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have proven to be men of integrity. They have proven to be as good as their word for what they could do, but obviously their limitations are very severe and obviously they cannot do that much.

On the other hand, I will as indicated further on, I will not be so gentle in my judgments based on the facts in terms of the higher officials of not only that agency but others. The recent developments within the INS over the last year 1977 on the special task force which was brought together here in Washington I think are suggestive of more positive possibilities, potentialities, and development. But briefly, and only briefly and only generally, this has been my experience in terms of my own efforts as an independent writer, author, and journalist, vis-a-vis these various Government agencies.

Now since that time I would like to add a couple of other things, and that is there is one agency in particular, I am not talking intelligence now, I am, talking Government Agency, which has proven to be virtually obstreperous in terms of this issue. That has been the State Department. They have consistently, everlastingly evaded, delayed, engaged in protracted delays with this issue. I think it is very interesting if you go back to my original work in 1963. I would like to point out that there I had indicated the folly of not going after documents and data and eyewitnesses in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. I do not care personally and objectively that they are Communist countries. I do not care what kind of data and documents and eyewitnesses I have because I will ultimately test them against standards of the objectivity of what we have here in this country.

I think on the David Susskind TV show that you, Mr. Chairman, referred to on which we appeared together with Miss Holtzman, Í think you both had very good answers to that.

Let us examine—this is the principle I proceeded along in 1962, 1963-let's examine the documents, let's examine the data, let's assess the eyewitness testimony which we are able to gather on these various questions and then in turn judge them and test them against, one, our juridical system and, two, our own investigatory standards, and let them stand on that basis. That is exactly what I did.

I am glad to see now that at last, over the last several months, the State Department has-you know it forbade the INS from gathering evidence in this area-is now apparently working in conjunction with the Immigration and Naturalization Service on securing data and documents and eyewitess testimony from these areas.

I might add, however, as I will indicate later on, in my view the officials at State are not asking the right questions and they are not vigorously enough pursuing these questions from a basic conceptual point of view. In other words, their questions are perfunctory. Consider the Berlin Document Center in West Berlin is essentially a State Department operation.

I might also point out that not only for myself but other journalists, writers, and authors, the Berlin Document Center has been a source of contention with us for a long while and with the State Department, they are not in any way cooperative. But they are extremely, extremely sensitive to the rights of alleged, even proven Nazi war criminals on whom they have plenty of records.

I offer as witness not only my own assertions on this and they are assertions although I have proven it in my writings and articles, the February 24, 1978 issue of the Miami Herald which carried a byline piece by Steven Miller of the Associated Press, which makes this same point about the Berlin Document Center. I also had exchanges with the BDC and this has been further demonstrated.

I also would like to point out that in conjunction with this, various prosecutors and investigatory bodies in the Federal Republic of Germany, West Germany, have also followed this pattern of delay, protracted delay, evasion, failure to cooperate, particularly with independent researchers, investigators, and writers like myself, and also with the media. That, too, can be verified.

I would like to underscore the impediments and the obstructions, particularly of the State Department because it is my analysis that the State Department is the kernel of this problem. I know the intelligence agencies have a certain glamor, mystery, aura about them which attracts a lot of people's attention. But the basic conceptual hard facts of the matter, largely, in my view, lie in the State Department, right from the beginning of this issue. I am talking about utilization, I am talking about also delays, protracted delays, evasions, and evasiveness.

One final thing. At the invitation of one of the major wire services in this country, I was asked to look into the recent reformulations and reorganizations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to see if it was working better on this matter. I must tell you that in company with another journalist, Mr. Mark Kamen of Texas we examined this for an entire day at the INS last fall. I was struck by two things--

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Allen, are you referring now to

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Castillo's present administration, Mr. Mendelsohn.

Mr. EiLBERG. You are speaking about the litigation unit?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes; the special unit, since its formulation I think in the summer of 1977, and then I think they really got rolling sometime about the fall.

Now, we went there and spent an entire day with those gentlemen, and I have two impressions. Let me first give you the bad news.

I have never seen such a mare's nest of inefficiency, incompetence, and absolute dead level inertia. I am now just talking about this area of administration. This is what Mr. Castillo and his administration have inherited. But I am talking about what I perceived to be the entire operations of the INS there.

Now the GAO report noticed in the form of a complaint that there was no system; system is hardly the word. As of October of 1977, nothing was on a computer in that entire agency, nothing. There was no computerization of any data. I am not just talking about the Nazi war criminal issue, I am talking about any data. To me that was just mind-boggling. When actually, as you know, a systems analyst could go in there, or a team could go in there and in weeks straighten that out and make the Nazi war criminal issue

subject to retrievals and analyses in micro seconds. This has not been done at all.

I was also—I went into one room which Mr. Castillo showed us in order to demonstrate what he had inherited. The sloth, the mismanagement, in terms of management of-from an efficiency point, not a moral point, a total corruption of office management. There were stacks and stacks and stacks in this one large room, as large as this room we are in now, stacks and stacks and stacks of unopened file cabinets and boxes and cardboard cartons, with visa entry applications falling all over the floor and with other just deplorable conditions.

He was trying desperately, this was ll o'clock at night and here the Commissioner himself was up working these hours. I deferred doing a story at that point because I thought on the second aspect of my impressions there. I thought Mr. Castillo and his administration, his staff, namely Mr. Mendelsohn, and Mr. Crossland and their associates, struck me as being very decent, sensitively motivated people.

I have done stories in the past on the INS and I have never been particularly impressed with that agency's qualitative level of operation or conceptual abilities but I do believe that this is a new group and so I deferred doing the story on the basis that they should be given time to see what they can do in a positive way.

I have already indicated that my communications with the Justice Department, State Department, INS, are available—if you would prefer, if you agree I will very gladly enter this into the record of your subcommittee.

Mr. EILBERG. We would like the opportunity to look at those statements. I do not want to assure you that we will put everything in the record.

Mr. ALLEN. I understand. But you can look at them. You are free to enter them into your record for purposes of historical background, which I understand is one of your purposes in gathering together the materials following subsequent to these hearings, is that correct?

Mr. EILBERG. That is correct.

Mr. ALLEN. Fine. Now, I also would like to make one final remark and this is by way of reportage, it is in my new book, that there was a high INS official, served in the INS, I will not name him here, who, according to my information-which is from a very, very fine source that is dependable, experienced, knows what he is talking about—there was a memo written in March 1964 coming from the official who managed the budget and the managerial processes, the administration of the INS for many, many years, telling them to close out all case 2 files; that is, the Nazi war criminals cases.

Now prior to this present administration I tried to ascertain whether or not that was true. I was not able to do so. That is one of the questions I put to the present administration of the INS, and it is a question which I also put to this subcommittee, particularly in view of the fact that the GAO now has apparently agreed to assign, detach persons in the full-time service of the subcommittee.

Mr. ÉILBERG. Departing from that point, once again, Mr. Allen, we appear to be in something of a dilemma. Statements are made,


we know your reputation of integrity, but I think we need something more than just a statement that some high official put a stop to all Nazi investigations, and if you wish to talk privately with us, if you have other information, we would certainly like to have that. But that statement alone I am afraid does not help us very much.

Mr. ALLEN. Oh, I understand. And I can tell you that as indicated by this brief statement I was making to the historical introduction up to the present, this can be demonstrated in other areas too. So that if you will be patient, you can read it in my book.

Now that concludes briefly—and I apologize for its brevity—that concludes the historical introduction by way of my own experience, and I hope it is of use and usefulness to the subcommittee. Do you want me to go to the second section.

Mr. EILBERG. Yes, please.
Mr. ALLEN. Fine.

Mr. EILBERG. We will be running into time problems and if it is possible, if you could shorten your presentation a little bit, we would appreciate it. We can accept of course further statements for the record, as you might wish to write to us.

Mr. ALLEN. Yes; you may reject or accept anything you wish, of course.

The second part I also—I apologize in advance, but it is going to take time to develop certain of the things I am going to say, certain things I am going to adduce and certain of the conclusions I will necessarily reach from the basis of my own analysis.

It just so happens, and I do mean just so happens, it is entirely coincidental, that starting last February I prepared massive Freedom of Information Act requests of 13 agencies of the U.S. Government. They include the following: Department of State; the DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency; the ONI of the Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence; Air Force, A-2; Department of the Army; Office of the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury; the National Security Council; the National Security Agency; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and the current International Communications Agency; Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty; the CIA; and the FBI.

Here is the four-page letter which I am sending to each of these individuals agencies indicating the specific nature and the general nature of my FOIA requests. This is a sample copy. [Referring to letter which was submitted to the subcommittee.]

I will be mailing these at the end of this week. I have included the following four elements in these remarks and I would like to briefly describe to you what they are and then give to you samplings from each of those areas that might be helpful and useful to the work of this subcommittee.

I must add at the outset, however, that these are all copyrighted materials. As a matter of fact, they will be parts of my book, so that they are copyrighted. But, on the other hand, in discussion with my own attorneys and in discussions with the Copyright Patent Office, I will perhaps be in a position that these things may properly be examined by others, including your subcommittee.

The first I call annex 1, these are going to be annexes in my book. As you know, since 1973 there have been several so-called lists of accused or reported Nazi war criminals residing in the United States. That is the official title which the INS has used since 1973 up until recently. There is now another system which Mr. Mendelsohn has introduced, it still amounts to a list. I know of and have secured at least seven of those lists and they will be put in as annexes to my own work. I find most of the lists, by the way, pretty sloppily drawn up and pretty ineffectual. You have to do an awful lot of work to understand them.

Annex 1 of my FOIA request to these agencies includes what I call individuals; naturalized or resident aliens. It amounts from A to literally Z, to 149 individual names, including cases and records of these individuals. It includes wherever possible their date and place of birth, their date and port of entry into the United States, their date of naturalization, a brief description in what you lawyers call a fair description of what is charged against the individual, a brief reference to the documents involved-because my book itself and my work itself go into each of these documents; also their present whereabouts in the United States, wherever possible. Fully 80 percent of this list is sound and accurate in those terms.

Of these 149 individuals, there is evidential material ranging from actual documents which will stand up substantively-namely, letters from the CIA, letters from the Justice Department, letters from the State Department-showing a relationship, an involvement by these individuals with these agencies. These 149 individuals have, when you take them collectively, been charged with the responsibility of genocidal participation amounting to some 2.4 million people during the period 1941 to 1945.

Mr. EILBERG. Did I understand you to say that all 149 had some involvement with the Federal agencies?

Mr. ALLEN. In one way or another, there is evidential materialby evidential materials I mean documents and also assertions on the part of some of the individually accused war criminals themselves.

Mr. EILBERG. The materials show the identification, working relationships with various agencies?

Mr. ALLEN. Or asserted relationships.
Ms. HOLTZMAN. May I ask a question?
Mr. EILBERG. Ms. Holtzman.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Is the witness referring to Freedom of Information Act material requests that have not yet been sent or is he referring to the materials he has received back in response to these requests?

Mr. ALLEN. Oh, no; I have not yet sent my FOIA request. I am saying this is the basis for the FOIA request.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ALLEN. Now I am not of course going to sit here and go through 149 names, but I have selected a dozen cases which I will identify by Nos. 1 through 12. As I said before, this is where I have problems with your rules because I myself would not do this.

I wonder if I might get a glass of water. Would that be all right?
But I would like to also point out that the second part-
Mr. EILBERG. Wait just a moment.

You referred to items 1 through 12. What did they represent for the purpose of the record? You said you had certain cases Nos. 1 through 12.

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