State ex rel. v. Owens. where they will be exposed to sale, by setting up three advertisements, one at the office of the justice issuing the execution, and one at each of two other of the most public places in the township, but then in case the execution issued from another township, the advertisements to be set up, one at each of three of the most public places in the township where the property is found. Such notice shall describe the goods and chattels taken, and shall be put up at least ten days before the day of sale." Section 7548, R. S. 1909. (2) It shall be the duty of the officer in whose hands any execution may come, before he shall levy the same, to apprise the person against whom such execution has issued of the property exempt from attachment and execution; and such officer shall summons from the neighborhood three disinterested householders, who, after being sworn honestly and impartially to appraise the property exhibited to them, shall proceed to appraise and set apart to said defendant the property exempt to him under this article" (Sec. 2184, R. S. 1909). (3) In construing an official bond, the construction should prevail which, in the light of attendant circumstances, would make the instrument efficacious instead of meaningless and ineffective. State ex rel. Watkins v. Miserz, 64 Mo. 596. (4) This is a suit upon an official bond, and the various breaches assigned cannot be called the statement of several causes of action. State ex rel. v. Davis et al., 35 Mo. 406. (5) At any rate the ruling of the trial court overruling appellant's motion to strike the petition is not here for review on appeal, because no exception thereto was preserved by a term bill of exceptions. White v. Railroad. 202 Mo. 539; Corter v. Exposition Co., 124 Mo. App. 534; Sholhoney v. Railroad, 231 Mo. 152. (6) In determining on appeal whether a petition is insufficient to support a judgment all reasonable intendments are to be indulged in favor of the pleading. State ex rel. v. Duncan, 130 Mo. App. 314; Drolshogan v. Railroad, 186 Mo. 264. (7) Suits instituted in the circuit court shall be triable at the return term thereof in all cases in which the defend State ex rel. v. Owens. ants have been summoned personally or by copies left at their usual place of abode at least fifteen days before the first of such term, unless continued for good cause as required by the law or the rules of court, and all default cases shall be heard and disposed of in court room No. 1. Sec. 3, an act to provide for the re-organization of the St. Louis Circuit Court, General Statutes of Mo. 1865, p. 892. (8) In all counties having more than forty thousand inhabitants, every defendant who shall be summoned or notified according to law, shall demur to or answer the petition on or before the third day of the term at which he is bound to appear, unless longer time be granted by the court; and in every such case the action shall be triable at the return term; and when the defendant makes default the plaintiff shall be entitled to his assessment of damages and final judgment at the term at which default is. made. Sec. 1799, R. S. 7909; Montz v. Moran, 263 Mo. 252. (9) Judgment by default (interlocutory) may, for good cause, when shown, be set aside at any time before damages are assessed or final judgment rendered. Sec. 2094, R. S. 1909; Scott v. Smith, 133 Mo. 618. (10) After the lapse of the term the court loses jurisdiction over the cause and has no authority to set aside the judgment, unless carried over by motion filed at the term in which the judgment was rendered. Montz v. Moran, 263 Mo. 252; Miller v. Crawford, 140 Mo. App. 711; Childs v. Railroad, 117 Mo. 414; Danforth v. Lowe, 50 Mo. 217; State ex rel. v. Harper, 56 Mo. App. 611; Orvis v. Elliott, 65 Mo. App. 96. (11) Court of records have authority to make rules governing the practice before them when in harmony with the law, and such rules should be enforced. State ex rel. v. Robertson, 181 S. W. 987, Sup. Ct. of Missouri, December 22, 1915; Rigdon v. Ferguson, 172 Mo. 52. State ex rel. v. Owens. ALLEN, J.-This is an action upon the official bond of defendant Thomas J. Owens, as Constable of the Fifth Justice of the Peace District in the city of St. Louis, the defendants being said constable and the sureties on his bond. The suit was instituted in the circuit court on November 17, 1915, and on December 11, 1915, the defendants filed a motion to strike out the petition upon the ground "that the petition is duplicitous." Thereafter, on December 30, 1915, the motion to strike out was overruled, and on January 26, 1916, at the same December Term, 1916, of the circuit court, defendants not having pleaded, an interlocutory judgment by default was entered as to all of the defendants. Thereafter, on February 5, 1916, at the same term, an inquiry was had as to plaintiff's damages and final judgment was rendered for plaintiff against the defendants for the penalty of the bond, to-wit, $5000, to be satisfied upon the payment of the damages assessed, viz., $273.77. On February 9, 1916, after the lapse of the December term aforesaid, defendants filed a motion, verified by affidavit, to set aside the judgment. In support of this motion defendants filed certain affidavits and plaintiff filed counter affidavits. On February 23, 1910, this motion was overruled. The case reaches this court by virtue of an appeal here granted to defendants under the provisions of section 2043, Revised Statutes 1909. The motion of defendants to set aside the final judgment by default proceeded upon the theory that the motion to strike out was considered and overruled by the court without notice to defendants' counsel, in violation of a rule of court. As to what occurred in this connection the facts are much in dispute, as appears by the affidavits mentioned above; but, for reasons to be noted, it is unnecessary to consider the matter. The motion was filed after the lapse of the term at which the interlocutory judgment and the final judgment were rendered, and hence could be effective, if at all, only as a petition for review authorized by section 2101, State ex rel. v. Owens. Revised Statutes 1909, and complying with the requirements of section 2104, Revised Statutes 1909. The motion in question purports to be a mere motion, and not a petition for review. But apart from this, it fails to comply with section 2104, supra, in that it does not set forth facts showing a meritorious defense. It is alleged in general terms that defendants have a meritorious defense; but this is not a "setting forth" of such defense within the meaning of the statute, supra. [See Icing Co. v. Kemper, 166 Mo. App. 613, 149 S. W. 1163.] Furthermore, since defendants appeared to the action and filed the motion to strike out, they are not within the purview of section 2101, supra, as parties entitled to file a petition for review. [See Jeude v. Sims, 258 Mo. 26, 1. c. 38, 166 S. W. 1048.] It follows that this motion can avail appellants nothing. It is argued, however, that the petition fails to state a cause of action as for a breach of the condition of the bond sued upon. The petition, after pleading the execution of the bond sued upon and setting out in substance the condition thereof, avers that defendant Owens "did not in every respect discharge and perform his duties as constable according to law," in respect to the matters subsequently stated. It is averred that plaintiff obtained a judgment against one Kranzberg and one Cohen before a justice of the peace in and for the said district, which judgment was afterwards revived and an execution issued thereon which was received by the defendant constable; that said defendant failed and refused to serve a certain writ of garnishment on the execution, refused to sell certain perishable property levied upon by virtue of said execution, though ordered to do so by the justice of the peace, failed and refused to levy on a certain motor truck owned by said Cohen, and thereafter wrongfully and unlawfully released all of the goods, wares and merchandise and other personal effects of said Cohen levied upon under the execution, which was the only property of Cohen State ex rel. v. Owens. subject to execution; that the judgment, amounting, with interest and costs, to $275.40, remains wholly unsatisfied; that said Cohen, at the times mentioned, was possessed of goods, wares and merchandise, money and credits and outstanding accounts sufficient to satisfy the judgment; and that "by reason of the failure and refusal of said constable to discharge his duties according to law" the plaintiff "has lost his debt and has been unable to collect the same or any part thereof." Whether this petition is in every respect in proper form, and whether every act of the defendant constable complained of is such as to constitute a breach of the condition of his bond, we are not called upon to decide. Obviously there are sufficient facts averred to render the petition good as stating a cause of action for dereliction of official duty on the part of the defendant constable, such as to constitute a breach or breaches of the bond sued upon. Appellants further insist that the court erred in overruling their motion to strike out the petition; and that this motion is before us for the reason that it fulfills the office of a demurrer. Though the motion is preserved in a bill of exceptions filed, appellants are here without a motion for a new trial and without an exception saved to the overruling of the motion to strike out. Consequently the ruling upon the latter motion is not here for review unless it be by reason of the rule upon which appellants rely. It is true that a motion sometimes fills the office of a demurrer, and consequently the action of the trial court thereupon is reviewed and adjudged by the rule pertaining to demurrers. [See Shohoney v. Railroad, 231 Mo. 131, 132 S. W. 1059; Burrows v. McManus, 249 Mo. 555, 155 S. W. 403; Knisley v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341, 166 S. W. 257; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 266 Mo. 423, 181 S. W. 998.] A demurrer and the court's action thereupon are, of course, matters of record proper, and as such are preserved for review in an appellate court; and if it can be said that this motion to strike out the petition, on the ground of duplicity, fills the office of a demurrer, then the |