CHAPTER X. THE NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA SYSTEMS. THE NYAYA SYSTEM. In the Nyâya System, Gotama, its reputed author, asks himself two questions: What are the subjects on which "right notions" are indispensable? and what are the means by which they can be obtained? He begins with the means, or instruments, for which the Sanskrit word is pramána. These instruments he declares to be — "1. Knowledge which has arisen from the contact of a sense with its object (that is, with the elements). 2. Inference of three sorts,-à priori, à posteriori, and from analogy. "3. Comparison; and 4. Knowledge verbally communicated, which may be of 'that whereof the matter is seen,' and of that whereof the matter is not seen,' (revelation.)" The prameya, or objects about which it is indispensable to have knowledge, are next treated of. These are:-the soul; body; five organs of sensation and their corresponding objects; understanding, manas, or the organ of imagination and volition; activity; faults or failings which cause activity (viz., affection, aversion, and bewilderment); transmigration; fruit or retribu Chambers' Encyclopædia, art. "Nyâya." PROOF. DOUBT. MOTIVE. 171 tion, or that which accrues from activity and failings; pain, and absolute deliverance or emancipation. We must content ourselves in this sketch with conveying an idea of the maner in which Gotama defines the first four. Soul (átman) is the site of knowledge or sentiment; it is infinite, eternal. Souls are numerous, but the Supreme Soul is one. It is demonstrated as the creator of all things. Knowledge, volition, desire, aversion, pain, pleasure, severally and collectively, argue the existence of soul. They are not universal attributes, as number, quantity, &c.,-common to all substances; but are peculiar qualities, apprehended only by one organ. They have a distinct substratum, which is neither substance, as heretofore understood, nor space, nor time. This substratum is the living soul, jîvátman, the animating spirit of each individual. This individual soul is infinite and eternal, and experiences the fruit of its deeds, whether pain or pleasure.1 Gotama's definition of body (sarira) is, that it is earthy, but not composed of the three elements, nor the four, nor the five; It is the seat of the soul's enjoyment, for it is the seat not merely of motion, but of effort or action, tending to the attainment of what is pleasing, and to the removal of what is displeasing. Organs of sensation (indriya), are next defined as "instruments of knowledge, conjoined to the body and imperceptible to the senses." Some of the observations on these senses are notable, as, in reference to sight, Gotama does not consider the pupil of the eye to be the organ of sight, but "a ray of light proceeding from the pupil of the eye towards the object viewed, is the visual organ." And so also in reference to hearing, "the outer ear or opening of the auditory passage" is not the organ of hearing, but, "ether contained in the cavity of the ear, and communicating by intermediate ether with the object heard.” 2 Objects of sensation (artha), corresponding with the indriya, 'Chambers' Encyclo., 1. 1.. Colebrooke, Misc. Ess., vol. i. pp. 267-8. are the qualities of earth, viz., odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and sound. Having determined what kind of evidence is to be admitted as proof, and what are the objects concerning which proof or right notions are indispensable for future bliss, Gotama proceeds to investigate the method by which doubt is removed and certainty is obtained. Doubt (sansaya), he says, may be caused "from unsteadiness in the recognition, or by the non-recognition of some mark, which, if we were sure of its presence or absence, would determine the subject to be so or so, or not to be so or so ; but it may also arise from conflicting testimony." "But how," in the words of Dr. Ballantyne, "is a man to get out of doubt? He will be content to remain in doubt if there be no motive for inquiring further." Gotama proceeds therefore to describe motive, prayojana, as that by which a person is moved to action. "It is the desire of attaining pleasure, or of shunning pain, or the wish of exemption from both; for such is the purpose or impulse of every one in a natural state of mind." He next defines drishtánta, a familiar instance. It is, according to him, a topic on which, in controversy, both disputants consent; or "that in regard to which a man of an ordinary and a man of a superior intellect entertain the same opinion." By the aid of such example the assertion of the proposition establishes, as he believes, a tenet or dogma, Siddhanta. This tenet may, however, be "a tenet of all the schools," that is, universally acknowledged, or "a tenet peculiar to some school," that is, partially acknowledged; or "a hypothetical dogma," that is, one which rests on the supposed truth of another dogma; or "an implied dogma," that is, one the correctness of which is not expressly proved, but tacitly admitted by the Nyâya. 'Chambers, 1. 1. p. 14. Colebrooke, 1. 1. vol. i. p. 291. 2 Colebrooke, vol. i. p. 291. Cham bers' Encyclo., 1. 1. p. 14. Dr. Ballantyne, in the Benares "Pandit," vol. i. p. 50. STEPS TO TRUTH. INFERENCE. 173 A tenet, however, is supposed to require a syllogistic proof. Gotama proceeds, therefore, to examine the nature of such a proof, and being thus led to an examination of the nature of discussion in general, enters into a detailed account of the various modes in which a discussion may be carried on. The definitions he gives, on this occasion, of the different sorts of discussion,-in which the object of the disputant is not truth, but victory,—are not the least interesting part of his treatise.1 Even the bare outline here given shows Gotama's peculiar mental power, and practical mode of dealing with the deepest questions which affect the human mind. He tries to discover man's place in the universe; and to do this correctly, he carefully examines the tools or instruments proper for the attainment of truth. His conclusions on one subject or another may be rejected; but his clearness of aim, and his distinct perception of right means towards its attainment, continue to be the invaluable guide of successive generations. It has been remarked, that "the great prominence given by the Nyâya to the method, by means of which truth might be ascertained, has sometimes misled European writers into the belief that it is merely a system of formal logic; but far from being restricted to mere logic, the Nyâya was intended to be a complete system of philosophical investigation, and dealt with some questions, such as the nature of the intellect, articulated sound, genus, variety, and individuality in a manner so masterly as well to deserve the notice of European philosophers."? The prominence, however, which Gotama himself gives to the method of reasoning, and the general interest which attaches to it, render it desirable that we should recur to it with greater detail. But before doing so we must note, that whilst European logic employs phrascology founded on classification, the Nyâya 1 Dr. Ballantyne, in "The Pandit," 2 Chambers' Encyclopædia, art. "Ny vol. i. p. 50. Chambers' Encyclopædia, | âya,” p. 14. art. "Nyâya," p. 14. system makes use of terms upon which a classification would be based. The one infers that "kings are mortal," because they belong to the class of mortal beings. The other arrives at the same conclusion, because mortality is inherent in humanity, and humanity is inherent in kings. way This difference may not seem to be in itself of great importance, but not to understand it would throw unnecessary difficulty in the of those who desire free and confidential interchange of thought with enlightened Hindus, on those subjects which are most deeply interesting to our common nature. Dr. Ballantyne says: "What we wish to impress in regard to this is, the necessity (if both parties wish to understand each other) of acquiring readiness and dexterity in transforming the one phraseology into the other; for a person habituated to the one form finds the other at first both repulsive and perplexing, because the rules which he has previously been accustomed to trust to, do not apply directly to the form of expression propounded, and are of no use to him till he has got the matter into the shape in which it might have been advantageously presented to him at the outset. The European logician will have no difficulty in bringing to the test of his own rules a statement presented to him in any intelligible shape by a pandit, or anyone else; but he will place a needless obstacle in the way of his own argument if he leaves to a pandit the task of doing the same thing for himself."1 The proposition given above would, as we have seen, be stated by a European logician as, "All men are mortal;" by a Hindu as, "Where there is humanity there is mortality." The process of reasoning is the same; but whilst the European is assisted by the abstract idea of class, the Hindu makes use of what in Sanskrit is termed vyapti.' This word indicates that inherent con 'Dr. Ballantyne, in the Benares Mag., vol. i. (1849), reprinted in the "Pandit,' vol. i. 22. p. "It is difficult," says Dr. Röer, "to find an adequate word in English for this term, "vyâpti." It means, literally, pervading inherence, but is only used in the philosophical systems to de note logical relations in a proposition fit to form the major term or member |