Gutweiler v. Lundquist. made such demand upon defendant, and that defendant told him, in substance, that no extra compensation was due him. He says that he did not sue defendant at this time, or while he remained in the company's employ, for the reason that he would have lost his position if he had done so; and that he continued to perform the services as theretofore, making his annual settlements and entering into a new contract of employment with the company each year. It appears that there was a table in the rear of the store, at which salesmen did such clerical work as their duties required; and that plaintiff frequently worked at this table, either in preparing his inventories or in working at these compilations. There is no testimony in plaintiff's behalf that the defendant knew that plaintiff did any of this work outside of his regular working hours; and defendant's testimony is positive to the effect that he never knew that plaintiff devoted any time thereto in the evenings. The evidence is that frequently the salesmen of the company were required to perform certain duties in the evening, and that for such "over time" they received nothing beyond an allowance, of fifty cents for "supper money." "" Appellant's learned counsel earnestly insist that the trial court erred in granting a new trial on the ground mentioned. It is said that "one rendering valuable services for another, at the other's request, in the absence of an express contract, under circumstances which do not point to the fact that the services were to be rendered gratuitously, is entitled to a fair compensation for the services." We have no occasion to question the general rule of law thus asserted; and it is unnecessary to discuss the authorities which are cited and quoted from in this connection. The circumstances and the relationship between the parties were here such as to render inapplicable the general rule that, as between strangers or parties occupying no peculiar relation to each other, the law implied a promise to pay for valuable services rendered upon the request of the party for whom they are performed. [See Wagner v. Electric Co., Gutweiler v. Lundquist. 141 Mo. App. 51, 121 S. W. 329.] And we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in granting a new trial upon the ground assigned. The authorities announce the rule that a servant, employed at a stipulated wage, cannot recover for "extra work," performed upon evenings or holidays, in the absence of an express contract on the part of the master to make additional compensation therefor (see Carrere v. Dun, 41 N. Y. Supp. 34, and authorities cited); though it may be perhaps, that under extraordinary circumstances a contract to pay extra compensation may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances. [See 18 R. C. L. 534.] These services were not of such character as to be wholly foreign to the work which plaintiff was employed to perform. And the presumption is that the salary and commissions received by plaintiff from the company constituted full compensation for all the services rendered by him. [See Carrere v. Dun, supra; Insurance Co. v. Goodrich, 74 Mo. App. 355.] In the case last cited it was held, in effect, that this presumption could be overcome only by evidence of an express contract entered into by the parties. That an express contract to pay extra compensation, as distinguished from a contract to be inferred from all the facts and circumstances, must be shown in every case, we need not say. See, in this connection, McGregor v. Harm, 19 N. D. 599; 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 649, and note. In the case before us the evidence does not show a contract, of any character, for additional compensation to be paid plaintiff either by this defendant or the company. Clearly there was no meeting of the minds as to this. Neither can it be said that the case is one where plaintiff throughout intended to charge, and defendant as a reasonable man must be held to have understood from the beginning that extra compensation would be expected (Wagner v. Electric Co., supra)-if this theory could, in any event, be invoked in a case of this general character. If plaintiff, prior to 1910 or 1911, contemplated charging for these services, defendant was not apprised thereof; and under the circumstances de Gutweiler v. Lundquist. fendant cannot be held chargeable with knowledge, during such period, that compensation would be expected. And when plaintiff made demand for extra compensation in 1910 or 1911, as he says, he was promptly given to understand that no extra compensation would be paid, as his own testimony shows. He thereafter continued in the employment, renewing his contract with the company each year, and continued to perform these same services during all of the subsequent years mentioned, without, it appears, making further claim for compensation. Obviously plaintiff could not continue to accept the employment from year to year, at a stipulated compensation, knowing that these services were expected of him, as an employe, and subsequently enforce a claim for extra pay therefor. [See Mathison v. R. R. Co., 76 N. Y. Supp. 89.] The fact that plaintiff worked at these compilations outside of his regular business hours, does not help his case, for the reason, if none other, there is no evidence that the defendant had any knowledge thereof. The only testimony touching the matter-that of defendant-is to the contrary. In this connection see Carrere v. Dun, supra. Plaintiff testified that these compilations were made merely for defendant's personal convenience; but this was a mere conclusion on his part. Obviously the compilations were required by defendant for the more convenient and expeditious discharge of certain managerial duties devolving upon him by virtue of his position. To hold that under circumstances of this character a servant may hold a superior servant liable for services rendered, at the latter's request, in the course of the common employment in and about the master's business, would be a dangerous doctrine indeed. [See Carter v. Hall, 2 Starkie, 361.] It follows that the judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered. Reynolds, P. J., and Becker, J., concur. Cheek v. Nat. Life Ins. Co. ROBERT T. CHEEK, Respondent, v. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant. St. Louis Court of Appeals. Argued and Submitted December 5, 1918. Opinion Filed January 7, 1919. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT: Extra Work: Proof of Value: Evidence. Where it appears that plaintiff had entered into a written contract with defendant insurance company, to solicit insurance and collect premiums for that company, and was to and did receive a commission for that work, and whilst so employed, claimed to have rendered extra services, at the instance and request of a general agent of the defendant company, in investigating claims against it, held, in an action by him against the insurance company to recover for such extra services, that there was no testimony as to value. 2. 3. : And, held that the services claimed for are not of such a character that the jury could determine value without testimony. -: Contract of Employment: Extra Work: Compensation. Where there is no substantial evidence that either the defendant company or its general agent ever contemplated paying for such extra services etc., held that plaintiff, a regularly employed servant of defendant, under a stated contract, without substantial evidence of a contract or understanding that he was to be paid for these extra services, cannot recover. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. -Hon. J. Hugo Grimm, Judge. REVERSED. Martin T. Farrow for appellant. J. B. Boyer of counsel. (1) Defendant's request for peremptory instructions 1 and 2 should have been granted, because: 1. Plaintiff failed to prove the value of his services. Van Zandt v. St. Louis Wholesale Grocery Co., Mo. App., 190 S. W. 1050; Bradner v. Rockdale Power Co., 115 Mo. App. 102, 91 S. W. 997; Woodward v. Cheek v. Nat. Life Ins. Co. Donnell, 146 Mo. App. 119, 123 S. W. 1004; Dobbin v. 193 S. W. 31; Gillen v. Haley, 185 Mo. App. 23, 171 S. W. 638. 2. That part of Kirkwood's agency which it is claimed was delegated to plaintiff involved acts of judgment and discretion and therefore could not be delegated, and the defendant is not liable for services performed under the agency thus unauthorizedly delegated. Hodkinson v. McNeal Machinery Co., 161 Mo. App. 87, 142 S. W. 457; Rector v. H. K. Mulford Co., Mo. App., 185 S. W. 255; Winkleback v. National Exchange Bank, 155 Mo. App. 1, 136 S. W. 712; Chouteau Land & Lumber Co. v. Chrisman, 204 Mo. 371, 102 S. W. 973; Menx v. Haller, 179 Mo. App. 466, 162 S. W. 688. 3. Plaintiff failed to show an express promise to pay, which was necessary, owing to the fact that the relationship of principal and agent existed and that the claim is for extra services rendered in the line of the claimant's duties in such matters, if any, as were delegable. (a) If there is no relationship between the parties such as principal and agent or the parental relationship the law will imply a promise to pay for services which the recipient had no reason to suppose were gratuitous. Wagner v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 177 Mo. 44, 75 S. W. 966; McDonald v. Redemeyer, 197 Mo. App. 630, 198 S. W. 483; Hartley v. Hartley's Est., 173 Mo. App. 18, 155 S. W. 1099; Kingston v. Roberts, 175 Mo. App. 69, 157 S. W. 1042. (b) If such relationship exists between the parties there is a presumption that the services were not to be paid for, which presumption can only be overcome in so far as services rendered outside of the employee's usual duties are concerned, by evidence showing that under the circumstances the parties must have intended that the services were to be paid for. Wagner v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 177 Mo. 44, 75 S. W. 966; Hyde v. Honiter, 175 Mo. App 583, |