"(1) Sales of property for future delivery, with the bona fide intention and obligation to make actual delivery, are lawful contracts; but, if under the form of such a contract the real intent be merely to specu late upon the rise and fall of prices, and the goods are not to be delivered, but the contract to be settled on the basis of difference of prices, the transaction is a wager and is non-actionable.

"(2) In order to affect the contract the alleged illegal intent must have been mutual, and such intent by one party, not concurred in by the other, will not avail.

"(3) The law presumes lawful purpose until the contrary is proved, and when one party charges illegal intent the burden of proof is imposed upon him.

"(4) The validity of the contract depends upon the state of things existing at its date, and is not affected by subsequent agreements under which the parties voluntarily assent to a settlement on the basis of differences.

"(5) The mere fact that at the date of his contract the vendor had not the goods and had made no arrangements for obtaining them, and had no expectation of receiving them unless by subsequent purchase, does not suffice to impair the contract. The contrary doctrine once announced is now thoroughly overruled.

"(6) It follows that the failure to identify the particular goods sold does not affect the matter, because the sale is not of ascertained articles but of articles of a designated kind, quantity to be selected thereafter, which is a lawful contract when the obligations are reciprocal."

The difficulties so clearly stated by Justice Fenner arise every time the attempt is made to prevent corners by law. It is not probable that trading in futures and the making up of corners on food products, or on products of manufacture, create or bring about industrial depression, but they are often serious aggravating accompaniments of such depres sion, and as such should be regulated, if it is in the power of law so to do, and it is to be hoped that some efficient means may be found which shall destroy the ability of men to work public harm through such kinds of speculation.

The Establishment of Boards of Arbitration to Settle Industrial Difficulties.-Industrial arbitration, and, in fact, all arbitration, is the result of high moral perception of right and wrong in the parties resorting to it. The laws of most states, if not all, offer facilities for the settlement of suits at law by sending the matter, on proper agreement of the parties involved, to a referee or referees, the decision of the referee or referees, when entered on the records of a court, having the binding force of a judgment by that court. To reach such a reference or arbitration, however, a party aggrieved brings an action in the ordinary way, by which the defendant is brought before a tribunal under the pains and penalties of law. The two parties then are before the court as parties, the defendant, brought there by the process of law served on him by an officer of the court, and he must appear or subject himself to judgment by default. When the two parties are before a court then the law allows them a more speedy way,

if they elect, to settle their difficulties than by trial; that is, by sub mitting the matter to a referee or referees. The adjustment of industrial difficulties in this way could have but one result, which, although an indirect result, would have all the features of a direct judg ment at law. If the employer or the employés in an industrial establishment, feeling that they have cause of complaint, either against the other, could summon the offending party in the way described before a board of arbitration or any tribunal which might be established for the purpose of settling the difficulty, and after a hearing of all the facts bearing upon the case by both sides, or of ex parte testimony in case the party summoned did not appear, a decision should be entered having any binding force whatever, even for a definite and clearly-defined period, such decision must of necessity carry with it a penalty for nonconformance. The condition of things then leaves the parties in the position, if an employer, of being obliged to manufacture goods under conditions established by law; that is, he must pay wages which the law directs or suffer the penalty; if an employé, he must accept the wages decreed by law, whether too low or otherwise, or incur the penalty imposed. This is simply establishing the rates of wages and prices of goods by law, and is a result which neither the employer nor the employé can for a moment desire, although, without looking to the logical results of a board having the powers designated, such a board is freely demanded as a solution of labor troubles and a remedy for industrial depressions. Now, industrial arbitration, in order to be successful in the least degree, must be purely voluntary on the part of those intending to submit their grievances to the decision of others.. The disposition to submit points in controversy to the decision of parties. outside of those immediately concerned is almost arbitration in itself,. and the parties are not far apart in their opinions. The creation of a board of arbitration by law, for the sake of having convenient machinery ready by which parties can have their differences adjusted by the good offices of arbitrators, would undoubtedly facilitate the growth of the spirit of arbitration, and in this direction the suggested remedy has vital force; but boards of arbitration created by law must be so constituted as not to make them obstacles to industrial peace instead of helps in bringing the workingman and his employer to a higher plane and a better appreciation of each other. It is the highest moral sentiment in man which leads him into arbitration, and when he is possessed of such sentiment he should have every facility given him for its activity. Industrial arbitration has done much in England toward preventing strikes, for in those trades where the men are most thoroughly organ. ized, and where they have adopted or established by voluntary action boards of arbitration, the fewest strikes occur. The English statute relating to the establishment of such boards has not, however, been resorted to in many instances. In fact, to-day it is almost a dead letter, but it stands on the statute book as the reflection of a moral sentiment,

and as such has stimulated the growth of the idea of adjusting difficulties on clearly-constituted and well-defined rights and privileges of both parties to a controversy.

The Contraction of Credit.-A very potent cause in producing financial difficulties, resulting it may be in industrial depres sion-certainly in producing falling prices, the opening symptoms of industrial depression-is the great expansion of credit, and the remedy suggested by some of the bankers of the country of "checking the expansion of credit" has great force, but such check is exceedingly difficult of accomplishment. So far as law is concerned, the most direct way, probably, would be to make the collection of debts more difficult under legal process, thereby stimulating men to depend upon honorable action for the payment of debts and not upon the force of an execution. The difficulty is more in the way of free transaction of business than in practical legal obstacles.

A Sound Currency is often suggested as one of the remedies for industrial depressions, but industrial depressions have occurred with a sound currency existing as well as when the currency was demoralized in any way. The present industrial depression, novel in its completeness, as has been pointed out, not only originated but has progressed along with the existence of what popularly has been considered the finest banking system of the world, and with a currency as stable as coin. It cannot be denied, however, that both inflation and contraction disturb values, and thereby disturb industry, and certainly a sound currency is demanded by labor in order that the laborer may know the value of his earnings at all times, and it is demanded by the producer that he may calculate with reasonable accuracy the cost of production. So, while a sound currency might not prevent an industrial depression or remedy it after it had commenced, it is one of the regulating influences which help largely to modify the severity of any industrial depression. The discussion of purely financial crises or monetary disturbances would develop far different considerations.

Commercial and Mercantile Conditions.-Under this general classification many remedies have been suggested. They nearly all relate to the tariff, ocean transportation, foreign trade, navigation laws, and public works; but under none of the topics suggested in the above general classification of commercial and mercantile is there much if any opportunity for illustration, and the remedies suggested are very largely confined to theoretical views. Nearly all have some bearing on the question, and some an important bearing, but it is diffi cult to see how any of the features suggested under commercial and mercantile remedies could, if adopted, prevent an industrial depression, because industrial depressions occur under the conditions referred to iu such suggestions. The general view under the chapter relating to the manufacturing nations of the world shows clearly the impossibility of preventing or remedying industrial depressions by the adoption of any

of the suggestions under this head. The opening of foreign markets would, of course, relieve this country of its surplus goods, but its surplus would then increase, and the relative position of the United States to the other nations in the family of manufacturing units would remain substantially the same. The increase of ocean transportation at a time when the means of transportation in Great Britain are a burden to that country, would hardly remedy depressions in this or any other commercial or industrial nation. The continuance of a protective tariff, or the abolition of a protective tariff, in the light of the conditions of other countries where as severe or severer depressions prevail than in this, would not remedy the depression nor prevent it. The judicious revision of the tariff, regulating duties on a just and equitable basis, in so far as it removes apprehension and puts all interests on a fairer basis, would be a remedial measure. Nor can a definite settlement of the tariff for a long series of years be accomplished, because changes in condition vary the cost of production, and would disturb any schedule which might be adopted. So far as a wide study of this subject would indicate, it seems that if a tariff having any of the elements whatever of protection in it is to be sustained, it should, as suggested under causes, be adjusted on a basis of the cost of production. Such adjustment would bring stability, would relieve manufacturers of anxiety, would satisfy labor, and would keep the treasury supplied with funds. Practically these are the ends sought, it is presumed, by any adjustment of the tariff, or even by its abolition. Any adjustment on the basis of the cost of production would inevitably result in a constant enlargement of the free list, and in so far would have a moral effect in the community which could not be otherwise than healthful.

The Distribution of Products.-Reform in the methods of distributing supplies would, if rightly directed, bring great relief to consumers. Coöperation, in its distributive form, is suggested as a remedy in this respect; but coöperative distribution is only a half measure, because this method is organized, economized, and made effective for consumers almost entirely, and producers as such are not materially benefited. This has been the case in England, where the Rochdale system has been carried to such magnificent proportions. Under this system the societies, as purchasers, keenly appreciate and follow the rule adopted by the private trader, buying at the lowest possible competition prices, and in their transactions with producers making use of the same expedients as those employed in private trade to drive good bargains and thus swell profits for the benefit of their cus tomers. The maxim that "goods well bought are half sold" is kept constantly in view, and the importance of keen and shrewd buying is so well understood that employés possessing the requisite ability in this direction are highly prized and liberally paid. To the producer, therefore, the system of coöperative distribution offers no special advantages; on the other hand, it tends to lower prices, and in so far as

this is the result depression is aided, so that the work or progress resulting from coöperative distribution may react against consumers sc far as they are producers; and the attempt to remove the middleman from the channels of trade fails. The coöperative stores pay competition prices and manufacture goods at the lowest possible labor cost, but its workmen, unless members of a coöperative store, can have no share in the profits. A recent writer indulges in the following criticism on the system:

"The coöperative wholesale society is a gigantic middleman; in its workshops it pays the lowest of competition wages; in the language of one of the workers in one of the shoe factories, 'the workmen have to work for what they can get; they know there is no true coöperation.' In its transactions with other producers it pays the lowest of competition prices; the profits made out of the retail prices are distributed amongst the members, labor is depressed. In short, it is as far from displaying a single feature of real coöperation as any private trader is who uses the weapons of competition and capitalism for his personal ends, regardless of the interests of others.

"The coöperative labor association, whose principal object is to recognize the combined interests of capital and labor in productive enterprise, is largely composed of members of the coöperative movement. In a conference just held, a resolution was passed asking the committee of the labor association to point out in a fraternal spirit to the wholesale coöperative society the grave injury they are doing to the cause of coöperation by their failure to carry out coöperative principles in their productive works, and to offer their services in placing the wholesale workshops upon a true coöperative basis."" a

So far, then, as relates to removing the evils which it is alleged spring from competition in the distribution of supplies, coöperative societies in England have not yet conspicuously succeeded. This does not, of course, indicate failure, for but little has been attempted in this direction, and the criticism is only introduced here to show that coöperative distribution without the alliance of coöperative production in some form is only a half measure as a remedy for bad distribution. The worst features of the distribution of goods are to be found, of course, in the enhanced price paid for products on account of the existence of intermediate handling by middlemen. A man who weaves cloth for which he receives less than 4 cents a yard as a producer, may have to pay 75 cents a yard as a consumer, the profit to the retailer in such case being at least 25 cents a yard; that is, the retailer, for handling one yard of goods receives 25 cents compensation, where the weaver, for weaving that same yard of cloth received less than 4 cents compensation. This single illustration is sufficient to show how far distribution is at fault in matters of depression and as an obstacle to the best interests of wage-receivers. In the production of goods cost has been greatly reduced by wise distribution of raw material; in fact, such distribution has been almost entirely reformed. The right honorable Mr. Goschen, M. P., in an address before the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in a Distribution Reform, by Thomas Illingworth. Cassell & Co,