Eighteen individuals, firms, and corporations are joined as defendants in this suit. Of these, 15 have demurred, and the grounds of these demurrers presented and relied upon in their briefs are as follows:

"(1) The declaration is not sufficiently specific, and does not set forth a cause of action.

"(2) Such action does not survive the death of Simon Frohlich.

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'(3) Simon Frohlich was estopped by reason of the sale of the tangible assets of his business."

The second ground of demurrer relied upon by defendants raises in our opinion the most important question in the case. It requires the construction of the statute under which the action is brought in assumpsit, and upon which plaintiffs rely. The exact question is for the first time before this court. This is Act No. 195 of the Public Acts of 1897, entitled:

"An act to provide for bringing actions of assumpsit in certain cases, and to provide that in such cases the cause of action shall survive."

The entire act reads:

"SEC. 1. In all cases where, by the fraudulent representations or conduct of any person, an injury has been or shall be produced, either to the person, property or rights of another, for which an action on the case for fraud or deceit may by law be brought, an action of assumpsit may be brought to recover damages for such injury, and in all such cases a promise shall be implied by law to pay all just damages arising from such fraud or deceit and may be so declared.

"SEC. 2. The causes of action specified in section one of this act shall, upon the death of the person injured, survive to his personal representatives."

Sections 10421 and 10422, 3 Comp. Laws (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §§ 13954, 13955).

The act in question, as its title indicates, is to provide that certain actions sounding in tort may be brought in assumpsit, and also to provide that in all cases where this may be done the causes of action

shall survive. This presupposes the fact that before the enactment of this statute such actions could not have been brought in assumpsit, nor would the causes of action have survived. It will therefore be necessary, first, to determine the class of actions which may be brought under this statute in assumpsit, from which it will logically follow that all such causes of action will survive.

In this State provision is made for the survival of actions, as follows:

"In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following shall also survive: that is to say: actions of replevin, and trover, actions of assault and battery, false imprisonment, for goods taken and carried away, for negligent injury to persons, for damages done to real or personal estate, and actions to recover real estate where persons have been induced to part with the same through fraudulent representations and deceit." Section 10117, 3 Comp. Laws (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 12761).

To this is added, by the act under consideration, the provisions as quoted in sections 10421, 10422, supra.

All such actions specifically mentioned survive by force of these statutes, whether or not they were assignable at the common law. Rights of action which survive are also assignable. Stebbins v. Dean, 82 Mich. 385-388 (46 N. W. 778).

Section 10117, supra, was adopted by this State verbatim (except the portions italicized) from the State of Massachusetts. In construing this statute, this court, in Stebbins v. Dean, supra, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice GRANT, adopted and followed the construction placed upon it by the Massachusetts courts, holding that the statute "was intended to include only those cases where injury is occasioned to property by the direct wrongful act of a party upon the property," citing Cummings v. Bird, 115 Mass. 346. Wisconsin, following Michigan, adopted the same statute, and in a line of decisions has given to

it a like construction. The same is true of the courts of several of the States.

Upon the construction of this statute, where similar phraseology is used, there appears to be no disagreement among the better authorities.

The contention of the demurring defendants is that by the words of this new act under consideration no change has been made in this respect, and that the rule laid down in the case of Stebbins v. Dean, supra, controls in this case. They insist that the cause of action plaintiffs declare upon essentially sounds in tort, and is based upon an alleged conspiracy entered into by defendants to create and carry out a trust and monopoly, a restriction in trade and commerce in lumber and building material to injure plaintiffs' testator and drive him out of business, in violation of the common law, and of the Michigan anti-trust act, so called, as a result of which conspiracy plaintiffs' testator suffered damage to his business in his lifetime, and that under all the authorities such causes of action do not survive.

The dispute upon this question, then, is narrowed to a single proposition, and that is whether Act No. 195, Pub. Acts 1897, supra, by its express provisions, has made a change in the law by adding to the list of causes of action which survive.

This statute includes all cases arising from injuries produced by the false representations or conduct of any person for which an action on the case for fraud or deceit might be brought at law, and gives the person injured a right to bring an action in assumpsit for such injuries. The nature of the injuries are specified as injuries "either to the person, property or rights of another."

Dealing with the instant concrete case, we must determine whether, upon the facts stated in the declaration, plaintiffs' testator could have brought an action on the case at law for fraud or deceit against

defendants to recover damages for the injury received.

The conduct charged in the declaration by plaintiffs against defendants may, without misnomer, be labeled fraudulent. It may further be said that this declaration was intended to state a cause of action for deceit brought about by fraud. In a similar case the action has been so recognized by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Murray v. Buell, 76 Wis. 657 (45 N. W. 667, 20 Am. St. Rep. 92). This was an action for conspiracy to monopolize the coal business in Milwaukee to the injury of plaintiff's business, referring to which in a later case, Lane v. Frawley, 102 Wis. 373 (78 N. W. 593), that court said:

"That action is in all respects analogous to the action of deceit, resulting in loss and damage."

And of the case then under consideration it said:

"This, then, being a tort action for deceit to recover general damages caused by the fraud, and not to recover back specific property obtained by fraud, it is vigorously debated whether or not it survives."

In both these Wisconsin cases, supra, it was held that the actions did not survive by reason of the Wisconsin statutes which have at no time contained language indicative of the intention that they should survive.

The instant case is a tort action for deceit to recover general damages to the business of plaintiffs' testator caused by fraud during his lifetime, and not to recover damages for injuries to specific tangible property. If a recovery can be had, it will be because this court holds that the right of action survived under the statute in question.

This statute makes provision for a right of action in assumpsit for injuries done "either to the person, property or rights of another." By the addition of the words "or rights of another," it must be held that the clear intent of the legislature was to add to the

actions which survived in this State another class of actions which were not theretofore included, namely: all actions for damages for injuries caused by the fraudulent representations or conduct of any person to the "rights of another."

The damages for which the instant suit has been brought are included in that class, and, as already stated, are damages, not to the specific property of plaintiffs' testator, but to his business. Such injury to his business was an injury to his rights.

The statute of the State of New York provides for the survival of actions for "wrongs done to the property, rights or interests of another." This language has been frequently before the court of last resort of that State for construction. In Cregin v. Railroad Co., 75 N. Y. 192 (31 Am. Rep. 459), Mr. Justice Rapallo, speaking for the court said:

"The rights and interests, for tortious injuries to which this statute preserves the right of action, have frequently been considered, and it is generally conceded that they must be pecuniary rights or interests, by injuries to which the estate of the deceased is diminished. * * * Where an injury to pecuniary interests is shown, the intent of the statute seems plain that the cause of action shall survive, notwithstanding that such injury be caused by a tort, provided it be not one of the torts specifically mentioned and excepted."

That this New York statute declaring that causes of action for injuries to "property, rights and interests shall survive" is much broader than the statutes of Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and the former statute of Michigan is apparent, and is recognized and admitted by defendants in one of their briefs. It is also recognized by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in John V. Farwell Co. v. Wolf, 96 Wis. 10-18 (70 N. W. 289, 290, 37 L. R. A. 138, 65 Am. St. Rep. 22), where the court said: