be control on one side, and dependence on the other, increasing with the increasing amount of collection and disbursements, which, by their absorbing character, would draw with them the imports and exports, with an increased control over the exchanges. Add to this the power which this measure would place in the hands of the banks at the favored points, and I hazard nothing in asserting that it would at all times be in their power to crush, by a'sudden and unexpected run, the banks elsewhere, which might incur their displeasure, with greater ease, and more effectually, than the late United States Bank, in its most palmy days, ever could.

The next permanent effect would be, to place the whole banking system under the control of this Government. It would hold over the banks the power of life and death. The process of bankruptcy against an incorporation is but another name for its death-warrant. It would give, with the power of destroying, that of regulating them, without regard to their chartered rights. The same bold construction that would authorize Congress to subject them to a bankrupt law, would give it the power to determine at pleasure what shall or shall not constitute acts of bankruptcy, by which it might limit the extent of their business, fix the proportion of specie to liability, and make it a condition for one dollar in circulation, there should be a dollar in their vaults. The possession of such a power would give Congress more unlimited control over the banks, than that which the States that incorporated them, possess, or which you would possess over a Bank of the United States, chartered by yourselves. Your power over such an institution, and the States over their own banks, would be limited by the acts of incorporation; while yours over the banks of the States, with the bankrupt power in your hands, would be without any other limitation, than your discretion.

It is easy to see that the complete subjugation of the State banks to your will, must be the result of such unlim

ited control; and not less easy, that with their subjugation the conflict between this Government and the banks would cease, to be followed by a close and perpetual alliance. It is in the nature of government to wage war with whatever is opposed to its will, and to take under its protection that which it has subdued; nor would the banks be found to be an exception. They would be forced to conciliate the good will of the Government, on which both their safety and profit would depend; and in no way could they more effectually do that, than by upholding its power and authority. They would be thus forced, by the strongest appeals to both their fear and hope, into the political arena, with their immense power and influence, and to take an active and decided part in all the party strifes of the day, throwing their weight always on the side which their safety and profit might dictate. The end would be the very reverse of that for which we, who are in favor of a divorce of Government and banks, have been contending for the last three years. Instead of divorce, there would be union; instead of excluding the banks from the political struggles of the day, they would be forced to be active and zealous partisans in self-defence; and instead of leaving the banks to the control of the States, from which they derive their charters, you would assume over them a control more powerful and unlimited, than has ever been before exercised over them by this Government, either through the pet banks or a National Bank. This control would be the greatest at the principal points of collection and disbursement-the very point where that of the local banks would be the greatest over all others. It follows that the Government would have the most decisive and complete control over those that would control all others; and, by lending their powerful aid and influence to maintain their control, would in reality control the whole banking system; thus making, in effect, the banks at the favored points the National Bank, and the rest virtually but branches. If to this we add the

control which it would give over the other and powerful corporations enumerated in the amendment, it may be safely asserted, that the measure, if adopted, would do more to increase the power of this Government, and diminish that of the States to strengthen the cause of consolidation, and weaken that of State Rights-than any which has been assumed by Congress.

Having pointed out the consequences, I now demand, in the name of the constitution, what right has Congress to extend a bankrupt act over the incorporated institutions of the States, and thereby seize on this immense power? The burden of proof is on those who claim the right, and not on us who oppose it. I repeat, ours is a government of limited powers, and those who claim to exercise a power, must show the grant-a clear and certain grant, in case of a power so pregnant with consequences as this.

I ask, then, those who claim this power, on what grounds do they place it? Do they rest it on the nature of the power, as being peculiarly applicable to banks and the other corporations proposed to be embraced? If so, frail is the foundation. Never was power more unsuited to its subject

-so much so, that language itself has to be forced and perverted to make it applicable. Taking corporations in their proper sense, as bodies politic, there is scarcely a single portion of the whole process, beginning with the acts of bankruptcy, and extending to the final discharge, applicable to them. What one of the numerous acts of bankruptcy can they commit? Can they depart from the State, or be arrested, or be imprisoned, or escape from prison, or, in a word, commit any one of the acts without which an individual cannot be made a bankrupt? No, but they may stop payment, and thereby subject themselves to the act. True; but how is the process to be carried through? The provision requires the bankrupt to be sworn can you swear corporations? It requires divers acts to be done by the bankrupt, under the

penalty of imprisonment can you imprison a corporation ? It directs a discharge to be given to the bankrupt, which exempts his person and future acquisitions: can a corporation receive the benefit of such discharge? No; the process itself is the dissolution, the death of the corporation. It is thus that language is forced, strained, and distorted, in order to bring a power so inapplicable to the subject to bear on corporations. It would be just as rational to include corporations in insolvent laws, which none has been, as yet, so absurd as to think of doing.

The right, then, cannot be inferred from the nature of the power. On what, then, can it stand? On precedents? I admit that if, at the period of the adoption of the constitution, it was the practice to include corporations in acts of bankruptcy, it would go far to establish that it was intended. by the constitution to include them. But the reverse is the fact. As long as the system has been in operation, there is not a case where a corporation was ever included, either in England, this country, or any other, as far as can be ascertained, nor ever proposed to be. The attempt in this case is a perfect novelty, without precedent or example; and all the force which it is acknowledged the practice of including them would have given in favor of the right, is thus thrown, with a weight equally decisive, against it.

But we have not yet approached the real difficulty. If the power was ever so appropriate, and the only one that was-if precedents were innumerable-it would only prove that this Government would have the right of applying the power to incorporations of its own creating. It could not go an inch beyond, and would leave the great difficulty untouched-the right of Congress to include State corporations in an act of bankruptcy passed by its authority. Where is such a power to be found in the constitution? It seems to be forgot that this and the State Governments are co-ordinate governments, emanating from the same authority, and

making together one complex, but harmonious and beautiful system, in which each, within its allotted sphere, is independent, and coequal with the other. If one has a right to create, the other cannot have the right to destroy. The principle has been carried so far, that in the case of the State of Maryland and McColough, the Supreme Court, after elaborate argument, decided that a State, in the exercise of its undoubted right of taxing, could not tax a branch Bank of the United States, located in its limits, on the ground that the right of taxing, in such case, involved the right of destroying. Admit, then, Congress had the right to include corporations of its own creation; still, according to the principle thus recognized, it could not include those created by the States, -unless, indeed, the fundamental principle of our system, admitted even by the extreme consolidation school of politics, that each government is coequal and independent within its sphere, should be denied, and the absolute sovereignty of this Government be assumed. If, then, the States have a right to create banks, and other corporations enumerated in the amendment, it follows that Congress has not the right to destroy them; nor, of course, to include them in an act of bankruptcy, the very operation of which, when applied to corporations, is, to destroy. But whether they have or have not the right, belongs not to Congress to decide. The right of the separate legislatures of the States to decide on their reserved powers, is as perfect as that of Congress to decide on the delegated. Each must judge for itself in carrying out its powers. To deny this, would be virtually to give a veto to Congress over the acts of the State legislatures—a power directly refused by the convention, though anxiously pressed by the National party in that body.

Such and so conclusive is the argument against the right; and how has it been met? We are told that the States have greatly abused the power of incorporation. I admit it. The power has been sadly and dangerously abused. I stand not