the public officers, or with the banks themselves, was merely nominal, as far as the operation and profits of the banks were concerned; that they would not make one cent less profit, or issue a single dollar less, if the deposits be kept by the officers of Government instead of themselves; and, of course, that the system would be equally subject to expansions and contractions, and equally exposed to catastrophes, like the present, in the one, as the other mode of keeping. He spoke of bank profits and bank issues generally, as derived from the deposit of public money,-the aggregate profits and issues of all banks, without reference to the distribution of those profits under the one or the other mode of keeping the public money. He would show, in a word, that the bill would no more divorce the Government from the banks, in relation to the deposits, than it would as it now stood, as to receiving their notes, and giving them credit and circulation as cash, in its dues and disbursements; and that it would unite them as effectually in respect to both, as they were before the suspension in May. Although the assertion might excite some surprise at first, it would be very easy to make plain every word he had said.

The profit which the banks derive from the public deposits, when their own notes were collected and deposited, as would be the case if the bill passed in its present form, arises from the withdrawing of their notes from circulation. While their notes are in deposit, they are as completely withdrawn from circulation, for the time, as if burnt or destroyed; and the withdrawal makes a vacuum to that extent in the circulation, which has to be filled up by new discounts, and, of course, increased business and profits; and this was equally true, whether the notes withdrawn were deposited in certain banks, as under the Deposit Act of 1836, or in the hands of receivers-general, and other executive officers, as proposed by this bill. The profit depended, in no degree, on the fact where their notes were deposited; but on the amount with

drawn, and the length of time they were kept out of circulation. The larger the amount withdrawn, and the longer kept out, the greater the business and profits of the banks. Nor can the issues exceed the sum necessary to fill up the vacuum occasioned by the deposits, whether they be made with the banks themselves, or the officers of the Government. When the vacuum occasioned by the withdrawal is filled, whatever exceeds that must return on the banks, without regard to the place of deposit, and check further issues. It follows clearly from all this, that the deposit of the public funds, if collected in bank-notes (as proposed by the bill as it now unfortunately stands amended) in the custody of the public officers, would not in the least affect the discounts and the business of the banks. They would be as great as if deposited with the banks, and would keep the circulation of bank-notes as much expanded, and subject to as many fluctuations and shocks. These propositions he held to be incontrovertible. He would be glad to hear any member rise in his place and attempt to answer them.

Nor would the treasury be a particle more independent of the banks than under the deposit system, before the suspension of specie payments. The revenue, as he had said, would be collected under this bill, should it pass, as it was then, exclusively in bank-notes-which, on another suspension, would be just as worthless in the hands of the officers in whose custody they might be deposited, as they would be in the banks themselves; and which, of course, would again compel the Government, in such an event, to pay its debts in worthless rags, to its own great discredit and the loss of its creditors, or not pay them at all. Nor would it be possible, any more than in the present instance, to collect its debts. in the legal currency of the country. Gold and silver would as certainly disappear as completely from circulation, under the operation of this bill, as it did under the system of bank deposit that existed at the time of the late suspension.

But if it will have no effect in rendering the treasury more independent of the banks, nor in limiting banking operations or profits, as it certainly will not—where, he asked, will it differ from the late deposit system under the act of 1836, which this bill is intended to supersede? There is, and can be, but one point of difference, viz., in the distribution of the profits from the deposits; and even that difference, he would show, is more apparent than real. Where the revenue is deposited with certain banks, selected by the Secretary of the Treasury, as under the act of 1836, the profits of the deposits accrue almost exclusively to them. They discount on them, and issue the notes of other banks, which they hold in deposit, or draw specie from them, and thus increase their business and profit, without incurring any additional liability; but where the deposits are made with the executive officers, the profits would accrue, apparently, to the banks generally. He said apparently, for it would depend wholly on the officers holding the deposits. They can, at pleasure, give the profit to what banks they please, by holding back the notes of one bank, and disbursing the notes of another, and thus keeping the notes of one out of circulation, and throwing the other into circulation through disbursements, to return on the banks issuing them. The effects of this would be to give one all the profit that it could derive from being a deposit bank, and strip the others almost entirely of the advantage of having their notes received in the dues of the Government. Take, for instance, two banks, in a place where the average public deposits were a million of dollars; is it not clear, if the executive officer would make it a rule to disburse the notes of one bank, and hold back those of the other, it would operate, in fact, as a standing loan to that amount in the favored bank?

The result is, that in either case the distribution of the profit resulting from the public deposits would depend on the Executive Department, whether made with the execu

tive officers, or in deposit banks under the act of 1836. The Executive in one case would have the selection of the banks, and in the other the control over the subordinate officers of his department; with this difference, that when the bank was selected, it would, under the act of 1836, be under the control and protection of law, but the officers would be completely under the control of the head of the department at all times. This is the sum total of the difference. If you pass this bill, you have the one; and if you defeat it, you have the other.

Thus regarding it, and being opposed, on constitutional grounds, to receive any thing but the legal currency of the country, or Government securities, in the public dues, and to the increase of Exccutive patronage, he could not possibly vote for the bill as amended. He was decidedly opposed to all discretionary powers, especially in the Executive branch of the Government, and this bill would give greater than any that has ever passed. It would not only give the power to which he had already alluded of favoring what bank it pleased, but the controlling power of demanding specie, at pleasure of the Executive, of any bank it might desire to oppress, and abstaining from demanding of those it intended to favor. Powers such as these he regarded as incompatible with our free system of government, and he, for one, could not consent to confer them.

But he had other and insuperable objections. In giving the bill originally his support, he was governed by a deep conviction that the total separation of the Government and banks was indispensable. He firmly believed that we had reached a point where the separation was absolutely necessary to save both Government and banks. He was under a strong impression that the banking system had reached a point of decrepitude-that great and important changes were necessary to save it and prevent convulsions—and that the first step was a perpetual separation between them and

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the Government. But there could be, in his opinion, no separation-no divorce-without collecting the public dues in the legal and constitutional currency of the country. Without that, all would prove a perfect delusion, as this bill would prove, should it pass. We had no constitutional right to treat the notes of mere private corporations as cash; and if we did, nothing would be done.

These views, and many others similar, he had openly expressed, in which the great body of the gentlemen around him had concurred. We stand openly pledged to them before the country and the world. We had fought the battle manfully and successfully. The cause was good, and having stood the first shock, nothing was necessary, but firmness; standing fast on our position to insure victory-a great and glorious victory in a noble cause, which was calculated to effect a more important reformation in the condition of society than any in our time-he for one, could not agree to terminate all these mighty efforts, at this and the extra session, by returning to a complete and perfect reunion with the banks in the worst and most dangerous form. He would not belie all that he had said and done, by voting for the bill as it now stood amended; and to terminate that which was so gloriously begun, in so miserable a farce. He could not but feel deeply disappointed in what he had reason to apprehend would be the result-to have all our efforts and labor thrown away, and the hopes of the country disappointed. All would be lost! No; he expressed himself too strongly. Be the vote what it may, the discussion would stand. Light had gone abroad. The public mind had been aroused, for the first time, and directed to this great subject. The intelligence of the country is every where busy in exploring its depths and intricacies, and would not cease to investigate till all its labyrinths were traced. The seed that has been sown will sprout and grow to maturity; the revolution that has been begun will go through, be our course what it may.