Intimate relation (samaraya) is constant connection. It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are those of which two the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts, qualities and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, difference and eternal substances.

Antecedent non-existence (prágabháva) is without beginning, and has no end. Such is the non-existence of an effect previously to its production. Destruction (pradhwansa) has a beginning and no end. (Such is the non-existence) of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) is that the counterentity whereof is considered independently of the three times (past, present, and future). For example (such is the non-existence in the instance where it is remarked, that) there is not a jar on the ground. Mutual nonexistence or difference (anyonyábháva) is that the counterentity whereof is considered with reference to the relation of identity. For example (such difference is referred to when it is remarked that) a jar is not a web of cloth.

Since everything is properly included under the categories that have been now stated, it is established that there are only seven categories.

This Compendium of Logical Results was composed by the learned Annam Bhatta, in order to perfect the acquaintance of students with the opinions of Kanada and of the Nyâya.

Thus is the Tarka-sangraha completed.

CHAPTER XI.

THE MIMANSA SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

MIMANSA is the collective name of two of the six divisions of Hindu philosophy. The word is derived from the Sanskrit man, and implies that the authors of these works have investigated (or decided) the meaning of the Vedas. There are two Mîmânsâs. The Pûrva-Mîmânsâ and the Uttara-Mîmânsâ, the latter being universally known as the Vedanta, whilst the former is simply called Mîmânsâ. The terms púrva and uttara mean former and latter, and have been supposed to indicate that the one work was older than the other. These terms do not, however, apply to the relative ages of the two Mîmânsâs, but to that of the sacred books which they "investigate." The Pûrva-Mîmânsâ especially treats of Brahmanic ritual and sacrifice as promulgated in the Sanhitâs and Brahmanas; whilst the Uttara-Mîmânsâ (known as the Vedanta) treats of the nature of God and the soul as taught in the Aranyakas and Upanishads, which are a later portion of the Vedas.

The Pûrva-Mîmânsâ is always ranked by Hindu writers as one of the six philosophical systems, but it is not philosophy according to the sense in which Europeans use the word. It is not "concerned with the nature of the absolute or with the human mind,

nor with the various categories of existence in general,” which are the subjects of all the other Darsanas. The reputed founder of this system is Jaimini, of unknown date. He taught it in twelve books, each subdivided into four chapters, except the 3rd, 6th, and 10th books, which contain eight chapters each.1

It appears to have been written after a variety of schools and theories had, by their different interpretations, endangered a correct or, at any rate, an authoritative understanding of Vedic texts; and it labours, therefore, to show that discrepancies between such texts are merely apparent. Its object is wholly religious, but the method adopted imparts to it a higher character than that of a mere Vedic commentary. Its topics "are arranged according to certain categories, such as authoritativeness, indirect precept, concurrent efficacy, co-ordinate effect, &c." It treats, moreover, incidentally, and, for the sake of argument, of some subjects which belong rather to the sphere of philosophic thought, as "the association of articulate sound with sense, the similarity of words in different languages, the inspiration or eternity of the Veda, the invisible or spiritual operation of pious acts, &c."

We will endeavour to give an idea of its character by a few quotations. Its first Section is on Duty.2

"Aph. 1. Next, therefore, (O student, that thou hast attained thus far) a desire to know Duty (dharma) is to be entertained by thee.

"Aph. 2. A matter that is a Duty is recognised by the instigatory character (of the passage of scripture in which it is mentioned).

Aph. 3. An examination of the cause of (our recognising) it (viz., Duty, is to be made)."

The fourth Aphorism explains that knowledge acquired through the organs of sense is not the cause, "because (the organs of sense are adapted only to) the apprehension of what is (then and

1 Knight's Encyclo., art. “Sanskrit Literature" (by Dr. Rost). Chambers' Encyclo., art. “Miîmânsâ" (by Dr. Goldstücker).

2 Chambers' Encyclo., art. "Mîmâusâ.”

there) existent (which an act of Duty is not)." The fifth Aphorism proceeds to show that "the natural connection of a word with its sense" is the instrument whereby knowledge of Duty is acquired, for the intimation of Scripture is "unerring, though given in respect of something imperceptible." And this is stated to be the opinion also of Bâdarâyana, the author of the Vedanta Aphorisms. The commentator gives several arguments and examples to prove that the senses are fallible, whilst Scripture is infallible, and concludes the Section with the following words: "but the injunction, 'He that desireth paradise should solemnise the Agnihotra sacrifice,' never at any time, past, present, or future, is liable thus to wander from the truth; therefore is it, independently of anything else, the clear evidence of a duty."

The subject of the second Section is the Eternity of Sound.

It commences by referring to the preceding Aphorism with its commentary, which it says declares "that the connection between a word and its sense is eternal."

"Aph. 6. Some say that it (viz., Sound) is a product, for in the case of it we see (what constitutes it such).”

And

Some," we are told, means the followers of the Nyaya system, who contend that Sound is not eternal, for the following reason.' "Aph. 7. Because of its transitoriness.

"Aph. 8. Because we employ (when speaking of Sound) the expression 'making.'

"Aph. 9. From its simultaneousness in another person.

“Aph. 10. Aud (the Naiyâyikas infer that Sound is not eternal, from the observation) of the original and altered forms (of sounds)."

The word dadhyatra (i.e. "milk-here") is given as an example; the original form was dadhi atra, the change being in the shape of the letter y, which replaces the original letter i.

"Aph. 11. And, by a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it.

“Aph. 12. But alike (according to both opinions-that of these objectors and of ourselves) is the perception thereof, (both agreeing that this is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to Sound itself being so)."1

Several Aphorisms follow which assert that "Sound is proved to be eternal," and Aph. 21 adds: "by there being no ground for anticipation (of its destruction).

The "eternity of language," and "the eternity of Scripture," is the real point of interest, and the argument for it is continued in the third Section. On the nature of sentences, Aphorism 27 states: "That some have declared the Vedas to be recent, because there are the names of men in it." Here again 66 some refers to the Naiyâyikas, and their argument is met by explaining that the "names" in question were the names of men who "read" or "studied" special sections afterwards called after them, &c., &c.

Mr. Ward gives, as "the opinion of a sage of the school of Jaimini," that "God is simple sound; to assist the pious, in the forms of meditation (incantations), he is represented as light; but the power of liberation lies in the sound God-God. When the repeater is perfect, the incantation, or name repeated, appears to the repeater in the form of simple light or glory." 2

The Pûrva-Mîmânsâ is so strictly Brahmanical that it necessarily proves less attractive to Europeans than works treating on subjects of more universal interest. Neither does it appear to be so much studied in India as the other five works which are called Darsanas. "A few years ago," however, Mr. Ward says, in his edition published in 1820, "Bodhimanda Ghanendra Swâmin, a very learned Brahman, born in Drâvira (a Dandin), visited Bengal and gave lectures" on the Pûrva-mîmânsâ, in Calcutta. "A pupil of his, Shobha Shâstrin, at present one of the pandits in the Sudder Dewani Court at Calcutta, is perhaps the best ac

Ballantyne, Mimânsâ Aphorisms.

2 Ward's View, vol. iv. p. 291.