self-existent, independent, and eternal. A being to whom these attributes do not belong, can never be regarded as God, except he be called so by a figurative use of the term. The generation or production of the Son of God, as divine, as really and truly God, seems to be out of question, therefore, unless it be an express doctrine of Revelation; which is so far from being the case, that I conceive the contrary is plainly taught. If the phrase eternal generation then, is to be vindicated, it is only on the ground that it is figuratively used, to describe an undefinable connexion and discrimination between Father and Son, which is from everlasting. It is not well chosen, however, for this purpose, because it necessarily,even in its figurative use, carries along with it an idea, which is at variance with the self existence and independence of Christ, as divine; and of course, in so far as it does this, it seems to detract from his real divinity.

I cannot therefore understand, what "God of God; light of light; very God of very God," means; nor can I think, that any definite and positive ideas ever were or could be attached to these phrases. That the Nicene Fathers meant to contradict Arius; is sufficiently plain, to any one conversant with the history of the Council of Nice. But that they have made out a positive, or affirmative and intelligible definition of the distinction between Father and Son, I presume no one, at the present day, will hardly venture to assert.

The Council of Constantinople [A. D. 381] in their Synodic Epistle to the Western Bishops, as exhibited in p.30 above, have shown the manner, in which the doctrine of the Trinity was stated and defended, in their day. They adopted and enlarged the Nicene Symbol, so as to strike at the opinions of Macedonius; and then, in their Synodic Letter, gave the sum of what they had done, or what they believed. My objection to their language is, that it is too affirmative. "Three most perfect hypostases, or three perfect persons," thougn aimed to contradict Sabellius, Paul of Samosata, and others of like sentiments, is an attempt to define too far. Hypostases, or persons, in the sense of distinction in the Godhead, may be admissible,. through the penury of language. But most perfect hypostases, perfect persons, is attempting to make the distinction more a matter of definition, than it can be made. I believe

that what they designed to assert, is substantially true; but I cannot adopt, because I cannot regard as intelligible, all their language.

Let us leave antiquity now, and glance, for a moment, at some of the similar attempts at definition, or illustration, in modern times. The celebrated Leibnitz, was requested by Loefler, who had undertaken to refute the writings of a certain English Antitrinitarian, to give him an affirmative definition of the persons in the Godhead. He sent for answer the following; "Several persons in an absolute substance numerically the same, signify several, particular, intelligent, substances essentially related." On further consideration, he abandoned this, and sent a second; which was, "Several persons, in an absolute substance numerically the same, mean relative, incommunicable modes of subsisting."

If Leibnitz actually understood this, I believe he must have been a better master of metaphysics, than any person who has ever read his definition. In fact, he does not himself appear to have been satisfied with it: for not long after, he wrote as follows; "We must say, that there are relations in the divine substance, which distinguish the persons, since these persons cannot be absolute substances. But we must aver, too, that these relations are substantial. At least, we must say, that the Divine Persons are not the same Concrete, under different denominations or relations; as a man may be,at the same time, both a poet and an orator. We must say, moreover; that the three persons are not as absolute substances as the whole."*.

This is somewhat better than either of his former at tempts, in as much as it is confined principally to description of a negative kind. Yet after all, I obtain by it no additional light upon the subject, which is important.

With quite as little success, did that original genius and masterly reasoner, the celebrated Toellner of Frankfort, labour to define the subject in question. "It is certain," says he, "that we must conceive, as coexisting in God, three eternal and really different actions, the action of activity, of idea, and of the desire of all possible good within and without him.

Three really different actions, coexisting from eternity, necessarily presuppose three really different and operative Remarques sur le livre d' un Antitrinitaire Anglois, p. 26.

substrata. It is thus, through the aid of reason illuminated by the Scriptures, we come to know, that the Power, the Understanding, and the Will of God are not merely three faculties, but three distinct energies, that is, three substances." (Vermisch. Aufsätze. B. I. p. 81.)

Tertullian's explication, or the Nicene Creed is, at least, as intelligible to me as this.

I have not produced these instances, in order to satisfy you, that all attempts of this nature are and must be fruitless. You doubtless need no such proof. I have produced them for two reasons: the first, to justify myself, in some measure, for not attempting a definition, in which no one has yet succeeded; the second, to show that notwithstanding all the fruitless attempts at definition, which have been made, and notwithstanding the variety of method in which men have chosen to make these attempts; yet, for substance, there is a far greater unanimity of opinion among Trinitarians, than you and your friends seem to be willing to concede. I grant freely, that there is a great variety, in the mode, by which an attempt at definition or illustration is made. With my present views, I can never look upon any attempts of this nature, but with regret. But I am very far from accusing them, generally, of any ill design; much less can I treat them with contempt.

Patient investigation and candor will lead one to believe, as it seems to me, that the thing aimed at was, in substance, to assert the idea of a distinction in the Godhead. To do this with the more success, as they imagined, they endeavoured to describe affirmatively the nature of that distinction. Here they have all failed. But does this prove, that there is actually a great variety of opinion among Trinitarians, in regard to the principal thing concerned, merely because endeavours to define this thing, have produced a great variety of illustration? I cannot help feeling that this matter is sometimes misrepresented, and very generally but little understood.

And now can you by arguing a priori, prove to me that the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent with itself, or "subversive of the doctrine of divine Unity," and therefore untrue? We say the divine essence and attributes are numerically one, so far as they are known to us; but

that there is in the Godhead, a real distinction between the Father and the Son. (I omit the consideration of the Holy Spirit here, because your Sermon merely hints at this subject; and because all difficulties, in respect to the doctrine of the Trinity, are essentially connected with proving or disproving the Divinity of Christ.) We abjure all attempts to define that distinction; we admit it simply as a fact, on the authority of divine Revelation. Now how can you prove that a distinction does not exist, in the Godhead? I acknowledge that the want of evidence, in the Scriptures, to establish the fact, would be a sufficient reason for rejecting it. But we are now making out a statement of the subject, and answering objections that are urged a priori, or independently of the Scriptures. The proof, which the New Tes tament exhibits, we are hereafter to examine. How then, I repeat it, are you to show that we believe in a self contradiction, or in an impossibility? If the distinction in question cannot be proved, independently of the Scriptures, (and most freely I acknowlege it cannot ;) it is equally certain that it cannot, in this manner, be disproved. In order to prove that this distinction contradicts the divine Unity, must you not be able to tell what it is, and what the divine Unity is? Can you do either?

Allow me, for a moment, to dwell on the subject now casually introduced. It is a clear point I think, that the unity of God cannot be proved, without revelation. It may perhaps be rendered faintly probable. Then you depend on Scripture proof, for the establishment of this doctrine. But have the Scriptures any where told us what the divine Unity is? Will you produce the passage? The oneness of God they assert. But this they assert always, in opposition to the idols of the heathen-the polytheism of the Gentiles-the gods superior and inferior, which they worshipped. In no other sense, have the Scriptures defined the ONENESS of the Deity. What then is Oneness, in the uncreated, infinite, eternal Being? In created and finite objects, we have a distinct perception of what we mean by it: but can created objects be just and adequate representatives of the uncreated ONE? Familiar as the assertion is, in your conversation and in your Sermons, that God is ONE, can you give me any definition of this oneness, except a negative one?

That is, you deny plurality of it; you say God is but one, and not two, or more. Still, in what, I ask, does the divine Unity consist? Has not God different and various faculties, and powers? Is he not almighty, omniscient, omnipresent, holy, just, and good? Does he not act differently, i. e. variously, in the natural, and in the moral world? Does his unity consist, then, appropriately in his essence? But what is the essence of God? And how can you assert that his unity consists appropriately in this, unless you know what his essence is, and whether oneness can be any better predicated of this, than of his attributes?

Your answer to all this is; "The nature of God is beyond my reach; I cannot define it. I approach to a definition of the divine unity, only by negatives.' That is, you deny the numerical plurality of God; or you say there are not two or more essences, omnisciencies, omnipotencies, &c. But here all investigation is at an end. Is it possible to show, what constitutes the internal nature of the divine essence, or attributes; or how they are related to each other; or what internal distinctions exist? About all this, Revelation says not one word; certainly the book of nature gives no instruction concerning it. The assertion then that God is one, can never be fairly understood as meaning any thing more, than that he is numerically one; i. e. it simply denies polytheism, and never can reach beyond this. But how does this prove, or how can it prove, that there may not be, or that there are not distinctions in the Godhead, either in regard to attributes, or essence, the nature of which is unknown to us, and the existence of which is to be proved, by the authority of the Scriptures only?

When Unitarians, therefore, inquire what that distinction in the Godhead is, in which we believe; we answer, that we do not profess to understand what it is; we do not undertake to define it affirmatively. We can approximate to a definition of it, only by negatives. We deny that the Father is, in all respects, the same as the Son; and that the Holy Spirit is, in all respects, the same as either the Father or the Son. We rest the fact, that a distinction exists, solely upon the basis of Revelation.

In principle then, what more difficulty lies in the way of believing in a' threefold distinction of the Godhead, than in believing in the divine Unity?