wholly disproved. There is no question whatever about this. The testimony of these Coburns and Mary Hunter, all three, will not weigh a feather for a moment in your minds. And then upon every thing else, from one end of the case to the other, every particle of credible testimony, you have the deliberate judgment of the best witnesses on our side. I leave her case, therefore, upon this statement, and respectfully submit that for both their sakes you will render a verdict promptly and joyfully in favor of Helen Dalton-for both their sakes. There is a future for them both together, gentlemen, I think; but if that be not so—if it be that this matter has proceeded so far that her husband's affections have been alienated, and that a happy life in her case has become impracticable, yet for all that, let there be no divorce. For no levity, no vanity, no indiscretion, let there be a divorce. I bring to your minds the words of Him who spake as never man spake: "Whosoever putteth away his wife "-for vanity, for coquetry, for levity, for flirtation ?-"whosoever putteth away his wife for anything short of adultery, intentionally, willingly indulged, and that established by clear, undoubted and credible proof-whosoever does it, 'causeth her to commit adultery.'" If they may not be dismissed then, gentlemen, to live again together, for her sake and her parents' sustain her; give her back to self-respect and the assistance of that public opinion which all of us require. There was a time in the progress of this cause when that father, unaware of what might be produced against her, or by what instruments of defense it would be necessary here to protect his daughter's honor, set on foot an inquiry of recrimination to be instituted against the libellant. Information was brought to his ears on which he directed a certain inquiry; the result was communicated to counsel, and that result has been stated on the files of the court. On that allegation of recrimination we have had occasion to produce no evidence; it was contrary, as Mr. Gove has sworn, to the wishes of his daughter from first to last, that the attempt should be made at all. There is, therefore, by her request-and it is gratifying to the counsel in that respect to be able to indulge that request-not a tittle of evidence upon which it can ever be predicated that he was guilty; as to that he must be found to be innocent. Permit me to say that she would have thought it the last drop in this bitterest cup if her own frivolities and vanities had done anything to tempt or even to bring into suspicion the chastity of her husband. It would have been the bitterest drop in her cup. She would say by me, as she said to him in her last letter to Frank: "You have done all you can to disgrace me, but no matter nowI will not blame you. You are my husband for the present; I will not talk against you nor say aught that can make you unhappy. Wishing you much happiness and peace with much love, if you will accept it, I remain, your wife." So may she remain until that one of them to whom it is appointed first to die, shall find the peace of the grave. I thank you for your kind indulgence and leave the case in your hands. It is perhaps proper here to state, that when this speech was delivered, reporters did not always possess the skill they now have. Mr. Choate, when excited and in the full tide of his argument, spoke with great rapidity-a vehement and onward rush of thoughts. It was, therefore, difficult, often impossible, to take down fully and accurately all he said; and Professor Brown, in speaking of this argument, remarks, that the mere reading of it can give but a feeble idea of its beauty and cogency. A reporter once remarked, he would as soon undertake to report "chain-lightning" It is related of Mr. Choate, that after reading one of his addresses, a friend asked him whether it had been correctly given. The reply was, not verbally, not verbally, but the general nonsense of the thing they have got." 44 The effect of the powerful appeal in the Dalton Case went farther than the jury box. It brought conviction in a strange direction. Mr. Choate, we have reason to believe, convinced the plaintiff. It is certain, at all events, that soon after the trial Dalton began paying attentions to his wife, sending her bouquets, and exhibiting other tokens of his affection. Both shortly left Boston, were reunited, and lived together in harmony. ARGUMENT OF EDWIN M. STANTON, IN DEFENSE OF HON. DANIEL E. SICKLES, INDICTED FOR THE MURDER OF PHILIP BARTON KEY. IN THE CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, WASHINGTON, D. C., APRIL 23d, 1859. ANALYSIS OF MR. STANTON'S ARGUMENT. 1. Homicide defined. 2. Theory of the defense. 3. Effects of the crime of adultery upon the home circle.-Sanctity of the nuptial bond. 4. The hallowed relation as between parent and child. 5. The tie between brother and sister. 6. The punishment of adultery under the Levitical law. 7. Conduct embraced within the act of adultery. 8. The husband legally justified in slaying the adulterer. 9. Review of Manning's case. 10. Slaying the adulterer no crime under the law. 11. The wife's consent no qualification of the adulterer's guilt. 12. The English and American authorities discussed. 13. The wife's consent cannot be invoked to shield the adulterer. 14. The prisoner's right to slay further based on the law of self-defense. 'Whether a homicide committed by a man smarting under a sense of dishonor is murder or manslaughter," says Mr. Wharton in his work on homicide, "depends upon the question whether the killing was in the first transport of passion or not. In the latter case the offense is murder; in the former manslaughter." Those not familiar with legal principles may regard this as an extremely harsh rule. Many will, no doubt, consider that a man is not only blameless, but justified in taking the life of the adulterer, and that, in doing so, he discharges a duty which he owes to the community. The rule, however, is a wise one, and salutary in its operation. Chief Justice Ruffin, of North Carolina, in a very able opinion, illustrates the wisdom of the law on this subject. He says: "Where a husband only hears of the adultery of his wife, no matter how well authenticated the information may be, or how much credence he may give the informer, and kills either the wife or her paramour, he does it not upon present provocation, but for a past wrong-a grievous one, indeed; but it is evident he kills for revenge. Let it be considered how it would be if the law were otherwise. How remote or recent must the offense be? How long or how far may the husband pursue the offender? If it happen that he be the deluded victim of an Iago, and, after all, that he has a chaste wife, how is it to be then? These inquiries suggest the impossibility of acting on any rule but that of the common law, without danger of imbruing men's hands in innocent blood, and certainly of encouraging proud, headstrong men to slay others for vengeance, instead of bringing them to trial and punishment by law." The act of adultery, therefore, furnishes no excuse for the homicide. Its effect, at most, is to reduce the grade of killing from murder to manslaughter. It is only under the common law of England, however, that the slaying of the adulterer caught in the act, is regarded as manslaughter. Such killing was justified by the laws of the Greeks, the Romans, the ancient Goths, and other nations of antiquity. If a burglar enters my dwelling to spoil my goods, and I kill him, the authorities all agree that I am justified. I am not guilty of any offense, because the circumstances will excuse the homicide. Applying this principle, it was urged in the Sickles case, that if a libertine destroys his friend's home, if he spoils his domestic happiness, ruins the wife's chastity and the mother's virtue, the husband would be justified in taking his life. The burglar seeks that which is material and perishable. What the adulterer destroys is more precious than gold or rubies, and cannot be restored. Hon. Edwin M. Stanton discussed the law upon this subject in a masterly manner, and made perhaps the most powerful argument that has ever been attempted upon the subject. On behalf of his client he claimed, that if such killing was manslaughter under the common law as it existed in England, it should not be followed here, nor declared as part of our American jurisprudence. He urged that both in law and in morals Mr. Sickles was justified in taking the life of the adulterer, for he insisted that, in the eye of the law, he slew him in the act. The facts of the case are briefly told. On Sunday afternoon, on the 27th of February, 1859, Sickles shot and killed Key in a public thoroughfare, in the city of Washington. The night before the homicide, he learned that Key, who had been his friend and companion, had violated the sanctity of his friendship and betrayed his hospitality, and had been for a long time criminally intimate with Mrs. Sickles. The truth of this terrible revelation was confirmed the next morning. While Mr. Sickles was seated near his front window, he saw Key drive past and wave his handkerchief, the signal that he desired to meet Mrs. Sickles away from the roof of her husband. Within a very few hours the opportunity presented itself, and the husband, enraged and mortified beyond endurance, shot and killed the seducer upon the public street. “Key, you scoundrel," he exclaimed, “you have dishonored my house; you must die," whereupon he fired three shots, all of which took effect in the body of the victim. The inquiry before the court was not as to how far the accused was blameless in the eye of his maker for inflicting vengeance upon the destroyer of his domestic happiness. However interesting such a discussion might be to the mind of the casuist, it did not necessarily arise before a human tribunal. Could the slayer be convicted under the law? Was the fact that he took the life of an adulterer, because he had committed adultery, a legal excuse for the homicide? Mr. Stanton undertook to show, as matter of law, that the prisoner was justified; that those decisions which sustained a contrary doctrine had their origin in an age which for vice and profligacy has no parallel in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, and that the law declared during that period had no precedent in the past, and had not been followed since. He argued the question in all its bearings, not only as affected by the common law of 1 State v. Neville, 6 Jones (N. C.) Law, 433 England, but the aspect in which the prisoner's acts would have been regarded under other systems of jurisprudence which have prevailed among men since the morning of time. He cites the law of Moses for the government of the Jews, a people whose statutes were ordained not by any human legislature, but by divine authority. And so under the law of all civilized countries of which we have any account in ancient history, either sacred or profane, there is but one answer to the question as to the punishment of the adulterer. When, however, Mr. Stanton justifies his client's conduct upon the broad principles of self-protection, which he asserts as a natural right, his argument is great. His eloquent description of the sanctity, the beauty and purity of the family relation, and the importance of family influence as the great factor in social life, upon which alone the existence of civil society depends, commands admiration and is rendered powerful and effective; while the conclusion is irresistible, that the crime of adultery brings destruction not only upon the individual, but upon society itself. The argument was not upon the facts to the jury, but upon the law to the court, in order to sustain the position taken by the prisoner's counsel upon the requests to charge the jury. In order that the argument may be thoroughly understood, the reader will find the requests submitted by the prosecution and the defense, and the rulings of the court, at page 718 of the Appendix. Before Mr. Stanton filled the office of attorney-general of the United States, his reputation as a lawyer was established in connection with the Wheeling Bridge Case, and the Pennsylvania Railroad v. The Canal Commissioners, reported in 9th of Harris. A brilliant advocate and profound lawyer, he possessed also the qualities of a great judge. By his early demise, shortly after his appointment to the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, the world has lost the benefit of his ripe learning, wide research and experience. The trial of Mr. Sickles was commenced on Monday, April 4th, 1859, in the Criminal Court for the District of Columbia, at the city of Washington, before Hon. T. H. Crawford and a jury. Robert Ould, U. S. District-Attorney, was assisted on behalf of the prosecution by Mr. J. M. Carlisle, of Washington. The following gentlemen appeared for the prisoner: James T. Brady and John Graham, of New York, Edwin M. Stanton, Mr. Radcliff, Mr. Clinton, Mr. Magruder, and Mr. Phillips, of Washington. The trial lasted twenty days, and resulted in verdict of acquittal. Mr. Stanton addressed the court as follows: MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HONOR:-It becomes my duty to present some considerations in support of the points of law which have been submitted by the defense, and which points are in conformity with those which may be given to a jury.' The event which has brought the jury and the prisoner at the bar into solemn relations, and made the court and counsel participators in this momentous trial, is the death of Mr. Key at the hand of Mr. Sickles, which took place on Sunday, the 27th of February. The occasion of this event was an adulterous intrigue between Mr. Key and the wife of Mr. Sickles. The law rising on the case must depend on 1 For the points submitted, see Appendix, p. 718. |