narrow slip of land fit for cultivation; but the Indus alone animates the country: on its right bank begins the sandy desert which extends far to the west: on the left bank the cultivated slip is rather broader; but from the Ran, which is itself 150 miles wide, the desert rapidly increases, till, under the 28th degree of latitude, it almost entirely covers a tract 360 miles in breadth.

"It would be useless to discuss at length, why from its mouth to the junction with the rivers of the Punjab, the Indus cannot be a line of defence nor a military frontier; because it may be stated in a few words, that an army cannot fall back on its line of operations, which must be beyond the desert, and because an army posted here would leave all Hindoostan exposed to the enemy; besides, an enemy would scarcely be expected from this side, though the first Mahometans, coming from Kandahar and Ghuznee, penetrated into Guzerat by this route: they, however, came only in detached bodies, while the great armies always cross the Indus at Attock.

"From the junction of the rivers of the Punjab upwards, the right bank is the last slope, of a rude and steep mountain chain with scanty cultivation, which is inhabited by savage tribes of Afghans, through which solitary caravans made deep paths, but which are scarcely practicable for an army. Here, too, the Indus would be the very worst frontier, because it must be immediately abandoned, in order to unite the troops at the point where the enemy would appear, which must be Attock, 300 miles distant from the confluence of the rivers of the Punjab.

"The fact that the enemy must appear at Attock is what makes the Indus so inviting as a frontier; but a frontier is good only when it is difficult for an enemy, and easy for your own troops to reach it. Now it would be easier for a marauding party to approach the Indus from the west than from the east; that is, from its mouth to Attock: on the Indian side the Indus is, in fact, as good as inaccessible to troops, and, a military force stationed there could maintain its communications with Bombay by means of steam-boats, whence the Indus might certainly be used to make a diversion on the enemy's line of communication; but a General would hardly send his troops in steam-boats up and down the Indus, and deprive himself of their co-operation in Hindoostan.

"It is recorded in history as something astonishing, that Alexander the Great, found the way to India, and even the most intelligent modern historians admire his sagacity, in having entered

it at the very point where it was most easy to be assailed. Others wonder how Vasco de Gama found the way from Mozambique on the east coast of Africa to Calicut, on the coast of Malabar. There is, however, nothing more wonderful in this, than in a plain journeyman mechanic finding his way from Vienna to Paris; for even in the time of Alexander, the productions of India were brought to Persia and Greece, and the merchants chose, not merely the easiest, but the only road: in the same manner Vasco de Gama met with a pilot who conducted him from Mozambique to the well known commercial city of Calicut. * * * * * * All the subsequent conquerors, Timour, Baber, Nadir Shah, and Achmet Shah, took the same road to India as Alexander. The cause is simply this, that this is the only road for an army.

"But supposing the Indus to be the frontier of India, it would be extremely rash in a General to risk a decisive engagement there. A finer field of battle than the plain near Attock, which is like a parade, extending 15 or 20 miles in every direction, could hardly be chosen; but what would be the consequence of a victory to the defenders of India? that the enemy would retire to the strong positions in his rear, through a country which cannot easily be exhausted, and where the roads are not rendered impassable by the rain, and where the invading army might remain if it pleased a whole year unmolested, while the rainy season would entirely hinder the arrival of supplies on the other side of the Indus. But if the battle should be lost, what would be the consequence to the English troops? It would be this; the defeated army would be obliged to retreat through a most difficult and barren country, in which a shower of rain would make it impossible to bring the artillery, and even the beasts of burden through the endless ravines: the army would not be able to rally, till it reached the Jailum, and from thence the rivers are so close together, and subject to such dreadful, irregular inundations, that there would be imminent danger, in case of a second disaster, of losing the remainder of the artillery. From the Indus to the Sutlej, all the disadvantages are on the side of the retreating army, and every position may be turned, while the retreat can be only in one direction. What an undertaking it What an undertaking it is to cross a river with an Indian army is manifest from the fact, that for every fighting man there are ten unarmed followers.

"Now, compare with this highly extolled natural line of defence of the Indus, the artificial decried line of the Sutlej. The broad

tract of the Indian desert extends along the Indus and the Sutlej to Ferozpoor, which makes it almost impossible for an army to pass through it, and in which small Rajapoot States form advanced posts, Rajapoots, who have been, at all times, distinguished by unequalled bravery and love of liberty, and who are fully equal to oppose any corps that might find it possible to penetrate on this side through the desert. From the end of the desert and arid tract near Ferozpoor to the Himmalaya, the distance is not much more than 100 miles, and an army stationed behind the Sutlej can more easily move from one place to the other, than can be effected by the enemy on the right bank, who cannot turn the position, either through the Himmalaya or through the desert. Whatever may be the frontier of India, the great battle must be fought on the plain of Sirhind, where all the advantages are on the side of the defenders, and where a defeat, exposes the invaders to the same destruction which awaits the former, in case of their losing a battle on the Indus. The most evident proof of this, is afforded by Achmet Shah, who, after losing a battle in the plain of Sirhind, on his first invasion of India, fled, without stopping any where, across the Attock. * *

"Should events (and they will do so) extend the English frontier to the Indus, they must necessarily advance their line of defence further to the west, into the mountains between Kabool and Herat, perhaps as far as Herat itself.” TRANSLATOR.

LETTER VI.

TO CARL RITTER.

The Anglo-Indian army. The Sepoys.- The Hindoo and Mussulman. -The European soldier.

Strength and

divisions of the army.-Pay. The corps of officers.

Karnoul, January 25. 1843. KEPT close prisoner in my tent by increasing torrents of rain, I will employ myself in complying with your request to give you some particulars relative to the Anglo-Indian army: but you must consider these communications merely as a sketch, and not be surprised if many of your questions remain unanswered.

The Anglo-Indian army is unquestionably one of the most experienced in the art of war, because war is its proper and true vocation. Impressed with the recollection of the glorious actions already accomplished, it looks forward, after a short repose, to new combats, full of hope and expectation of performing new deeds of chivalry, and of reaping fresh laurels. The British army in India has never been without opportunities in which soldiers were formed, who, in endurance and resolution, are not exceeded by any army in Europe.

The Hindoos, of whom the greater part of the army is composed, have no national basis, either in themselves or in their history. history. India, under its Hindoo dynasties, was split into a thousand petty states, each of which contended with the others for

the supreme power, and in which some individuals indeed founded kingdoms which were equal to the largest in Europe, but their existence was too transitory to have any influence on the present generation. Those days are entirely forgotten;-the Hindoo of the present day neither knows nor cares to what dynasty his ancestors belonged. He considers himself merely as a part of the great race of the Hindoos.

Religion and the privileges of his caste, on the other hand, are sacred in the estimation of the Hindoo; in them alone lies a separate political existence, with which the British government has never interfered. The tribes, too, which belong to the military profession, are neither original nor particularly distinct from the great body of the Hindoo nation. We find in the ranks of the soldiers, the brahmin, as well as the merchant, the peasant, and the artisan.

They are totally ignorant of the manner in which the country is governed: their life passes away, for the most part, in the camp or in barracks, separated from the great mass of the people. A portion of the Hindoos in the Bengal army belongs to petty tributary states, which might certainly make them accessible to political influence.

The Hindoo sepoy of the Madras army, is still more alien to the great body of the Hindoo people than the sepoy of Bengal: he is in general of very low caste, born and brought up in the field. Thus every regiment is, as it were, a little wandering colony, isolated from the rest of the world: but a large proportion of the soldiers are Mahometans. Hence it has hitherto been easy to send troops of this