of Tarentum, and wrefted from Rome her moft ancient Allies, amongst whom Capua held the firft Rank. This City, by the Fertility of its Soil, advantageous Situation, and the Bleffings of a long Peace, had rofe to great Wealth and Empire. Luxury, and a Flow of Pleasures, the common Attendants on Wealth, had enervated the Minds of her Citizens, who, by a natural Inclination, were but too well difpos'd to receive Impreffions from Luxury and Debauch.

HANNIBAL made Choice of this City for his Winter Quarters. Here it was that his Army, which had fuftain'd the moft irkfome Labours, and rofe fuperior to the most threatening Dangers, fell vanquish'd by Delights and Plenty, into which it plung'd with the greater Eagerness as they were before untry'd and unknown. Its Courage was foften'd to that degree in fo bewitching a Retirement, that all its After-efforts were rather the Confequences of a Reputation acquir'd by former Victories, than the Effects of a prefent and determin'd Valour. When Hannibal march'd his Forces out of this Town, one wou'd have faid that they were, other Men, and not the fame who had fo lately march'd into it. Accustom'd, during the Winter, to commodious Lodgings, to Eafe and Plenty, they were not longer able to struggle with Hunger, Thirft, long Marches, Watchings, and the other Labours' of War: Befides which, all Obedience, all Exactness of Discipline were entirely forgot.

Giseks by their Colonies bad feiz'd almost all the Maritime Coaft, this very Country, with Sicily, obtain'd the Name of Great Greece, & Cluver. Geograph. 1. 3. c. 30.

Ibi partem majorem hiemis exercitum in tectis habuit; adverfus omnia humana mala

fæpe ac diu durantem, bonis inexpertem atque infuerum. Itaque quos nulla mali vicerat vis, perdidere nimia bona ac voluptates immodicæ, & co impenfius, quo avidius ex infolentia in eas fe merferant. Liv. 1. 23. n. 18.

T 3

I ONLY

/ I ONLY transcribe from Livy, who, if he deserves Credit, makes the Stay at Capua a Reproach to Hannibal's Conduct, and pretends that he was here guilty of an Error incomparably greater than when he neglected to march right to Rome after the Battle of Canne. For this Delay, fays Livy, might appear only to have retarded his Victory, whereas this laft Mifmanagement render'd him incapable to overcome. In one word, as Marcellus judiciously faid afterwards, Capua was to the Carthaginians and their General, what a Canne had been to the R mans. There their warlike Genius, their Love of Difcipline, were loft: There their ancient Glory, and their almoft certain Hopes of more to come, difappear'd. And in fact, from this Time the Affairs of Hannibal went faft to Decay, Fortune rang'd herself on the Side of Prudence, and Victory feem'd to be reconcil'd to the Romans.

I KNOW not whether Livy juftly, and with Rea fon, charges the Stay at Capua with all thefe fatal Confequences. When all the Circumftances of this Hiftory are carefully examin'd, it will be no easy Matter to perfuade ourselves, that the little Progrefs afterwards made by the Arms of Hannibal, ought, to be afcrib'd to the Retreat at Capua. It might be a Caufe indeed, but a very inconfiderable one: And the Bravery with which his Forces afterwards fought the Armies of Confuls and Prætors, the Towns which they took in the Sight of the Romans, their Conquefts fo well preferv'd, and Italy kept fourteen Years after without a Poffibility of driving them out; all this inclines us to believe, that Livy has too much exceeded in his tragical Difplays of the Capuan Luxury.

e Illa enim cun&tatio diftuliffe modo victoriam videri potuit, hic error vires ademiffe ad vincendum. Liv. l. 23. n. 18.

d Capuam Annibali Cannas

fuiffe, ibi virtutem bellicam, ibi militarem difciplinam, ibi præteriti temporis famam, ibi. fpem futuri extin&tam. Liv. 1. 23. n. 45.

THE

THE Decay of Hannibal's Affairs was indeed owing to the Want of neceffary Recruits and SucCours from Carthage. After the Oration of Mago, Liv. 1. 23. the Carthaginian Senate came to a Refolution forn. 13. pufhing the Conquefts in Italy, and in order to that, of fending thither a confiderable Reinforcement of Numidian Horfe, forty Elephants, and a thousand Talents; and of hiring in Spain twenty thousand Foot, and four thousand Horfe, to reinforce their Spanish and Italian Armies. Nevertheless, Mago Ibid. n. cou'd prevail for no more than twelve thoufand Foot, 32. and two thousand five hundred Horfe: And even when he was ready to march with an Army fo much inferior to what was promis'd, he was countermanded and dispatch'd to Spain. So that Hannibal, after. all these magnificent Promises, receiv'd neither Infantry, Cavalry, Elephants nor Money, but was left to shift as well as he could. His Army was reduc'd to twenty-fix thousand Foot, and nine thousand Horfe. And how was he qualified, with an Army fo difproportion'd to his Neceffities, to feize in an Enemy's Country all the advantageous Pofts, to keep his new Allies firm to his Interefts, to preserve old Conquefts and make new ones, and to keep the Field with Advantage against two Armies of the Romans recruited every Year? This was the true Caufe of the Declension of Hannibal's Affairs, and of the Ruin of thofe of Carthage. Had we the Place where Polybius delivered himself upon this Matter, we should doubtless fee that he enlarges more upon this Caufe than the Luxuries of Capua.

Affairs of Spain and Sardinia.

Liv. 1. 23. n. 26-30-32-402 41.

THE two Scipios continued in the Command of Spain, and made great Progrefs with their Arms, when Afdrubal, who alone appear'd capable to make Head against them, receiv'd Orders from Carthage to march into Italy to the Relief of his Brother. Before he left Spain, he writ to the Senate, to convince them of the Neceffity of fending a General in his Room, who was fit to be oppos'd to the Romans. Imilco was fent thither with an Army, and Afdrubal put himself upon his March with his own to join his Brother. The firft News of his Departure, threw the greatest Part of Spain into the Hands of the Scipios. These two Generals, animated by this happy Succefs, put themselves in AƐion to hinder his Paffage out of Spain. They confider'd the Danger to which Rome would be expos'd, if, but just able to refift Hannibal alone, fhe fhou'd have upon her Hands the two Brothers at the Head of two powerful Armies. They purfu'd him therefore, and, overtaking, oblig'd him to fight against his Inclination. Afdrubal was overcome, and, far from being capable to continue his March for Italy, he faw himself in no Condition to remain with Safety in Spain.

THE Carthaginians had no better Succefs in Sardinia. Pretending to make Advantage of fome Rebellions excited by them in that Country, they lost twelve thoufand Men in a Battle against the Romans, and had still a greater Number of Prifoners taken, amongst whom were Afdrubal, firnamed Calvus, *Not the Hanno, and Mago*, diftinguifh'd by their Birth and Brother of military Honours.

Hannibal,

but a near Relation.

Liv.

The

The ill Succefs of HANNIBAL. The Sieges of Capua and Rome.

Liv. l. 23. n. 41—46. 7. 25. n. 22. l. 26. n. 5—16.

After Hannibal's Stay at Capua, the Carthaginian Affairs in Italy no longer went on with the fame Reputation. M. Marcellus, firit as Prætor, and then as Conful, had a great Share in this Revolution. He harrafs'd Hannibal's Army without Intermiffion, depriv'd him of his Quarters, oblig'd him to raise Sieges, and beat him in feveral Rencounters, fo that at Rome he obtained the Name of her Sword, as Fabius had before that of her Buckler. But the moft fenfible Difgrace to the Carthaginian General, was that of seeing Capua befieg'd by the Romans. To preferve his Reputation amongst his Allies, by a vigorous Support of those who held the chiefelt Rank as fuch, he flew to the Relief of that City, brought his Forces up, fell upon the Romans, and fought feveral Battles to oblige them to raise the Siege. At laft feeing all his Measures defeated, he march'd haftily to Rome to make a powerful Diverfion. He defpair'd not, if he could in the first Confternation feize any Part of the City, of drawing the Roman Generals with all their Armies from the Siege of Capua to the Relief of their Capital; at leaft he flattered himself, that if, in Continuance of the Siege, they divided their Forces, their Weaknefs might offer an Occafion, either to the Capuans or himself, of fighting and beating them. Rome was ftruck, but not confounded. Upon a Propofal of one of the Senators to recall all the Forces to the Relief of Rome, Fabius reprefented the Shame of

e Fabius Maximus abfcedi a Annibalis, flagitiofum ducebat. Capua, terrerique & circumagi Liv. l. 26, n. 8.

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