1 Griffith v. Mutual Protective League. precludes recovery. Travelers Insurance Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661; Grand Circle Women of Woodcraft v. Rausch, 134 Pac. 141; Greer v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 190 S. W. 72. J. O. Barrow and Hostetter & Haley for respondent. (1) There is no evidence that at the time its policy was issued defendant was anthorized to do business in this State as a fraternal beneficiary society, and although the rule is that the finding by the trier of fact, in an action at law is binding on an appellate court, yet if there is no evidence to support such finding the rule does not prevail. Brewing Co. v. St. Louis, 209 Mo. 601; Vincent v. Means, 207 Mo. 709. Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois-a foreign corporationand must prove that at the time its policy in controversy was issued, it was authorized to do business in this State as a fraternal beneficiary society, in order to escape being governed by the provisions relating to regular or old line insurance. Gruwell v. Knights & Ladies of Security, 126 Mo. App. 496, 501, and cases there cited; Conner v. Association, 171 Mo. App. 364 (and cases there cited); Brassfield v. Woodman, 88 Mo. App. 208; Brassfield v. Knights of Maccabees, 92 Mo. App. 102; Huff v. Woodmen, 85 Mo. App. 96; McDermott v. Woodmen, 97 Mo. App. 636; Keeton v. National Union, 178 Mo. App. 301; Lowenstein v. Old Colony Life Ins. Co., 166 S. W. 889. (2) The character of a company and its liability are determined, not by its name, nor by what it pretends to be, but by the policy in question. Toomey v. Knights of Pythias, 147 Mo. 129; Jacobs v. Life Ass'n, 146 Mo. 523; Folkens v. Ins. Co., 98 Mo. App. 480; Aloe v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n, 164 Mo. 675 Trenton v. Humel, 134 Mo. App. 595; State ex rel. v. Vandiver, 213 Mo. 187, 207. "It is not the nature of the society but the terms of the contract in suit that determines the matter. See Wilson v. Gen. Assembly of Am. Griffith v. Mutual Protective League. Benev. Ass'n; 125 Mo. App. 597, 103 S. W. 109, and cases there cited. McPike v. Mystic Circle, 187 Mo. App. 686. (3) Courts will construe policies of insurance most strongly against the insurer; this rule is rigidly applied as to the amount of indemnity to be paid upon the happening of the contingencies insured against, and all doubtful languages and ambiguous provisions relating thereto will be resolved against the Company and in favor of the insured. Stix v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 175 Mo. App. 171; Birtlenham v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 167 S. W. 590; Matthews v. Modern Woodmen, 236 Mo. 326; Renn v. Supreme Lodge K. of P., 83 Mo. App. 442; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Jeary, 51 L. R. A. 698; Mitchel v. Accident Co., 179 Mo. App. 1. LaForce v. Williams Ins. Co., 43 Mo. App 518, 530; Hoffman v. Accident Indemnity Co., 56 Mo. App. 301; Renshaw v. Mo. State Mut. F. & M. Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 595; Realty Co. v. Insurance Co., 179 Mo. App. 138 and cases there cited. Where is a conflict between a policy and the by-laws as to the amount of indemnity to be paid, the policy controls. Courtney v. Fidelity Mut. Aid Ass'n, 120 Mo. App. 115; Goodson v. Nat. Masonic Accident Ass'n, 91 Mo. App. 339, 348; and this rule applies to a foreign as well as a domestic corporation. Goodson v. Nat. Masonic Ass'n, supra; McFarlane v. Ins. Co., 124 Mo. 221. The contract will be construed so as to effectuate the indemnity; and this is true although the insurer may have intended otherwise. LaForce v. Williams Ins. Co., 43 Mo. App. 518; Hoffman v. Accident Ins. Co., 56 Mo. App. 501; Hale v. Insurance Co., 46 Mo. App. 508. (4) In the interpretation of contracts of insurance the maxium, noscitur a sociis, obtains. When a clause stands with others, its sense may be gathered from those which immediately precede and follow it. (5) An insurance contract should not be frittered away by vague and ambiguous clauses, nor emasculated by fine-print hidden forfeitures which the insurer never reads, or if read is misleading. Courts Griffith v. Mutual Protective League. do not, and should not, look with favor on this palpable scheme to deceive and trap the unwary. It would require an excess of legal acumen to discover the "joker" which appellant's counsel now contends forfeits the insurance. Stix v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 175 Mo. App. 171; Matthews v. Modern Woodman, 236 Mo. 343; Boon v. Aetna Ins. Co., 40 Conn. 586. STATEMENT. Under date of March 12, 1908, the defendant company issued its benefit certificate to Mrs. Bertie Nicholson, a member of the order, by which certificate it promised to. pay, at the time of the death of Mrs. Nicholson, while a member of the corporation or society, the sum of $500 to John W. Nicholson, her husband, and $500 to Howard G. Nicholson, her adopted son, these designated as beneficiaries, upon satisfactory proof of the death of Mrs. Nicholson, the certificate representing a total of $1000. The benefit certificate is attached as an exhibit to the petition and was introduced in evidence and, designating John W. Nicholson, her husband, and Howard G. Nicholson, her adopted son, as beneficiaries, as above, it contains, among other provisions, the following, which are here material: "That in the event of the death of any beneficiary prior to the death of said member, and upon his failure to have designated another beneficiary, then the amount to be paid under this certificate shall be due and payable to the other surviving beneficiaries, if there be any, and if none survive him, then to the legal heirs of said member." It is further provided that the certificate is issued and accepted subject to the agreements, privileges and conditions named, among which is this, number 5: "5. If a member holding this certificate shall be convicted of a felony, or shall be expelled from the Order, or become so far intemperate, or use opiates, cocaine, chloral of other narcotics or poison to such Griffith v. Mutual Protective League. an extent as to impair his health or to produce delirium tremens, or should die in consequence of a duel or while engaged in war, or by suicide, whether sane or insane, intentional or unintentional, except it be committed while the member is under treatment for insanity, or has been judicially declared to be insane. or by the hands of beneficiary or beneficiaries named herein, except by accident, or by the hand of justice, or from disease resulting from his own vicious, intemperate or immoral habits, act or acts, or in consequence of the violation or attempted violation of the laws of the State or the United States or any other province of nation, or if any of the statements or declarations in the application for membership and upon the faith of which this certificate was issued shall be found in any respects untrue, this certificate shall be null and void and of no effect; provided that in all such cases of death the amount of money contributed to the benefit fund by such member shall be returned and shall be paid to the beneficiary out of such fund in lieu of the benefit." The words which we have italicized above are those which are here involved. The final clause is, "This certificate is issued and accepted subject to all the conditions on the back hereof, and subject to all the laws, rules and regulations of the Mutual Protective League now in force, or that may hereafter be enacted, and shall be null and void if said member does not comply with all of said conditions and with the laws of the Council to which the said member belongs." There is another provision allowing the member to change the beneficiary by written instrument. In the application for the benefit certificate, which was put in evidence by the defendant, clause 5, as above set out, is embodied, except that where in the certificate itself the words are, "or by the hands of beneficiary or beneficiaries named herein, except by accident," the words in the application are, "or by Griffith v. Mutual Protective League. the hands of beneficiaries named herein, except by accident." By the constitution of the Order it is provided: "The certificates hereafter to be issued shall be in such form as is or may hereafter be determined by the board of directors." This appears to have been in force at the time of the issuance of this benefit certificate, the certificate bearing date March 12, 1908. The petition upon which the case was tried avers that the plaintiffs are the surviving brothers of Bertie Nicholson; that she died on June 21, 1913, and that they constitute and are her only heirs at law; that at the time of her death Bertie Nicholson was a member of the defendant corporation, which, it is averred, was organized as such under the laws of the State of Illinois, and whose chief business, it is averred, is the insuring of the lives of its members for a pecuniary profit and consideration, for the benefit of its members and their beneficiaries. It is further averred that John W. Nicholson, a co-defendant, is the surviving husband of Bertie Nicholson and made a party defendant because he refused to join as plaintiff, and is a necessary party to a complete determination of the issues involved. It is further averred that by the benefit certificate issued March 12, 1908, and filed as before stated, defendant promised to pay to John W. Nicholson and Howard G. Nicholson, as beneficiaries, at the time of the death of Bertie Nicholson, while a member of the society, the sum of $500 each, or the total sum of $1000, upon satisfactory proof being made to the corporation of the death of Bertie Nicholson, and that it was further provided in the certificate, "that the said defendant corporation obliged and bound itself in the event of the death of said beneficiaries to pay said sum of $1000 to plaintiffs as legal heirs of said Bertie Nicholson." It is then averred that on June 20, 1913, John W. Nicholson, then being the husband of Bertie Nicholson, feloniously murdered her by pouring gasoline and |