 157 N. W. 282.

62. Executors and Administrators-Mortgage.—Where notes and a mortgage were executed by a debtor and his wife to the creditor's widow and her son, who assigned them to the creditor's administrator, the maker could not, in the administrator's action to foreclose the mortgage, question his authority to accept an assignment of the notes-Chambers v. Cunningham, Ark., 184 S. W, 49.

63.-Preference.- Where a nonpreferred claim was joined with a claim for funeral charges, and a judgment entered for the aggregate amount, and the order for judgment separately stated the amounts due on each cause of action, the preference due the funeral charge was not lost.-Elton v. Lamb, N. D., 157 N. W. 288.

64. False Imprisonment-False Arrest.-Deputy sheriff, who, in response to telephone message from another officer, detained plaintiff in jail because he answered the description given of an offender, and only until it was ascertained that he was not the party wanted, held not liable for a false arrest and imprisonment.Kittredge v. Frothingham, Me., 96 Atl. 1063.

65. Fraud-Damages.-The buyer of a motion picture theater, induced thereto by the misrepresentations of the seller as to his right to asign the lease and as to the receipts of the show, could recover the benefit of his bargain as an element of damages, in addition to the price paid, unless the loss of business arose from the buyer's lack of skill, experience or industry.-Harmon v. Dickerson, Mo. App., 184 S. W. 139. 66.

Fraudulent Conveyances-Husband and Wife.--A wife whose claim to personal property under a bill of sale from her husband was not in good faith, or who permitted him to hold the property out to creditors as his own, could not claim it as against such creditors who might enforce their claims by execution.-Bank of Almyra v. Laur, Ark., 184 S. W. 39.

67.-Inquiry.-Creditor, taking a conveyance for fair consideration from his debtor with knowledge of four-year-old suit pending against the latter, was not under duty to make any inquiry as to any fraudulent design of the debtor toward the plaintiff in the suit. --National Bank of Slatington v. Massopust, N. J., 96 Atl. 1071.

68. Husband and wifeAlienation of Affections.—In action for alienation of affections, burden is on plaintiff to show that defendant was pursuer, not merely pursued, and that defendant deliberately influenced plaintiff's husband.-Stewart v. Hagerty, Pą, 96 Atl. 1099.

69. Indictment and Information-Defects. Notaries public held without authority to ad. minister oaths in connection with criminal prosecutions, and hence information made on oath of persons whose affidavits, taken before notaries public, were annexed was defective. United States v. Schallinger Produce Co., U. S. D. C., 230 Fed. 290.

70. Insurance Extension. — Where insured, having procured a loan for the full value of the policy, defaulted in payment of premiums, interest and principal of loan, the insurance was not automatically extended under a provision for extension after payment of three full premiums in case the policy was free from debt. -Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oliver, Miss., 71 So. 302.

71.- Forfeiture.-If a letter reminding an insured of his nonpayment of a premium amounts simply to an expression of willingness






to reinstate a forfeited policy upon payment, there is no waiver of default; but, if it indicates an intention to treat the policy as in force, there is a waiver.-Noem v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, S. D., 157 N. W. 308.

72.—Notice to Agent.-Knowledge acquired by an insurance agent while acting in connection with a matter in which he is authorized to act will be imputed to the company or prewumed to have been communicated by him to it. -West v. National Casualty Co., Ind. App., 112 N. E. 115.

73. - Temporary Insurance.--A printed receipt for the first premium on a life policy reciting that the applicant was insured from its date, if accepted as an insurable risk, was contract of temporary insurance from that date, although the applicant died before receiving the policy which provided for a larger premium.Kempf v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, Mo. App., 184 S. W. 133.

74.- Total Loss.—The question of total or partial loss is to be decided by the present condition of the building and whether it has lost its identity as a building, rather than its use after being repaired.-Brown v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., Mo. App., 184 S. W. 122.

75.-Waiver.- Where insured relies on the act of an agent as waiver, he must show, either that the agent had express authority to make the waiver, or that the insurer, with knowledge of the facts, ratified the agent's acts.Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huntsberry, Okla., 156 Pac. 327.

76. Libel and Slander-Damages.-In action for libel alleging damage to value of plaintiff's lease of a hotel property, the correct measure of damages would be the diminution of the net income from hotel business, and not the lessening of the gross receipts after publication of alleged libel. --Adams v. Scott, s. D., 157 N. W. 321.

77.-Innuendo. - A newspaper interview, stating that plaintiff had under an assumed name "trailed" defendant and her daughter to a summer resort, and that “when he had left a diamond pin she had was gone," is actionable per se, with allegations, by way of innuendo, that it meant to accuse plaintiff of larceny,Davis v. Kelly, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 158 N. Y. Supp. 145.

78. Malicious Prosecution Damages.-Expenses such as attorney's fees and costs incurred by the plaintiff in malicious prosecution, in the former action, if reasonable and necessary, and so far as they are the actual and proximate result of the prosecution, may be awarded as items of damage.-Wren v. Rehfeld, S. D., 157 N. W. 323.

79. Mandamus-Discretion.-Relator is not entitled to mandamus to compel placing, of name on official ballot unless act is one which law enjoins as duty resulting from office, trust, or station.-State v, Lloyd, Ohio, 112 N. E. 141.

80. Master and Servant-Employers' Liability Act.-A contract by which an interstate railway carrier employs another to handle the coal required for its engines, and which provides that the carrier reserves no control over such person except as to the results to be accomplished, does not create the relation of master and servant so as to render the Employers' Liability Act applicable to the employes of such contractor.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Čo. v. Bond, U. S. Sup. Ct., 36 Sup. Ct. 403.

81.- Evidence. The state rules as to sufficiency of evidence to prove negligence apply in actions under the federal Employers' Liabil. ity Act, as that act contains no specific provisions as to quantity or method of proof of negligence.-Mulligan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., S. C.. 88 S. E. 445.

ly as a means of describing the territory to be protected, and if the defendant was not injured thereby, the order should be affirmed, even though not technically justified.-Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Pilot-Butte Mining Co., Mont., 156 Pac. 409.

84. Monopolies--Breach of Contract.-New York fashion company selling patterns to Texas buyer and fixing prices, etc., so that the contract was partially violative of the Texas AntiTrust Act, could not recover for the buyer's breach.-Segal v. McCall Co., Tex., 184 S. W. 188.

85. Mortgages-Practical Construction.-The practical construction by the parties cannot effect the priority of mortgages which are definite and certain in themselves.-Stanley v. True, Me., 96 Atl. 1057,

86. Municipal Corporations-Improvement. The use to which property is put cannot of itself determine the question of benefits from an improvement; the usual test being the increase of value for any use to which the land might be adapted.--City of Vancouver . Corporation of Catholic Bishop of Nisqually, Wash., 156 Pac. 383.

87. — Obstruction of Street.-A paving contractor has the right to occupy the streets with a truck bearing a concrete mixer, and the inere fact that it thereby obstructs travel does not make him a wrongdoer or liable for the inconvenience to the public or individuals.--Law v. Bryant Asphaltic Paving Co., Iowa, 15? N. W. 175.

88.—Sidewalks. Where city established the grade of a street and placed lights and signs thereon and permitted pedestrians for years to use a portion of it as a sidewalk at the point where plaintiff was injured, the city was liable for failure to maintain the sidewalk. -Proctor v. City of Poplar Bluff, Mo. App., 184 S. W. 123.

Sidewalks.-An irregularity of nearly four inches in the sidewalk, two sections of which were not on the same level, cannot be held a defect of so trivial a character that no recovery for injuries occasioned by reason of the defect could be had.—Merwin v. City of Utica, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 158 N. Y. Supp. 257.

90. Negligence-Comparative. The comparative negligence rule established by the Employer's Liability Act is not applicable to the case of a rear brakeman who, after going back to signal a train approaching from the rear, remained in the caboose until a collision occurred; his negligence being the sole cause of the injury.--Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wiles, U. S. Sup. Ct., 36 Sup. Ct. 406.

91.--Minor.-The conduct of a boy 15 years old was not to be measured by that of the ordinarily prudent man of mature years, and his age was to be considered.-Marshall v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, Mo., Ap., 184 S. W. 159.

92. Novation-Test of.-The grantee of widow, who agreed to support her for life, she thereafter agreeing to his sale to a third person and the latter's substitution as the party who was to support her, was relieved from his obligation and was not liable for his grantee's breach.-Nalls v. McGrill, Tex. Civ. App., 184 S. W. 275. 93. Partnership-Survivor.-Surviving broth

of two composing partnership operating a hotel, the deceased brother having ordered plans for an addition, and the survivor not having objected, held liable for the charge.-Snaman v. Lane, Tex. Civ. App., 184 S. W. 366.

94. Patents—Infringement.—Infringement is not avoided by combining two elements of the patented structure into one so long as


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