Cotton Lumber Co. v. La Crosse Lumber Co. etc. The verdict is general and does not find on either count. Where there are several causes of action some good and some bad, a general verdict will not be upheld because it is impossible to tell whether the verdict was based on the good or the bad counts, or how much of it rests on the good and how much rests on the bad counts. Brownell v. P. R. R. Co., 47 Mo. 243, and cases there cited; Christal v. Craig, 80 Mo. 371; Mooney v. Kennett, 19 Mo. 553; Anderson v. Shockley, 181 S. W. (Mo.), 1154 The jury are as much bound by instructions in a libel case, except as to its right to determine whether or not the writing in controversy is libelous, as in any other case. Arnold v. Jewett, 125 Mo. 241, 252. (4) The damages are excessive, both actual and punitive, and the amount of each class of damages is clearly indicative of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury、 Where it is patent that a verdict is the result of passion and prejudice, the cure will not be by enforcing a remittitur, but it is vitiated to such an extent that it will be reversed. Harper v. R. R. Co., 172 S. W. (Spring. Ct. of Apps.), 59 and cases there cited; Boyce v. Wheeler, 197, Mo. App. 311 and 316. (5) The court erred in refusing defendant's instruction No. 1 which told the jury that in no event could more than one cent be found as actual damages. The jury in this particular were required to be governed by the instructions of the court, notwithstanding this is a libel suit. Arnold v. Jewett, 125 Mo. 252. (6) The court erred in refusing defendant's instruction No. 3. This instruction told the jury that if Mr. Munroe wrote and mailed the letters complained of without the direction, knowledge or consent of any officer of defendant, then punitive damages could not be assessed against defendant. "Where libelous language is inserted in a newspaper by a reporter, without the knowledge or consent of the proprietor, the latter is liable to the extent of compensatory damages, and for punitive damages only on proof from which his approval of his employee's conduct may be legally inferred." Haines v. Schulz, 50 N. J. Law (21 Vroom.) 481, 14 Atl. 488. "The principal is not responsible in ex Cotton Lumber Co. v. La Crosse Lumber Co. emplary damages for the actual malice of his agent in publishing a libel unless he has participated in or retified and confirmed the malicious act of the agent." Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis. 570. (7 & 8) The court erred in refusing defendant's instruction Numbers 4 and 5. (9) The court erred in giving plaintiff's instruction No. 5. The first paragraph of the above instruction is erroneous in that it refers to actual damages and puts it up to the jury as though that body had the power to assess such damages in such substantial sum as they might find would compensate plaintiff. (10) The circuit court of Shelby county erred in overruling defendant's motion to dismiss the cause and it acquired no jurisdiction over defendant and the circuit court of Monroe county likewise acquired no jurisdiction. The plaintiff corporation maintained an office in Shelby County as well as in other counties in Missouri. Sec. 1755, R. S. 1909, is relied on by the plaintiff corporation as furnishing authority for the institution of this suit against the defendant corporation in Shelby county and sending the summons to Pike county and serving it there. It is clearly apparent that the lawmakers when they enacted section 1755 had in mind an individual when they gave authority to sue in libel cases in the county !'in which plaintiff resides.' Frank W. McAllister, James P. Boyd, John S. Fitzgerrell and John T. Gose for respondent. (1) A. Complaint of alleged improper remarks of counsel which were not called to the attention of the trial court in motion for a new trial will not be reviewed on appeal. Staffer v. Railroad, 243 Mo. 323; Eppstein v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 197 Mo. 738; Northrop v. Diggs, 146 Mo. App. 152; Vawter v. Hultz, 112 Mo. 639; Booker v. Railroad, 144 Mo. App. 281. B. No alleged improper remarks whatever were complained of in the motion for a new trial and only two were complained of in the supplemental motion for a new trial filed four days later. The third alleged Cotton Lumber Co. v. La Crosse Lumber Co. remark reffering to "lumber trust whose purpose was to extortion on the users of lumber, particularly the farmers" not being complained of, and called to the attention of the trial court in either of the motions for a new trial will not be reviewed by this court. Cases cited under A., supra, also: Sterrett v. Met. Ry. Co., 225 Mo. 106; Lumber Co. v. Niedermeyer, 187 Mo. App. 188. C. After defendant's objections were sustained, there was no request by defendant for a rebuke or further rebuke and no adverse ruling thereon, hence there is nothing for this court to consider. Dutcher v. Railroad, 241 Mo. 137, 176; Norris v. Railroad, 139 Mo. 719, 720. (2) "Any publication which imputes to a merchant or other business man conduct which is injurious to his character and standing as a merchant or business man is a libel per se. This ruling is supported by all the authorities we have consulted." Dobbin v. Railroad, 157 Mo. App. 698. Plaintiff's case did not depend upon proof of actual damages. Upon a finding of libel, the extent of the injury and the amount of the verdict is peculiarly the province of the jury. Sotham v. Telegram Co., 239 Mo. 624. "The jury are in no way bound to give nominal damages only; they may read the libel and give such substantial damages as will compensate the plaintiff for such defamation." Newell on Slander and Libel (3 Ed.), sec. 995; see also: Brown v. Knapp & Co., 213 Mo. 697; Hayward v. Maroney, 86 Conn. 261; Markham v. Russell, 94 Mass. (12 Allen), 573; 90 American Decisions 164; Bishop v. Journel Newspaper Co., 168 Mass. 327; Sanders v. Hall, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 282; Richter v. Stolze, 158 Mich. 594; Price v. Clapp, 119 Tenn. 432; Turner v. Hearst, 137 Cal. 232; Lick v. Owen, 47 Cal. 259; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 406; Newell on Slander and Libel (3 Ed.), sec. 988, page 1017. (3) Where there is really but one cause of action stated in a different manner in different counts so as to meet any possible state of facts; or where the verdict Cotton Lumber Co. v. La Crosse Lumber Co. necessarily disposes of all the issues in the case and precludes any further liability on part of defendant for matters alleged in the petition, or where other counts are treated as abandoned, then a general verdict is sufficient. Allen v. Railway Co., 84 Mo. 657; Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 397; Polston v. See, 54 Mo. 291; Courtney v. Hamlin, 150 Mo. 277; Clemens v. Collins, 14 Mo. 604; Daugherty v. Railway Co., 62 Mo. 555; Moffett v. Turner, 23 Mo. App. 196; Owens v. Railroad Co., 58 Mo. 386, 394-395; Bradley v. Kennedy, 2 Green (Iowa), 231; Gosling v. Morgan, 32 Penn. St. 273, 276; Massucco v. Tomassi, 80 Vt. 194; Hurley v. Chicago, 159 Ill. App. 92; Richmond v. Whittelsey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 230; Bradshaw v. Perdue, 12 Ga. 510. (4) Remembering the character of the libelous letters, the fact that defendant retained the writer in its employ and apparently approved of his conduct; considering the wealth of defendant and the purpose of exemplary or punitive damages, the amount of the verdict is not in any wise indicative of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Brown v. Globe, 213 Mo. 653-654; Brown v. Knapp & Co., 213 Mo. 655, 697; Sperry v. Hurd, 185 S. W. 174; Buckley v. Knapp et al., 48 Mo. 162; Trimble v. Foster, 87 Mo. 54; Polston v. See, 54 Mo. 291; 8 R. C. L. 606608, secs. 151, 152; Williamson v. Eckhoff, 185 Mo. App. 234; Schafer v. Otsman, 148 Mo. App. 650, 651; Leavell v. Leavell, 114 Mo. App. 33; Brown v. Globe, 213 Mo. 654. (5) The court did not err in refusing defendant's instruction No. 1 limiting the finding of the jury to one cent actual damages. The words being libelous per se this instruction was clearly erroneous. It was erroneous anyway since there was proof of actual damages. See authorities under 2, supra. (6) The court did not err in refusing defendant's instruction No. 3. It would authorize the jury to find for defendant even though the libel was published by its agent in his endeavor to promote defendant's business within the scope of his admitted authority, or even though Cotton Lumber Co. v. La Crosse Lumber Co. defendant approved or ratified the act of its manager thereafter. Lampert v. Drug Co., 238 Mo. 409; Brown v. Knapp, 213 Mo. 655; Brown v. Globe, 213 Mo. 653-654; Penn. Iron Works Co. v. Henry Vogt Machinery Co., 139 A. S. R. 504 Ky. 497, 8 L. R. A. (N S.) 1023; Hardoncourt v. North Penn. Iron Co., 225 Pa. St. 379, 74 Atl. 243; Philadelphia W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 16 L. Ed. 73; Citizens Life Insurance Co. v. Brown, 1904 Law Reports, Appeal Cases, page 423. (7) Defendant's refused instruction No. 4 was erroneous. Where the words are libelous per se the law implies malice and plaintiff does not have to prove actual malice. "That exemplary damages may be based alone upon a publication libelous per se, we have many authorities from many States, "citing, among others cases, Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152, in which last-mentioned case it was said: 'When slanderous words are spoken, or a libelous article is published falsely, the law will affix malice to them. There is no necessity of proving express malice. (Hundon v. Garner, 22 Mo. 423; Goetz v. Ambs, 27 Mo. 28).” Brown v. Knapp & Co., 213 Mo. 693. "And, without proof of actual malice, the jury were at liberty to give the plaintiff such exemplary damages as they might have believed it proper for them under all circumstances of the case to impose as a punishment upon the defendant. Id." Wood v. Hilbish, 23 Mo. App. 400. See also: Callahan v. Ingram, 122 Mo. 355, 371, and cases cited; Arnold v. Sayings Co., 76 Mo. App. 182; Ferguson v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 72 Mo. App. 465; Wood v. Hilbish, 23 Mo. App. 389, 399 and 400; Newell on Slander and Libel, sec. 401, p. 402, also page 843. (8) Defendant's refused instruction No. 5 was, like its refused instruction No. 3, erroneous because it denied to plaintiff the right of recovery unless "defendant directed the letters to be written and sent, or knew thereof and assented thereto." See authorities cited under 6, supra. (9) Appellant's complaint |