volence is infeparably connected with the fupreme intelligence all the higher orders of intellectual beings have, probably, higher degrees of it, in the general, and accidental differences, as we call them, being allowed for; and therefore the highest intelligence, the infinite mind, must have it in an infinite degree; and as every degree of benevolence becomes a proportional fource of happiness to the benevolent, fo the infinite benevolence of the Supreme Being is the fame thing with his infinite perfection and happinefs. In like manner, the contemplation of the infinite perfection and happiness of GOD is an inexhaustible treasure of happiness to all his benevolent and devout creatures; and he is infinitely benevolent to them, in giving them fuch faculties, as, by their natural workings, make them take pleasure in this contemplation of his infinite happiness.

Eleventhly, A reafon may be given not only confiftent with the infinite benevolence of GOD, but even arifing from it, why fome doubts and perplexities fhould always attend our inquiries into it, and arguments for it, provided only that we fuppofe our prefent frame to remain fuch as it is for it appears from the frame of our natures, as I fhall fhew hereafter, and was hinted in the laft paragraph, that our ultimate happiness muft confift in the pure and perfect love of GOD; and yet, that, admitting the prefent frame of our natures, our love of GOD can never be made pure and perfect without a previous fear of him. In like manner, we do, and muft, upon our entrance into this world, begin with the idolatry of external things, and, as we advance in it, proceed to the idolatry of ourselves; which yet are infuperable bars to a complete happiness in the love of God. Now, our doubts concerning the divine benevolence teach us to fet a much higher value upon it, when we have found it, or begin to hope that we have;

our fears enhance our hopes, and nafcent love; and all together mortify our love for the world, and our interested concern for ourselves, and particularly that part of it which feeks a complete demonftration of the divine benevolence, and its infinity, from a mere selfish motive; till at last we arrive at an entire annihilation of ourselves, and an absolute acquiefcence and complacence in the will of God, which afford the only full anfwer to all our doubts, and the only radical cure for all our evils and perplexities.

Twelfthly, It is probable, that many good reasons might be given, why the frame of our natures fhould be as it is at prefent, all confiftent with, or even flowing from, the benevolence of the divine nature; and yet ftill that fome fuppofition must be made, in which the fame difficulty would again recur, only in a lefs degree. However, if we fuppofe this to be the cafe, the difficulty of reconciling evil with the goodness of GOD might be diminifhed without limits, in the fame manner as mathematical quantities are exhausted by the terms of an infinite feries. It agrees with this, that as long as any evil remains, this difficulty, which is one fpecies of evil, must remain in a proportional degree; for it would be inconfiftent to fuppofe any one fpecies to vanish before the rest. However, if God be infinitely benevolent, they must all decrease without limits, and confequently this difficulty, as juft now remarked. In the mean time, we must not extend this fuppofition of evil, and of the difficulty of accounting for it, to the whole creation we are no judges of fuch matters; and the fcriptures may, perhaps, be thought rather to intimate, that the mixture of good and evil is peculiar to us, than common to the universe, in the account which they give of the fin of our firft parents, in eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

Thirteenthly, Some light may, perhaps, be caft upon this most difficult fubject of the origin of evil, if we lay down the feveral notions of infinite goodnefs, which offer themselves to the mind, and compare them with one another, and with the appearances of things. Let us fuppofe then, that we may call that infinite benevolence, which makes either,

1. Each individual infinitely happy always. Or, 2. Each individual always finitely happy, without any mixture of mifery, and infinitely fo in its progress through infinite time. Or,

3. Each individual infinitely happy, upon the balance, in its progrefs through infinite time, but with a mixture of mifery. Or,

4. Each individual finitely happy in the course of its existence, whatever that be, but with a mixture of mifery as before; and the universe infinitely happy upon the balance. Or,

5. Some individuals happy and fome miferable upon the balance, finitely or infinitely, and yet fo that there shall be an infinite overplus of happiness in the universe.

All poffible notions of infinite benevolence may, I think, be reduced to fome one of these five; and there are some perfons who think, that the infinity of the divine benevolence may be vindicated upon the laft and lowest of these fuppofitions. Let us confider each particularly.

The firft, viz. That each individual should be always happy infinitely, is not only contrary to the fact at first view, but alfo feems impoffible, as being inconfiftent with the finite nature of the creatures. We reject it therefore as foon as proposed, and do not expect that the divine benevolence fhould be proved infinite in this fenfe. And yet were each individual always finitely happy according to the next fuppofition, we fhould always be inclined to ask

why he had not a greater finite degree of happiness conferred upon him, notwithstanding the manifest abfurdity of fuch a queftion, which muft thus recur again and again for ever.

The fecond fuppofition is that which is most natural as a mere fuppofition. We think that pure berevolence can give nothing but pure happiness, and infinite benevolence muft give infinite happinefs. But it is evidently contrary to the fact, to what we see and feel, and therefore we are forced, though with great unwillingness, to give up this notion alfo. It may, however, be fome comfort to us, that if we could keep this, the fame temper of mind which makes us prefer it to the next, would fuggeft the question, why not more happiness? again and again for ever, as juft now remarked; fo that we fhould not be fatisfied with it, unless our tempers were also altered. This, indeed, would be the cafe, because, as I obferved before, all the fpecieses of evil and imperfection muft vanish together. But then this confideration, by fhewing that the endless recurrency of the question above-mentioned, and the concomitant diffatisfaction, are imperfections in us, fhews, at the fame time, that they are no proper foundation for an objection to the divine benevolence.

The third fuppofition is poffible in itself; but then it can neither be fupported, nor contradicted, by the facts. If there appear an unlimited tendency towards the prevalence of happiness over mifery, this may be fome prefumption for it. But all our judgments, and even conjectures, are confined within a fhort distance from the prefent moment. A divine revelation might give us an affurance of it. And it feems, that this fuppofition is, upon an impartial view, equally eligible and fatisfactory with the foregoing. We estimate every quantity by the balance, by what remains after a fubtraction of its oppofite; and if

this be an allowed authentic method, in the feveral kinds of happiness, why not in happiness confidered in the abstract? But we must not conclude, that this is the genuine notion of the divine benevolence. There may perhaps be fome prefumptions for it, both from reafon and fcripture; but I think none, in the prefent infancy of knowledge, fufficient to ground an opinion upon. However, there feem to be no poffible prefumptions against it; and this may encourage us to fearch both the book of God's word, and that of his works for matter of comfort to ourselves, and argument whereby to reprefent his moral character in the most amiable light.

The fourth fuppofition is one to which many thinking, ferious, benevolent, and pious perfons are now much inclined. All the arguments here used for the divine benevolence, and its infinity, feem to infer it, or, if they favour any of the other fuppofitions, to favour the third, which may be faid to include this fourth. There are alfo many declarations in the fcriptures concerning the goodness, bounty, and mercy of GoD to all his creatures, which can fcarce be interpreted in a lower sense.

As to the fifth fuppofition, therefore it follows, that it is oppofed by the preceding arguments, i. e. by the marks and footsteps of GOD's goodnefs in the creation, and by the declarations of the fcriptures to the fame purpose. However, there are a few paffages of fcripture, from whence fome very learned and devout men still continue to draw this fifth fuppofition; they do alfo endeavour to make this fupfition confiftent with the divine benevolence, by making a farther fuppofition, viz. that of philofophical liberty, as it is called in thefe obfervations, or the power of doing different things, the previous circumftances remaining the fame. And it is highly incumbent upon us to be humble and diffident in the