tofore been assigned for them. The acts prohibited were precisely those which the States had been passing, and which mainly led to the adoption of the Constitution. The section might have been inserted ex abundanti cautela. Or the convention might have regarded the previous clause, which grants the power to regulate commerce as exclusive throughout the whole subject; and this section might have been inserted to qualify its exclusive character, so far as to permit the States to do the things mentioned, under the superintendence and with the consent of Congress. If either or both of these motives combined for inserting the clause, the inference which had been drawn from it against the exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce, would appear to be wholly unwarranted. But if these police regulations of the States are to be considered as a part of the immense mass of commercial powers, is not the subject susceptible of division, and may not some portions of it be exclusively vested in Congress? It was viewing the subject in this light that induced my learned associate' to assume the position which has been misconceived on the other side. This proposition was, not that all the commercial powers are exclusive, but that, those powers being separated, there are some which are exclusive in their nature; and among them is that power which concerns navigation, and which prescribes the vehicles in which commerce shall be carried on. It is, however, immaterial, so far as this case was concerned, whether the power of Congress to regulate commerce be exclusive or concurrent. Supposing it to be concurrent, it could not be denied that where Congress has legislated concerning a subject on which it is authorized to act, all State legislation which interferes with it is absolutely void. II. THE COASTING TRADE PROTECTED BY THE LAWS OF CONGRESS. It is not denied that Congress has power to regulate the coasting trade. It is not denied that Congress has regulated it. If the vessel now in question was sailing under the authority of these regulations, and has been arrested by a law of New York forbidding her sailing, the State law must, of necessity, be void. The coasting trade did, indeed, exist before the Constitution was adopted; I might safely admit that it existed by the jus commune of nations; 1 Mr. Webster. that it existed by an imperfect right; and that the States might prohibit or permit it at their pleasure, imposing upon it any regulations they thought fit, within the limits of their respective territorial jurisdictions. But those regulations were as various as the States, continually conflicting, and the source of perpetual discord and confusion. In this condition the Constitution found the coasting trade. It was not a thing which required to be created, for it already existed. But it was a thing which demanded regulation, and the power of regulating it was given to Congress. They acted upon it as an existing subject, and regulated it in an uniform manner throughout the Union. After this regulation it was no longer an imperfect right, subject to the future control of the States. It became a perfect right, protected by the laws of Congress, with which the States had no authority to interfere. It was for the very purpose of putting an end to this interference, that the power was given to Congress; and if they still have a right to act upon the subject, the power was given in vain. To say that Congress shall regulate it, and yet to say that the States shall alter these regulations at pleasure, or disregard them altogether, would be to say, in the same breath, that Congress shall regulate it and shall not regulate it; to give the power with one hand, and to take it back with the other. By the acts for regulating the coasting trade, Congress has defined what shall be required to authorize a vessel to trade from port to port; and in this definition not one word is said as to whether it is to be moved by sails or by fire; whether it carries passengers or merchandise. The license gives the authority to sail, without any of those qualifications. That the regulation of commerce and navigation includes the authority of regulating passenger vessels as well as others, would appear from the most approved definitions of the term commerce. It always implies intercommunication and intercourse. This is the sense in which the Constitution uses it; and the great national object was to regulate the terms on which intercourse between foreigners and this country, and between the different States of the Union, should be carried on. If freight be the test of commerce, this vessel was earning freight; for what is freight but the compensation paid for the use of a ship? The compensation for the carrying of passengers may be insured as freight. The whole subject is regulated by the general commercial law; and Congress has superadded special regulations applicable to vessels employed in transporting passengers from Europe. In none of the acts regulating the navi gation of the country, whether employed in the foreign or coasting trade, has any allusion been made to the kind of vehicles employed, further than the general description of ships or vessels, nor to the means or agents by which they were propelled. 12. PERORATION.-REPLY TO MR. EMMETT. In conclusion, I observe that my learned friend (Mr. Emmett) has eloquently personified the State of New York, casting her eyes over the ocean, witnessing everywhere this triumph of her genius, and exclaiming, in the language of Æneas: "Quæ regio in terris, nostri non plena laboris?" Sir, it was not in the moment of triumph, nor with feelings of triumph, that Æneas uttered that exclamation.' It was when, with his faithful Achates by his side, he was surveying the works of art with which the palace of Carthage was adorned, and his attention had been caught by a representation of the battles of Troy. There he saw the sons of Atreus and Priam, and the fierce Achilles. The whole extent of his misfortunes-the loss and desolation of his friends, the fall of his beloved country-rush upon his recollection. "Constitit, et lachrymans; Quis jam locus, inquit, Achate, Sir, the passage may, hereafter, have a closer application to the cause than my eloquent and classical friend intended. For, if the state of things which has already commenced, is to go on; if the spirit of hostility which already exists in three of our States, is to catch by contagion and spread among the rest, as, from the progress of the human passions and the unavoidable conflict of interest, it will too surely do, what are we to expect? Civil wars have often arisen from far inferior causes, and have desolated some of the fairest provinces of the earth. History is full of the afflicting narratives of such wars, from causes far inferior; and it will continue to be her mournful office to record them till time shall be no more. It is a momentous decision which this court is called on to 1 To those who are familiar with the speech of Mr. Emmett, as reported in Wheaton, this explanation is due. It was corrected after the argument, and the portion of it to which Mr. Wirt's reply refers, now reads: 'And conscious of the value of her own good works, she may turn the mournful exclamation of Æneas into an expression of triumph, and exultingly ask ‘Quæ regio in terris,' &c. The words in italics were interpolated after the speech was made, and their introduction takes away the chief point of the reply. 66 ARGUMENT OF MR. WIRT IN GIBBONS v. OGDEN. make. Here are three States almost on the eve of war. It is the high province of this court to interpose its benign and mediatorial influence. The framers of our admirable Constitution would have deserved the wreath of immortality which they have acquired, had they done nothing else than to establish this guardian tribunal to harmonize the jarring elements in our system. But, sir, if you do not interpose your friendly hand and extirpate the seeds of anarchy which New York has sown, you will have civil war. The war of legislation, which has already commenced, will, according to its usual course, become a war of blows. Your country will be shaken with civil strife. Your republican institutions will perish in the conflict. Your Constitution will fall. The last hope of nations will be gone. And what will be the effect upon the rest of the world? Look abroad at the scenes which are now passing on our globe, and judge of that effect. The friends of free government throughout the earth, who have been heretofore animated by our example, and have held it up before them as their polar star, to guide them through the stormy seas of revolution, will witness our fall with dismay and despair. The arm that is everywhere lifted in the cause of liberty, will drop, unnerved, by the warrior's side. Despotism will have its day of triumph, and will accomplish the purpose at which it too certainly aims. It will cover the earth with the mantle of mourning. Then, sir, when New York shall look upon this scene of ruin, if she have the generous feelings which I believe her to have, it will not be with her head aloft, in the pride of conscious triumph-"her rapt soul sitting in her eyes;" no, sir, no; dejected, with shame and confusion-drooping under the weight of her sorrow, with a voice suffocated with despair, well may she then exclaim: ARGUMENT OF DANIEL WEBSTER IN THE CASE OF OGDEN V. SAUNDERS. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-A certificate of discharge under a State insolvent law is no bar to an action brought by a citizen of another State, in the Courts of the United States, or of any other State than that where the discharge was obtained. ANALYSIS OF MR. WEBSTER'S ARGUMENT. 1. Bankrupt laws can be established only 2. Obligation of contracts considered. 4. A statute which diminishes or lessens an 5. The law acts upon a contract only when it is broken, but forms no part of the contract itself. 6. Object and purpose of the constitutional prohibition. 7. Grants of powers to Congress and prohibitions to the States considered. The argument of Mr. Webster in the case of Ogden v. Saunders-though not so famous as his splendid effort in behalf of his alma mater (4 Wheat. 518), which made his reputation as the foremost constitutional lawyer in America; nor so well known as his exhaustive and learned exposition of the law of charitable uses in the Girard Will Case (2 How. 127), nor so elaborate as the speech delivered on the trial of John Francis Knapp, charged with aiding and abetting in the murder of Joseph White, which was pronounced by so competent an author. ity as Rufus Choate, as a more difficult and higher effort of mind than that more famous "Oration for the Crown,"-is, perhaps, equal to any of his great discussions as a specimen of perfect reasoning and clear statement. The questions presented are of the utmost importance to the commercial world, and the manner in which they are discussed indicate the power and force of his understanding—not inferior to that possessed by any man who has ever worn the robes of his noble and honorable profession-and worthy of the first lawyer and the first statesman of his age. The propositions advanced are demonstrated with mathematical accuracy, by a chain of argument leading inevitably to the conclusions reached. The facts upon which the case arose are as follows: Ogden had been discharged from his debts, under an insolvent law of the State of New York, known as the Three-Fourths Act, and was afterwards sued by Saunders, a citizen of Kentucky, in the United States Court for the District |