Instances of sagacity in many other animals might also be collected ;-sufficient to show that when occasion seems to call forth their energies, a display of intellect follows which ought rather to be considered as a matter of course, than of very anomalous occurrence. For these instances of sagacity are too numerous in the brute creation to constitute what may be termed rare exceptions. We might with nearly as much propriety make extraordinary instances of sagacity in our own species, exceptions to the common rule, by taking uncivilized tribes as models from which to form a true estimate of the human character. Animals in the wild state fulfil the intentions of nature more perfectly than man in the civilized. And, again, many animals, when domesticated or trained to useful purposes, and associated with civilized man, display signs of affection, gratitude, and ingenuity, with other noble and excellent traits of character, which, considering they are not bound by the obligation of any moral duties, are truly wonderful.

It would be easy to add anecdotes of many other animals to those I have collected: and I would just repeat the observation, that in contemplating the acts in question, there is every reason to think, the animals are in a good degree conscious of the end and design of such acts, perhaps as much so as many of our fellow creatures are, when lending their assistance to us in the same way. But this cannot be proved: nor can it ever amount to more than a high degree of probability; for the want of artificial signs,

without doubt very wisely, prevents all mental intercourse between man and the brute. So that we can never understand to what degree they are conscious agents, beyond the outward evidence of natural language. If it should be thought by some a mark of the irrational or brute nature not to comprehend the connexion of means and ends and to be unconscious of design, it is on the other hand sufficiently clear, that like the lower animals in many instances, multitudes of our fellow creatures suffer themselves to be employed in various operations, and frequently act without having any clear knowledge of the complicated means or end which the superior understanding, whatever it is, to which they submit themselves, has in view.

How far the words rational and irrational, have been used legitimately, to distinguish man and the brute, I shall not pretend to say. But if I may appeal to such an authority, there appears to me no ground in Scripture for the use of the word Reason, as it is applied in the present day, in this distinguishing sense. It occurs only in Daniel, as a power of the intellect, where it is said "Nebuchadnezar's reason returned unto him:" and the same Hebrew word, two verses before, is translated, Understanding; in other parts, Reason is used for mere argument, or discussion of opinion. Understanding is the term we meet with in Scripture, which refers to something higher than mere human or outward knowledge, and

is generally classed with Wisdom. "Buy wisdom and instruction, and understanding"-" He hath stretched out the heavens by his understanding""The inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding."-" My people have no understanding."

It is clear that the word applies to knowledge, above that which relates to the common concerns of life and, it moreover appears, that a mere reasoning or comparing faculty is not once referred to as the exclusive privilege of man.

I mention these few things to show that so far as we can gather from the use of terms, the Scripture affords us no light by which we can discriminate between the truly intellectual and animal nature, (for I do not now speak of the divine influence in man,) and that the words rational and irrational, as applied specifically to make a formal distinction between man and the brute, with regard to their respective faculties for acquiring outward knowledge, are inventions of the schools, rather by assumption than by proof.

I wish therefore to be understood to say, that there is no more ground for making an essential distinction between those outward faculties in man and the brute, which compare ideas in order to draw simple inferences, than for making a distinction in kind between their respective powers of remembering. So that, if the brute can remember by his creaturely mind or animal nature, so may he reason, as far as

his limited capacity will enable him to do so, by the same animal nature. I make no reference here, to those higher principles in the human mind, which are far above outward reason; and of which the brute certainly knows nothing.

CHAP. V.

OF THE ACCOMMODATING POWER OF INSTINCT, AND INFERENCES FROM THE FACTS,

In the preceding Chapter, I have spoken of pure Instincts, which act without any instruction, prior to all experience, I have also spoken of the natural senses and their perfection in man and the brutes, as well as of some anomalous acts of the latter exhi bited in their migrations; and have lastly given some examples of the higher qualities in the minds of brutes, which are depending on instruction and education, like human reason. I shall now very briefly notice another train of actions or modified instincts, if they may be so called, in which the brutes, without instruction from man, appear to deviate in some degree from the unerring rule of Instinct, and adapt their conduct to circumstances. Dr. Darwin is very anxious to prove that these deviations arise from a reasoning faculty.

We are told by Adanson, that Rabbits in the island of Sor, near Senegal, do not burrow in the earth;