RAILROADS-Continued.

is no variance between the pleading and the proof.
Wabash Railroad Co., 397.

Riffe v.

4. Receivers: Purchasers of Road. Where the purchaser of a railroad
at a receiver's sale agrees to pay, in addition to his bid, the
liabilities incurred by the receiver, this will include damages
to land caused by overow due to failure to construct and main-
tain lateral drains and openings through the road-bed. Ib.

5. Several Defendants. In an action to establish the liability of
the receivers of a railroad, for damages for causing to be flooded
with water, the right to sue the purchaser and the prior receivers
in a county other than where the receivers resided is permitted
under section 1732, Revised Statutes 1909, the purchaser, having
agreed to pay all liabilities incurred by the receivers, is a neces-
sary party to complete determination of the question involved.
Ib.

6. Instructions. An instruction in an action under section 3150,
Revised Statutes 1909, against a railroad for damages from flood
due to its failure to construct and maintain sufficient lateral
ditches and openings through its roadbed, which ignored the ques-
tion of it being from an. unprecedented rain, is erroneous.
RATIFICATION. See Contracts, 12; Principal and Agent.
REAL ESTATE AGENTS.

Ib.

Commission: Authority. Evidence discussed relating to the employ-
ment of a real estate agent to sell land, and of his compliance
with the authority given him as to terms. Harris v. Milikan, 599.

RECEIVERS. See Railroads, 4.

REFERENCE. See Appellate Practice, 1, 2, 14; Trial Practice, 3.
REMARKS OF COUNSEL. See Criminal Law, 3; Trial Practice, 1.
REPLEVIN.

1. Conditions Precedent: Bill of Sale: Suit in Equity: "Muniment of
Title.''
A bill of sale of personalty is not such a muniment of
title as requires a suit in equity to have it declared void before
the seller can recover the property on the ground that such bill
of sale was never delivered. Poplin v. Brown, 255.

2. Title of Plaintiff: Evidence. Plaintiff could maintain replevin on
the bill of sale as a symbolic delivery, provided the intent was to
have the bill vest title at once unconditionally, or provided plain-
tiff had complied with the conditions necessary to vest title in him
before suit was instituted. Ib.

RES ADJUDICATA. See Judgments, 4; Negligence, 16, 17, 18.

REVERSALS. See Appellate Practice, 18.

REVIEW.

See Appellate Practice, 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14; Certiorari.

ROADS AND HIGHWAYS. See Highways.

SALES. See Board of Trade, 1; Fraudulent Conveyances; Bulk Sales
Law.

1. Bill of Sale: Delivery. To make a bill of sale valid, delivery is
essential. Poplin v. Brown, 255.

SALES-Continued.

2. Same. Delivery of a bill of sale involves intent as well as physical
control, and there is no delivery, such as makes the instrument
a present conveyance, unless the grantor so intended. For a bill
of sale to pass title, the grantor must deliver it for that purpose,
and not for some other purpose. Poplin v. Brown, 255.

3. Title of Plaintiff: Evidence. In replevin for an automobile, plain-
tiff's title being based upon a bill of sale signed by defendant,
the question of the actual or constructive delivery of the property
covered by the bill of sale at the time of the manual delivery of
bill of sale by defendant to plaintiff, while not vital, had a bearing
on the issue whether delivery of bill of sale was conditional. Ib.

SERVICE OF PROCESS. See Attachments.

SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES. See Attachments.

Official Bonds: Action against Constable and Sureties: Sufficiency of
Petition. A petition in an action against a constable and his
sureties on his official bond, examined, and held good as stating
a cause of action for dereliction of official duty on the part of the
defendant constable, such as to constitute a breach or breaches
of the bond sued upon. State ex rel. Mosberg v. Owens et al., 468.
SLANDER. See Libel and Slander.

STATUTES OF RAUDS. See Frauds, Statute of.

Laws of 1897, page 57, see page 65.
1897, page 257, see page 84.

1903, page 200, see page 127.

1905, page 251, section 62, see page 185.

1905, page 268, see page 167.

1911, page 292, section 22, see page 388.

1913, page 163, see page 239.

1913, page 193, see page 30.

1913, page 373, section 6836, see page 649.

1913, page 373, section 6838, see page 649.

1913, page 658, see page 83, 85.

1917, page 96, see page 127.

1917, page 102, see page 127.

STATUTES, FEDERAL AND STATE.

See Inter-State Commerce.

STIPULATED DAMAGES. See Damages, 3.

STOCK SUBSCRIPTION. See Corporations.

STREET RAILROADS.

1. Carriage of Passengers: Duty to Pay Fare: Tender of Fare Must Be
Unconditional. A person boarding a street car has no right to
remain upon the car without paying his fare or unconditionally
tendering it. Green v. United Railways Co., 303.

STREET RAILROADS-Continued.

2. Same: Refusal to Pay Fare: Ejectment from Car: Right to Use
Necessary Force. And when the fare is not paid or unconditionally
tendered, such person has no cause of action as for a wrongful
ejection from the car, provided no more force than was necessary
was used in ejecting him, for the reason that he did not, on his
part, accept the contract of carriage tendered him and perform
the obligation resting upon him as the other party thereto. Green
v. United Railways Co., 303.

3. Same: Payment of Fare: Right to Transfer. However, had he paid
his fare and had the conductor of the street car then refused to
issue the transfer he would have had his remedy. Ib.

4. Same: Refusal to Pay Fare: Duty to Leave Car. But if he chose
not to pay his fare, under the circumstances, then it was his duty
to leave the car at the first opportunity, i. e., when the car had
been stopped at a safe place for him to alight, and seek other
means of redress if he so desired; he was not entitled to con-
tinue to ride upon the street car without paying his fare. Ib.

5. Same: Duty to Pay Fare: Conditional Tender: Ejectment from Car.
Where a person on a street car conditioned his tender of fare on
the issuance of a transfer to which he was entitled, the fact that
the conductor refused to issue the transfer in any event, so that
unconditional tender of fare would have been unavailing, as to ob-
taining the transfer, did not prevent the street railroad from jus-
tifying his ejection for failure to pay fare or unconditionally ten-
der the same. Ib.

6. Same: Ejectment from Car: Unnecessary Force. In such case though
the street railroad was entitled to eject plaintiff who refused to
pay fare or tender it unconditionally, if unnecessary force was
used whereby plaintiff was injured, the street railroad is liable to
respond in damages therefor. Ib.

7. Same: Question for the Jury.

In an action against a street rail.
road for wrongful ejection from a car, though the conductor had
the right to eject kecause plaintiff did not pay fare or uncondi-
tionally tender it, plaintiff was entitled to go to jury on the issue
that unnecessary force was used. Ib.

8. Same: Ejection from Car: Cannot Recover for Humiliation. Where
plaintiff invited ejection from a street car in order to test his
right to obtain a transfer, no recovery may be had for humiliation
or disgrace by reason of being ejected in the presence of passen-
gers or others. Ib.

9. Same: Unnecessary Force: Punitive Damages. Plaintiff, who in-
vited ejection from the street car which he had boarded to test
rights in the matter of transfers, if ejected with unnecessary force
on refusing to pay fare or make an unconditional tender thereof,
is entitled to recover compensatory damages for his actual physi-
cal injuries, and likewise punitive damages in the discretion of
the jury. Ib.

10. Collision with Automobile: Contributory Negligence of Chauffeur:
Failure to Look. Where an automobile chauffeur approaching a
street intersection was given a signal to cross by the traffic police-
man, from his failure to observe the movements of an approaching
street car, when the car was about 100 feet from the crossing at
the time of the signal, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that
the chauffeur was guilty of contributory negligence in proceeding
to cross the street car tracks without paying further heed to the
street car. Am. Auto Ins. Co. v. United Railways Co., 317.

STREET RAILRCADS-Continued.

In

11. Collision with Automobile: Action for Damages: Instructions.
an action against a street railroad for injuries to an automobile
caused by a collision with a street car, an instruction which, in
substance, required the jury to find that the traffic officer gave a
signal or direction for the street car to stop and permit the auto-
mobile to pass, and that the motorman saw the signal, or by the
exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances would have
seen it, but failed to comply therewith, and then tells the jury
that if they "further find from the evidence that such failure
of the motorman in such respect caused the street car to collide
with the automobile and damage it," and further find that such
failure to obey the signal of the traffic officer, is given, "was
failure on the part of the motorman to exercise ordinary care for
the safety of the automobile," then to find for plaintiff, provided
the jury further find that the driver of the automobile was at the
time exercising the highest degree of care for his own safety and
that of the automobile, was not objectionable as failing to require
the jury to find that the motorman could have stopped his car
after the giving of the signal by the traffic officer. Ib.

12. Same. In such action, an instruction to the effect that the motor-
man's failure to obey the traffic officer's signal, if given, was a
failure to exercise ordinary care, held proper, where the evidence
sufficed to warrant a finding that the street car could have been
stopped after such signal was given in time to avoid the collision.
Ib.

13. Same: Proximate Cause: Failure to Ring Bell: Instructions. Like-
wise, it was not reversible error, under the circumstances, to sub-
mit to the jury, as a predicate of liability, the failure of the
motorman to ring his bell, though the automobile chauffeur, hav-
ing seen the car 100 feet north of the crossing, proceeded to cross,
in obedience to the signal, without further observing the car. Ib.

SUPERSEDEAS.

See Appeals; Appellate Practice, 3, 4, 5.

SURETIES, ONE SURETY. See Appellate Practice, 3, 4, 5.

TAX BILLS.

1. Ordinances: Defective Title. Where the title of an ordinance ex-
presses the subject in the act in such terms that the lawmakers
and the people are not left in doubt as to what matters are treated,
the ordinance is not void. (Section 8555, R. S. 1909). Reinert
Bros. Con. Co. v. Tootle et al., 284.

2. Same: Publication. An ordinance approved February 24, 1914, and
published from March 16th to March 21, 1914, is not void for fail-
ure to publish for a period of five consecutive days within twenty
days after it was passed and approved as required by section 8694,
Revised Statutes 1909, as the first publication was within the
prescribed twenty days. Ib.

3. Same: Error in Number: Publication. Where the proof of publica-
tion of an ordinance for street improvement stated that Ordinance
No. 6675 instead of No. 6676 was published, the error is not fatal,
since the ordinance itself and all the proceedings connected with
the street improvements, disclosed that ordinance No. 6676 was the
one referred to and no one could have been misled by such mistake.
Ib.

4. Grading of Streets in St. Joseph, Mo.: Assessment of Damages:
Necessity for Appointment of Commissioners. Unless all property