State ex rel. v. Mackin. When the voluntary association was organized, it appointed certain of its members as agents of the association to buy the right of way and to contract for the building of the levee. They employed a surveyor who made plans and specifications and when the contract for the building of the levee was executed on March 22, 1910, these plans and specifications were attached to the contract as the ones to be followed. There was no letting of the contract to the lowest bidder, as is required by section 5733 when a Levee Board is contracting. The situation then is this: A voluntary unincorporated association of private individuals made their own contract (i. e. without seeking bids and letting it to the lowest bidder), for the construction of a levee according to their own plans and specifications, had the levee constructed and paid the contract price therefor, and then, at the price they paid, turned it over to a Levee District that was incorporated while the work was being done and that agreed, before the levee was finished, to take it at the contract price. Under such circumstances can the District compel an objecting landowner to consribute to such enterprise and sell his land under taxbills issued by the District if he refuses? We do not think it can, and hence are of the opinion that the trial court was right in finding for defendant. We have been unable to find any statute permitting or authorizing such a procedure, nor has any been called to our attention. It is true, one levee district may take over the incomplete work of another. [State ex rel. v. Bugg, 224 Mo. 537, 557; Wilson v. King's Lake Drainage District, 257 Mo. 266, 289.] But in that situation the conditions and requirements of the statute to protect and safeguard private rights, and which must be complied with in order to validate taxbills against property, are all complied with, and the method prescribed by the statute is followed, either by the old district or the new. But in the case at bar the method prescribed by the statute to be followed, and the con State ex rel. v. Mackin. ditions required, are not observed. In this case there was no letting of the contract to the lowest bidder as required by section 5733. Section 5725 requires the Board of Directors of the Levee District to decide on the work to be done, to procure plans and specifications therefor, and under 5728 and 5729 these are to be submitted to the landowners at their meeting. The plans and specifications in this case were those of the association of private individuals instead of the Board who are required to be sworn officers. It may be said that the Board made the plans and specifications their own by ratification and approval, and that the meeting of the landowners did likewise. But clearly there was no real freedom to change or modify the plans since at these times they were fixed as provided in the association's contract and, as the levee was nearly constructed, the plans, both as to the construction and extent of such levee, were rigid and unalterable. While it is true the statutes authorizing levees, being for beneficent and reclamation purposes, should be liberally construed, yet this applies only to matters of irregularity not affecting the substantial rights of the property owner. It does not apply to steps which are in their nature conditions precedent to the levying of the assessment. If any of these steps are omitted the assessment is invalid. [Paige & Jones on Taxation by Assessment, sec. 777, p. 1338; Elsberry Drainage Dist. v. Harris, 267 Mo. 139, 148.] Levee districts have only those powers that are conferred upon them by statute, and such powers can be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the statute. [State ex rel. v. Wall, 153 Mo. 216, 220; City of Nevada v. Eddy, 123 Mo. 546, 558; Nishnabotna Drainage Dist. v. Campbell, 154 Mo. 151, 157.] And the requirement that contracts shall be let to the lowest bidder is mandatory. [25 Am. & Eng. Ency of Law, 1210.] It makes no difference if the method adopted is no more expensive to the property owner than that specified in the statute; nor will the fact that the proceedings taken were free of all taint of dishonest motive or intention Mendell v. Howard. relieve the situation so far as the validity of the taxbills is concerned. It is merely a question of whether statutory conditions precedent to the exercise of the power granted have been complied with. If not, the bills are invalid. [Thrasher v. City of Kirksville, 204 S. W. 804; Sedalia Național Bank v. Donohue, 190 Mo. 407, 422.] Consequently, we have no right to regard the trial court's holding as a sacrifice of substance to mere form, or to treat the procedure of the District as a mere irregularity not affecting the substantial rights of the defendant. No doubt everything that was done by the individuals and the District was from pure motives with the best intention and with scrupulous regard to honest dealings; but to uphold the validity of the taxbills in this case would result in establishing a method of procedure in such matters wherein a door would be opened through which the grossest fraud and oppression could easily enter and escape detection. There is no principle of estoppel applicable to defendant in this kind of a case. [Perkinson v. Hoolan, 182 Mo. 189, 195; Verdin v. City of St. Louis, 131 Mo. 26, 99; Neill v. Transatlantic Mortgage Co., 89 Mo. App. 644, 646.] Indeed, it is not perceived how he could be estopped since he never at any time agreed to the construction of the levee nor did he by any act or course of conduct induce or bring about the method of procedure that was adopted. The judgment is affirmed. The other judges concur. PETER MENDELL, Respondent, v. CHARLES M. HOWARD, et al., Appellants. Kansas City Court of Appeals, December 2, 1918. 1. ENCUMBRANCE: Tender: Ownership: Payment. A creditor whose claim was allowed in the probate court sought to have his judg. ment made a lien against land encumbered by two deeds of trust, and he offered in his petition to pay the notes secured by these Mendell v. Howard. deeds, but he did not deposit his tender. The court rendered judgment for him conditioned that he pay the notes and interest "as of the day" he instituted his action. He did not pay these notes for about six years. It was held that he did not become the owner of the notes until the day he paid them, and that he was not entitled to interest except from that day. 2. TENDER: Deposit in Court: Interest. A tender of the sum due on indebtedness secured by a deed of trust, unaccompanied by a deposit in court, will have the effect of stopping the interest only. 3. TENDER: Deposit in Court: Discharge: Debt: Security. A tender in a pleading of the sum due on an encumbrance without keeping it good by a deposit in court will not discharge either the debt or the security. Appeal from Vernon Circuit Court.-Hon. B. G. Thurman, Judge. AFFIRMED. John H. Crain and M. T. January for appellants. W. M. Bowker for respondent. ELLISON, P. J.-This case stands for itself and another wherein John A. Silvers is plaintiff against these defendants. The two involve the same questions and grow out of the same transactions, and they were consolidated in the circuit court and tried together. Plaintiff Mendell is a judgment creditor, with a junior lien on certain lands. He seeks to recover from defendants certain money claimed to be a surplus left in the hands of defendant January as trustee in a sale under a prior deed of trust. Plaintiff Silvers seeks to recover the remaining part of the surplus by reason of being the owner by purchase at a foreclosure sale conducted by defendant January as trustee. The judgment was for plaintiffs in the trial court. The matters out of which the case grew are lengthy and greatly involved, much of which need not be noticed here. One Zweigert once owned a large tract of land in Vernon county. He died owing defendant Howard Mendell v. Howard. $7000, which was allowed against his estate in the probate court. He had given a deed of trust on the land to secure an indebtedness of $8000. Before his death he made a voluntary deed to the land to his daughter and she gave a subsequent deed of trust on it to secure $2911, to a bank at Rich Hill, Missouri. He also was indebted to plaintiff Mendell in the sum of $1800. This was allowed against his estate and afterwards in an action in the circuit court, it was made a lien on such real estate subject to the deeds of trust. After Zweigert's death the bank bought the first deed of trust securing the debt for $8000 and took an assignment of it. The bank then had its deed of trust for $2911 foreclosed and John A. Silvers (plaintiff in the other suit) became the purchaser of the land at the foreclosure sale. After defendant Howard had his claim of $7000 allowed against Zweigert's estate he brought suit against Silvers, Zweigert's daughter, the Bank and this plaintiff, wherein he asked that his judgment of allowance be declared a lien on the land mentioned, and he offered in his petition, to pay to the bank the amount of the two notes, in the deeds of trust then held by the bank, but he did not keep such tender good by deposit. He lost the case in the circuit court, but on appeal to the Supreme Court he was successful and that court directed that "the case should be reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a decree setting aside the conveyance from Henry Zweigert to Lizette Zweigert of the lands in controversy and decreeing plaintiff's judgment to be a lien upon said lands and setting aside the foreclosure sale and the trustee's deed to Silvers, upon payment to the defendant bank of the principal and interest due upon the two Zweigert notes as of the date at which this suit was brought. and that defendant bank upon said payment assign to plaintiff said notes and deeds of trust securing them, and for costs." This judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered in 1917, and in compliance therewith defendant Howard, |