descendants of Cain the following names: Enoch, Irad, Mehujael, Methusael, Lamech, Gen. 4, 17, 18; and later among the descendants of Seth these similar ones: Enoch, Methuselah, Lamech, Gen. 5, 21-25. See Dr. Robinson's Greek Harmony of the Gospels, p. 183-187.

NO. II. See § 67.

The Traditions of the Elders were unwritten ordinances of indefinite antiquity, the principal of which, as the Pharisees alleged, were delivered to Moses in the mount, and all of which were transmitted through the High Priests and Prophets, down to the members of the great Sanhedrim in their own times; and from these, as the Jews say, they were handed down to Gamaliel, and ultimately to Rabbi Jehudah, by whom they were digested and committed to writing, toward the close of the second century. This collection is termed the Mishna; and in many cases it is esteemed among the Jews as of higher authority than the law itself. In like manner, there are said to be many Christians, at the present day, who receive ancient traditionary usages and opinions as authoritative exponents of Christian doctrine. They say that the preached gospel was before the written gospel; and that the testimony of those who heard it is entitled to equal credit with the written evidence of the Evangelists; especially as the latter is but a brief record, while the oral preaching was a more full and copious announcement of the glad tidings. These traditions, both of the Jewish and the Christian Church, seem to stand in pari ratione, the arguments in favor of the admissibility and effect of the one, applying with the same force, in favor of the other. All these arguments may be resolved into two grounds, namely, contemporaneous practice subsequently and uniformly continued; and contemporaneous declarations, as part of the res geste, faithfully transmitted to succeeding times. It is alleged that those to whom the law of God was first announced, best knew its precise import and meaning, and that therefore their interpretation and practice, coming down concurrently with the law itself, is equally obligatory.

But this argument assumes what cannot be admitted; for it still remains to be shown that those who first heard the law, when orally announced, had any better means of understanding it than those to whom the same words were afterwards read. The Ten Commandments were spoken in the hearing of Aaron and all the congregation of Israel; immediately after which they made and worshipped a golden calf. Surely this will not be adduced as a valid contemporaneous exposition of the second commandment. The error of the argument lies in the nature of the subject. The human doctrine of contemporaneous exposition is applicable only to human laws and the transactions of men, as equals, and not to the laws of God. Among men, when their own language is doubtful and ambiguous, their own practice is admissible, to expound it; because both the language and the practice are but the outward and visible signs of the meaning and intention of one and the same mind and will, which inward meaning and intention is the thing sought after. It is on the same ground, that where a statute, capable of divers interpretations, has uniformly been acted upon in a certain way, this is held a sufficient exposition of its true intent. In both cases it is the conduct of the parties themselves which is admitted to interpret their own language; expressed, in cases of contract, by themselves in person, and in statutes, through the me dium of the legislators, who were their agents and representatives; and in both cases, it is merely the interpretation of what a man says, by what he docs. But this rule has never been applied, in the law, to the language of

any other person than the party himself; never, to the command or direction of his superior or employer. And even the language of the parties, when it is contained in a sealed instrument, is at this day held incapable of being expounded by their actions, on account of the greater solemnity of the instrument. See Baynham v. Guy's Hospital, 3 Vesey's Rep. 295. Eaton v. Lyon, Ibid. 690, 694. The practice of men, therefore, can be no just exponent of the law of God. If they have mistaken the meaning of his command from the beginning, the act of contravention remains a sin in the last transgressor, as well as the first; for the word of God cannot be changed or affected by the gloss of human interpretation.

The other ground, namely, that the testimony of those who heard Jesus and his apostles preach, is of equal authority with the Scriptures, being contemporaneous declarations, and parts of the res geste, and therefore admissible in aid of the exposition of the written word, is equally inconsistent with the sound and settled rules of law respecting writings. When a party has deliberately committed his intention and meaning to writing, the law regards the writing as the sole repository of his mind and intention, and does not admit any oral testimony to alter, add to, or otherwise affect it. The reasons for this rule are two; first, because the writing is the more solemn act, by the party himself, designed to prevent mistake, and to remain as the perpetual memorial of his intention; and, secondly, because of the great uncertainty and weakness of any secondary evidence. For no one can tell whether the by-standers heard precisely what was said, nor whether they heard it all, nor whether they continued to remember it with accuracy until the time when they wrote it down or communicated it to those who wrote it; to say nothing of the danger of their mixing up the language of the speaker with what was said by others, or with their own favorite theories. And where the witnesses were not the original auditors of what was said, no one knows how much the truth may have suffered from the many channels through which it has passed, in coming from the first speaker to the last writer or witness. On all these accounts, the law rejects oral testimony of what the parties said, in regard to anything that has already been solemnly committed to writing by the parties themselves, and rejects the secondary evidence of hearsay, when evidence of an higher degree, as, for example, a written declaration of the party, can be obtained.

Now, inasmuch as the writings of the Evangelists and Apostles were penned under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, why should not the documentary evidence of the Gospel, thus drawn up by them, be treated with at least as much respect, as other written documents? If they were inspired to write down those great truths for a perpetual memorial to after ages, then this record is the primary evidence of those truths. It is the word of God, penned by his own dictation, and sealed, as it were, with his own seal. If it were a man's word and will, thus solemnly written, no verbal or secondary evidence could be admitted, by the common law, to explain, add to, or vary it; nothing could be engrafted upon it; nor could any person be admitted to testify what he heard the party say, in regard to what was written. The courts would at once reject all such attempts, and confine themselves strictly to the writing before them, the only inquiry being as to the meaning of the language contained in that document, and not as to what the party may elsewhere have spoken. The law presumes that the writing alone is the source to which he intended that resort should be had, in order to ascertain his meaning. But by calling in the fathers, with their traditions, to prove what Christ and his Apostles taught, beyond what is solemnly recorded in the Scriptures, the principle of this plain and sound rule of law is violated; resort is had to secondary evidence of the truths of our religion, when the primary evidence is already at hand; and the pure fountain is deserted for the muddy stream.

NO. III. See § 137.

The use of the word testament, (diatheke,) in a sense involving also the idea of a covenant, and in connexion with the circumstances of a compact, has greatly perplexed many English readers of the Bible. The difficulty occurs in Matth. 26. 28, and the parallel places, where our Lord employs the word testament, or last will, in connexion with the sacrificial shedding of his own blood; a ceremony which, by means of a suitable animal, usually was adopted among the ancients, upon the making of the most solemn engagements; and instead of which, the mutual partaking of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, by the contracting parties, was substituted among Christians in later times. The same embarrassment occurs, perhaps in a greater degree, in the exposition of several passages in the eighth and ninth chapters of the Epistle to the Hebrews, (manifestly written by a profound lawyer, be he Paul or Apollos,) where he uses language applicable indifferently both to a covenant inter vivos and a last will. For with us, a testament is simply a declaration of the last will of the testator, in regard to the disposition of his property after his decease, irrespective of any consent or even knowledge, at the time, on the part of him to whom the estate is given; while a covenant requires the mutual consent of both parties, as essential to its existence. The one is simply the ultima voluntas of an individual, the other is the aggregatio mentium of both or all.

The solution of this difficulty belongs rather to theologians, whose province it is by no means intended here to invade ; but perhaps a reference to the laws and usages in force in Judea in the times of our Saviour and his Apostles may furnish some aid, which a lawyer might contribute without transgressing the limit of his profession.

It is first to be observed that the municipal laws of Greece and Rome were strikingly similar; those of Greece having been freely imported into the Roman jurisprudence. In like manner, the similarity of the Grecian laws and usages with those extant in Asia Minor, indicated a common origin; and thus, what Greece derived from Egypt and the states of Asia Minor, these states, after many ages, received again as the laws of their Roman masters. It should also be remembered that Palestine had been reduced to a Roman province some years before the time of our Saviour; long enough, indeed, to have become familiar with Roman laws and usages, even had they been previously unknown; and that Paul, to whom the Epistle to the Hebrews is generally attributed, was himself a thorough-bred lawyer, well versed in the customs of his country, whether ancient or modern. Among those nations, the civil magistrate often exercised the functions of the priesthood, these dignities being in some respects identical; and thus, whatever was transacted before the magistrate, might naturally seem to partake of the character of an act of religion. Covenants were always made with particular formalities, and to those of graver nature, religious solemnities were often superadded. They were frequently confirmed by an oath, the most solemn form of which was taken standing before the altar; and whosoever swore by the altar, swore by the sacrifice thereon, and was held as firmly bound as though he had passed between the dismembered parts of the victim. Of the latter kind was the oath, by which God confirmed his covenant with Abraham, (Gen. xv.) when the visible light of his presence passed between the pieces which the patriarch had divided and laid "each piece one against another."

With these things in view, we may now look at some of the modes of transferring property, practised by the nations alluded to.

Among the methods of alienation or sale of property by the owner, in his lifetime, was that which in the Roman law was termed mancipatio; a mode by which the vendor conveyed property to the purchaser, each party being

present, either in person, or by his agent, representative, or factor. Five witnesses were requisite, one of whom was called libripens, or the balance-holder. This form had its origin in the sale of goods by weight, but was gradually extended to all sales; and the practice was for the buyer to strike the balance with a piece of money called a sestertius, which was immediately paid over to the vendor as part of the price; and hence the expression per as et libram vendere.

Wills or testaments were made with great solemnity. One method among the Romans, probably common, in its principal traits, to the other nations before mentioned, was termed the testament per as et libram, it being effected in the form of a sale. This mode seems to have been resorted to whenever the estate was given to a stranger, (hæres extraneus,) to the exclusion of the hæres suus, or necessarius, or, as we should say, the heir at law; and it was founded on a purchase of the estate by the adopted heir, who succeeded to the privileges of the child. The forms of a sale by mancipatio were therefore scrupulously observed; the presence and agreement of the purchaser, either in person or by his representative or negotiator, being necessary to its validity. The reason for requiring this form was because it involved a covenant on the part of the adopted heir or legatee, by which he became bound to pay all the debts of the testator. Having entered into this covenant, he had the best possible title in law to the inheritance, namely, that of a purchaser for a valuable consideration. Among the Greeks, and probably among the Romans also, this was transacted in the presence of a magistrate, who sanctioned it by his sentence of approval. This was the most ancient form of a will; and it does not seem to have been abrogated until the time of Constantine.

expression And if so, Does it in

Now, when our Saviour speaks of the new testament in his blood, or of his blood of the new testament, and when Paul uses similar forms of may not the figure have reference to the custom above stated? may not this custom guide us to the true meaning of the words? timate to us that the promised inheritance was first given to man, as it were by a testament in this ancient form, upon a covenant of his own perfect obedience to every part of the law of God; that having broken this covenant, his title became forfeited; that the inheritance was afterwards promised, in the same manner, to every one, Jew or Gentile, upon a new covenant and condition, namely, of a true faith in Christ; a faith evinced in the fruits of a holy life; that this inheritance by a new testament and covenant was negotiated, as it were, and obtained for man by the mediation of Jesus Christ, ("the mediator of the new testament," Heb. 9. 15,) as the representative of all who should accept it by such faith, and their surety for the performance of its conditions; that it was purchased by his obedience and solemnized by the sacrifice of himself as the victim?

This solution is suggested with much diffidence. That it carries these passages clear of all difficulty is not pretended. The very nature of the subject renders it difficult of illustration by any reference to human affairs; and the embarrassment is proportionally increased, whenever the simile is pressed beyond its principal point of resemblance.

See Ayliffe's Pandect, pp. 349, 393, *367-*369. Book iii. tit. xii. xv. Leges Atticæ, De Testamentis, &c. tit. vi. S. Petit. Comm. in Leges Attic. p. 479-481. Justin. Inst. lib. 2. tit. 10, § 1. Ibid. tit. 19, § 5, 6. Cooper's Justinian, p. 487. Cod. lib. 6. tit. 23, 1. 15. Fuss's Roman Antiq. ch. 1, § 87, 97, 103, 107, 183. Michaelis, LL. Moses, vol. 4, art. 302. Bp. Patrick, quoted in Bush's Illustrations, p. 254.

NO. IV.

THE TRIAL OF JESUS.

The death of Jesus is universally regarded among Christians as a cruel murder, perpetrated under the pretence of a legal sentence, after a trial, in which the forms of law were essentially and grossly violated. The Jews to this day maintain, that, whatever were the merits of the case, the trial was at least regular, and the sentence legally just; that he was accused of blasphemy, and convicted of that offence by legal evidence. The question between them involves two distinct points of inquiry, namely, first, whether he was guilty of blasphemy; and, secondly, whether the arraignment and trial were conducted in the ordinary forms of law. But there will still remain a third question, namely, whether, admitting that, as a mere man, he had violated the law against blasphemy, he could legally be put to death for that cause; and if not, then whether he was justly condemned upon the new and supplemental accusation of treason or of sedition, which was vehemently urged against him. The first and last of these inquiries it is proposed briefly to pursue; but it will be necessary previously to understand the light in which he was regarded by the Jewish rulers and people, the state of their criminal jurisprudence and course of proceeding, and especially the nature and extent of the law concerning blasphemy, upon which he was indicted.

In the early period of the ministry of Jesus, he does not appear to have excited among the Pharisees any emotion but wonder and astonishment, and an intense interest respecting the nature of his mission. But the people heard him with increasing avidity, and followed him in countless throngs. He taught a purer religion than the Scribes and Pharisees, whose pride and corruption he boldly denounced. He preached charity and humility, and perfect holiness of heart and life, as essential to the favor of God, whose laws he expounded in all the depth of their spirituality, in opposition to the traditions of the elders, and the false glosses of the Scribes and Pharisees. These sects he boldly charged with making void and rejecting the law of God, and enslaving men by their traditions; he accused them of hypocrisy, covetousness, oppression, and lust of power and popularity; and denounced them as hinderers of the salvation of others, as a generation of serpents and vipers, doomed to final perdition. It was natural that these terrific denunciations, from such a personage, supported by his growing power and the increasing acclamations of the people, should alarm the partisans of the ancient theocracy, and lead them to desire his destruction. This alarm evidently increased with the progress of his ministry; and was greatly heightened by the raising of Lazarus from the dead, on which occasion the death of Jesus was definitively resolved on; but no active measures against him seem to have been attempted, until the time when, under the parable of the wicked husbandmen who cast the heir out of the vineyard and slew him, he declared that the kingdom of God should be taken from them, and given to others more worthy. Perceiving that he spake this parable against them, from that hour they sought to lay hands on him, and were restrained only by fear of the popular indignation.

Having thus determined to destroy Jesus at all events, as a person whose very existence was fatal to their own power, and perhaps, in their view, to the safety of their nation, the first step was to render him odious to the people; without which the design would undoubtedly recoil on the heads of its contrivers, his popularity being unbounded. Countless numbers had received the benefit of his miraculous gifts; and it was therefore deemed a vain at

1 See John xi. 47-54.

2 Matth. xxi. 33-46. Mark xxii. 1-12. Luke xx. 9-19.