conquering force of which every act that does not correspond to this force is inexact and feeble. This principle he finds expressed in the activities of inanimate nature as well as in the free play of human instincts. The thought is brought to his attention on various occasions of which we quote the following:

"The storm broke in all its power, discharging thunder and hail, and I realized with wonderful clearness that to understand nature one must, as I had done, go to her to be saved, far from all worries and all our heavy constraints. What mattered to me, then, man and his troubled will! What mattered to me then, the Eternal Thou Shalt and Thou Shalt Not! How different are lightning, storm and hail, free powers without ethics! How happy they are, those free wills which the mind has not troubled!"

This admiration of "free powers without ethics" is the prominent point in all Nietzsche's doctrines. It finds even more emphatic expression in the form of the idea that "The Will for Power" is the fundamental principle of all life. It occurs to him in the year 1870, at the seat of war, while he was serving as a volunteer in a German army ambulance. On one occasion at the close of a very heavy day with the wounded, he happens to enter a small town lying on one of the chief military roads. He is wandering through it in a leisurly fashion when suddenly as he turns the corner of a street protected on either side by lofty stone walls, he hears a roaring noise as of thunder, which seems to come from the immediate neighbourhood. He hurries forward a step or two, and what does he see, but a magnificent cavalry regiment gloriously expressive of the courage and exuberant strength of a people-ride past him like a luminous storm cloud. The thundering din grows louder, and louder, and lo and behold! his own beloved regiment of field artillery dashes forward at full speed, out of the mist of motes, and speeds westward amid an uproar of clattering chains and galloping steeds. While this procession passes before him, on its way to war and perhaps to death, so wonderful in its vital strength and formidable courage, Nietzsche is struck with the thought that the highest will to live can not find its expression in a miserable "struggle for existence," but in a will to war, a will to power, a will to overpower. To use his own words: "Man is never so great as when he combines an alertness and refinement of mind with a certain native brutality and cruelty of instinct."

Nietzsche's ideas of freedom from ethics and will to power do not comply with those of American money magnates or of society leaders. Such freedom and power as these men exert Nietzsche despises as being but the outcropping of perverted intellects, and not of natural instincts. The philosopher seeks in vain for an expression of his ideal in modern civiliza tion; he, therefore, goes back to more ancient peoples who have lived closer to the heart of nature.

"We shall not dissect the Greek genius, we sh revitalize it, and teach men to feel it; our generation shall enter into possession of the grand legacy transmitted by the past."

The "Greek genius" here referred to is the doctrine that was promulgated and practised by Lycurgus of whom we read in the "Plutarch's Lives." Nietzsche lauds the rude and primitive centuries of ancient Greece, and he evidently aspires to serve his own generation as Lycurgus did his Nietzsche studies the reforms and the results that were connected with the career of the Greek leader, and concludes that a type o men equal to the old Spartans might again be seen on this earth if human beings would consent to adopt such rules of life as were responsible for the Spartan civiliza tion.

Lycurgus advocated simple living calculated to produce the greatest amou of physical and mental strength. His people lived on equal terms with one an other and with equal incomes, striving only to surpass each other in courage and virtue. Regulations were made regarding marriage and births. The bodies of the giris were strengthened by suitable exercises All affectation and exclusiveness among women were forbidden. Children wer not viewed as belonging to the parents a father was not permitted to bring up offspring. Each child was brought to place where the elders sat in judgmen upon the child. If it was mean-looking an misshapen, it was sent to a place calle "the exposure" to perish, but if strong an healthy it was well reared. Children we taught to endure labors, and win battie They were trained to steal, and if caugh were punished for stealing clumsily. Th Spartans were represented as being mo warlike and at the same time most poet cal. "The sword with song full well co bines," said the Laconian poet.

When the enemy was in sight, it was a nagnificent and terrible spectacle to see the Spartans marching in time to the flutes, with no thought of fear, but quietly and steadily moving to the sound of the music against the enemy. After they had routed their enemy and gained their victory, they pursued the enemy far enough to make the victory sure, then drew off as it was not nanly for a Greek to butcher those who could fight no longer.

Lycurgus had seen that virtue and ingle-mindedness was the fountain-head of happiness, therefore he directed all his fforts to implant in his countrymen feelngs of honor, self-reliance, and self-control. He produced an inimitable constitution, nd showed the spectacle of an entire city cting like an aggregation of philosophers. parta became by far the most celebrated ity in Greece for five hundred years under is constitution. After that the laws of ycurgus were disregarded, and a decline et in.

In the typical Spartan, Nietzsche sees templified the free play of natural instincts ombined with the advantages that ccompany a man's high intellectual pacities. Nature's own mode of proceire is here carried out without compuncon. The weakling is eliminated but the terests of the strong are promoted from e earliest childhood. The example of the partans also affords Nietzsche support r the high esteem in which he holds war ith its pageantry and its stimulus to its of courage and achievement. Nietzsche olds that mankind must again adapt self to the "Greek genius" which is the irit of nature, for only by so doing can enter into its inheritance.

"When you speak of humanity," etzsche writes, "you imagine an order sentiment by which man distinguishes nself from nature, but such a separation es not exist; these qualities called tural and those called human grow gether and are blended. Man in his blest aspirations is still branded by ister nature. Thus it is that the Greeks, most human of all men, remain cruel, ppy in destruction."

The Germam philosopher deserves to be led, "The Apostle of the instincts." To d to our natural instincts is the principle emphasizes, yet he does not confine himto brute instincts, realizing as he does t man is a superior creation. There

full measure of the assertion of the selfish instincts he considers to be the explanation of the type of greatness which he finds exemplified in the cases of Frederick II, Napoleon, Bismarck, and Cæsar Borgia. He professes great admiration for the achievements of these men. Indeed, he is obliged to do so out of consideration for the logic of his philosophy, although it appears at times as though he suffers in so doing since this definition of greatness seems rather harsh for his naturally pensive and sensitive soul.

Nietzsche's doctrine is essentially a rule of life for the leader in war, not a defence for the weak. Not that he despises the inferior man, but deems it a part of the cosmic process that the lower exists for the benefit of the higher. He rather enjoys contemplating the simple pleasures of the humble; he sees, however, that the herdinstinct, the timidity and the mob-mind by which the underman is so largely governed are detrimental to the higher type which he is trying to promote. This herd-instinct tends toward equality and effacement of dignity, while Nietzsche chooses to commend exceptional men. He argues that Napoleon and Bismarck outforc he often questions himself how a culture may be founded, that is to say, a harmony of rules, beliefs and traditions, by submission to which man become nobler. He declares that art is an indispensable element of culture. He says that love is ennobling since it is a fascination for beautiful things, but it must not be permitted to degenerate into a sentiment of sympathy. Virtue is that action of the soul by which it tends to the highest good. "Truth is good in proportion to the services it assures, and illusion is preferable if it performs its duty better.'

When Nietzsche lauds nobility, he shows that the word "noble" originally meant in Greek, one who was something, who had a firmly united reality, which the cowardly and untruthful person had not. The nobler type of human being, which was the centre of Nietzsche's vision, was to be the product of a radical, and if necessary, cruel revolution of ethics. This idea is expressed in his own words as follows: "Our duty is not to take shelter in metaphysics, but to sacrifice ourselves to the birth of culture. Hence my severity against misty idealism."

Not moral nor mental culture, but a

stripped their fellow-beings in achievements because Napoleon and Bismarck asserted their natural powers. Achievement is what he praises them for, not the humanitarian virtues of brotherly love and justice. Indeed, here he holds the same view as Goethe, who says: "To be just in all things is to destroy one's own ego."

Nietzsche's ideal may be stated to be the unbridled assertion of self in contrast to the impotency of the self-denial dogma. This self-assertion is the prerogative of the leader. In this, Nietzsche is voicing the sentiment of several other philosophers of a similar way of thinking. The activities of the leaders, they say, are amenable to a higher law than that of common morality which is impracticable in dealing with the masses. The truly moral man will carry his plans through to victorious accomplishment. The mass of men are simply valuable as furnishing needed materials and tools. The morals of humility, of sympathy, of obedience to law are a selfprotective device on the part of the weak. Nietzsche says:

"The loss of force which suffering has already brought upon life is still further increased and multiplied by sympathy. Suffering itself becomes contagious through sympathy. Sympathy thwarts on the whole, in general, the law of development which is the law of selection."

He gives recognition, however, to the fact that the weak serve in inventing schemes for circumventing their disadvantage in their lack of brute strength, and that their inventiveness thus serves the general cause of progress.

The rules of asceticism, or the self-denial dogma, seems to Nietzsche altogether intolerable. To mortify the self and to refuse to heed its claim is a great crime. To stigmatize the natural self as the seat of vileness and corruption while placing virtue in some outside ideal is a humilia

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tion to which he cannot consent. The self is supreme and its rights must be respected: but a revaluation of good and evil must be made inorder to understand this. That is truly good which promotes the interest of the superman, no matter how long cus tom may have condemned it as wicked. On the other hand, that is alone evil which hinders the interests of the superman no matter how loudly it has been proclaimed as virtue.

The inefficiency of the self-denial doc trine has been proved in the history of monks and Puritan saints, where it has been demonstrated repeatedly that fast ing and flagellation works so long as the body is exhausted, but that the organism soon asserts itself, and that ineradicabl instincts for family life and the craving for pleasure soon make themselves felt again This law works both ways. Professo Cooley says that those who have bee strong in advocating gratification of selfis instincts, have been frequently observed t be the most gentle and kindly disposed to ward their fellow-beings. The man wh reverences the possibilities of life for him self and admits them frankly, is the on most likely to respect the needs of other The principle of self-denial is that huma nature requires to have violence done to i But the true business of morals should b to see that the capacities which constitut the self are fulfilled, not repressed. Natu cannot be expelled.

In his Thus Spake Nietzsche says:

Zarathustra,

"Verily, a new good and evil is your virtue. It power that new virtue, one dominating thought it and round it a cunning soul, and round it the serpe of knowledge.'

EW words are more frequently used to-day than the word Democracy: yet few words are less understood. Not only is it on everybody's lips, but it is used to denote the quality and purpose of innumerable and contradictory social and political regimes, reform movements, etc. No matter what the real nature and purpose of a reform policy be, the advocates of it are sure to say that it is a democratic policy. Democracy, or the belief in Democracy, has become the fashion; and for that reason it is in danger. It is often the way with people when they hate a thing more deeply than usual, to pretend they like it, to associate it with things that are really opposite to it in nature, and so make the very word odious. Democracy stands in danger of such a fate. As every thoughtful person knows, Democracy is the antithesis of everything that presupposes or encourages class distinction, aristocracy and caste; yet we are witnessing men who are aristocrats to their finger tips advocating "democratic" reforms, making speeches that are full of easy talk about Democracy. But apart from the insincere advocacy of Democracy, there is much misconcepmisconception and confusion of thought with respect to the nature and meaning of Democracy among those who devoutly believe in it. The prevailing idea seems to be that Democracy is a social and political regime which secures for all absolutely equal rights and power, socially politically and economically. The Socialist's ideal of Democracy is a State n which every member is guaranteed gainst physical insufficiency, etc. To the advanced Liberal, on the other hand, Democracy stands for equality of political ights, equal access to all Government posts n every branch of the Civil Service, etc.

To a very large number Democracy imply means the rule of the common eople. These, accepting the existing accepting the existing olitical aims and methods, look to wining the working classes over to their

view, when, having gained a majority in the national legislature, they will give effect to what they call the will of the people. They recognise that the rich are divided against the poor, and, believing that capital and labour are diametrically and inevitably opposed to another, and that hitherto the rich minority has ruled to their own advantage the poor majority, maintain that the time has come when the people ought to look after themselves, to take possession of the reins of government and legislate in the interests of the masses, that is, in accordance with what they believe to be the strict principles of justice.

But are any of these interpretations of Democracy satisfactory? In each case caste, class feeling and class class war seem to be taken for granted, to be regarded as permanent elements in society, existences which human nature is unable to overcome. Were any of the foregoing types of Democracy to be established society would still be in a state of chaos and class warfare, and would be quite as much riven by unrest and discontent as it is to day. The only difference would be that the rich instead of being rulers would be ruled, at least nominally; but by reason of their pride and riches, the wealthy minority would do all they could to bring about the downfall of the government; they would circumvent the laws in subtle ways and so render legislation ineffective.

But if we think quietly and deeply, I feel convinced we shall conclude that none of these things are what we really mean by Democracy. It is quite true that Democracy has never yet been adequately defined; indeed I believe it (at the present stage of development) to be undefinable, the ideal of life and of society it stands for being as yet only vaguely conceived of, even by the most spiritually advanced. At the same time I think it possible to say many things about Democracy, to name some of its attributes and

conditions; and it is in order to do this that the present article is being written. Personally I believe that Democracy stands for a level of social development such as has never been reached by any known community; and I further believe that the key to its attainment lies in the adoption of such principles as I have developed in the present series of articles. With the readers' permission I will endeavour to state a few of my ideas concerning the meaning and implications of Democracy.

Now the first thing I think we ought to be able to say about Democratcy is that it is opposed to caste, to every form of class distinction. For so long as there exists the element of caste, the struggle for power and position, for the external signs of greatness, the things which make men "seem" to be superior to their fellows, will be sure to continue. Class distinctions and materialism go together. To attain a spiritual view of life and of man is ipso facto to rise superior to that foolish pursuit of wealth and power which is so characteristic of the present time. From this it follows that the attainment of Democracy will involve the elimination of poverty. Poverty is due almost absolutely to self-love, class-feeling, to an attempt to convince the world by various kinds of ostentation and display that we are very superior beings; for poverty is neither natural nor inevitable. Consequently until the people's eyes are opened, and a materialistic and aristocratic view of life is supplanted by a spiritual and democratic view, poverty is sure to abound. Thus I contend that Democracy and poverty are incompatible, and that the attainment of the former will necessarily involve the elimination of the latter. And surely in an approximately ideal society there ought to be no poverty, no starving for bread, no bitter struggling for the means existence !

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But do not misunderstand me. I am not, as I stated in a previous article, one of those who believe that strife and struggling of all sorts ought to be done away with. I am no advocate of namby-pambyism, of a life that calls for neither backbone nor spirit; in which there is nothing to contend for, nothing to battle against. The State which acts as a sort of minor Providence, anticipates and provides for all its members' needs, physical, intellectual, spiritual, is to me intolerable, loathsome.

I hold that liberty, initiative, the right to discover ends and to work out means to those ends are essential to the highest development and well-being. Fighting, conquering, achieving are as essential to life as air and water. But as I pointed out in the article, above referred to,fighting need not be of the physical order, for the means of physical existence. Every man ought to fight, but to fight for grander ideas, nobler ideals, finer principles, better methods, and ought to struggle to give perfect and original expression to his thoughts, feelings and aspirations. In a Democracy the physical problem, the problem of poverty, of getting a livelihood, ought to have been overcome and the people's interest drawn to the deeper ques tions and concerns of the mind and spirit, to such matters as art, education, religion, social relationships, the meaning of life, etc., etc. It is irrational, almost barbaric to assert that physical necessity is indispensable as a motive to work, for every enlightened person knows that work is a spiritual and educative principle, and that it is impossible to attain to the full stature of manhood, and to true well-being, to feel, understand and appreciate the deeper things of life, without spending a very large portion of one's life in work, creative effort. It is only the ignorant and physi cally minded who believe that work is somethig to be avoided. Thus in a Democracy the object of work will not be to secure the maximum of wealth but the most life, will not be to rob others of the means of existence but to create the mos: useful and beautiful things, whether ideas works of art, or mechanical appliances. etc., for the benefit of others.

Thus Democracy presupposes a spiritua view both of life and of man. The error of the pseudo-Democracies lies less in a stilted political theory than in a false and narrow view of life. The real complaint against most modern governments is not that the franchise is too narrow but that the ideals of those who support them are essentially materialistic. The rule of physical force over the means of existence is the effect of a false view of life; so that merely to alter the external order of society and to leave its mind and heart unchanged would be no guarantee either of peace or plenty. Consequently Democracy is not so much a political theory as a life-theory, and depends not nearly so much upon the