Bank of Seneca et al. v. Morrison et al. the validity of the order of relinquishment of the probate court in substance on three grounds: (1) That no notice was given to the creditors of the intention to make application for such order; (2) that there was no report made by the administratrix to the probate court of the relinquishment and the terms and conditions thereof; (3) that the probate court did not approve and confirm the so called relinquishment. Plaintiffs, of necessity, must overcome the obstacle of the relinquishment if it be treated as such before there could be any cause of action in any court; for if the relinquishment is valid, then there can be no legal complaint as to the management of the estate by the administratrix in regard to the interest of deceased in the mining property. It is conceded that the last named defendants have in their possession, or are the beneficiaries of whatever, if anything, the Hornsby contract was worth to the estate. A suit may sometimes be maintained in a court of equity which would ordinarily appear to be a matter for the probate court, but such is the case only in those rare instances where the provisions of the administration law fail to provide for a complete and adequate remedy, and when relief may be found only in a court of purely equitable cognizance. [Brewing Company v. Steckman, 180 Mo. App. 320, 168 S. W. 326; Nebel v. Bockhorst, 186 Mo. App. 499, 172 S. W. 452.] In Matson & May v.. Pearson, 121 Mo. App. 1. c. 130, 97 S. W. 983, it is said: "It has been pointedly decided, however, by our Supreme Court that the reason on which equity interposed in matters of administration in the old days does not obtain with us and that the principle suggested has no application in view of our statutes with respect to administration. It is pointed out that they are so full and complete, abounding with apt and pertinent provisions to administer full, complete and adequate relief at law, and that their provisions are so ample with respect to matters of administration that they amount to an exclusion in Bank of Seneca et al. v. Morrison et al. fact, of the chancery jurisdiction asserted unless there be some fact or facts involved which renders the case one where adequate relief at law cannot be had." Jurisdiction, however, was held to be proper in a court of equity in the last-mentioned case because of the inadequacy of the remedy in the probate court. Reasoning as though the property in dispute was situate in this State, we think that the case at bar falls within the exception. Whatever interest David B. Morrison had in the Hornsby option was an interest in real estate. He had paid $4000, and was put in possession by the grantor, and was in possession at the time of his death; and no attempt had been made to forfeit the payments made on any alleged breach of the contract to purchase. So far as appears from the record Morrison made the payments exactly as he agreed. He died just before the first $4000 payment fell due. The many devious and intricate angles in the case at bar we think brings it within that class of cases of which it was said in Brewing Company v. Steckman, 180 Mo. App. 1. c. 326, 168 S. W. 226, that "if the claim made is of purely equitable cognizance, the summary statutory remedy in the probate court would not be available, since that court could not try such questions; for frequently they involve the most difficult, intricate and abstruse questions and require all the powers and machinery of a court of equity to adjust and settle upon an equitable basis." It is pointed out in Brewing Company v. Steckman, supra, that there are a number of cases in this State wherein equitable relief was granted, and where the jurisdiction of the circuit court passed unchallenged, and Leeper v. Taylor, 111 Mo. 312, 19 S. W. 1096; Tufts v. Latshaw, 172 Mo. 359, 72 S. W. 679; Wernse v. McPike, 100 Mo. 476, 135 S. W. 809 are cited as such examples. We think that State ex rel. v. Holtcamp, 245 Mo. 655, is in point and decisive on the question of the validity of the order of relinquishment. Independent of that opinion it would appear that no notice to the creditors was required to give the probate court juris Bank of Seneca et al. v. Morrison et al. diction to make the order of relinquishment, as that was the holding in Garrett v. Bicknell, 64 Mo. 404, and inferentially Valle v. Flemming, 19 Mo. 454, is to the same effect; and it is upon those two cases that defendants principally rely to uphold the validity of the order to relinquish. But the question in State ex rel. v. Holtcamp, supra, was so similar to the question here touching the validity of the order of relinquishment that there is no escape from the effect of that decision. From the Holtcamp case at page 669 we quote: "We are aware that a somewhat similar sale was upheld by this court in Garrett v. Bicknell, 64 Mo. 404; but the objection to the administrator's deed in that case was mainly on the ground that no petition was presented to the probate court asking that the sale be made, and the deed in that case was not assailed on the ground that there was no notice to the heirs. Courts usually do not pass upon issues which are not specifically called to their attention. [Howard v. Brown, 197 Mo. 36, 1. c. 45.] The lack of notice to the heirs was not called to the court's attention in the Garrett case, supra, and therefore the opinion in that case is not authority upon the issue now under consideration It is true, as contended by respondents, that sections 147 and 148, Revised Statutes 1909, do not require any notice to heirs or creditors of a proceeding to sell incumbered lands; but in the well considered case of State ex rel. v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 1. c. 394, we said: 'The law in accordance with the principles of justice-principles which are fundamental and eternal-will require that notice be given before any person be passed upon, either in person, estate or any other matter or thing to which he is entitled. And though the statutes do not in terms require notice, the law will imply that notice was intended.' [See, also, State ex rel. v. Maroney, 191 Mo. 531.]" It is true that the Holtcamp case involved a question of notice to the heirs, while the complaint here 200 M. A.-12 Bank of Seneca et al. v. Morrison et al. is that there was no notice to the creditors, but where notice under the statute is required it is to be given to all persons interested in the estate. [See Sec. 152, R. S. 1909.] We call attention to the amendment of section 146, Revised Statutes 1909, in Laws 1917, p. 96. The amendment, however, was not in existence when the order of relinquishment was made in the case at bar and we merely call attention to it in passing. We have reached the conclusion that the order of relinquishment is void for failure to give notice to the creditors; but said order is void for the reason that the land respecting which the order was made is not in this State. The power of the administratrix as such did not extend beyond the boundaries of this State. As administratrix here she had no power or authority over property in Oklahoma belonging to her intestate. In Emmons v. Gordon, 140 Mo. 1. c. 498, 41 S. W. 998, it is said: "An administrator's power as such does not extend beyond the boundaries of the State in which his letters of administration are granted, nor can he sue in the courts of any State, or take possession of property belonging to his intestate without becoming a trespasser, unless he first qualifies as administrator according to the laws of the state where suit is intended to be brought, or the property is situated. In other words, letters of administration have no extra-territorial force. [Naylor's Adm'r. v. Moffatt, 29 Mo. 126; Scudder v. Ames, 89 Mo. 522; In re Partnership Estate of Ames & Co., 52 Mo. 290; State ex rel. v. Osborn, 71 Mo. 86; McPike v. McPike, 111 Mo. 216, 20 S. W. 12.]" This question is discussed somewhat at length in the Emmons case, and a number of authorities are cited and quoted, holding that an administrator has no control whatever over property beyond the State where the letters of administration are issued, and we make reference to the Emmons case for a more complete discussion of that question. [See, also, Bank v. Dowdy, 175 Mo. App. 478, 161 S. W. 859.] Bank of Seneca et al. v. Morrison et al. If the administratrix, Mrs. Morrison, had no control over the Oklahoma property then it follows that she should not have inventoried it, and that any order made by the probate court of Newton county, Mo., affecting the Oklahoma property was void. Also it is clear from the Emmons case and other cases there cited that plaintiffs cannot maintain this cause of action. In the Emmons case the administrator de bonis non was seeking to recover of the executor named in the will the proceeds of some Texas land sold by the executor. It was held that such suit could not be maintained. If the administrator de bonis non could not maintain such suit, then creditors certainly cannot. The only way whereby Morrison's interest in the Oklahoma property could have been disposed of in administration would have been under an ancillary administration in that State, and according to the laws of that State. The quit-claim deed of Mrs. Morrison and the heirs conveyed whatever interest they had individually, which conveyance they had had a right to make independent of an order of the court. While the instrument is called a relinquishment, it is not such as the statute contemplates, but on the other hand it is just the ordinary quit-claim deed with some additional recitals, which in no wise change its character. All of the evidence shows conclusively that the $8000 that Morrison owed on the land at the time of his death was as much, if not more, than the whole property was worth. It is true that Morrison agreed to give $12,000 for it in August, 1915, but that is far from establishing its value in March, 1916, when Rood took over the property, or even in August, 1915, when Morrison agreed to give $12,000 for it. Morrison was in the tripoli mining business, and already owned or was interested in some tripoli mines not far distant from this property, and Morrison's success with this particular property after he obtained possession was not such as to enhance its value. The property had been in a court of bankruptcy, and was sold at public sale for $7000 a short time before Morrison got hold of |